



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search


Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>



HW HIN7 S

GE
AL
C

9278.26.2



TRANSFERRED
TO
HARVARD COLLEGE
LIBRARY

A COLLEGE MANUAL OF RHETORIC

A COLLEGE MANUAL OF RHETORIC

BY

CHARLES SEARS BALDWIN, A.M., PH.D.
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF RHETORIC IN YALE UNIVERSITY

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

91 AND 93 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK
LONDON AND BOMBAY

1902

9278. 26. 2

✓
July 12, 1905
Harvard University,
Child Memorial Library
Gift of
Barnett Wendell

TRANSFERRED TO
HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY
1940

COPYRIGHT, 1902, BY
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

All rights reserved

Norwood Press
J. S. Cushing & Co. - Berwick & Smith
Norwood Mass. U.S.A.

TO
THOMAS RANDOLPH PRICE

CONTENTS

	PAGE
§§ 1-4. INTRODUCTION AND DIVISION	I

PART I. PROSE COMPOSITION

A. LOGICAL COMPOSITION (*PERSUASION AND EXPOSITION*)

CHAPTER I. §§ 5-48

I. THE ELEMENTS OF LOGICAL COMPOSITION

i. <i>The Composition as a Whole</i>	7
<i>a.</i> as a brief undivided whole	7
1. unity	8
2. coherence	9
3. emphasis	9
<i>b.</i> as a series of paragraphs	10
ii. <i>The Paragraph</i>	12
<i>a.</i> as a whole	12
1. unity	12
2. coherence	13
(<i>a</i>) explicit reference	13
(<i>b</i>) asyndeton	16
3. emphasis	17
(<i>a</i>) of position	17
(<i>b</i>) of space	18
(<i>c</i>) in relation to the coherence of the whole essay	19
<i>b.</i> as a series of sentences	19
1. the number of sentences as determined by paragraph emphasis	19
2. the number of sentences as determined by paragraph coherence	22

	PAGE
iii. <i>The Sentence</i>	23
<i>a.</i> unity	
<i>b.</i> coherence } coördination and subordination	23
<i>c.</i> emphasis	28
1. through the period	28
2. through climax	32
3. through balance	34
4. in relation to the coherence of the whole paragraph	36

CHAPTER II. §§ 49-80

II. EXPOSITION

i. <i>Scope</i>	37
ii. <i>Aim</i>	39
iii. <i>Method</i>	40
<i>a.</i> theoretical (logic)	40
1. division	40
2. definition	43
<i>b.</i> practical (compilation)	44
1. taking notes	44
2. composing notes	50
3. analysis to test the composition	53
(<i>a</i>) summary by paragraphs	53
(<i>b</i>) expository plan	55
iv. <i>Literary Form</i>	57

CHAPTER III. §§ 81-144

III. PERSUASION

i. <i>Scope</i>	60
ii. <i>Argument</i>	64
<i>a.</i> the tabulation of proof	64
<i>b.</i> the logic of proof	74
1. deduction	76
(<i>a</i>) argument from antecedent probability	76
(<i>b</i>) syllogism	77
(<i>c</i>) enthymeme	77

CONTENTS

ix

	PAGE
2. induction	78
(a) Mill's canons	78
(b) working rules for ordinary induction	82
(c) circumstantial evidence	82
3. analogy	84
c. degrees of proof	86
d. refutation	94
1. refutation of premises	94
2. refutation of inferences (fallacies)	96
3. burden of proof	100
4. methods of refutation	101
e. the preparation of proof	104
1. analysis <i>a priori</i>	104
2. analysis <i>a posteriori</i>	109
(a) testimony as to fact	111
3. composition	114
(a) working plan	114
(b) essential parts	115
(c) formal parts	116
(d) division for debate	117
(e) emphasis	120
(f) coherence	122
iii. <i>Literary Forms</i>	125

B. LITERARY COMPOSITION (NARRATION AND DESCRIPTION)

CHAPTER IV. §§ 145-152

I. THE ELEMENTS OF LITERARY COMPOSITION

i. <i>Unity</i>	129
a. as arising from personal selection	131
b. as felt in singleness of impression	133
ii. <i>Coherence</i>	133
a. the technic of transitions	134
iii. <i>Emphasis</i>	136
a. subordination	136
b. variety	136

CHAPTER V. §§ 153-181

II. NARRATION

	PAGE
i. <i>Character</i>	139
<i>a.</i> dominance of one main character (unity, emphasis)	141
<i>b.</i> development of character (coherence as consistency)	143
<i>c.</i> dialogue	144
ii. <i>Plot</i>	145
<i>a.</i> unity	146
1. through the limiting of time and place	146
(<i>a</i>) the "dramatic unities"	147
2. through the choice of a narrator	147
<i>b.</i> emphasis	148
1. gauged by the issue as climax	148
<i>c.</i> coherence	149
1. movement to the climax	150
2. suspense and solution	151
3. the mode of story compared with the mode of drama	152
4. technical details	153
(<i>a</i>) management of the antecedent action	153
(<i>b</i>) dialogue as a means to rapidity	157
(<i>c</i>) implication of descriptions	160
iii. <i>Literary Forms</i>	162
<i>a.</i> the novel in its two moods	163
1. epic, leading to realism	163
2. romance	163
<i>b.</i> the short-story	169

CHAPTER VI. §§ 182-200

III. DESCRIPTION

i. <i>Definition : the Limits of Description</i>	171
ii. <i>The Details and the Whole (Unity and Emphasis)</i>	174
<i>a.</i> singleness of impression	175
<i>b.</i> value of details for themselves	175
1. as salient	176
2. as characteristic	176
3. as picturesque	178
<i>c.</i> observation for science and observation for art	179

CONTENTS

xi

	PAGE
iii. <i>The Mechanism (Coherence)</i>	180
<i>a.</i> the paring away of explanatory transitions	181
<i>b.</i> the use of outline	182
<i>c.</i> the method by narrative	183
<i>d.</i> the method "by effects"	185
1. Ruskin's "pathetic fallacy"	186
<i>e.</i> the terms (transition to Part II)	188

PART II. PROSE DICTION

CHAPTER VII. §§ 201-237

A. <i>USAGE</i>	193
B. <i>STYLE</i>	198

I. THE PERSONAL USE OF LANGUAGE, OR ORIGINALITY

i. <i>not distortion nor eccentricity</i>	202
ii. <i>but range of vocabulary as basis</i>	205
iii. <i>and individuality in combination as method</i>	206

II. ELEGANCE

i. <i>as opposed to cheapness and vulgarity</i>	208
ii. <i>as opposed to pedantry</i>	209
iii. <i>as choiceness</i>	209
<i>a.</i> especially the choice of words whose connotations are delicate and reserved	209
<i>b.</i> dangers in this pursuit	210

III. DIRECTNESS, OR FORCE

i. <i>the choice of words whose connotations are emotional</i>	213
<i>a.</i> familiar	213
<i>b.</i> concrete and specific	213
(<i>a</i>) figures of speech	214

IV. THE BALANCE OF ELEGANCE AND FORCE IN CLASSIC PROSE	215
--	-----

V. HARMONY

	PAGE
i. <i>euphony</i>	222
ii. <i>prose rhythm</i>	223
iii. <i>other recurrences</i>	228

VI. SINCERITY	230
-------------------------	-----

APPENDIX

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I	235
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II	257
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III	275
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV	299
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V	303
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI	332
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VII	346

LONGER SELECTIONS

I. GIFFORD PINCHOT, TREES IN THE FOREST	363
II. ALICE MEYNELL, SYMMETRY AND INCIDENT	372
III. JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, LITERATURE	383
IV. JOHN MARSHALL, INTERSTATE COMMERCE	402
INDEX	439

PREFACE

THIS has been made a college manual of rhetoric in the conviction that the work now done by good schools should be recognized as a foundation, and in the hope of answering those further needs which give to composition in the vernacular a definite place in college. The more important function of rhetoric as a college study may be defined in a word as that anciently assigned to logic. In becoming applied logic, it has become practically the *organon*. For the mass of college students this seems to remain its more urgent duty. But since we have so extended the term "rhetoric" as to include the whole field of literary composition, this too is staked out here, in order that a student's reading, for himself and for college courses in literature, may be summed up in the main aspects of technic, — in order much more that his practice in this too may have a practical guide. Doubtless the extension of the term has been too long current to be rejected now. At any rate, the thing itself, the practice of literary composition, — whether in a given course it be called rhetoric or literature or simply English, — both has its approved place in college and seems to need a manual. Hence arises the division of Part I into logical composition and literary. The former has its selections for extended study mainly at the back of the book; the latter mainly in the Appendix.

The sequence of principles has been relieved throughout of elaboration and detailed direction by relegating many of the examples and all the notes, references, and exercises to a single appendix, keeping the same section numbers. First, then, is a body of doctrine, mainly for the student; second, a body of apparatus, mainly for the teacher. By this means there was opportunity to make the doctrine simpler and the apparatus fuller. The references are in great part to the ultimate sources. Aristotle, for instance, having been somewhat overlaid by centuries of indirect citation, it seemed worth while to furnish exact reference, and, at important points, full summary. The directions for themes, again, have been made the more explicit because it is often easier for a teacher of limited experience to omit than to divine.

The order of parts, whatever its merit for practice as well as for theory, cannot in any manual be adapted to all cases. Though the order here expresses some years' reflection and experience, the several parts have been made distinct enough to be used in another order. The twofold division of Part I, though it may have some support in De Quincey's "literature of knowledge and literature of power" and in Dr. Gardiner's "literature of thought and literature of feeling," differs from these in dividing, not literature by its effect upon the reader, but composition by the method of the writer. Reached independently in directing actual practice, it is advanced for the judgment of teachers on its practical value.

The debts of any modern writer on rhetoric have accumulated too long to be acknowledged fully. To the detailed citations of the Appendix I may add only the word gratitude for the generous criticism that has saved this book at more than one point from deviation.

My colleagues at Yale, Professor Wells (now of the University of California) and Dr. Taylor, solved some problems of method that we discussed at length together. Professor Wendell of Harvard and Professor Bradley of the University of California were kind enough to review for me in detail the little book that is now enlarged to be Chapter I. I hope the larger book will prove worthy of further counsel. That a preface should not be a list of names prevents me from enumerating those others to whom it is none the less a cordial greeting.

C. S. B.

BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA,
July, 1902.

A COLLEGE MANUAL OF RHETORIC

INTRODUCTION

1. Speech and writing may be considered first and essentially as composition, and then also as the use of separate words, phrases, and clauses. Both considerations are included in the term *rhetoric*; but whereas rhetoric means originally and properly the art of persuasion by public speaking, it is now used more largely to mean the whole art of speech and writing in whatever kind. In this larger sense, as in the narrower, rhetoric may be divided into prose composition, which is the subject of Part I., and prose diction, which is the subject of Part II.

2. Prose composition, again, may be divided into two classes, overlapping, indeed, but broadly distinguishable: composition for business, for those common ends which are the only concern of most men in writing; and composition for pleasure, for that expression of individuality which is the concern of the few and which is the impulse to art. The former, being ultimately determined by logical relations, may be called logical composition; the latter, being controlled less by logical relations than by artistic, may be called literary composition. The progress of logical composition is from proposition to proposition, and may be so measured in summary; the progress of

literary composition has a different measure of its own. The former is covered by the rhetoric of the ancients. For the latter, since they had comparatively little prose composition, except histories, outside of the former, the ancients had no separate body of theory; but since in their principles of the drama verse is not considered as an essential element, some of the fundamental aspects of our second class are developed at length in the ancient poetics. These two classes are not to be thought of as more than convenient abstractions. Business and pleasure are not terms mutually exclusive, nor logic and art. An essay, for example, must be logical to the extent of having a clear and reasonable sequence. It may also be artistic, have literary charm, and the more of this the better. But since the division, on the one hand, that sort of composition which everybody practises and everybody may learn to practise well, and on the other hand, that sort which only the few practise much and only the few have the gift to practise well, it serves as a sound basis for practical discussion.

3. Each of these two classes has one main kind of composition and also a subsidiary kind. The type of the former class, the main business of composition, is persuasion, the winning of assent; but necessarily combined with this, and also appearing separately, is exposition. The type of the latter class is narration, story-telling; but necessarily combined with this, and also appearing sometimes, though not often, separately, is description. Thus beneath all forms of prose lie four kinds of composition, which, though variously combined, are yet profitably distinguishable, practically separate in methods: *persuasion*, the methods of winning assent; *exposition*, the methods of lucid explanation; *narration*,

the methods of conducting a story; *description*, the methods of suggesting mental images corresponding in some degree to scenes beheld or imagined by the writer.

The plan, therefore, is simply this :—

RHETORIC

I. *deals primarily with prose composition,*

A. *both logical composition; i.e.*

1. *persuasion* and

2. *exposition;*

B. *and literary composition; i.e.*

1. *narration* and

2. *description.*

II. *deals also with prose diction.*

4. In both A. and B. the elementary principles are generally applicable to either of the component kinds. Therefore the elements of logical composition are discussed first without distinction of kind, and the particular applications made afterwards, first to exposition, then to persuasion; and so with literary composition. The direct use of rules of construction, whether these rules be compiled from previous treatises or drawn or exemplified from good prose, is confined to revision. Indirectly, sound principles, and even sound rules as to detail, may lead to good habits; but directly they are of no practical use till something, at least, is written. To write by rule, in the sense of pausing to apply rules in the course of composition, is of course futile. In that sense nobody, perhaps, ever wrote by rule. To rewrite by rule is simply to follow the method of progress in any art.

PART I
PROSE COMPOSITION

- A. LOGICAL COMPOSITION**
(PERSUASION AND EXPOSITION)
- B. LITERARY COMPOSITION**
(NARRATION AND DESCRIPTION)

CHAPTER I

THE ELEMENTS OF LOGICAL COMPOSITION

I. THE COMPOSITION AS A WHOLE

a. The Composition considered as a Brief Undivided Whole

5. Composition in any art is guided by three fundamental principles: unity, coherence, emphasis. The principle of unity demands that the whole composition shall show one main purpose and have one main effect, and that every part of it shall harmonize with that purpose and contribute to that effect. Negatively, unity means the exclusion of everything irrelevant or incongruous. In writing it expresses the difference between an accumulation of notes and an essay.

6. Unity appears plainly in the following essay of Bacon:—

OF ADVERSITY

It was a high speech of Seneca (after the manner of the Stoics), *that the good things which belong to prosperity are to be wished; but the good things that belong to adversity are to be admired. Bona rerum secundarum optabilia, adversarum mirabilia.* Certainly if miracles be the command over 5 nature, they appear most in adversity. It is yet a higher speech of his than the other (much too high for a heathen), *It is true greatness to have in one the frailty of a man, and the security of a god. Vere magnum habere fragilitatem*

hominis, securitatem dei. This would have done better in 10
 poesy, where transcendences¹ are more allowed. And the
 poets, indeed, have been busy with it; for it is in effect the
 thing which is figured in that strange fiction of the ancient
 poets, which seemeth not to be without mystery — nay, and
 to have some approach to the state of a Christian; that 15
Hercules, when he went to unbind Prometheus (by whom
 human nature is represented), *sailed the length of the great*
ocean in an earthen pot or pitcher; lively describing Chris-
 tian resolution, that saileth in the frail bark of the flesh
 through the waves of the world. But, to speak in a mean,² 20
 the virtue of prosperity is temperance; the virtue of adver-
 sity is fortitude, which in morals³ is the more heroical
 virtue. Prosperity is the blessing of the Old Testament;
 adversity is the blessing of the New, which carrieth the
 greater benediction and the clearer revelation of God's 25
 favour. Yet even in the Old Testament, if you listen to
 David's harp, you shall hear as many hearse-like airs as
 carols; and the pencil of the Holy Ghost hath laboured
 more in describing the afflictions of Job than the felicities
 of Solomon. Prosperity is not without many fears and 30
 distastes; and adversity is not without comforts and hopes.
 We see in needleworks and embroideries it is more pleasing
 to have a lively work upon a sad and solemn ground, than
 to have a dark and melancholy work upon a lightsome
 ground. Judge therefore of the pleasure of the heart by 35
 the pleasure of the eye. Certainly virtue is like precious
 odours, most fragrant when they are incensed⁴ or crushed;
 for prosperity doth best discover vice, but adversity doth
 best discover virtue.

Here is nothing that does not contribute to the eluci-
 dation of the theme — *The blessings of adversity are*
superior to the blessings of prosperity. To test the unity

¹ hyperboles. ² *i.e.* in plain prose. ³ ethics. ⁴ burned.

of any brief essay, try to sum it up thus in a single sentence. And, in shaping rough notes into an essay, let the first step be to express the theme, not in a topic, as *The Uses of Translations*, but rather in a sentence, as *The use of translations is a hindrance in the acquisition of a language*, or *Some knowledge of a literature may be gained through translations*. Then, by successive modifications of this trial sentence and of the notes, bring the two into harmony.

7. The principle of coherence demands that the composition shall proceed in natural sequence without break or jar, that one thing shall lead to another. This means, of course, that the thoughts must be brought into order. It usually means also that the logical relation between each thought and the preceding shall be, not merely latent, but explicit. In the essay quoted above, the second thought is explicitly connected with the first by the correspondence of phrase: *It was a high speech—It is yet a higher speech*. The transitional phrase, *But to speak in a mean* (line 20), leads naturally to the following summary. But the thought, *Prosperity is not without many fears* (line 30), etc., is brought in abruptly. It is not out of relation, but its relation is not shown. Most students will find it necessary to make a separate revision solely to insure the explicit reference that is so important a part of coherence.

8. The principle of emphasis demands that those parts which elucidate the theme directly shall have prominence of position and of space. Negatively, this means that whatever is merely indirect or subsidiary must be kept subordinate. Now the most prominent position in any piece of writing is the end. Thus of all laws of composition the most familiar is climax. In

10 THE ELEMENTS OF LOGICAL COMPOSITION

the essay above, Bacon closes with a pithy iteration of the theme in a sort of proverb. The reference to the Psalms (line 27) or the figure of embroidery (line 32) would make an ending obviously inferior because those parts are subsidiary. The law of emphasis, then, coincides with the law of unity in keeping uppermost in mind the conclusion.

9. Next to the end the most emphatic place is the beginning. Introduction being often unnecessary in brief essays, a direct statement of the theme, such as that which results from the revision for unity, may often be made in the very first sentence. In any case, wherever the essay begins, with or without introduction, the theme should usually be stated there. Thus many good essays begin and end with the theme.

10. Prominence of position, however, is not more important than prominence of space. In a short essay especially, nothing of indirect bearing should receive more than a few lines. In the essay above, the illustrations from the myth of Hercules and from embroidery are the only ones stated, and these doubtless because neither would have been plain from mere allusion. Mere allusion suffices for the rest, and here appears a due proportion of space. Proportion, in fact, sums up in a word this aspect of the law of emphasis.

b. The Composition considered as a Series of Paragraphs

11. So soon as an essay is developed beyond a certain length, it falls naturally into paragraphs corresponding more or less to some division of the subject into parts. A paragraph¹ is a part which, during the process of

¹ The term *paragraph* is commonly applied also to what are sometimes called "isolated" or "unrelated" paragraphs. Thus a

composition, has defined itself as one distinct stage in the progress of the essay. It is a unit, but a component unit. As a unit it is marked for the eye by indentation,¹ and is governed by the principles of unity, coherence, and emphasis. As a component, being like a link in a chain or a step in a stair, it contains in its first sentence some reference to the preceding paragraph.

12. By expressing the gist of each paragraph in a single sentence, one may reduce an essay to its lowest terms without affecting its coherence. By conceiving, on the other hand, each paragraph amplified into a chapter, one has a graphic idea of what is meant by the development² of a theme. Bacon might easily have presented the extremely concise essay on *Adversity* in more ample form. The ends of the undeveloped paragraphs may be discerned at lines 6, 20, 30.

13. When a part intended for a paragraph is found to occupy only two or three sentences in the first draught, it should probably be incorporated in another paragraph by subordination (compare § 22). If it cannot be subordinated, it should probably be developed more fully or else omitted altogether. In other words, it should be worked in, or worked up, or worked out. For though theoretically a paragraph may be of almost any length, from one sentence up, yet practically paragraphs of only two or three sentences are almost always fragments.

brief editorial is often called a paragraph. In this book the term is used only in the sense defined above.

¹ Since indentation is the accepted indication of a new paragraph, the student is warned never to indent except for that purpose.

² No reference is to be understood here to the actual process of composition.

12 THE ELEMENTS OF LOGICAL COMPOSITION

Their bearing is so indefinite that they are hardly paragraphs at all. They indicate imperfect composition.

14. Again, when the transition from part to part occupies more than one sentence, it is spaced by some authors as a separate paragraph; but the general custom includes it, even if it extend to several sentences, in the following paragraph. The opening of the paragraph is thus regarded as the natural place, not only for announcing the new point, but also for referring to the last point (compare § 11). Occasionally in long essays a transition may seem quite too long to be incorporated, and so may an example or an illustration. As in the preceding section, the distinction by length, though mechanical, is useful; for except in very extended discussions, a transition, an example, an illustration, must be out of proportion unless it can be incorporated.

II. THE PARAGRAPH

a. The Paragraph considered as an Undivided Whole

15. The paragraph is the logical basis of literary form. Since it has been already defined in its main relation, there remains only the application to it of those fundamental principles that govern the whole composition. A paragraph has unity when it can be summed up readily in a single sentence. The subject of a paragraph is a sentence, not a topic. In many paragraphs such a sentence appears at the beginning, or at the end, or in both places; but unity requires only that the reader should be able to sum up, not necessarily that the writer should sum up for him. Note which paragraphs, quoted in the following pages, state their themes, and which merely imply them.

16. The development of a proposition within the limits of paragraph unity defines the idea or enforces it; defines it, as by specification, comparison, contrast, example, illustration; enforces it, as by iteration, proof, summary, or application. By any of these means, or by all, the idea is carried out so far as is demanded by the purpose of the whole essay. The following pages and the appendix have various examples of paragraph development.

17. Coherence in a paragraph demands, first, a logical sequence of sentences. The thought must go steadily forward, not round and round, not back and forth, not by leaping of gaps. Moreover, coherence usually demands, in the second place, the indication of this sequence by words of explicit reference. In the following paragraph the words of explicit reference are printed in italics.

First, the people of the colonies are descendants of Englishmen. *England*, Sir, is a nation which still I hope respects, and formerly adored, her freedom. The colonists emigrated from you when *this* part of your character was most predominant; and they took this bias and direction the moment they parted from your hands. They are *therefore* not only devoted to liberty, but to liberty according to English ideas, and on English principles. Abstract *liberty*, like other mere abstractions, is not to be found. *Liberty* inheres in some sensible object; and every nation has formed to itself some favourite point, which by way of eminence becomes the criterion of their happiness. It happened, you know, Sir, that the great contests for freedom in this country were from the earliest times chiefly upon the question of taxing. Most of the contests in the ancient commonwealths turned primarily on the right of

14 THE ELEMENTS OF LOGICAL COMPOSITION

election of magistrates, or on the balance among the several orders of the State. The question of money was not with them so immediate. *But* in England it was otherwise. On *this point of taxes* the ablest pens and 20 most eloquent tongues have been exercised; the greatest spirits have acted and suffered. In order to give the fullest satisfaction concerning the importance of *this* point, it was not only necessary for those who in argument defended the excellence of the English Constitution to insist 25 on this privilege of granting money as a dry point of fact, and to prove that the right had been acknowledged in ancient parchments and blind usages to reside in a certain body called a House of Commons. They went much *further*; they attempted to prove, and they suc- 30 ceeded, that in theory it ought to be so, from the particular nature of a House of Commons as an immediate representative of the people, whether the old records had delivered this oracle or not. They took infinite pains to inculcate, as a fundamental principle, that in all mon- 35 archies the people must in effect themselves, mediately or immediately, possess the power of granting their own money, or no shadow of liberty could subsist. The colonies draw from you, as with their life-blood, *these* ideas and principles. Their love of liberty, as with you, fixed 40 and attached on *this specific point of taxing*. Liberty might be safe, or might be endangered, in twenty other particulars, without their being much pleased or alarmed. *Here* they felt its pulse; and as they found that beat, they thought themselves sick or sound. I do not say whether 45 they were right or wrong in applying your general arguments to their own case. It is not easy, indeed, to make a monopoly of theorems and corollaries. The fact is that they did *thus* apply those general arguments; and your mode of governing them, whether through lenity or indolence, 50 through wisdom or mistake, confirmed them in the imag-

ination that they, as well as you, had an interest in these common principles. — BURKE: *On Conciliation with America*.

18. On analysis, the logical connection appears to be indicated mainly in three ways: (*a*) by conjunctions, etc.; (*b*) by demonstratives; (*c*) by repetition of important words. With so great a range of choice the student is inexcusable who confines himself to perpetual *and* and *but*. For though Burke's nicety of adjustment is a distinguishing mark of his mastery, some care in adjustment must be taken from the beginning, or there will be small progress in composition. Examine also the following paragraph, and compare § 28.

The situation here contemplated exposes a dreadful ulcer, lurking far down in the depths of human nature. It is not that men generally are summoned to face such awful trials; but potentially, and in shadowy outline, such a trial is moving subterraneously in perhaps all men's 5 natures. Upon the secret mirror of our dreams such a trial is darkly projected, perhaps, to every one of us. That dream so familiar to childhood, of meeting a lion, and, through languishing prostration in hope and the energies of hope, that constant sequel of lying down 10 before the lion, publishes the secret frailty of human nature, reveals its deep-seated falsehood to itself, records its abysmal treachery. Perhaps not one of us escapes that dream; perhaps, as by some sorrowful doom of man, that dream repeats for every one of us, through every 15 generation, the original temptation in Eden. Every one of us, in this dream, has a bait offered to the infirm places of his own individual will; once again a snare is presented for tempting him into captivity to a luxury of ruin; once again, as in aboriginal Paradise, the man falls 20

by his own choice ; again, by infinite iteration, the ancient earth groans to heaven, through her secret caves, over the weakness of her child : " Nature, from her seat, sighing through all her works," again " gives signs of woe that all is lost ;" and again the counter sigh is repeated to the 25 sorrowing heavens for the endless rebellion against God. It is not without probability that in the world of dreams every one of us ratifies for himself the original transgression. In dreams, perhaps under some secret conflict of the midnight sleeper, lighted up to the consciousness at 30 the time, but darkened to the memory as soon as all is finished, each several child of our mysterious race completes for himself the treason of the aboriginal fall. — DE QUINCEY : *The English Mail-Coach*.

19. But observe that by no means all the sentences in the paragraph at § 17 have explicit reference, that some stand in *asyndeton* (*i.e.* without connectives). Moreover, many of these sentences are not less closely connected than the others. Connection they have, but not connectives. Examination will show here the rule that asyndeton occurs : (*a*) when the succeeding sentence is an expansion, iteration, example, or illustration of the preceding — in other words, when the connection is obvious ; (*b*) when, as at line 12, a slight break is intended to mark a wider transition. (Compare § 7.)

20. In the following paragraph, which has asyndeton throughout, observe the effect of abruptness.

But now, on the new system of travelling, iron tubes and boilers have disconnected man's heart from the ministers of his locomotion. Nile nor Trafalgar has power to raise an extra bubble in a steam-kettle. The galvanic cycle is broken up for ever ; man's imperial nature no 5 longer sends itself forward through the electric sensibility

of the horse; the inter-agencies are gone in the mode of communication between the horse and his master, out of which grew so many aspects of sublimity under accidents of mists that hid, or sudden blazes that revealed, of mobs 10 that agitated, or midnight solitudes that awed. Tidings fitted to convulse all nations must henceforwards travel by culinary process; and the trumpet that once announced from afar the laurelled mail, heart-shaking when heard screaming on the wind, and proclaiming itself through the 15 darkness to every village or solitary house on its route, has now given way for ever to the pot-walloppings of the boiler.—DE QUINCEY: *The English Mail-Coach*.

Compare also the second example in § 25.

In revising for coherence, then, look first to the sequence of sentences, then to the indications of that sequence; and, except in the cases noted above, or in the cases where abruptness is desired, avoid asyndeton. (See also § 28.)

21. The principles of emphasis as stated in §§ 8–10 apply without modification to the paragraph. Of the emphasis secured by prominence of position Bacon furnishes a more striking instance in the opening paragraph of his essay on *Ceremonies and Respects*:

He that is only real had need have exceeding great parts of virtue, as the stone has need to be rich that is set without foil. But if a man mark it well, it is in praise and commendation of men as it is in gettings and gains. For the proverb is true that light gains make heavy purses; for light gains come thick, whereas great come but now and then. So it is true that small matters win great commendation, because they are continually in use and note, whereas the occasion of any great virtue cometh but on festivals. Therefore it doth much add to a man's reputation, and is, as Queen Isabella

said, like perpetual letters commendatory, to have good forms.

This is a climax (§§ 40, 41). By withholding the subject till the last sentence it gives also the force of suspense (§ 37).

22. Of the emphasis gained by proper proportion of space an admirable example is the paragraph quoted in § 17. The proposition developed by this paragraph may be stated as follows: *Since the American colonists are descendants of Englishmen, their love of liberty is fixed on this specific point of taxing.* The part concerning English descent, being subsidiary, is compressed within eight lines: the part concerning taxation, being the main point, occupies practically all the rest of the paragraph, forty-four lines. The last sentence, though summing up only this latter part, is skilfully made to close with a reminder ("these *common* principles") of the former.

23. A particular means of paragraph emphasis is parallel construction, the balancing of sentence against sentence. It is most natural in successive expansions or iterations, or in an oratorical cumulation like the following :

Carry the principle on by which you expelled Mr. Wilkes, there is not a man in the House, hardly a man in the nation, who may not be disqualified. That this House should have no power of expulsion is a hard saying. That this House should have a general discretionary power of disqualification is a dangerous saying. That the people should not choose their own representative is a saying that shakes the constitution. That this House should name the representative is a saying which, followed by practice, subverts the constitution.
— BURKE: *Speech on the Middlesex Election.*

This last means of emphasis is somewhat too artificial to be commonly available. On the other hand, the first means, a strong close, is practically always useful; and the second, due proportion of space, is obligatory.

24. Paragraph emphasis is closely related to the coherence of the whole composition. The end of any paragraph ought to show clearly the bearing of that paragraph; *i.e.* its entire meaning as a part of the meaning of the whole essay. Only thus is there easy progress to the next stage. Conversely, the meaning of the whole essay, the conclusion, may determine which part of a roughly drawn paragraph should be made its close. Often the whole progress may be clarified by transposition in a single paragraph. By this means or another, each paragraph must close clearly, or the whole essay is weakened by loose ends (§§ 28, 41).

b. The Paragraph considered as a Series of Sentences

25. A paragraph is commonly defined as a group of sentences with unity of purpose; and though a paragraph is not primarily a group of sentences, yet ultimately it must be considered in this aspect. "In how many sentences shall this paragraph be developed?" is a question, not merely of the extent, but also of the manner, of development.

For my religion, though there be several circumstances that might persuade the world I have none at all, as the general scandal of my profession, the natural course of my studies, the indifferency of my behaviour and discourse in matters of religion,—neither violently defending one, 5 nor with that common ardour and contention opposing another,—yet in despite hereof, I dare, without usurpa-

tion, assume the honourable style of a Christian. Not that I merely owe this title to the font, my education, or the clime wherein I was born, as being bred up either to confirm those principles my parents instilled into my unwary understanding, or by a general consent proceed in the religion of my country: but having in my riper years and confirmed judgment seen and examined all, I find myself obliged, by the principles of grace and the law of mine own reason, to embrace no other name but this. Neither doth herein my zeal so far make me forget the general charity I owe unto humanity as rather to hate than pity Turks, infidels, and (what is worse) Jews; rather contenting myself to enjoy that happy style than maligning those who refuse so glorious a title. — SIR THOMAS BROWNE: *Religio Medici*.

What is the hardest task in the world? To think. I would put myself in the attitude to look in the eye an abstract truth, and I cannot. I blench and withdraw on this side and on that. I seem to know what he meant who said, No man can see God face to face and live. For example, a man explores the basis of civil government. Let him intend his mind without respite, without rest, in one direction. His best heed long time avails him nothing. Yet thoughts are flitting before him. We all but apprehend, we dimly forebode the truth. We say, I will walk abroad, and the truth will take form and clearness to me. We go forth, but cannot find it. It seems as if we needed only the stillness and composed attitude of the library to seize the thought. But we come in, and are as far from it as at first. Then, in a moment and unannounced, the truth appears. A certain wandering light appears, and is the distinction, the principle, we wanted. But the oracle comes because we had previously laid siege to the shrine. It seems as if the law of the intellect resembled that law

of nature by which we now inspire, now expire the breath ; by which the heart now draws in, then hurls out the blood, — the law of undulation. So you must labour with your brains, and now you must forbear your activity and see 45 what the great Soul showeth. — EMERSON : *Intellect*.¹

Compare the difference between these paragraphs in number of words with the difference in number of sentences.

26. Apparently the question is, Long sentences or short ? And the answer is twofold. First, as a matter of logic, a given statement is left as an independent sentence or is combined in the same sentence with other statements according as it is coördinate or subordinate. Logically, then, the question becomes, Should this statement receive the prominence of a separate sentence, or should it be reduced to a clause or a phrase ? Does it bear on the subject of the paragraph directly ; or does it bear indirectly, through its relation to a neighbouring statement ? In the former case, being independent, it is a sentence ; in the latter, being dependent, it is a clause. This is the logic of paragraph emphasis. And since practice in reducing to clauses statements written carelessly as sentences is a direct means of overcoming a habit of redundancies, it is clear that attention to paragraph emphasis is a large part of conciseness.

27. In the second place, as a matter of rhetoric, the succession of sentences in the first paragraph is smooth, in the second paragraph abrupt. And the difference, though it lies partly in explicit reference, lies mainly in the predominance of long or of short sentences. A paragraph of long sentences, then, has the advantage

¹ Quoted in Carpenter's *Exercises in Rhetoric and English Composition* in this connection.

over a paragraph of short sentences in a nicer subordination and an easier flow. But it will not do to think of a paragraph as limited to one or the other. Each has its purpose, and both are necessary to variety. Moreover, since monotony of style means monotony in sentence-forms, variety in length is an end in itself.

28. Again, it is evident from §§ 17–20 that a paragraph is a group of sentences when we consider its coherence. But paragraph coherence affects even the form of the sentences, by what Professor Genung calls “inversion for adjustment”; for paragraph coherence has the same dependence on sentence emphasis as the coherence of the whole essay has on paragraph emphasis (§§ 24, 41). A striking example of this is the following oratorical paragraph :

But the age of chivalry is gone. That of sophisters, œconomists, and calculators, has succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguished forever. Never, never more, shall we behold that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud submission, that dignified obedience, that subordination of the heart, which kept alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom. The unbought grace of life, the cheap defence of nations, the nurse of manly sentiment and heroic enterprise, is gone! It is gone, that sensibility of principle, that chastity of honour, which felt a stain like a wound, which inspired courage while it mitigated ferocity, which ennobled whatever it touched, and under which vice itself lost half its evil, by losing all its grossness. — BURKE: *Reflections on the Revolution in France*.

It should be added, first, that such inversions, besides contributing to paragraph coherence, contribute also, like the exclamatory and interrogative forms, to empha-

sis and variety; secondly, that inversion, exclamation, interrogation, all three must be regarded as exceptional. The frequent use of these devices makes style laboured and pompous.

The length of a sentence, then, and its form are to be decided, not absolutely for the sentence itself, but relatively to the paragraph.

III. THE SENTENCE

29. In English every statement is punctuated as a sentence unless it be definitely subordinated to some other statement as a dependent clause, or coördinated as an equal member. It is not technically incorrect to write —

The tide was rising; so we ran,
though punctuation by comma —

The tide was rising, so we ran,
can hardly be defended; but, however punctuated, in effect those seven words make two sentences —

The tide was rising. So we ran.

For the two statements are left independent, side by side. Read aloud, all three forms have exactly the same effect on a hearer. Not punctuation, but only a definite subordination will make them one sentence —

We ran because the tide was rising,
or, better,

Since the tide was rising, we ran.

To run two sentences together, even when both, as above, are short and custom admits a semicolon, shows a feeble grasp of both paragraph (§ 24) and sentence.

24 THE ELEMENTS OF LOGICAL COMPOSITION

It is much grosser to punctuate a clause as if it were a sentence. Until these two converse errors are eradicated, nothing further can be done. No one can revise for sentence unity until he recognizes the unit.

30. Except in that it is easier to unify a short sentence than a long one, the length of a sentence has nothing to do with its unity. Above are seven words not in unity, and at lines 22–29 in the paragraph at § 17 are seventy words entirely in unity. Besides, the length of a sentence depends, partly upon the exigencies of the individual thought, partly upon the emphasis of the whole paragraph (§ 26). Length, then, is not the test, but relevance, the bearing of the modifiers on the main part. In the following sentence the modifiers move steadily away from the main part:

In this uneasy state Cicero was oppressed by a new and cruel affliction, the death of his daughter Tullia, which happened soon after her divorce from Dolabella, whose manners and humours were entirely disagreeable to her.

The remedy here is simple. Cast out the irrelevant modifiers. If they are not worthy the dignity of separate sentences, suppress them altogether. In general, beware of the *House-that-Jack-built* sentence.

31. But the trouble is deeper. Wherein lies the absurdity of the following sentence?

I turned to reply, when the platform on which I was standing gave way with a crash.

Here the writer may be taken to represent himself as unmoved in the midst of disaster :

When the platform on which I was standing gave way with a crash, I turned to reply.

The sentence is logically upside down, the main thought being expressed as subordinate, the subordinate thought as main. This corrected, the sentence is at once logical.

When I turned to reply, the platform on which I was standing gave way with a crash.

The following sentence has the same fault, but the remedy is to cut the sentence in two :

Vasco da Gama first doubled Cape Colony, and later, in 1652, the Dutch came and made settlements there, when England, always anxious for new territory, seized all South Africa, with the attending results of six wars with the natives and with a mixture of natives and Dutch settlers.

In a word, a complex sentence must have only one main part, and that part must be expressed as the main clause.

32. In compound sentences, where there is no one main part, unity demands that there shall be real co-ordination, that the members shall be coequal parts of one main idea. Unity appears in the balanced sentences at §§ 45, 46. Compare also § 41. Most of the compound sentences that violate unity, except such as make merely irrelevant additions with *and*, do so because they violate coherence.

In revising sentences for unity, then :

- (1) See that the punctuation tells the truth.
- (2) See that the main thought is in the main clause, not in some modifier.
- (3) See that the modifiers are relevant.
- (4) See that the members of compound sentences are really coördinate parts of one idea.

33. Coherence in a sentence is primarily correctness in syntax, and, as such, is hardly matter of rhetoric; and, conversely, almost all solecisms are but forms of what the Greeks called *anacoluthon* (incoherence.) Thus *different than* puts a conjunction after a word logically followed by a preposition; thus the so-called hanging participle is a construction left unfinished; thus *and which* tries to make a clause at once coördinate and subordinate; and so of faults in correlation and in the sequence of tenses.¹ But coherence in a sentence is also matter of logic. The legend in open electric cars —

Avoid danger. Keep your seats till the car stops,
or

Avoid danger and keep your seats, etc.,
is illogical. The weakness of the former will appear on reference to § 26. Substantially the same is the error of the latter. The writer has made two requests where he meant to make one. He has written as coördinate a clause that is clearly subordinate. He means —

To avoid danger, keep your seats, etc.

The connecting thus by the coördinating conjunction *and* or *but* of two statements that are not coördinate is one of the commonest, as it is one of the gravest, phases of incoherence. The remedy is to be found not so much in the avoidance of *and* and *but* as in educating oneself to distinguish readily what is subordinate from what is coördinate. In brief, avoid illogical compound sentences.

34. Thus unity and coherence unite in demanding that the sentence adhere throughout to one plan. But,

¹ See Appendix.

furthermore, that plan must at every point be clear. Failure in this may almost always be traced to one of three kinds of error: (a) undue ellipsis, (b) faulty reference, (c) faulty placing of modifiers.

(a) undue ellipsis.

Cardinal Richelieu hated Buckingham as sincerely as the Spaniard Olivares (ellipsis of the verb).

Daudet is nearer Trollope than Dickens (ellipsis of the preposition).

Even to-day many people are found who could not be induced to sit down in a party of thirteen at table, in the dread that one of the number would die within a short time, or would surely faint if a white cat were to enter the house (ellipsis of the relative).

(b) faulty reference.

If a man has done an Indian a wrong, his only safety lies in killing him (ambiguity of personal pronouns).

So on the third day he rode over a long bridge, and there started upon him a passing foul churl, and he smote his horse on the nose so that he turned about and asked him why he rode over that bridge without his license (ambiguity of personal pronouns. Compare (c)).

Black Death was the name given to an Oriental plague marked by inflammatory boils which in the fourteenth century desolated the world (ambiguity of the relative pronoun. Compare (c)).

(c) faulty placing of modifiers.

They are separated from the class to which they belonged *in consequence of their crimes*.

Though we are all *by no means* connoisseurs, yet we all go to exhibitions, not because it is the fashion, but because we think it elevates our minds.

In this chapter is seen the master of Thornfield led about like a child *crushed in attempting to save his wife* who perished in the flames she had created.

35. Blunders of these types have given rise to the following cautions :

(1) A given pronoun must refer throughout a given sentence exclusively and unmistakably to one antecedent.

(2) The position of any modifier should be next to the word it modifies, or as near as possible. Negatives and the words *only*, *merely*, *hardly*, etc., demand especial attention.

(3) Non-restrictive ("coördinate") relative clauses are always set off by commas, restrictive clauses never.

36. The unity and coherence of a sentence being properly matters of grammar, under emphasis is included all that may strictly be called the rhetoric of the sentence, the rules, that is, of effective form. For most effective sentence-forms are applications of the rule (§§ 8, 9) concerning prominence of position. Of all such forms two stand as types, the *period* and the *climax*. A third, the *balance*, though not logically distinct from the two former, is so marked as to deserve separate treatment. None of these terms, in fact, is exclusive of the others; but each marks a model of construction.

37. *The periodic sentence, or period*, keeps its construction incomplete up to the end. It closes grammatically with the last word, not before. In general, that suspension of the sense which is characteristic of the period is accomplished (*a*) by putting all the modifiers before the main part, or (*b*) by the use of correlatives and other words of suspense, or (*c*) by a combination of these methods.

(a)

Apart from such an assertion, or such a result, I myself am little aware of the pace. — DE QUINCEY: *The English Mail-Coach*.

Such now being at that time the usages of mail-coaches, what was to be done by us of young Oxford? — *ibid.*

Many a stern republican, after gorging himself with a full feast of admiration of the Grecian commonwealths and of our true Saxon constitution, and discharging all the splendid bile of his virtuous indignation on King John and King James, sits down perfectly satisfied to the coarsest work and homeliest job of the day he lives in. — BURKE: *Thoughts on the Present Discontents*.

An influence which operated without noise and without violence; an influence which converted the very antagonist into the instrument of power; which contained in itself a perpetual principle of growth and renovation; and which the distresses and the prosperity of the country equally tended to augment, — was an admirable substitute for a prerogative that, being only the offspring of antiquated prejudices, had moulded in its original stamina irresistible principles of decay and dissolution. — *ibid.*

Compare the first sentence in the paragraph quoted at § 25.

(b) (c)

This doctrine, as applied to the prince now on the British throne, *either* is nonsense, and therefore neither true nor false, *or* it affirms a most unfounded, dangerous, illegal, and unconstitutional position. — BURKE: *Reflections on the Revolution in France*.

Yet have I not *so* shaken hands with those desperate resolutions who had rather venture at large their decayed bottom,

than bring her in to be new trimmed at the dock, who had rather promiscuously retain all than abridge any, and obstinately be what they are than what they have been, *as* to stand in diameter and swords' point with them. — SIR THOMAS BROWNE: *Religio Medici*.

The little cany carriage — *partly*, perhaps, from the violent torsion of the wheels in its recent movement, *partly* from the thundering blow we had given to it — as if it sympathized with human horror, was all alive with tremblings and shiverings. — DE QUINCEY: *The English Mail-Coach*.

Some twenty or more years before I matriculated at Oxford, Mr. Palmer, at that time M.P. for Bath, had accomplished *two* things, very hard to do on our little planet the Earth, however cheap they may be held by eccentric people in comets — he had invented mail-coaches, and he had married the daughter of a duke. — *ibid.*

Among them, *indeed*, I saw some of known rank, some of shining talents; but of any practical experience in the state, not one man was to be found. — BURKE: *Reflections on the Revolution in France*.

38. The main characteristics of this periodic form are four:

(1) It is usually more formal than the unperiodic sentence.

(2) It tends toward unity, the suspense tending to force out irrelevant modifiers.

(3) It tends toward coherence.

(4) It is decidedly emphatic, both because the main part comes at the close and because the suspense stimulates the mind to receive the close with attention. (Compare the periodic paragraph from Bacon quoted in § 21.) Naturally, therefore, it has been a favourite form with all great orators. Moreover, Herbert Spencer explicitly

maintains that by presenting the whole idea at once to the mind, instead of building it up bit by bit as the unperiodic sentence does, the period secures the greatest economy of attention.

39. In all these respects, except the single one of formality, the unperiodic sentence seems inferior. But formality is hardly to be sought, and most certainly to be sought is variety (§ 27). Therefore no one is free to use the period exclusively, even if he would. Besides, *unperiodic*, being only a negative, needs further elucidation.

We frequently hear the habit of reading lauded highly and the acquiring of it recommended, to the young in particular, usually in very general terms, as if its advantages were truths so self-evident that no one would think of denying them, very much indeed as we hear religion praised, or industry, no matter to what applied, or any other of what are considered the safeguards of society.

The weakness of this sentence lies in the fact that it sounds, in great part, like a succession of after-thoughts. Instead of receiving a definitely formulated idea, the reader feels as if he were called on to assist at the process of formulation. The successive modifiers call for successive revisions of the original statement. Few styles are more tiresome or more irritating than one in which such sentences are habitual.

He sent a life of Milton to the Edinburgh Review, and contributed several articles to that magazine up to the time he entered Parliament, where he made himself immediately famous as an orator.

This sentence violates emphasis by violating unity.

In Western cities the theatres are open on Sunday, but in New York Sunday entertainments of that class are confined

principally to so-called sacred concerts, although it is doubtful what selections that are played could be rightly termed sacred music.

Here the writer evidently has not even decided which is his main idea.

40. All three sentences above violate the principle of emphasis ; all are typical of the danger of the unperiodic sentence, the danger of mere aggregation. But in the following unperiodic sentence the principle of emphasis is just as evidently observed as in the period :

In such a people the haughtiness of domination combines with the spirit of freedom, fortifies it, and renders it invincible. — BURKE : *On Conciliation with America*.

Equally emphatic are the unperiodic sentences in the paragraph quoted from the same author at § 28. Sentences in which, as in these, the parts succeed in ascending scale are said to have *climax*.

41. Climax, moreover, does not mean merely that the succeeding clauses have stronger and stronger words. The climax in the following is gained by such successive expansions of the thought as make it grow in significance while one reads :

Such preëminently is Shakespeare among ourselves ; such preëminently Virgil among the Latins ; such in their degree are all those writers who in every nation go by the name of Classics. — NEWMAN : *Literature*.

A sentence has climax when there is a logical advance from clause to clause up to the point of the sentence. Both the following sentences exemplify this, and at the same time, by the way in which the first leads up to the second, show how sentence emphasis is involved in paragraph coherence (§ 28).

And what that energy, which is the life of genius, above everything demands and insists upon, is freedom; entire independence of all authority, prescription, and routine,—the fullest room to expand as it will. Therefore a nation whose chief spiritual characteristic is energy will not be very apt to set up, in intellectual matters, a fixed standard, an authority, like an academy.—MATTHEW ARNOLD: *The Literary Influence of Academies*.

42. Periodic, or unperiodic? then, in so far as the question concerns the single sentence, not the whole paragraph, should be answered with an eye to certain maxims:

(1) Either form may be good or bad.

(2) The period is more stimulating to closeness of thought, in the reader and in the writer.

(3) A short period is more commonly useful than a long one. The short period, in fact, might be called the most useful of sentence-forms.

(4) The unperiodic sentence has often a more direct, a more conversational effect.

(5) The unperiodic sentence is emphatic in proportion as it has climax.

43. So far only one position of emphasis has been considered, the end. The beginning is also emphatic, but not in the same degree as the beginning of a paragraph. For the fact that most English sentences, on account of the lack of inflections in English and the consequent dependence of clearness upon the order of words (§ 34 c), begin with the subject, detracts somewhat from the emphasis of the subject in this position. Conversely, some other part of the sentence, not so naturally expected in that position, receives emphasis at the beginning:

At Sens, thirty miles away to the west, a place of far graver aspect, the name of Jean Cousin denotes a more chastened temper, even in these sumptuous decorations. — PATER: *Imaginary Portraits*.

44. Observe also that additional emphasis is thrown upon the opening phrase of the sentence above by the break that follows. Even the subject may be emphasized in this position by a following parenthesis :

The Cecils, we suspect, did their best to spread this opinion by whispers and insinuations. — MACAULAY: *Francis Bacon*.

Strangers, meanwhile, were less unjust to the young barrister than his nearest kinsman had been. — *ibid.*

It should be remembered, however, that the beginning of any sentence, being the natural place for explicit reference (§ 17), is subject to the needs of paragraph coherence.

45. The term *balance*, as applied to sentences, is self-defining (compare § 23). Balance to a certain extent is required of all sentences (§ 33 and Appendix). In all ordinary collocations symmetry has been made a part of correctness. Lapses in this jar upon the ear. And such sentences as the following, though they cannot be called incorrect, have the same effect of discord :

The Roman Catholic goes to Mass and devotes the rest of the day to pleasure, while the Protestant goes to church and rests the remainder of the day.

One feels that the two contrasted statements should be alike in form, that in form as in substance they should be halves of one whole. Developed more highly, this desire for balance has led to many memorable sentences :

When his imagination wells up, it overflows in ornament ; when his heart is touched, it thrills along his verse. — NEWMAN : *Literature*.

The power of French literature is in its prose writers ; the power of English literature is in its poets. — MATTHEW ARNOLD : *The Literary Influence of Academies*.

46. Here the sentence is cast in halves. This, technically speaking, is the balanced sentence, as distinguished from such sentences as contain balance incidentally. It is a natural means of heightening contrasts. Where the effect of correspondence is heightened by repetition, the balance approaches epigram :

The party whose principles afforded him no guarantee would be attached to him by interest : the party whose interests he attacked would be restrained from insurrection by principle. — MACAULAY : *History of England*.

To make us love our country, our country ought to be lovely. — BURKE : *Reflections on the Revolution in France*.

It was dangerous to trust the sincerity of Augustus : to seem to distrust it was still more dangerous. — GIBBON : *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*.

47. The last example has the inverted balance called by the Greeks *chiasmus*. It is hardly necessary to point out that the English sentence is not flexible to such forms. Even simple balance easily conveys in English an impression of artificiality hardly felt in the more flexible Greek and Latin. For this reason, and on account of the obvious monotony of a series of balanced sentences, the form has in English a limited use. But, though limited, its use is very distinct and very great. Pithy summaries, especially such as ap-

proach epigram, are much heightened by the balance ; and, in general, it is an admirable mould for emphatic compound sentences.

48. In sum, the principle of emphasis, applied to sentences, generally means in revising so to transpose a sentence as to put at the end that word which is most important both for the force of the sentence itself and for connection with the next sentence. Whatever form thus makes the main word stand out is for that place a good form ; and conversely every good sentence form — period, climax, balance — is good, not in itself, but in so far as it suits a particular place (§ 28).

CHAPTER II

EXPOSITION

I. SCOPE

49. Exposition includes all kinds of lucid explanation ; but its object is always to make a given audience understand a given subject. Thus it succeeds only if it is quite clear. It should usually be interesting, too, but clear it must be. An expositor is, for the time and the subject, a teacher. He has taken the bearings of his subject and his audience. Gauging his limits of time also, he makes such division and definition as can within those limits be readily comprehended and remembered. Thus his synthesis is based on painstaking analysis, and leads, if may be, to one main point, which is the conclusion.

50. The object of exposition is always the essence, the gist, the underlying principle. In this is its difference from description. Description suggests, stimulates the imagination by the specific and the concrete, presents always the individual; exposition explains, uses the specific and concrete only to analyze their significance, seeks always some generalization. Kipling's story of "007" describes a locomotive; to expound one would be to show how the principle of the pump is applied to traction. What does this subject mean? asks the expositor. What is it in its essence, its scope, its import, its difference from such and such other things to

which it has some likeness? How shall I make it stand out clearly for itself?

52. Again, the mood of exposition is dispassionate, unprejudiced, uncontroversial. In this is its difference from argument. Argument, of course, cannot go on without exposition, but exposition can go on without argument. Equally of course exposition may be a cover for argument; that is, argument may be carried on, throughout or in part, in the form of exposition. This is rather trick than sound art; but it is not objectionable on the score of mingling the two kinds, since the two kinds cannot be sharply distinguished. It remains true, however, that exposition free from argument, whether in an essay ostensibly expository or in that subsidiary exposition which is necessary in persuasion (§§ 3, 136), commands the greater respect. Moreover, in developing a faculty of criticism it is most useful to study pure exposition, rigidly excluding argument; in a word, to set forth what is, without turning aside to what should be.

53. This distinction from the other kinds of writing with which it is often combined does not imply that exposition must be bare, cold, impersonal. Bare, cold, impersonal, it may be, indeed, and still be worthy, as in a text-book of physics; but it need not be, and in such expository essays as most of us write it should not be. For a listless reader will not take pains to understand; and, on the other side, the significance of a subject will be the more readily found by the writer for whom that significance has some real interest. So, in detail, the abundance of example and illustration which makes Macaulay's essays popular is a direct means to clearness. Else the same means would not be used so

freely by Huxley also, and by Tyndall, and proverbially by the most effective teachers and preachers. In this and in other ways the transpiring of the writer's personality makes the exposition better. The only caution necessary is not to forget the prime object, which is to reach significant generalizations and to reach them clearly.

54. Thus the exposition which, besides being readiest to hand, is most obviously instructive and interesting is exposition based on personal experience. For this everybody of any observation has at least a small fund. Whether it be of racing sloops or of beetles or of electric traction or of local politics or of lumbering, almost every intelligent man has some special knowledge accumulated by a special interest. Within this field he can expound freely without book. But it is not the only field open to originality. Exposition based on reading may be just as original and otherwise just as profitable to the writer as exposition based on personal experience. In either case the material is not usually new. Only the very few expound what they themselves have discovered or invented. Discovery, invention, are rare; exposition is necessarily common. Exposition, therefore, deals commonly with material already known, even with material already explored and classified. Yet though its facts are not new, its result may be original. Original, indeed, it is whenever a writer gives to facts, however often they may have been presented, his own grouping and interpretation.

II. AIM

55. This kind of writing is at once directly educative in college and directly useful outside. Originality of

discovery, as in science, originality of creation, as in art, are for most men equally impossible; but originality of compilation, the power to read facts, to analyze, collate, combine them, to give them promptly such direction as shall unfold their significance, according to each writer's view of the significance, is a mastery hardly to be shirked by any educated man. To energize knowledge is the office of persuasion; but to realize knowledge comes first, and that is the office of exposition. In college and in the world the man that can give out with most clearness and largest suggestion of relations what he has taken in shows most grasp. That is the aim of exposition.

56. Specifically, then, exposition means the succinct and orderly setting forth of some piece of knowledge, whether the knowledge come from one's own observation, from the regular course of his studies, or from the reading of his predilection. It means a luminous report of conditions in track athletics, debating, local or national or foreign politics, rapid transit, the contemporary stage; a concise explanation of Greek tragedy, the turbine wheel, the Roman legion, the feudal system; a criticism of a book, a tendency in art, a salient character or period in history. The range is wide; the aim and use are single. For the aim of all exposition is, without waste of words, clearness; its use is to develop, in analysis and synthesis, grasp.

III. METHOD

a. Theoretical

1. *Division*

57. Grasp here means power in grouping facts, in seeing their bearings, in expressing their gist. To

take the bearings of a subject is essentially what is known in logic as *division*, separation into component parts. For scientific treatment and for argument, division must be complete; *i.e.* must take account of all the parts. Division in this sense is scientific classification. Thus Gray divides surgical anatomy into osteology, articulations, muscles and fasciæ, arteries, veins, nervous system, etc. No conclusions concerning surgical anatomy could be based on a division that failed to take account of all its components. No conclusions concerning the nervous system as a whole could ignore any part of that system. But ordinary exposition, especially in brief essays, does not aim at scientific completeness, nor at scientific conclusions. Its very subjects, being commonly those that bear on human nature or human life, are not readily susceptible of scientific treatment. And even when the subject may be so treated, no one shall say that it must be.

Religious "conversion" has been analyzed by the science of psychology. The statistics thus collected and the resulting division into groups according to temperament cannot be ignored by any subsequent discussion that aims at scientific conclusions. But that division does not preclude another division for another purpose. Wishing to explain that "conversion" is something, whether fact or idea, ingrained in the American mind, I may divide my treatment into: (1) the familiarly recurrent mention of it in talk, (2) its cruder manifestations among negroes, and how far these are essentially like those among educated whites, (3) whether it is usually regarded as a test, and of what, (4) why I never heard of it in France, (5) etc. My essay will not be scientific. Neither will it be unscientific; it will not ignore any phase that seems to bear on my purpose; for my purpose my

division is complete. Science hardly enters ; division in this aspect is purely a matter of rhetoric.

Thus the kind of division sought by popular exposition, that is by brief essays for ordinary readers, is such as shall present a subject, or any definite part of a subject, most clearly to a particular audience. This kind of division is complete when it omits nothing that affects its purpose.

58. Two other rules of logic concerning division enter more largely into popular exposition ; for they are both safeguards against confusion. The first is that the parts into which a subject is divided must be mutually exclusive, must not overlap. The second is that the division must be according to one principle, that there must be no "cross-division."

The importance of these will appear in two very obvious violations. Suppose I divide *disease* into (1) diseases of the nervous system, (2) fevers, (3) diseases of the intestines, etc. Here I at once muddle the matter instead of clarifying it ; for typhoid might be put under both (2) and (3) and perhaps also under (1). Suppose again I divide the American people into Republicans, Democrats, Socialists, Imperialists, Catholics, etc. Here I start to divide by party, proceed to divide by political theory, and then by religion. No educated man is likely to lapse so far ; but many less obvious cases of confusion are due to violation of these same rules.

Logic says, It is prudent to begin, if possible, by a twofold division ; *i.e.* by separating into two mutually exclusive parts, each afterwards to be subdivided : rhetoric says, Scrutinize every division to make sure that it really divides ; and remember that the object of exposition is to simplify.

2. Definition

59. The other fundamental process of exposition is *definition*. Essentially definition is what we all learned of it in geometry; *i.e.* the giving of *genus* and *differentia*, the class to which a thing belongs and the peculiarities that separate it from other members of the same class.

(a) A cube is a (*genus*) polyedron (*differentia*) bounded by six equal squares.

(b) A cathedral is a (*genus*) church (*differentia*) in which a bishop has his seat.

(c) Faith is (*genus*) certitude (*differentia*) with respect to matters in which verification is unattainable.

Long or short, every definition has these two parts.

60. Thus it is plain, especially from example (c), that definition is the result of a process of generalization. After much consideration *faith* is assigned to the class *certitude*. So "*second-sight*" might be relegated by some expositor to the class *hallucination*, or *Kalmucks* to the class *Tartars*; and another expositor might reach a different generalization, might read the reported facts differently. Two considerations follow:

(1) Definition and division go together; it is hard to generalize without classifying, or to classify without generalizing.

(2) Generalizing leads often to argument; for concerning the interpretation of facts there is often difference of opinion. Therefore no one may insist on his generalization without proving it; but anybody, of course, may suggest one.

61. A definition can rarely be left with a single proposition, however luminous. A single proposition

may, usually should, sum up the whole result ; but it will not make the result clear by itself. Either before or after this summary, or both before and after, there must be enough development and iteration to impress it clearly on the particular audience. This is the process outlined at § 16 and exemplified in the corresponding section of the Appendix. In a wider sense, then, definition implies almost all the processes of exposition.

b. Practical (Compilation)

1. Taking Notes

62. Division and definition comprise the logic, or theory, of exposition. Practically, luminous division and definition are reached, more often than in any other way, through skilful compilation, — compilation that engages, not only the industry of the compiler, but also his intelligence. The object set forth at the beginning of this chapter is to gain grasp in grouping and in interpretation. Whatever writing involves this is composition, and therefore profitable ; whatever writing does not involve grouping is beneath the attention of educated men. Practically this means that every exposition drawn from reading must, in order to be worth while, have more than one source of information. An essay drawn from one source is at worst mere reproduction, like the dictation in primary schools ; at best it is a digest, summarizing point by point. Summary is good elementary exercise, but it is not composition. How to compose material from several books so that the result shall be original and the composition valuable as practice, is of common, everyday concern ; in other words, how to compile.

63. First, cite always; quote rarely; use phrase without quotation never. This last counsel ought to be superfluous; but from a confusion of too copious notes even educated people will make half-conscious borrowings; and until this habit is broken nothing can be learned. Instead, then, of transcribing a passage to a note-book, note the point as briefly as possible, and the volume and page. This saves time, cultivates reflection, fixes the habit, necessary in all serious exposition, of systematic reference. Facts are not copyrighted; but unless a writer is accepted as himself an authority, he is expected to tell where he found them. Form, that is order, grouping, is private property, copyrighted, not to be reproduced without paying royalty, not worth reproducing anyway, since the whole point of writing at all is thereby lost. Phrase is as strictly private as its maker's purse. It may, of course, be quoted, with citation as of fact; but frequent quotation is tiresome and unprofitable. Use without quotation is theft.

64. Secondly, distinguish between fact and opinion and scrutinize generalizations. Facts are the material of exposition, as generalization is a large part of its object. "Chivalry is the spiritual product of feudalism." That sentence has nothing for the compiler's note-book, since it is at once an opinion and a generalization. If it seem suggestive or doubtful, it may be worth a note of query; as — *chivalry essentially spiritual?* or — *chivalry limited to the feudal period?* This distinguishing of fact from opinion is the first approach alike to the critical attitude in reading and to independence in writing.

65. Thus compilation begins by rejection, exclusion, and so it proceeds. Beginning with an undefined idea

of writing on the Greek drama, it narrows the subject to Greek Tragedy, then to the Presentation of a Greek Tragedy, or The Dramatic Unities in Greek Tragedy; that is, its first care is to take bearings for the purpose of limiting the theme. Limiting the consideration of the Roman legion to the Roman legion as a military engine, it rejects all the successive stages by which the legion developed historically, confines research to the period of the legion's prime, and seeks information mainly as to the characteristic manipular formation and the system of encampment. (See Appendix.) It is a false industry that heaps up notes for the waste-paper basket, that takes notes instead of thinking, that reads a whole book for the sake of two pertinent chapters. In reading for style, for literature, there must be no skipping; in reading for facts, skipping is the only reasonable method.

66. So in reading for style, for literature, better one book in a given time than six; in reading for facts, in compilation, better six books than one. Indeed, as has been already pointed out, there must be more than one source or there is no composition. The ability to collect much in little time is a practical skill, and comes by practice; but it may be learned more quickly by holding to a few proved maxims. First of all, practise putting the question. Putting the question is in general the way to limit the theme. Now that I have read this brief survey, how much of the subject can I presumably handle in my limits? That point settled, what parts of the material may I justly omit? Where may I be general; where must I be specific? To expound the theory of the Church held by Gregory the Great, shall I read much on Gregory's personality? Thus the lines of research are laid in advance; and, even when

they have to be changed afterwards, there is a great saving of time.

67. Putting the question is also the way to go on, ought to be repeated at each stage of the research. What ground is now covered, and what remains to investigate? Does the division still seem sound, hitting the main points for comprehension by this audience? What definition emerges? Can the whole be simplified by a definition to be carried out in every part? The feudal system was a system of land-tenure, of rent. For intelligent workmen that definition will serve to keep together somewhat various aspects, will simplify the parts and unify the whole. A steam-engine is a pump. Any boy can grasp that. The heroic figures of earlier literature, Achilles, Siegfried, Roland, Launcelot, may be ranged in two classes, epic heroes and romantic heroes; and this division, for an audience of some reading, is an illumination. Such definition and division never come from reading alone; they come from analysis, from questioning the material to test old groupings or find new ones, from reflection in the time gained by knowing what one is looking for. Of course, the ability thus to question unclassified facts of nature is a faculty of the scientific mind, the mark of Darwin; but in lower degree and in material already explored it is a habit quite attainable by patient practice.

68. For the first answers to such questions, the first stages of research, especially for tentative research to limit a theme about which the compiler knows little, it is best to use the most compendious accounts available. Sometimes a good atlas will give the bearings figuratively as well as literally; and usually the start may be made from a gazetteer, a compend of universal history,

a dictionary of biography, or a compendious cyclopædia. First of all, then, learn by trial what are the standard books of reference and the scope of each. In all libraries these books are ranged within easy access, and familiarity with them is the first lesson of research.

From books of reference one may usually learn also what are the standard works, the authorities, and perhaps something of their comparative values. Some books of reference are solely for this purpose, as Adams's *Manual of Historical Literature*. By habitual use of these means one acquires despatch and accuracy.

69. From Poole's *Index to Periodical Literature* and its supplements it is easy to make a superficial compilation, quite difficult to make one of much solidity. For though this manual is quite invaluable, and in certain cases the only guide available, it cannot be used to advantage except by a compiler already somewhat expert in discriminating between what is well authenticated and what is random or irresponsible or written solely for entertainment. Moreover, though the material of Poole's Index is often attractively handy, it is so miscellaneous that even a compiler of some skill loses, in appraising it item by item, far more time than he has gained at the start. In most cases, Poole's Index is proper, not for rapid research and brief presentation, but for exhaustive research and very detailed presentation. And in every case the beginnings of research and the acquisition of skill are had best through books, not magazines.

70. Despatch in consulting books is skill, not haste. Indeed, it begins rather in that stopping to think, in that questioning attitude, which is the attitude of research. Gibbon's habit of considering before he read

a book what it would probably contribute to his purpose, and what not, is the habit of all expert compilers. Certain books, ostensibly on the subject, they know would merely waste their time. This is no divination. It comes from long practice in rejecting a book on its preface or index, or in passing from these to another book instead. And even a beginner, when he reads to answer questions made more and more definite at every stage, omits whole paragraphs, sections, chapters. It is more difficult, but no less worth learning, to catch the drift of a paragraph from its beginning before reading it by sentences. In general, if one is strict in determining what he is looking for, he will learn quickly how to omit.

71. And as one learns to omit in reading, so he learns to take few notes and to take them under heads, subdividing as he goes on. To this end small slips or cards or a small note-book from which the leaves can be detached are the most suitable; for the arranging of the notes in order may then be done, in great part, mechanically and without waste of time. This system may be carried to the extent of noting each fact and its corresponding citation on a separate slip, that any change in order may be made by mere shuffling. By whatever mechanical process, the point is to cut down the mechanical labour of writing out the raw material, setting it in order, and, as is almost always necessary, revising the order. There is no one way best for everybody; each man should determine what best saves time for him. But in general the working division should be simple. A detailed plan (§ 77) is better as a test of the first draught, as a means of revision, than as a guide in construction. A detailed plan, in fact, is less like

the builder's plan of a church than like the guide-book plan, made after the church is finished, to exhibit its proportions. The working plan of an essay may be not even written out, but merely by pondering over systematic notes, fixed in the writer's mind. In sum, let plan save work for the writer as well as for the reader.

2. *Composing Notes*

72. The development from a simple working plan, the "amplification," as it is sometimes called, has been exemplified in detail in the Appendix. The actual process is matter less for rules of rhetoric than for the experiment of the student. The result, the rough draught written out in full, is tested in revision, of course, by the cardinal principles, unity, emphasis, coherence, and also by adaptability to a particular audience. This last, indeed, during the earlier stages of composition, may well be thought of more explicitly than the other tests. Even a perfunctory college essay should be written, always so far as may be, as a lecture to a boy's club, or a report to the Commissioner of Highways or to a meeting of students, or an open letter to a newspaper, or an article for a certain magazine, or for some other definite purpose and audience.

73. Two additional counsels as to order, however, are of general importance. The first is negative, Avoid the order of chronology: the second is positive, Keep in mind the leading of a reader from what he knows already, step by step, to your end; *i.e.* expound inductively. The order of chronology is to be avoided, if for no other reason, because being commonly the order of one's sources of information, it gives little, if any, chance for composition. But further, the clearest way

to expound the turbine wheel in six paragraphs is not by narrating the successive experiments through which it was perfected ; the clearest way to expound the feudal system within the same limits is not to trace its development from stage to stage. If I wish to understand the presentation of a Greek tragedy, I ought, indeed, to hear of its religious origin ; but instead of hearing in order of the rustic festivals, then of Thespis, then of Phrynichus, and so down the years, I should have the matter analyzed into its elements, combined in such order as is most fit for my degree of education, and, if possible, brought to a conclusion on the main point for me to remember. Again, the meaning of a man's life — and what is an essay in biography for, if not to draw out something of that? — is not presented effectively by chronological summary. The chronological summary of a man's life is of all composition for students perhaps the most futile. The dictionaries of biography have done that already ; they have done it, in most cases, better ; and they make no pretence of giving more than the materials of composition. What of it? remains to be asked at the end ; and if the student begin there, not rewriting the annals, but seeking throughout the characteristic traits, the typical activities, the expression of individuality, he will find no better practice. Thus not only the reader, but far more the writer, gains by the abandoning of the order of chronology.

The same reasons made unprofitable almost all expositions of processes, as of manufacture. In both cases the objection lies against an order fixed beforehand. Of course it is not always necessary to make a new division ; but generally what precludes a new division will also preclude originality of treatment.

74. The inductive way of exposition is rather an attitude of mind than a method. It is knowing where to take hold so that the reader can certainly follow, and how fast to go on—or, conversely, where to pause, to “dwell on a point.” Further, it is a realization of the force of logical sequence as always a means of clearness and sometimes amounting to demonstration. Logical sequence, indeed, is a measure of the force of exposition. In proportion as the subject is unfolded, not merely point by point, as it were by catalogue, but step by step, each paragraph following as if necessarily from the preceding, and giving a wider view, the exposition gives grasp to the reader and shows grasp in the writer. In some subjects, indeed, the order of presentation does not seem vital. The exposition of the life of trees in Selection I (which is only one chapter of a larger whole) shows comparatively little logical progress, and yet is entirely clear. Again, the strong and vital order of parts in Selection IV might suggest that logical progress belongs rather to argument than to exposition. But though it is possible sometimes to expound clearly without logical progress, and though such progress is more important in argument, yet it remains true that most expositions gain thereby in clearness and that any exposition gains in force.

75. Logical sequence necessarily implies a conclusion, a goal. In argument the conclusion is invariable; it is always the proposition to be established. In exposition the conclusion varies with the writer. According to his limitation of the field and his interpretation of the material he sets his own goal. This goal is not, as in argument, something to be proved, but something to be remembered by the reader as the gist of the whole

matter or the most important point, the main bearing or the application. A sufficient expository conclusion may be found in a mere summary; but the best exposition usually ends at the top of an ascending scale. (For the means of indicating sequence see §§ 17-20; for the relation between the sequence of the whole and the emphasis of each paragraph, § 24.)

3. *Analysis to Test the Composition*

76. Logical sequence being so important to the force of exposition, there is no better beginning for the revision of the first draught than the summary of each paragraph in a sentence. This immediately tests the coherence of the whole and the unity of each paragraph, and no other means makes more directly or more simply for logical structure. A summary by topics (*i.e.* by single words or phrases) makes no such test. On the contrary, it leaves room for rambling and looseness. The subject of a paragraph being a sentence (§ 15), only a sentence can test either the unity of a paragraph or its bearing on the rest of the essay.

SYMMETRY AND INCIDENT

(Summary of Selection II by paragraphs)

- I. Japanese art, in spite of its great influence on our own art, is essentially alien.
- II. Its influence on all forms of art has been to sacrifice symmetry to incident.
- III. In ornament the Japanese consistently evade symmetry.
- IV. In composition they substitute for symmetry position.

- V. Its influence on etching in particular shows its unessential character, for it makes etching ephemeral.
- VI. Japanese landscape fails to satisfy permanently because it is intent on perpetual slight disorder.
- VII. So Japanese representation of men and women is intent on perpetual slight deformity.
- VIII. In Japanese caricature this is patent to every one.
- IX. But our bodies reveal symmetry as one of their abiding principles.
- X. Thus not Japan but Greece, not incident but symmetry, presents the more perdurable relation.

77. The summary by paragraphs also gives some view of the proportions ; but that end is served more directly by an entirely different system, set forth by Professor Lamont¹ and called by him the *expository plan*. The paragraph is the logical basis of composition ; the expository plan has nothing immediately to do with composition. It is an exercise in analysis, and particularly an exhibition of emphasis, *i.e.* of the bearing of subordinate parts. The essence of the expository plan is to exhibit by a system of notation (1) the points of an essay irrespective of its paragraphs, (2) the immediate and the ultimate relations of every point. In a word, the expository plan gives a complete tabular view of the division (§ 57). Coördination is indicated by like signs. Thus the main parts of an essay may be marked A, B, C, etc. Subordination is indicated by change of signs, as by (*a*) under B, or (1) under (*a*).

¹ In the introduction to *Specimens of Exposition*, New York, Henry Holt & Co.

SYMMETRY AND INCIDENT

(Expository Plan of Selection II)

Japanese art is alien,

- A. though it has affected all the arts of the west ;
 - 1. It appears in the passing of music from the symmetry of melody to the isolation of the *leit motif*.
 - 2. It appears also in domestic architecture.
 - 3. It appears also in "irregular" metres.
 - 4. It appears also in portraits,
 - (a) which show the Japanese exaggeration of major emphasis.
 - (b) and have the expectancy of aspens rather than the tranquillity of oaks.
- B. for it is primarily not symmetrical ;
 - 1. In ornament it evades symmetry.
 - (a) In general it avoids the repetition and counter-change habitual in Greek and Gothic.
 - (b) In diaper patterns, where repetition is necessary, it has recourse to interruption.
 - x. etc., etc.
 - 2. In composition it substitutes for symmetry position,
 - (a) on the principle of Italian scales,
 - (b) intervals counting like rests in music,
 - x. the spaces being just so wide.
- C. then it is bent, not on the permanent, but on the transitory ;
 - 1. as appears in its influence on etching,
 - (a) the transitoriness of printed paper exaggerating that of painted paper.
 - 2. as appears in its landscapes,
 - (a) which have no eye for distances and greatness,
 - (b) which seek, not slight novelty, but slight disorder,

- x.* as if a man should carry home a crooked stone instead of seeing the moon,
- y.* typically in their painting of waves.
- (1) etc., etc.

D. and finally it belies the human form.

1. Japanese figure-painting is intent upon perpetual slight deformity.

(*a*) This is not merely a misconception arising from our lack of sympathy.

x. Though we may fail to recognize their standard of human beauty, we can see that they do not try to present that standard,

(1) except here and there, as in the case of a warrior.

(*b*) Their figures are evidently grotesque and derisive.

x. They find humour in a man with his head "beneath his shoulders";

(1) With us this is humorous only to a child, and to him only in a drawing, not in life.

y. and this humour is without purpose of satire,

(1) the artist seeming freely equal with his hideous models,

(2) though of course there is satire in Japanese caricature.

2. But the exterior symmetry of the body is an abiding principle of human life,

(*a*) in spite of the internal asymmetry,

x. man being Greek without and Japanese within.

(*b*) in spite of its perpetual inflection

x. in attitude and motion.

(1) of work, war, and pastime.

IV. LITERARY FORM

78. Though exposition may of course appear in almost any literary form, it is roughly commensurate with what by common consent is called the essay. The collected essays of Matthew Arnold, Pater, or Macaulay, for instance, are substantially expository, and so in lighter vein are those of Augustine Birrell, or Robert Louis Stevenson, or Agnes Repplier. Most of these are essays in criticism of art, literary or musical or graphic; but equally essays, and even more strictly expository, are Huxley's or Tyndall's, on natural phenomena and their laws, and many essays in history or politics, as Froude's or Gladstone's. Widely as these differ in tone and method, — and it is easy by extending the list to show even greater variety, — they have enough in common to show that the peculiar literary form of exposition is the essay.

79. Some longer expository works, such as Symonds's or Pater's on the Renaissance, are substantially series of essays. A few, notably Bacon's *Advancement of Learning*, are single, the whole work being a progressive unity. Most histories, especially recent histories,¹ give exposition large place. Whether the whole method of a history is rather expository or rather narrative depends on the temper and purpose of the author. In either case almost any history has whole sections of pure exposition, as Green's chapter on the Puritans, or Mommson's on the Græco-Italian stock. But as in histories it is often difficult to decide whether a given part should be called narration or exposition, so it is equally diffi-

¹ The earlier English histories, from the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle to Clarendon, are almost pure narrative; and so, to a great degree, is McMaster's *History of the People of the United States*.

cult and equally unprofitable to determine in other cases between exposition and description. True, the typically narrative and descriptive appear more naturally in fiction, and the description in a novel is typically different from the description in an essay; but in general the kinds of composition do not correspond exactly to the forms of literature, and they do not stand alone. An essay in history may be both narrative and expository, and descriptive as well. The point for the student of exposition is simply to subordinate description and narration to his expository end.

Thus a report, as of a survey or an exploration, though it necessarily contains description, is measured by its effect as exposition. Thus again a review of a book or a play, though it usually sums up the plot, is measured by its force and justice as an appreciation. In critical appreciations of art, as in literature, or of life, as of characters or tendencies in history, most students should find opportunity to work, not only at first hand, that is by their own interpretations, but also in real forms, that is in forms existing outside of the class-room.

80. On the other hand, as narration and description are freely used to fortify exposition, so exposition, both in literature and in common use, constantly subserves argument. In fact, exposition is very commonly but a part (§ 136) or a means of proof. We explain a situation in order to show that it should be alleviated. Possible and profitable as it is merely to set forth the facts and their significance (§ 52), the significance is so often matter of dispute or concern — else we might not have chosen the subject — that we more commonly go on to urge our convictions and assail the convictions of others. Tyndall's essay on the meteoric theory of the sun's

heat consists mainly of exposition ; but its purpose is argumentative. Stevenson's *A Foot-note to History* is concerned, not merely with explaining Samoa to the civilized world, but with getting by that means justice from the civilized world for Samoa. It is necessary to distinguish the two kinds clearly ; to keep them separate would be sometimes a superfluous care. For after all, the commonest use and need of exposition is as a means to persuasion.

CHAPTER III

PERSUASION

I. THE SCOPE OF PERSUASION

81. Persuasion is that kind of composition which seeks to win assent. It is trying to make you believe, or even act, as I wish. It is an appeal from person to person. Thus it is of all kinds the most direct. Exposition is properly impersonal, dispassionate; persuasion may be passionate and is always personal. The image of persuasion is Peter the Hermit preaching the first Crusade.

82. Persuasion includes all that the ancients meant by rhetoric (§§ 1, 2). As the fine art of composition reached its height for them in the drama and was expounded in Aristotle's *Poetic*, so the useful art of composition was summed up in the orator and had its system of rhetoric. Rhetoric is literally the art of the orator, the art of public speaking. That the word is applied to-day more commonly to writing shows a change in the way of the world; that many principles of the ancient rhetoric, and these the most important, are still current, shows the change to be merely in the accidents, not in the substance of the art. The practical end of composition is still persuasion. That we persuade now largely by print is an important change; but it only modifies, not abrogates, the ancient rhetoric.

83. Persuasion, then, is the field of rhetoric in its

original signification and, in a wide sense, its final signification. For the common concern with words is to win assent and action. That is the concern of the orator and of the commercial traveller. In this sense rhetoric can never cease to be practical. Oratory may be decaying, as we often hear; but though we may be dubious concerning legislatures, there are no signs of decay in pleading at the bar, nor in that pure form of oratory, the sermon. As for the supplanting newspaper, whatever else it may be, it is essentially persuasion. The difference between speech and print is largely a difference of force, a difference of degree rather than of kind. The living voice of Macaulay was much greater than the printed words of his speeches, and the living voice is usually stronger; but Burke was far stronger in print, and Stevenson's *Father Damien*, which is a printed letter, moved men wherever it went. Small modifications in detail have not disturbed the tradition of rhetoric.

84. The appeal for assent, which is persuasion, is to feeling or to reason. About the feelings and appeals to them tradition speaks in general terms and by maxims; and the modern science of psychology has not yet brought much that is more specific. As in general the best equipment for the business of persuasion is knowledge of human nature, so on each particular occasion the force of appeal depends on the gauging of the audience. That is, persuasion is partly the winning of sympathy. But there is no art of human nature, nor any science. The guides to knowledge of the feelings take us but a little way. Skill in these matters is quite simply sagacity, coming only by experience.

It must never be forgotten, however, that the engaging of the feelings, at least to the extent of keeping the interest of the whole audience, is a practical necessity. For the strongest evidence remains inoperative without a man's pushing of it home. Since the mere enunciation of truths is not persuasion, a speaker to his fellow-men must not permit himself to be listless. What is popularly called magnetism, though it proceeds sometimes—always, perhaps, when it is at its strongest—from inborn gift, yet seems to some degree attainable by deliberate effort. At least it may be roughly analyzed into two elements. The first, the prerequisite, is wishing people to listen. Without that no speaker should expect any result. The audience will most certainly care no more than you care yourself. The second—and this is more properly what is meant by magnetism—is forcing people to listen. It consists (*a*) in watching individuals, in speaking, not to the mass, but to the man in the sixth row and the woman by the pillar, in looking at them, making them look at you. If you have the inborn gift of the Ancient Mariner, they cannot choose but hear; if not, you must take measures to recall anybody's wandering at once. Thus (*b*) a broken current of attention may often be reëstablished by a change of tone; either (1) a physical change of voice, as by inflection to break monotony, or (2) a change of intellectual tone, as by illustration, question, or dialogue. If some people still remain apathetic, you may as a last resort (*c*) make direct appeal, sometimes even to these particular people. Obviously this must be a last resort, for it is implicitly a confession of weakness. But by all means people must listen. Obviously also no one can command an audience if he is not already in command of his matter and order. First, then, grasp your speech entirely; then devote yourself entirely to the individuals of your audience. Given something worth saying, failures to secure attention are due not so often to lack of natural eloquence as to indolence. Most intelligent men can gain

power in persuasion if, both before they speak and while they speak, they will work hard enough.

85. Another obvious means of persuasion lies not only beyond art but above speech, the persuasion of personality. This stands first in Aristotle's scientific division, and rightly. What made men renounce the world to seek misery with that young Sicilian who was afterwards called St. Francis of Assisi? Daniel Webster once stood in Faneuil Hall and said: "Gentlemen, I am a Whig, a Constitutional Whig, a Faneuil Hall Whig; and, if you break up the Whig party, where am I to go?"

"But," says Wendell Phillips, "if he had been five feet, three—"

That cry of Felix, "With but little persuasion thou wouldst fain make *me* a Christian," suggests an amazing influence of the speaker's personality, as St. Paul implies in his famous rejoinder. But all this amounts practically to the truism that much depends on what is called the speaker's presence. A man whose presence is an impediment would better confine his persuasion to writing; and, on the other hand, no writing can transmit the power of a great speech by a great speaker.

86. But that division into appeal to feeling and appeal to reason is somewhat misleading. We are not so crudely twofold that it is easy to find feeling without reason, or reason without feeling. Pure reason is rather a notion than a fact of human nature; and all great orators have acted accordingly. Feeling, again, hardly ever has way among civilized people without at least some show of reason. Even Mark Antony's speech to

the mob is at least in form argumentative. At any rate, the distinction between address to the feelings (in which the imagination is usually included by implication) and address to the reason, is impracticable; for in most persuasion the two have always been inextricably commingled.

87. It is sometimes said that the object of persuasion is action; the object of argument, conviction. But conviction is not sought for itself, except in exercises purely academic; it is sought only as a means of persuasion. Outside of pure science, how many pieces are there of pure conviction without intent to persuade? Certainly the aim of argument is to convince; but it is not an ultimate aim, nor gained by a process sharply distinct in practice from that other, the appeal to feeling. Feeling and reason are appealed to, not separately, but together; and all the means of appeal are included in the idea of persuasion. Thus argument is not something distinct from persuasion; it is a part of persuasion.

88. Still, whereas the appeal to feeling seems to reject analysis, or at any rate analysis that can be made a useful basis for practice, appeal to reason, argument, has been analyzed fully. Thus almost all the doctrine of persuasion is concerned with the methods and processes of argument.

II. ARGUMENT

a. The Tabulation of Proof

89. Argument is the giving of reasons in support of a proposition. The word is both general and particular; that is, it may mean either one reason for a proposition or a whole body of reasons taken together. Its

end, its conclusion, is a proposition, and it proceeds always by propositions. It is impossible to argue a term, such as *Filipinos*, *free trade*, *State control of railways*. There must always be a sentence: *The Filipinos are uncivilized. The United States should adopt free trade. Railways should be owned and operated by the State.* That is, there must always be an explicit statement of fact or judgment, or there can be no end to the argument.

90. But any giving of reasons for a proposition, however informal, is argument. In fact, most argument is informal.

You ought to study medicine in New York, where the greatest professors are and the best hospitals, not in this small city just because this would be cheaper. Don't be "penny wise and pound foolish."

Here is an everyday argument. What it amounts to, and what its relations are, is shown best by setting down the reasons under the proposition thus:

Proposition. — You ought to study medicine in New York.

Reason 1. New York has better professors.

Reason 2. New York has better hospitals.

Reason 3. That New York would cost more is not a sufficient objection.

Reason for 3. (a) The ultimate gain would make the present expense cheap.

Of this argument two points are positive or direct, and the third negative or indirect (*i.e.* argument by refutation of the other side). Observe in the analysis that *a* bears the same relation to 3, as 3 to the proposition; *i.e.* it is a reason of a reason. This method of tabulation is of great practical service.

Suppose now an argument on the other side.

I don't need to be told that the New York hospitals are the best; but a man can't get more than so much experience in two years, and there is enough here to keep me busy. As to professors, they are not better in New York; they are only better known. Smith here knows all there is to know about anatomy, and he will give me more of his time than any professor in New York can ever give to any single man in those large classes. Besides, I can't go to New York without borrowing of father. If I stay here, I shall be independent; and he'd like to have me stay, though he wouldn't refuse me the money to go.

By the same system of tabular analysis this arranges itself as follows:

I ought not to study medicine in New York.

1. The fact that New York hospitals are better is not important.
 - a. The hospital here will give me all the experience I can assimilate in two years.
2. The assertion that the New York professors are better is not true in the sense in which the word is used.
 - a. Though they are more eminent, they know no more about their subjects.
 - x. Professor Smith here knows all anatomy.
 - b. Even if they did know more, they could teach any given man rather less than more.
 - x. The size of the class precludes much attention to the individual.
3. The "penny wise, pound foolish" proverb is not in point.
 - a. I could not go to New York without borrowing money.
 - b. By borrowing I should sacrifice my independence.

- c.* By borrowing I should impose on my father's generosity.
- 4. It would please my father better, if I didn't.

Here, as often in debate, the reply consists almost exclusively of refutation.

But suppose the first speaker persists in his contention, reviewing the case, and adding new arguments to the following effect:

You ought to study medicine in New York.

- 1. New York has better teaching.
 - a.* It is admitted that the professors are more eminent.
 - b.* It is only fair to presume that the reputation of a great school demands, and its endowments secure, the best teaching.
 - c.* The argument that the professors are merely more eminent, without having more knowledge, is fallacious.
 - x.* Eminence makes superiority highly probable.
 - (1) An undeserved name cannot be held long in the competition of a great city.
 - y.* The instance of Professor Smith, who "knows all there is to know about anatomy," is not sufficient.
 - (1) It is only one case.
 - (2) The contention assumes that the science of anatomy is complete, finished forever; and this is not true.
 - (3) The other branches of study are still more subject to the revision of recent investigations.

PERSUASION

- a. Physiology is yearly made more exact.
 - b. Therapeutics undergo perpetual revision.
 - c. Even the *materia medica* is not fixed.
- (4) Only the large schools benefit by recent discoveries at once.
- d. The advantage of the small school, that the professors can give more time to the individual student, is overbalanced by the advantages of the large school.
 - x. It is admitted that the lectures in the large school are at least equal.
 - y. The teaching of the individual student is carried on more thoroughly by the "quizzes" of the large school than by the professor in the small school.
 - z. The appliances of the large school, as models, charts, specimens, and especially dissecting rooms, are superior.
2. New York has better hospitals.
 - a. The New York hospitals offer far greater variety for clinics.
 - b. The New York hospitals show the latest methods in both medicine and surgery.
 - c. The assertion that a man may learn all he can hold from two years in any hospital is fallacious.
 - x. If it means that the student cannot profit by variety and by superior methods, it is untrue.
 - y. It ignores the superior opportunity for appointment to a city hospital after graduation.
3. The lack of present funds is not a sufficient bar.
 - a. It is admitted that money can be borrowed.

- b. The argument for independence is fallacious.
 - x. Independence thus gained might be but temporary.
 - y. Permanent independence is promised more quickly by superior training.
 - z. It is open to you to borrow at interest.
- 4. The present gratification of your father is not a strong argument.
 - a. Your father would rather forego present gratification for the future gratification of greater good to you.
 - x. This appears in his willingness to advance you money for New York.
 - b. Your father has the comfort of your younger brothers.
 - c. The experience of your elder brother shows this.
 - x. Your father has repeatedly expressed his satisfaction at your elder brother's going to New York to study engineering.
 - y. Your brother spent nearly as much time in the company of his family during vacations as he could have spent if he had studied at home.

91. Here, set down in formal analysis,¹ is the elaboration of the previous simple arguments. The definiteness evidently necessitated by such analysis makes it

¹ This system of analysis was devised by Professor George P. Baker of Harvard University. It was published first in his *Specimens of Argumentation* (New York, Henry Holt & Co.), elaborated and fully explained in his *Principles of Argumentation* (Boston, Ginn & Co.), to which the student is referred as to the most important contribution of our time to the teaching of argumentation. I wish to express my thanks for the permission to apply here what some years of experience have shown to be an essential method.

constantly serviceable as a test. As a test it is further serviceable in determining the exact bearing of every part. Thus it is seen to be essentially the same as the expository plan (§ 77). But whereas in the expository plan the minor parts may stand in any relation to the major parts (as of example or illustration or exception), in the argumentative plan the relation is always the same—the relation of proof. Each part must be a direct reason for the part next above; and conversely, when a part will not so stand, it is seen to be either out of place or fallacious.

Thus in drawing up an argumentative plan, first state the proposition so as to express the issue definitely and also fairly to both sides; secondly, set down each supporting proposition under the proposition that it directly supports. If, for the argument above, the proposition had been put, *The New York schools of medicine are superior*, a large part of the argument would have been fighting the air; for that was not the whole issue. And again, if the argument from superior appliances had been made major instead of minor (*e*, instead of *x* under *d*), it would have been found not coördinate with *a*, *b*, *c*, and *d*.

The typical use of this system of analysis is to test or exhibit the purely logical relations of part to part in a finished written argument. Incidentally it is also very useful in detail, to test a doubtful bearing, or sum up the progress made at any stage of research; but the complete plan of the whole argument is best made after the first draught of the whole is finished (§ 135). Drawn up then, it serves as a guide in revision, especially of emphasis, and, when it has itself been revised to correspond to the final draught, as a chart for the reader. Like the "expository plan" (§ 77), it is independent

of paragraphs, as of all other literary considerations. It must be drawn up throughout in sentences or it ceases to be a test; and it may relieve the written speech by carrying in the margin all the citations. With such full citation it may also be used very profitably as a separate exercise, either for a brief to be submitted as a preliminary to formal debate, or, with no view to composition, spoken or written, simply to exhibit or preserve the fruits of research—as it were to map out a survey.

ANALYSIS OF SELECTION IV. INTERSTATE COMMERCE

92. Analysis of the Opinion of the Supreme Court in the Case of Gibbons *versus* Ogden, given by Chief Justice Marshall.

PROPOSITION

The judgment of the lower court is repugnant to that clause of the Constitution which authorizes Congress to regulate commerce among the states; i.e., *The Steamship Bellona has the right to carry passengers and freight between Elizabethtown, in New Jersey, and New York.*

INTRODUCTION

[The state of New York granted, for a term of years, an exclusive right to Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton to navigate the waters of that state with boats moved by steam; and from them Ogden derived the right. Gibbons having established two steamboats on the waters between Elizabethtown, New Jersey, and the city of New York, Ogden obtained an injunction against him; and upon the hearing of the case in the Court of Chancery in New York, the defence of Gibbons, which was that his boats were regularly licensed as coasters under the laws of Congress, was overruled, and the injunction made perpetual. Gibbons took the case to the Court of Errors, which affirmed the

decree in chancery; and as that was the highest state tribunal, he now brought it, on a writ of error, to the Supreme Court. The opinion of the Supreme Court was given by Chief Justice Marshall.]¹

I

The facts are not in dispute; this is purely a question of right.

2

The appellant pleads that his United States license confers on him the right set forth in the proposition.

3

The respondent pleads that the right conferred by the United States license is not broad enough to cover the case.

a. The state of New York is competent to regulate, as in this case she has done by charter, navigation from New Jersey into New York harbour.

4

The issue, then, is between the United States license and the state charter, *i.e.*, between the federal power and the state power.

PROOF

- A. The relations of the states to the federal government are to be determined only by the Constitution.
 - 1. Their previous status was changed by the adoption of the Constitution.
 - 2. No other consideration is determining.

¹ Quoted, with slight changes, from *The Writings of John Marshall upon the Federal Constitution*, Boston, 1839, page 287. See the head-note to Selection IV.

- B. The interpretation of the Constitution is not *a priori* limited to "strict construction."
 - C. The constitutional power of Congress to regulate commerce includes navigation from one state into another.
 - 1. It includes navigation.
 - 2. It includes navigation from state to state.
 - D. The constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is exclusive.
 - 1. The parallels urged to the contrary are not sufficient to show the recognition by Congress of a concurrent power of a state to regulate interstate commerce.
 - a. The power of a state to tax is not in point.
 - x. It is not analogous.
 - y. It does not imply concurrent right.
 - b. The power of a state to make inspection laws is not a power to regulate commerce.
 - c. The act of 1803 concerning the importation of slaves is evidently no more than an exception for a limited period.
 - d. The act of 1789 concerning pilots, etc., does not imply a concurrent power in the several states.
 - e. The right to construct lighthouses, if it proves anything, proves too much.
 - 2. The words *to regulate* imply exclusive regulation.
 - 3. Even assuming a concurrent power in the several states, any exercise of that power which contravenes the exercise of the power of Congress is *ipso facto* null and void.
 - E. The exercise of this constitutional power by Congress in granting a license confers on steam vessels so licensed a right to pursue the coasting trade between ports in different states.
93. In drawing up an analysis of this sort, remember:
(1) that the "introduction," being essentially distinct

from the proof, should be strictly expository, not argumentative. Corresponding to the "statement" in a lawyer's brief, it should be simply a clear and concise exposition of the issue, avoiding what is not accepted by both sides and any terms that imply prejudice (§ 52).

(2) that since this system of analysis is essentially to put every proposition *over* the grounds for it by saying

A is B

for *c* is *d*

the word *therefore* can never be used; for it would reverse the order to

c is *d*

Therefore A is B

The two forms are equally logical; but one or the other must be used exclusively, and the former is much the more practicable.

(3) that a large number of major divisions suggests imperfect analysis, the need of better grouping; for in such cases the major divisions are usually found to be not all coördinate.

5. The Logic of Proof

94. The preceding plans exhibit most of the ordinary procedure in ordinary cases and a method of analysis useful in all cases. This, then, is argument practically. What argument is theoretically, and what are its scope, its divisions, its limitations, its methods, these are the subject-matter of logic.

The processes of argument are divided by formal logic into (1) reasoning from principles or generalizations already accepted to a conclusion as to a particular case, the attempt to conclude a case by bringing it

within the generalizations of experience, reasoning from the general; and (2) reasoning from particular facts accumulated for the purpose to a conclusion general enough to cover all facts of the same class, the attempt to conclude a case by the evidence of investigation into that case, reasoning from the particular. The first kind, argument before or without investigation, as when we conclude that a man will go to Mass on Sunday because he is a Catholic, is called *a priori*; ¹ *a posteriori*, on the other hand, is sometimes used of the second class, as when we conclude from investigation that an epidemic of typhoid is due to contaminated milk. These two terms correspond roughly to the more definite terms *deduction* and *induction*. *Deduction*, or *a priori* reasoning, then, is reasoning from general principles, from one's store of previous generalizations; *induction*, or *a posteriori* reasoning, is reasoning from particular facts collected and interpreted for the purpose.

95. The terms *general* and *particular* being relative, it should be observed that sometimes the same conclusion may be reached both deductively and inductively. In the one process the premises would be more general than the conclusion; in the other, less general. What is of more consequence, the generalizations reached by induction may be the basis for subsequent deduction; the conclusions of either process may be tested by the other; and finally, the two processes are habitually used by turns. One may be called the method of reflection; the other, the method of research.

¹ *A priori* is sometimes still defined to mean reasoning from cause to effect (*a posteriori*, reasoning from effect to cause); but this definition is not commensurate with current use.

I. DEDUCTION

(a) *Argument from Antecedent Probability*

96. That form of deductive reasoning which is perhaps most obviously *a priori* is the *argument from antecedent probability*. My friend A is accused of forgery. Before hearing any of the evidence I argue that the charge is false because it is not in A to commit forgery. We all recognize this as a fair way of rejecting some propositions. If a newspaper should announce the invention of an air-ship capable of carrying one hundred passengers across the Atlantic at a speed of three hundred miles an hour, most of us would doubt, and some of us would utterly deny, the statement without investigation. In approaching an investigation, moreover, antecedent probability is most useful (§ 129). We say to ourselves, "No use in spending time on such testimony"; or, "There should be traces here"; or, more generally, "It will not be hard to make a great array of supporting evidence"; or, "This cannot be settled by evidence; it must be fought out on general considerations." In fact, this is the chief use of antecedent probability—to clear the way, to forecast. It is preliminary, not final. Though I rightly refuse to tolerate a charge of forgery against my friend, yet I must admit that even his well-known uprightness does not, as against positive evidence of his having signed such and such cheques, prove his innocence. The argument from antecedent probability shows which way the probabilities lean before the case is investigated; it establishes a presumption. In some cases we are content to accept it as sufficient; in other cases,

as sometimes in astronomy and philology, we have nothing better ; in most cases we go on to the evidence.

(b) *Syllogism*

97. The typical form of deductive reasoning is the *syllogism* :

Major Premise. Marriage with a divorced person is contrary to Catholic law.

Minor Premise. A's marriage was with a divorced person.

Conclusion. A's marriage was contrary to Catholic law.

The major premise is ideally a universal, indisputable truth ; the minor premise indicates the course of the argument, which is to prove that a particular instance falls within that universal, indisputable truth ; the conclusion follows of necessity. The conclusion, being necessary, being demonstrated as a universal, indisputable truth, becomes in turn the major premise for succeeding syllogisms, and so on. Thus geometry is a chain, or rather a web, of syllogisms ; and, conversely, all syllogistic argument may be carried back and back until it rests on some axiom.

(c) *Enthymeme*

98. In common speech we express the syllogistic argument less formally. We say: "He must go the way of all men"; "Nothing else could come of that vice in the blood,"—implying those links of reasoning with which every one is familiar. And we use it less absolutely ; else (except as a formal test) we could never use it at all ; for persuasion, as Aristotle says, is not absolute and abstract, but relative and concrete. Our

arguments concern "things which appear to admit the possibility of conclusion either way . . . for no one ever deliberated about things which offer no alternative, which can exist or issue only in one way." An informal syllogism, or a syllogism whose major premise is not the ideal "universal," but simply an accepted generalization, is called an *enthymeme*. Persuasion, then, according to Aristotle, deals with enthymemes, with incomplete syllogisms.

2. INDUCTION

(a) *Mill's Canons*

99. Inductive argument, or reasoning from evidence, is ultimately the investigation of causes. Inductive logic, therefore, sets forth the conditions of a valid inference of cause. These were formulated by John Stuart Mill in the five "canons" that are known by his name.

"I. *The Canon of Agreement.*

"If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon."

In an epidemic of typhoid the only circumstance in which all the cases are found to agree is the use of milk from a particular herd of cows. Therefore it is argued that the immediate cause of the typhoid is that milk. The "characteristic imperfection" of this method is "the impossibility of assuring ourselves that we know all the antecedents in our instances."¹ It is hard enough in a country village to be

¹ Killick, *Handbook to Mill*, page 118.

sure that milk from a particular source is the only thing in which all the cases agree (one of the patients was out of town a part of every day before his illness; another has a contaminated well, which may have been used by disobedient children; etc.); in a great city, it may easily be impossible. Hence there is further

“II. *The Canon of Difference.*

“If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs and an instance in which it does not occur have every circumstance save one in common, that one occurring only in the former, the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon.”

“The principle is that of comparing an instance of the occurrence of a phenomenon with a similar instance in which it does not occur, to discover in what they differ.”¹ This is typically the method of experiment. If after pressure upon a certain point of a monkey's brain certain muscles of the monkey's right leg are immediately paralyzed, *no other change having occurred* in the animal's physical conditions, it is inferred that the nerve-centre thus injured is the motor-centre for those leg-muscles. And, in fact, experiments of this sort have enabled physicians, from certain symptoms, to locate the exact spot of a human brain at which an operation is necessary to relieve pressure.

“III. *The Canon of the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference.*

“If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while

¹ Killick, *Handbook to Mill*, page 120.

two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance, the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon."

"If a man finds that whenever he eats cucumber he suffers from indigestion, this indicates by Agreement that cucumber is the cause of his pain. But, if he is fond of cucumber, he will put the fault upon other ingredients of his diet taken at the same time, such as cheese, salmon, or pastry, which he likes less. Making, however, a second list of dinners (say) when visiting, at which cucumber is not served, whilst cheese, salmon, pastry, etc., all occur, and finding that he does *not* suffer from indigestion, the conclusion seems to be forced upon him that cucumber is the only pleasure of the table that must be bought with pain."¹

"IV. *The Canon of Residues.*

"Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous inductions to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents."

Certain college debaters are defeated. They learn from trustworthy testimony that in the opinion of the judges they equalled their opponents in weight of evidence and force of logic. The judges being assumed to have freed their decision from bias, the beaten debaters conclude the reason for their defeat to be inferiority in the only other possible element of the decision—in manner, in form.

"V. *The Canon of Concomitant Variations.*

"Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner, whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular

¹ Carveth Read, *Logic Deductive and Inductive*, page 178.

manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation."

Examples of this canon appear graphically in charts of statistics; *e.g.* in charts showing the rise and fall of prices according to the degree of the prevalence of certain other economic conditions. Thus also we infer familiarly the advantages of thrift or cleanliness, or the demoralizing effects of stimulants or high temperatures. Thus, also, in cases where the other methods are not applicable, we argue by "progressive approach," as that the nearer men come toward fulfilling the counsels of the Gospels, the happier they become and the more beneficent.

100. These canons are all based on the uniformity of nature, on the theory that the phenomena of the universe are going on, and will go on, as they have gone on. This, as Cardinal Newman insists and Mill agrees, is an assumption; it cannot be absolutely proved. Only it is an assumption on which, in most cases at least, we are wont to act. Again, the canons are applicable primarily to the investigation of the phenomena of nature; and they are usually inapplicable strictly to the phenomena of human life; for we cannot separate emotions and weigh temperaments and tendencies as we can separate and weigh the chemical elements. But as, even in the natural sciences, the canons cannot achieve absolute demonstration, must be content with formulating tendencies, so on the other hand in the inductions of everyday research, in matters which do not admit of demonstration by any process, they offer a safeguard against fallacy and a guide to sound results. They apply profitably, though the results be even farther from demonstration than in the fields of science, to the

processes of ordinary discussion. For the methods of ascertaining truth or forming hypotheses are not essentially different from those of supporting them.

(b) *Working Rules for Ordinary Induction*

101. From these scientific canons, then, emerge some simple working rules:

(1) Do not be content with a few instances of a supposed cause or effect, but get as many as you reasonably can. Beware of rash generalizations [*method of agreement*].

(2) Test your supposed cause or effect both positively and negatively; *i.e.* try to show not only that the result follows when the alleged cause is present, but that it does not follow when the alleged cause is absent [*joint method*].

(3) Try to show that your alleged cause is not merely a new condition preceding the known result, but that it is the only new condition, the only material change in the circumstances preceding the result [*method of difference*].

(4) Or show, not only that your supposed cause reasonably accounts for the known result, but that no other supposed cause accounts so well [*method of residues*. See also § 124].

(5) Look for a parallel rise and fall of your supposed cause and effect, as of democracy and personal liberty, of average temperature and average human energy [*method of concomitant variations*].

(c) *Circumstantial Evidence*

102. Where Mill's canons can be applied to even smaller extent, a certain degree of probability can be

shown by a collection of facts which, though it is not sufficient for a solid inference of cause, yet points in that direction. This is called *circumstantial evidence*. It is inconclusive; but it may fortify better evidence; and of itself it has a value in proportion, of course, as the number of particular instances increases toward the point where their united force would withstand the test of the canons.

The hypothesis that a certain prisoner caused the death of his neighbour may be rendered probable by a number of circumstances shown from credible testimony; as that the deceased had more than once injured the prisoner, that the prisoner returned home later than usual on the night of the death, that he purchased, some days before, a pistol of the same caliber as the fatal bullet, that he left town very early the next morning, etc. But since any of these facts, and all together, will bear another explanation than murder, it is accounted unjust to infer murder without further evidence. The inference will not stand the test of the canon of difference. It is not clear whether the facts established are significant, or are merely coincident circumstances.

A man once went on a steamer wharf in New York to meet a friend returning from Europe. The satchel in his hand contained a guide-book for Paris and a necklace bearing the trade-mark of a French jeweller. On leaving the wharf he was challenged by the customs officers, and was naturally unable to convince them that he had brought the dutiable jewellery from the street, not from the steamer, until he was supported by unimpeachable testimony. The facts were that he had carried the guide-book and the necklace on a visit to New Jersey, to talk over the one and exhibit the other; circumstantial evidence pointed to an attempt to smuggle.

3. ANALOGY

103. Another form of reasoning, not strictly either deductive or inductive, is the *argument from analogy* [*a pari*], the argument from history. This amounts to saying that like things have like results. Its force depends on the extent and degree of the likeness.

“He who believes the Scripture,” says Origen, “to have proceeded from Him who is the Author of nature may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it as are found in the constitution of nature” (as quoted by Butler in the introduction to *The Analogy of Religion*).

Patrick Henry cried out on a memorable occasion: “Cæsar had his Brutus, Charles I. his Cromwell, and George III. — may profit by their example.”

Colonial expansion, it is alleged, the increase of the standing army, the concentration of wealth and the increase of luxury among the few, made of the Roman republic an empire. Like conditions appear in the United States to-day. Therefore we may look for an empire here.

104. A particular form of the *a pari* argument is the *a fortiori*, the “much more” argument. “If God so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is and to-morrow is cast into the oven, will he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?”

105. The advantages of this method of argument are: (1) it is popular with most audiences; people like to have their learning appealed to; (2) it gives scope to a speaker’s ingenuity and penetration; (3) it is available in cases that do not admit either full deduction or full induction, and especially in argument as to the future of men and societies.

“That which chiefly constitutes probability is expressed in the word *likely*; i.e. like some truth [*verisimile*] or true event; like it in itself, in its evidence, in some more or fewer of its circumstances. For when we determine a thing to be probably true, suppose that an event has or will come to pass, it is from the mind's remarking in it a likeness to some other event which we have observed has come to pass.” (Butler, introduction to *The Analogy of Religion*, second paragraph.)

106. Its disadvantage is that it needs more careful use than almost any other method. Things that are loosely and popularly called like, as the Roman republic and the American republic, or Charles I. and George III., must, in order to have any force whatever in the argument, appear to be like essentially. If one essential difference can be pointed out, the argument is at least seriously weakened; if more than one essential difference, it is practically destroyed. In other words, the analogy, and conversely the difference, must be not only in a number of details (and, of course, the more the stronger), but in those particular details which are characteristic, or at least in those details which are for the purposes of the argument essential. And the conclusion of an analogy is a probability, greater in proportion as the argument approaches full deduction or full induction, but in popular use merely a presumption for or against what is to be proved or disproved otherwise. The conclusions of most arguments from analogy are only, This has happened before; it may have happened in this case; or, it may happen again: but more considerate use may reach the far more useful conclusion. The past plainly teaches us in our conditions to expect so-and-so. It may not come; but, if we are wise, we shall prepare for it.

c. Degrees of Proof

107. Are there degrees, then, of proof? No, if by proof be meant "demonstration," such a result as is obtained in geometry; yes, if by proof be meant the reaching of what we call practical certainty, which is the limit of argument on many important matters; yes still more, if we should admit, as we daily do, conclusions of such fair probability as is the limit of argument in subjects of discussion still more numerous. The latter use of the word *proof* is too general to be improper. In this sense proof has degrees; it expresses greater or lesser probability. If we may never call a proposition proved until it has been shown to be absolutely certain, then we must never, in the matters about which we usually argue, use the word *proof* at all; and conversely, since the conclusions that we actually reach are so highly probable as to be accepted for "practically certain," or are fairly probable, or probable so far as we know, it is convenient and natural to speak of degrees of proof; and it is very useful to estimate, in any given case, what degree we can attain, how far the argument can be carried.

108. The ideal, of course, is certainty. This is the ideal of the syllogism. But, as Aristotle says, persuasion deals, not with complete syllogisms, but with enthymemes, with incomplete syllogisms (§ 98), and this by a practical necessity. Complete syllogistic demonstration is not applicable to those cases to which argument is limited in ordinary practice. The syllogistic argument is constantly used and constantly useful in details; but the ordinary argument as a whole cannot be carried to demonstration; else there would be no

argument. We argue about free trade, our consular service, country roads, the government of cities, the putting of a crew on the water, the elective system in freshman year, the "honour" system in examinations; and not one of these subjects will give us, for all our searching, an indisputable major premise, a "universal." The very fact that they are in dispute implies that they cannot be settled by syllogisms.

So there is good ground for the popular distrust of the syllogism in matters that concern men nearly, of abstract reasoning in concrete matters. It is too neat, people say, too simple; there is juggling in it somewhere. They cannot disprove it, perhaps; but they will not assent. Perhaps the longest and most complete instance of the syllogistic argument applied to matter of actual dispute is Bishop Pecoock's *The Repressor of Overmuch Blaming the Clergy*; and it would be hard to find an equally elaborate piece of argumentation so tiresome and so futile practically.

109. And induction does not attain to certainty. Mill prints a formal warning against regarding the conclusions even of scientifically rigid induction in what we call the exact sciences as absolute, final truths. These "laws" of science, he says, must always be regarded as tendencies, that is as true so far as we can now determine, but possibly subject to counteraction from causes as yet undiscovered. Much more, then, in other fields, in economics, in politics — in short, in those very fields where we have occasion for most of our argument, induction reaches something less than certainty.

There are few notions more misleading than that any conceivable logic can provide an applicable test of the truth

of generalizations, so as to enable us to say of some that they are "logically proved" while others are not. Excluding . . . those which demand no proof, actual generalizations are *more* or *less* proved, from their first formation onward to their extreme development; they are theories from first to last, and of no theory do we ever know for certain that it has reached its final and perfect form. Further facts may always be discovered which shall compel us to modify even the best of our accepted views of natural science; or the old facts may come to be seen in a clearer light. To claim to have "fully established" any piece of theory is either merely a loose and convenient way of speaking, or else an unnecessary pretence. Practical, working certainty is what we want; and this we often get, — until the exceptional facts arrive which break it down and put some completer practical certainty in place of it. — SIDGWICK: *The Process of Argument*, pages 88–89.

This is what is meant by a proposition being "as good as proved," a conclusion as undeniable "as if it were proved," and by the reasons for it "amounting to a proof," for a proof is the limit of converging probabilities. — NEWMAN: *Grammar of Assent*, page 321.

110. This is to say, not that truth is only an idea, but simply that since we must in most cases act on generalizations short of certainty, it is toward such generalizations that we direct our argument.

Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect kind of information, and is to be considered as relative only to beings of limited capacities. For nothing which is the possible object of knowledge, whether past, present, or future, can be probable to an infinite Intelligence; since it cannot but be discerned absolutely as it is in itself, certainly true or certainly false. But to us probability is the very guide of life. — BUTLER: *Analogy of Religion*, Introduction, paragraph 3.

It means that we deceive ourselves, perhaps others, in setting as our goal proof in the sense of absolute, final demonstration. All that we can attain—and since it is enough to act on, it is enough to prove—is what we call practical sufficiency. Our lives are not regulated by absolute demonstrations. We live by probabilities—and by faith.

111. Practically, then, a proposition is said to be proved when the process of proof, having been carried as far as is practicable, leaves in men generally no doubt. This is the highest degree of practical sufficiency.

Thus is proved that comets recur at fixed intervals. The ultimate major premise here is the assumption of the uniformity of nature (§ 100). We all agree that comets recur at fixed intervals; but we may have some hesitation in asserting that a particular comet will reappear in 1985. It occurs to us that influences now unknown may intervene; that is, we are not absolutely certain whether our proposition is universally true or but generally true. Yet the proof of it is so far complete as to be generally accepted. It is practically sufficient proof.

That this test of sufficiency needs more explicit statement appears when, though still keeping in the same domain of natural science, we enunciate a proposition that has passed into popular discussion—*All forms of life have arisen from an ultimate protoplasm*. Has the proof of that the same degree of force? Not if we measure by extent of acceptance. Yet it may pertinently be said that the proposition—*The earth revolves about the sun*—was long in winning general acceptance, and that even in our day a negro preacher argued before large crowds—“*The sun do move*.” By general acceptance, then, we mean the acceptance of men intelligent, educated, and sufficiently informed to reason in the premises.

And as we will not hear the negro's argument about the sun, so we may abstain from arguing about protoplasm. We may say that we cannot weigh the evidence, that we do not know enough. Without denying the proposition we may withhold our assent; or, on the other hand, we may assent without grasping the proof, we may accept the proposition on authority. In either case we acknowledge a modification of this test of sufficiency. Proof is practically sufficient when it wins the general assent of those capable of understanding it.

112. Below this degree of sufficiency are several degrees of force to which is commonly given the name of proof. Loosely a proposition is said to be proved when a fair degree of probability is made out for it.

Mary Queen of Scots was an accomplice in the murder of Darnley. The Man with the Iron Mask was the brother of Louis XIV. Swift married Stella. These propositions cannot be proved at all; nor can they be disproved. The evidence is simply insufficient. What can be proved to practical sufficiency is: *Mary Queen of Scots was probably innocent of the murder of Darnley. The Man with the Iron Mask probably was not the brother of Louis XIV. Swift probably married Stella.* So with most questions of past fact, as of the objective reality of the visions of Joan of Arc; that they remain in dispute suggests that the evidence is insufficient for their settlement.

A nearer approach to sufficiency may often be attained for propositions concerning past right, justice, expediency, benefit. *Webster was justified in his attitude toward the Clay Compromise. Henry VIII. was not justified in suppressing the monasteries. The administration of Andrew Jackson did more harm than good to this country. The system of Indian agencies is a mistake. Napoleon III. was personally responsible for the Franco-Prussian War.* These propositions may be main-

tained or attacked with more nearly conclusive proof. But was the United States justified in the Mexican War? Has the Reformation proved, on the whole, a blessing to mankind? These questions are more hotly discussed and farther from conclusion.

They are more hotly discussed because they bear somewhat on the present and the future. Of propositions that look entirely to the present and future, that express what we conceive to be our rights and duties, our privileges and opportunities, proof may mean no more than the showing of evidence stronger than can be shown for the counter-proposition. The test of sufficiency thus becomes practically an adversary's analysis in refutation. These questions are perpetually in debate; and anything worthy to be called proof of them is reached but slowly. That is implied in calling them live questions or living issues. The propositions that frame them not only cannot be proved absolutely; they cannot even be shown to have that high degree of probability which is attainable for the theories of natural science. We cannot be certain about them as we are certain about the recurrence of comets, or even of the guilt of Napoleon III.

Yet we may support them with great force of argument. We may be persuaded and persuade others that this or that is the sounder public policy; that the United States ought to develop a merchant marine by subsidies, that railroads should not be owned by the State, that trades unions should be restricted by federal law, that there should be a national divorce law. These propositions being of the stuff of actual debate, in each case we have in mind to prevail over the counter-proposition held by opponents. The force of our proof is not absolute, but relative; the probability of our proposition we conceive to be not merely strong, but relatively stronger. Thus we set out to prove that our college should put a crew on the water. Aware that the lack of a crew would not subvert morality, nor even damage scholar-

ship, we are yet persuaded "*for good and sufficient reasons*" that it is *better* to have a crew. Thus, also, we have the weightiest practical reasons to show that our city should establish a certain system of drainage, or our state separate the election of state officials from those of federal officials. In a certain sense these propositions cannot be proved, — if they could be, we should hardly have to argue; but they can be proved in the sense that our fellow-students or fellow-citizens can be convinced of their expediency. Men can be won to agree to them.

113. Though this lower range of sufficiency is the proper domain of persuasion, it should not, therefore, be said that persuasion is not concerned with truth. Our view of truth in matters of common argument we know to be incomplete. It grows; and toward its growth no small work is done by persuasion. And again, though any argument, if pushed far enough, may involve truth, involve certainties, we do not usually push an argument so far. The conclusions that in matters of common argument fall short of demonstration, do so partly for the very reason that they formulate, not certitudes, but opinions. They may be opinions very strongly held; we may say we are certain of them, but we then use the word *certain* loosely. A man is certain of his creed in religion; he is also certain of his creed in politics; but the word may not express the same attitude of mind in the one case as in the other. Inquiry may show that he holds the one set of propositions to be absolutely true, to be irrefragable; the other set to be very highly probable, to be very strong, or perhaps only to be far stronger than the creed of the other party.

When the proposition frames, not opinion, but certitude, it may still be unnecessary to produce complete demonstration. Whether certitude without complete demonstration is reasonable ; whether, that is, it is reasonable to hold absolute truth without being able to exhibit absolute proof, — this is the inquiry of Newman's *Grammar of Assent*, to which, and to James's *The Will to Believe*, the inquirer is referred once for all. Newman's detailed application to religion is in fact the practical application. Except in religion, absolute truth is not for most men of real concern.

Persuasion, then, moves for the most part in probabilities, in matters about which we feel more than we know ; and it so moves, not as though truth were subjective, but because in so many of our affairs, unable to be certain, we must proceed upon probabilities. As we learn more we revise our judgments, we reach higher and higher probability, nearer and nearer approximations to truth ; and in this process an important part is played by persuasion. Thus, in politics, only time gives us the truth ; but meanwhile, as one proposition after another is settled, it passes from discussion, and the others that become instant are only less doubtful than their predecessors were. Among these is persuasion, always of the living present, statesman and demagogue contending for the minds of men.

But since persuasion, more perhaps than any other kind of composition, takes colour from its material, rising with its subject, it is likely to be highest, to reach the pitch of eloquence, when it presents the highest motives, the weightiest sanctions, the final obligations. So modern eloquence is found oftenest, perhaps, in the pulpit. There, too, persuasion is devoted largely to winning assent to authority, to moving men, not indeed

without reason, but, since the hearers are not commonly in a position to measure the proof, without proof. With and without proof, persuasion, though having its usual concern with probabilities, finds its high concern in truth. Its journey-work is to win assent to probabilities; its great opportunity is to help men toward certitudes.

d. Refutation

114. Refutation is not a separate kind of argument, but simply a separate application. It is essentially the subjection of an opponent's argument to destructive analysis. As such, it is prepared along with the direct argument for one's own side; for the only adequate preparation of one's own side includes knowing the other side as well. The fundamental questions in refutation (§ 134) are: *How do you know?* and *What of it?*¹ That is, refutation, (1) negatively, (*a*) denies premises, either absolutely or in the form in which they are stated, (*b*) attacks the processes of argument as fallacious, (*c*) attacks the sufficiency of the proof as a whole; or (2) positively, exhibits counter-propositions as more probable; *i.e.* more reasonable, practicable, or just.

I. REFUTATION OF PREMISES

115. Absolute denial of premises, though not often feasible, is of course final.

To some one that defended his questionable practices by the proposition, "A man must live," Dr. Johnson made the famous retort, "Sir, I do not see the necessity." And again,

¹ The phraseology is borrowed from the teaching of Professor William G. Sumner.

when Boswell alleged the image-worship of Roman Catholics as essentially vitiating their religion, he replied, "They do not worship images." If the denial is warranted, there is nothing more to say.

116. More frequently a premise is open to attack in the form in which it appears.

A good deal of futile argument against the teaching of composition in schools and colleges can be shown to rest on the premise, "Writing cannot be taught," or "The ability to write is a natural gift, not an acquired skill." This proposition is accepted of writing marked by the quality that we call literary; it is not accepted of writing in general. Argument from this premise, therefore, does not touch the issue. Such a term as *writing* is said to "beg the question";¹ and the equivocal use of it, one sense in one premise, another sense in the other, is called by formal logic the fallacy of ambiguous middle. In general it may be said that refutation should first of all and above all scrutinize an opponent's terms.

117. But the commonest opportunity for attack on premises is some flaw in the evidence, some insufficiently supported assumption, some omission of a material circumstance [*Suppressio veri suggestio falsi*, says the Latin proverb], some statement contradicted by other testimony equally trustworthy, some substitution of inference for fact, of unconditional for conditional probability.

At an open-air meeting in a university town a candidate for the presidency encountered so much noise and disorder

¹ "Begging the question" [*petitio principii*] arises usually from the equivocal use of a term, a "question-begging" word; but the name applies generally to any use as a premise of what is substantially equivalent to the conclusion.

that he was finally forced to retire. Some newspapers next morning reported the occurrence as an assault by students whose family interests were menaced by the speaker's theories. It was replied that, though students were on the ground in large numbers, they were not in large numbers hostile to the speaker's theories; that the agency of students in the disorder was assumed, not proved; and that the real occasion of the tumult, the coincidence of the political meeting with a military review to military music, was ignored in these reports.

2. REFUTATION OF INFERENCES: FALLACIES

118. Refutation by attack on the processes of argument is the exposure of fallacies. Fallacies in deduction are summed up in the general term *non sequitur*. They are analyzed under heads by formal logic; for the syllogism, to use the admirable phrase of Professor Minto, is "the logic of consistency." The main practical value of the complete syllogism, the reason for the great space devoted to it by formal logic, is its constant value as a test. No ordinary argument can be carried on, as a whole, by syllogisms (§ 108); but in testing the whole process or any of its parts the syllogism has constant value in any argument. Without it, indeed, reasoning can hardly go on a sure foot. Deductive logic, by its elaborate analysis of the forms in which we are wont to reason, enables us to scrutinize inferences, to detect surely what is invalid, to confirm what is valid. The very absoluteness of syllogistic demonstration, its freedom from exception and contingency, gives to its formulas, so far as they go, constant value as tests.

119. Fallacies in induction may be summed up under another term of formal logic, *non causa pro causa*, insufficient proof of cause, the assumption of something as a

cause which need not be accepted as a cause (§102). Of this the commonest type is *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, arguing that *P* is the effect of *S* simply because it follows *S*.

One of the persons to whom we referred the other day as believing in divining rods, though apparently sane, has sent us a most interesting letter on the subject and with it two photographs, one of a lean rustic grasping a forked twig which points upward, and the other of the same individual in another place with the same twig pointing downward. These pictures our correspondent considers of importance because, first, they are, so far as he knows, the only ones ever taken of a "dowser" in the act of practising his mystical art, and, second, because water was found on digging at the spot where the twig turned downward. This "dowser," the letter tells us, has hunted water for years up in the Lake George region, and his photographer "has never heard of an entire failure." In other words, people who have followed the "dowser's" advice have rarely dug wells in vain. But on studying the two pictures we notice that in one case the twig was so held that it had to point upward, and in the second so that it had to point downward, whether any occult influence affected it or not; and also that it pointed upward at a place where the vegetation was only so-so, while an almost tropical luxuriance is revealed at the place where the spell worked. That, to say the least of it, is suggestive. One must remember, too, in considering the triumphs of "dowsers," that it is much harder, in regions not distinctly arid, to find places where water cannot be obtained by digging than it is to find places where it can be obtained. In this country, for instance, practically every farmhouse has its well, and it is not the well that determines the position of the farmhouse, but *vice versa*. We are quite prepared to believe that our correspondent's "dowser" not only can find, but often has

found water; we do not refuse to believe that he is perfectly honest in his necromancy, for the possibilities of self-deception are infinite. Our incredulity is for the explanation, not the facts. — *New York Times*, November 23, 1901.

The refutation, obviously, is to show that *P* follows, not only *S*, but also *M*; or that *S* is followed, not only by *P*, but also by *Q*. (See §§ 99, II.; 101, (3).)

120. This and all other fallacies of induction are due commonly to hasty generalization, especially to the neglect of negative instances. A very effective refutation of false induction is to turn an opponent's evidence against himself.

It would be easy to make out a long list of squires, merchants, lawyers, surgeons, yeomen, artisans, ploughmen, whose blood, barbarously shed during the late evil times, cries for vengeance to heaven. But what single member of your House, in our days, or in the days of our fathers, or in the days of our grandfathers, suffered death unjustly by sentence of the Court of the Lord High Steward? Hundreds of the common people were sent to the gallows by common juries for the Rye House Plot and the Western Insurrection. One peer and one alone, my Lord Delamere, was brought at that time before the Court of the Lord High Steward, and he was acquitted. You say that the evidence against him was legally insufficient. Be it so. But so was the evidence against Sydney, against Cornish, against Alice Lisle: yet it sufficed to destroy them. You say that the peers before whom my Lord Delamere was brought were selected with shameless unfairness by King James and by Jeffreys. Be it so. But this only proves that under the worst possible King, and under the worst possible High Steward, a lord tried by lords has a better chance for life than a commoner who puts himself on his country. — **EARL MONTAGUE:** *Defence of the Court of the Lord High Steward*; quoted by Bain, page 239.

121. A class of fallacies common to both deduction and induction may be summed up in the term *ignoratio elenchi*, ignoring the issue, arguing beside the point. To call attention to this is in itself sufficient refutation. It appears sometimes in the *argumentum ad hominem*, leaving the discussion of a proposition, to attack its supporters; sometimes in the *argumentum ad terrorem*, leaving the discussion of a proposition to forecast such consequences of it as can be made to alarm prejudice; and in other ways of making a diversion to cover a retreat. The same motive, conscious or unconscious, gives rise to the *fallacy of objections*. Merely to heap objections against a proposition is not to disprove it. The task is to show (1) that these objections are essential in the proposition, *i.e.* that the same objections would not exist otherwise; (2) that the combined weight of all the objections is greater than the weight of the support.

A particular form of the fallacy of objections is unfairly to object to the degree of proof. Where the proposition, for example, expresses a fair probability, to show that the proof of it does not reach demonstration is sophistical and beside the mark.

122. Besides these specific fallacies, other false inferences may arise from mere confusion. When a general statement is used so as unfairly to imply the inclusion of some particular, the refutation must "pin down" to specific statement, must call for particulars. What is brought forward as one argument is sometimes shown by destructive analysis to be two, the second being suggested under cover of the first; or what is brought forward as two arguments may be only one, the second being merely

an iteration in different form. Here again, of course, exposure is refutation; and here again the counsel recurs, never to let a term pass without scrutinizing its implication.

3. THE BURDEN OF PROOF

123. The sufficiency of any argument as a whole depends somewhat on "the burden of proof." *Burden of proof* is a legal phrase to express the degree of proof necessary for one side as compared with that necessary for the other. It is expressed in the legal maxim, "*He who affirms must prove.*"

A is District Attorney. B charges him with using his office for private gain. The burden of proof is on B; *i.e.* at law or in ordinary discussion, A is not obliged on hearing his charge to prove his innocence—else a man must be publishing himself daily; but B is obliged to prove A's guilt. Actually A may content himself with showing the insufficiency of B's arguments against him, or he may bring forward direct arguments for his own innocence; but since the burden of proof is on B, A will be right, and probably wise, in simply meeting what B brings forward.

So he who affirms that Christian missions in China should be suspended has the burden of proof. The supporters of the negative have done enough if they show his reasons to be insufficient. They do not have to establish, from the foundation up, that Christian missions in China should be pursued. So in general the attacking party, supposing the proposition to express, as it always should, a real issue, has the harder task; for the defence has the advantage of position. So, in another aspect, the burden of proof is on whoever attacks an old or recognized institution or practice; or, conversely, the presumption is in favour of what is accepted by custom or tradition.

In the course of argument the burden may be shifted from one side to the other. Thus if A wishes the public (or a court of law) to believe that B's attack upon him is malicious, or that B received money for making the attack, he must prove. The burden of proof then falls on him. For he that makes a particular affirmation, as of fact, not less than he that makes a general affirmation, as of principle, practice, or policy, has the burden of proof.

4. METHODS OF REFUTATION

124. Though refutation is not a separate kind of argument, it uses, more commonly than direct argument does, certain distinct methods. These are the logical exclusion, the dilemma, and the *reductio ad absurdum*. *Logical exclusion* consists in proving the proposition to be the only satisfactory solution by proving in succession every other solution to be unsatisfactory. Ideally this kind of destructive analysis must first make a complete division (§ 57); that is, it must not overlook any essential consideration. Then it must show sufficient grounds for rejecting successively each rival proposition until only the one remains. In this ideal form it is like Mill's canon of residues (§ 99, iv.); it is absolute demonstration; and, like other sorts of absolute demonstration, it is not applicable in ordinary arguments. But in ordinary arguments it has great cogency even though it cannot be pushed to completeness.

As far as I am capable of discerning, there are but three ways of proceeding relative to this stubborn spirit which prevails in your colonies and disturbs your government. These are: to change that spirit, as inconvenient, by removing the causes; to prosecute it as criminal; or to comply with it as

necessary. — BURKE: *Conciliation with America* (Select Works, ed. Payne, vol. I., page 187).

Burke then proceeds to show that neither of the first two ways is feasible. But he does not rest there; for his proof cannot be final, since his division may not be exhaustive. He goes on, therefore, to show directly that the third way would be adequate, feasible, and advantageous, and that it is practically necessary.

In like manner Huxley's argument¹ for the theory of the development of all forms of life from protoplasm is conducted by successive rejections of all other theories. The conclusion is that the protoplasm theory is true — so far as we know. Since it is not inconceivable that another hypothesis may arise from subsequent discoveries, a hypothesis it remains; but the hypothesis embodies what we now know of the truth, and the method of reaching it is largely useful in refutation.

125. In detail, logical exclusion may be used to overthrow an opponent's argument by showing that his proposition, general or particular, involves untenable premises or inferences. "My opponent's position as to this can be based on (or can lead to) only X, Y, or Z. But X is untenable, and Y, and Z. Therefore the position is untenable." Where the analysis reduces the position to alternatives, it is called a *dilemma*, and the holder of the position is said to be on the horns of the dilemma. Either way involves him in difficulty.

The next fault is that the inflicting of that punishment is not on the opinion of an equal and public judge, but is referred to the arbitrary discretion of a private, nay, interested and irritated individual. He who formally is, and substantially ought to be, the judge, is in reality no more than minis-

¹ *On the Physical Basis of Life.*

terial, a mere executive instrument of a private man, who is at once judge and party. Every idea of judicial order is subverted by this procedure. If the insolvency be no crime, why is it punished with arbitrary imprisonment? If it be a crime, why is it delivered into private hands to pardon without discretion, or to punish without mercy and without measure?—BURKE: *To the Electors of Bristol* (quoted in Genung's *Rhetoric*).

This is highly effective; but, as generally in logical exclusion, care must be taken to provide against any other possible way out, against what formal logic calls the *tertium quid*. The dilemma must present absolute alternatives.

126. *Reductio ad absurdum* is showing that an opponent's position involves an absurd conclusion. Formally, it assumes the opponent's position, and then deduces from it a conclusion manifestly untenable. Informally, as in the Platonic dialogues of Socrates, or in actual discussion by question and answer, it leads an opponent on, step by step, to admit the absurd conclusion himself.

Like this is showing that an opponent's argument "*proves too much*"; i.e. that if it were applicable at all, it would be applicable also to some other case in which it is manifestly inadmissible.

127. This and all other applications of the method of exclusion demand great care. They are edged tools; if they fail to cut one's adversary, they are pretty sure to cut oneself. Moreover, they should be used only when the exclusion will be seen by the audience to be complete, to be real. And, in general, refutation must always be within the grasp of the audience, it must never

go into subtleties that may seem like quibbles, and it must not try to answer every point singly. In fact, the best general counsel as to refutation is to meet the issue plainly oneself, and to insist that it be met plainly by one's opponent. If he shift his ground, leaving his line of attack to pursue another, this must be pointed out as a damaging admission; but, on the other hand, it is neither fair nor wise to allege admissions that are not necessarily implied; and it is both dangerous and puerile to impute unworthy motives or inferior intelligence. It must never be forgotten that refutation is not trick, and that its proper object is a proposition, not a man.

128. Finally, it must not be forgotten that refutation has to meet, not only the separate forces of the opponent's arguments, but also the combined force of his argument as a whole. The opponent's case must appear, not merely weak here and weak there, but weaker as a whole than one's own case (§ 121). Refutation, then, is not merely analysis in the sense of detaching separate points for answer. This is a necessary part of it, but not the whole. It is destructive, but it is also constructive; it meets the other side as a whole by proving one's own side as a whole the stronger.

c. The Preparation of Proof

I. ANALYSIS A PRIORI

129. In most argumentation the proposition is fixed beforehand by formal or informal agreement. When this is not done, when the speaker has to fix his own proposition, he must spend his first pains in stating it definitely, so that it shall be beyond mistake, and then

also fairly, so as fully to make the issue. Once fixed, the proposition deserves a good deal of preliminary reflection. There is usually a gain of time in considering *a priori* how far the proof must be carried for sufficiency, and by what sort of evidence; whether the question is of fact or of the interpretation of fact, and, if the latter, whether purely of expedience or also of right, or of both; what is the extent of common ground, the agreement, the starting-point; on what the argument will probably turn, and especially what will probably be the adversary's line of attack, what must be fortified and what may be touched lightly. The habit of thus questioning one's own mind was formally inculcated in the ancient rhetoric. Cicero sums up the precepts in three questions: (1) What kind of case is it (*naturam causæ*)? *i.e.* of fact or of the interpretation of fact; (2) On what does it turn (*quid faciat causam; id est, quo sublato controversia stare non possit*)? (3) Why is it disputed (*quid veniat in iudicium*)?

Suppose during the recent disturbances in China a question to have arisen concerning Christian missions, and to have taken form in the proposition, *Christian missions in China should be suspended*; and suppose A to be supporting the negative. The question evidently involves both political expediency and moral duty. The latter will be admitted, theoretically at least, to be the higher and the more compelling consideration. Here A's side seems at once far the stronger; but cannot his opponent meet him on that ground? Will the opponent be able to dispute, with any chance of success, the assumption that Christianity is always and everywhere the best possible religion? Must that be debated? At any rate, he can object to the assumption that even the best possible religion should be urged by propaganda on an unwilling people.

A has heard most of disturbances apparently resultant upon Roman Catholic missions. Can he show that his opponent's arguments apply only to these? Can widely different propaganda under the same general name be fairly discussed as one thing? Will the confusion and clash of different missionary interests be a strong argument against missions as a whole? Are these difficulties really very great? Every question here leads at once to the questions of fact, to the evidence.

Where is A to find the best evidence? Some important points may be settled at once by standard books on China, and by the latest year-books and maps. But in this case recent facts are in dispute as well as inferences. Is A to depend on the reports of missionaries? These might be aspersed as being veracious, indeed, missionaries being generally accepted as truthful, but probably biassed, missionaries being regarded as prone to overlook or misinterpret facts through zeal for their cause. This evidence, then, must be used with caution; that is, such facts must be sought in their reports as zeal could give no occasion for unconsciously misrepresenting. But A may go farther. Consular reports have not the same suspicion of bias. Wherever they mention missionary operations, their evidence will count for more. At points they will doubtless corroborate the reports of missionaries; and though they probably have little to say about missions, they may have more about the riots, burnings, and assassinations. A decides to begin with missionary magazines, looking primarily for facts cited with corroboration of consuls or other less partial witnesses, and verifying the citations. He decides to save time, too, by a preliminary survey of recent articles in magazines and reviews, looking out for particular reports of consuls or commissioners.

The opponent's main reliance will doubtless be the recent disturbances in China, disturbances great enough to involve the whole civilized world. He will try to lay these disturb-

ances at the door of the missions. Now, first, A reflects that this does not exhaust the case, if he can convince the audience, the judges, that even so great disturbance and blood are not too great a price to pay for the spread of Christianity. Still, the disturbances must then appear to be the price of success, not the price of failure. Are they of a nature to show that Christianity cannot prevail among the Chinese? And further, though the imagined argument of A's opponent fall short, still it is strong enough to be met squarely. A sees, then, that he must be master, (1) not only of the facts in general, but of well attested particular disturbances, their character, their number; (2) of the inference, of all that these facts fairly mean — how far they can be interpreted to prove the missions, directly or indirectly, causes. Here A feels a strong case, for his opponent has the burden of proof. His opponent must show, not merely that such and such missionaries were disturbers, but that missionaries have been disturbers in general and in the pursuit of their missions; while A has only to show negative instances enough to break down a difficult generalization. Still, he must beware of abusing this advantage. Since fair probability is the highest degree of proof now attainable for generalizations as to China, to demand more is to quibble.

But how are Christian missions to be suspended? By consent, or by governmental injunction? If there be in effect no third way, A plots a dilemma (§ 125) for his opponent, either of these two ways being demonstrably chimerical. But can his opponent refuse, on the basis of the proposition, to go beyond proof of abstract advantage? Can he fairly say that the proposition is satisfied when he shows that it would be better if the missions were suspended; that whether they can be or not is another matter? Not at all, thinks A; but here A also bethinks him that he is not estimating high enough the possibilities of the other side; and finally it occurs to him that a wise opponent, instead of

joining battle on the missions' having produced the disturbances, might rather argue: "Christian missions are in effect suspended by present military operations ensuing upon certain disturbances. This suspension is right and should continue, even at the cost of governmental interference, until the country is tranquillized; for missionary efforts in present conditions are hopeless, they are quite unduly dangerous to the missionaries, and they tend, at least in connection with armed interference, to prolong the disturbances and thus to defeat, not only the ends of diplomacy, but their own ends as well."

This line of attack, appearing more formidable and therefore more probable, throws A upon other considerations. Are the missions in effect suspended? What prospect is there of tranquillity in a year? in five years? The question remains whether the missions have been causes of disturbance, but in a different form; *i.e.* whether missionaries as well as invading troops are hated as "foreign devils." And, supposing them to be, what then? Shall the Christian nations wait an indefinite time for the Chinese to reach saner views? How are they to reach saner views? Have missions usually preceded or followed or accompanied the introduction of a foreign civilization? What may be argued from the analogy of Japan? Are the Christian nations to protect merchants without protecting missionaries? Is it not better, since armed intervention came unsought as an instant necessity, to reap from it first of all the security of Christian missions now? Would this establishment of missions at the point of the sword put them under a cloud, make them permanently objects of hatred and distrust? Would the missions appear in any better light, if they were given up, even for a time, because of opposition? etc.

So far A has not opened a book or a paper. He has simply thought the ground over in the light of his general knowledge and of his experience in argument. This *a priori*

survey needs correction ; but it saves time that might else be wasted in ill-directed reading. So long as one keeps guard against prejudice, against ignoring evidence that upsets his preconceptions, he does well thus to plan his research *a priori*. The danger of *a priori* is simply in going no farther (§ 96).

2. ANALYSIS A POSTERIORI

130. The gathering of evidence is not essentially different from the research for exposition (§§ 62-70); but the distinguishing between fact and opinion, the verification and citation of references, and the scrutiny of relevancy, are all of increased importance. At each point, major and minor, the question is simple. Is this probative? Is it sufficiently probative, or must there be further evidence for confirmation? Is this the strongest evidence obtainable? The sifting will be careful enough only when one keeps in mind how his evidence will be analyzed by his adversary.

131. Each line of the preliminary survey brings up at the twofold question, What are the facts and what do they mean? These two inquiries, though they go on together, may be considered separately. What are the facts? First, what do we understand by that word *fact*? A fact is a past happening or present condition; it is not an inference. A fact is concrete, not abstract.

Christian missions in China began in ——. The present total of converts is ——. Our treaty with China provides ——. The mission house at —— was attacked by the Chinese in ——. The local authorities made no serious efforts to protect it. These are statements of fact. The Chinese are averse to Christianity—that is not a statement of fact. It may be true or false; but in either case it is an inference

from facts, a generalization. Whether the truth be that the Chinese are averse to Christianity or averse to certain methods of Christianizing; whether it be the government that is averse, or the people, — is an inquiry to be conducted only by determining many facts of detail.

Even the so-called facts of one's own observation need to be disentangled from inference. A declares that the United States War Department in 1898 mismanaged the camps, supplies, hospital arrangements, and transportation. A himself saw the mismanagement in the camp at Montauk. Now what did A see? He saw landings from the transports delayed, the railway tracks crowded at the terminus, emaciated soldiers, hardly able to walk along the platforms, crowded into cars of any sort, — dust, confusion, hideous details of disease. If A saw these things, these are the facts. He did not see mismanagement; he inferred it, and the inference must be tested as an inference. Mismanagement is not the only possible cause. The cause may have been partly the unavoidable climate of Cuba, partly the impossible demands of a condition not to be foreseen. Moreover, A saw only a part. Was that part typical or exceptional? Subsequent governmental inquiry failed to prove mismanagement. A's inference, whether valid or invalid, he must not set down as fact.

Again, the alleged right of the Chinese to restrict missionary effort is not a fact either. Right is abstract; facts are concrete. The strike of the coal-miners of Pennsylvania in September, 1900, was a thing seen, heard, felt; it was concrete; it is a fact, composed of many separate facts; their right to strike is an idea in their minds and in the minds of many others; it cannot be seen, heard, reported to witnesses; it is abstract; it is not a fact, nor composed of facts.

132. A statement of fact, then, being a statement of past happening or present condition, not an inference,

being concrete, not abstract, when is such a statement to be accepted? In general, every alleged fact must be proved to be a fact by sufficient testimony; in general also, the only testimony sufficient in a given case is the best testimony obtainable in that case. This latter is a maxim of law. Thus the law demands, whenever it is possible, oral testimony by witnesses subject to cross-examination. Though cross-examination is beyond the possibilities of everyday investigation, the maxim is a binding principle. Not only law, but also the common sense of educated people, demands the verification of facts by the best tests in any given case available. No statements not thus supported need be accepted; no witness need be credited that does not appear reasonably careful in his observations, responsible, and free from bias and self-interest. Without such checks most argument remains in the air. The first challenge of one's opponent is, How do you know?

133. *Testimony as to Fact*

1. In general, since it is notorious that few people are habitually accurate observers beyond the rather narrow range of their interests or preoccupations, anybody's report of his observations should be analyzed, so far as possible, into its particulars for scrutiny. That is, testimony should be considered, never in bulk, but always in detail, point by point.

2. Then is the witness intelligent, of established character, responsible for his statements, clear from suspicion of bias or self-interest, and consistent?

3. Further, is the testimony corroborated or does it stand alone? Is there any testimony of fairly equal moral weight to contravene it?

4. Testimony given unwittingly (*i.e.* without consciousness of its import), or against the bias or interest of the witness, may have thereby an added significance.

5. Particular value attaches also to the testimony of a witness¹ expert in the observation of the class of facts involved.

Practically this means seek evidence that cannot easily be challenged. Most argument outside of law courts being based on evidence in print, sufficient testimony to fact is practically (1) the primary publications, the original documents (subject to the tests of credibility above), or as far back toward them as research can reasonably extend; (2) authority, *i.e.* accepted sources of information, as standard gazetteers, publications of government bureaus, etc. It is futile to argue about forestry or the adulteration of food products from an article in a popular magazine when every large library contains the reports of the Department of Agriculture; to take statistics about the Philippines from a campaign speech when one's opponent may counter with the *Congressional Record* or the reports of the Philippine Commission; to be content with information about the Siberian Railway from an article written to entertain, when the latest gazetteers and the publications of geographical societies furnish statistics far less liable to dispute. Unless you must, do not rest on information at second hand.

And again, be familiar with the standard sources; with the particular advantages of the various cyclopædias,

¹ By this is not meant "expert testimony," which may be the *opinion* of some one recognized as an authority in the matter involved; *e.g.* the report of a physician to the effect that a certain death was caused by chloroform, or of a bank teller to the effect that a certain signature was made by a certain man.

atlases, gazetteers, compends of history and of the arts and sciences; and also with other recognized publications of statistical information in particular fields. Know what guide-books will tell you where to look for authority in a given matter; turn from a book that cites a better witness to that witness himself; always keep note of the source of your every statement of fact; and never cite somebody else's citation without first verifying it yourself.

This habit of care will give some skill in weighing more doubtful evidence. Many arguments involve mere current report; and in some cases nothing better can be had. In such cases it should be remembered that conclusions are only tentative and temporary, that proof is of the lowest degree. For the rest, the student must compare different accounts, keep himself on the alert against bias and interest, and accustom himself to separate, in newspaper reports and credulous histories, probable fact from probable garnish of art or inference. Remembering that unsupported testimony, except from witnesses whose observation and character are so well known as to compel belief, is weak, he must try to fortify, or conversely, to offset one testimony by another. In a word, he must learn to read critically.

134. Thus fortified against an opponent's *How do you know?* one must also make ready against another question, *What of it?* (§114). *How do you know?* challenges the facts; *What of it?* challenges the inferences. In this case, and that, and that, the attacks of the Chinese "Boxers" were directed against mission stations. *What of it?* Does that prove the missions causes of the outbreak? In this case, and that, and that, — in all known cases, the grazing of sheep in our western forests has

been followed by the decline of the forests. What of it? Does that prove the grazing the cause of the decline? These two different cases are alike typical in presenting the ultimate inquiry as to all inferences. At the long last we come down to this question, Do the facts establish this as cause of that? The answer is in Mill's Canons (§ 99). One's deductions, too, as well as his inductions, should be tested (§ 118). Neither, of course, will bear a test for demonstration (§ 108-109); but since to a certain degree we always use both, since the enthymeme supports the partial induction, and *vice versa*, the use of both must be brought to habitual accuracy.

In all this analysis, *a priori* and *a posteriori*, what prevails, of course, is penetration. All that logic and rhetoric can supply is the tests formulated by experience. Everybody must acquire for himself the skill to see habitually and promptly what is in a case and what is to be done with it.

3. COMPOSITION

(a) *Working Plan*

135. When the evidence has been explored, the field gone over, the next step is to group the argument under as few main heads as possible, and these in an order at once easy to remember and forcible by its sequence. This counsel applies to writing, but much more forcibly to speaking. A complete plan (§ 91, fine print) is not for use in one's hand; its value is quite different. The notes for speaking, in one's hand or in his head, should be few and simple. An elaborate scheme, since it afflicts the memory and hinders quick adaptation, is unwieldy. An unexpected turn of an adversary, an unexpected disposition in an audience, may throw it out

and leave the speaker at a stand. Besides, even the complete plan gets its fulness from detail. A good argument, however elaborately analyzed, will be found to have only a few main points. Only a few main points, then, with their main support, should be regarded as fixed beforehand. Behind that the whole evidence must be ready, so far as possible, for use where it may be needed, but not all in a fixed adjustment from which it cannot readily be detached.

(b) *Essential Parts*

136. Aristotle says that argumentation has but two essential parts; the statement of the case, and the proof. The former is exposition; and the more purely expository it is, the freer from argumentative turns, the stronger will be its effect. Clear, unbiassed statement, excluding whatever is disputed, as it is the only fair way, so is the only wise way in this part. The statement of the case is sometimes called the narrative, since it is sometimes, especially at the bar, a rehearsal of events in chronological order; sometimes, and better, the introduction, since it is necessarily preliminary. It is the definition and division of the proposition, showing the meaning of the terms, their extent and implication, and the issue or issues, surveying and staking out the ground so that every step in the argument may be followed easily. It marks out the common ground of agreement from the debatable ground, and here it must be careful to assume neither too much nor too little: not too much, lest the adversary by fair objection undermine one's foundations; not too little, lest time be wasted in proving more than is necessary.

Here the expository part may merge in the proof. Definition may be made, often is made, in effect argumentative; and conversely, an unfair assumption or implication must be overthrown. But generally it is not hard to establish a fair agreement as to the limits of necessary proof; and generally this part may be regarded as purely expository.

(c) *Formal Parts*

137. But Aristotle makes another division, the four formal parts of a speech, exordium, statement, proof, peroration; and though these are not all essential, they have been at all times common. The two added parts, the first and the last, may be called purely rhetorical. They add nothing to the argument; they may add much to persuasion. Thus the office of the exordium, or rhetorical introduction, according to the concise and final definition of Cicero, is to dispose an audience to good will, attention, and open mind—*reddere auditores benevolos, attentos, dociles*. The means to this end are as various as audiences and speakers. The office of the peroration, or rhetorical conclusion, is correspondingly to leave a clear remembrance and a strong impression. It is the natural place for recapitulation and summary, and the recognized place for appeal to feeling. Summary is generally stronger than recapitulation. It is better to put the whole in a nutshell than to risk being tiresome. But when important points seem to have missed their due impression, it is better to repeat them, and so of any points slighted by an adversary. Appeal to feeling is proper to the peroration, negatively because earlier in the speech the

audience is not so likely to be open to it, has not, as we say, been worked up; and positively because a strong impression implies, almost of necessity, engaging the feelings. To have presented reasons without engaging sympathy is to leave an audience cold. The peroration, then, is the place for applying the discussion to men's real concerns, or, as we say in a metaphor full of import, for bringing it home.

(d) *Division for Debate*

138. Intercollegiate debating has fairly fixed a custom of dividing an argument among three speakers. This threefold division should be such that each speaker may clearly support his predecessor and clearly carry the discussion on toward the conclusion. The case must be complete in an order outlined at the start, carried steadily forward, definitely concluded. On the other hand, the case must not be inflexible. No case, of course, is worth the making which has not considered attentively all probable arguments of the other side, and also forecast probable groupings of these arguments; but completely to forecast the line of the other side is rarely possible. Therefore the plan laid out by any three speakers must also be flexible enough to throw emphasis where emphasis is in the actual debate found necessary. It must also leave some spare time for such answers as may serve to remove an impression that the line has been blocked or broken. Rebuttal is separately provided, by present custom, in a brief second speech from each debater; but since a case loses much of its force which seems at any time to be thwarted, it is both customary and practically necessary for attack and

defence to meet arguments, at least briefly, as they come up. A good line of debate, then, is both a very nice adjustment for emphasis and coherence, and at the same time flexible to immediate pressure.

The practical result of these considerations is somewhat as follows: The first affirmative speech is largely an introduction (§ 136), *i.e.* is largely expository. In defining the issues and the line of proof it should be prepossessing, but above all fair and lucid. The hearers must find the case, or so much of it as is not withheld for strategy, plausible from the start; but first and foremost they must be prepared to follow it easily. The first speaker for the negative has much the same office; but he has also something to attack. It is usually advisable, sometimes necessary, to point out a general deficiency or a particular omission, to insist on a slighted issue, to rebut an ill-advised contention, or to note an implied admission; in general, to reply. This may be done by way of preface, or better, if there be convenient opportunity, in connection with the points of his own case. But since the bringing forward of his own case is his main business, since the clearness of that case depends largely on him, since the case is presumably strong as a whole against the affirmative as a whole, he must not, in an attempt to meet all his adversary's points, leave his own ground. His colleagues are there to carry on the attack in detail; he is there rather to make clear from the start that the case is strong as a whole. Therefore, contenting himself with general reply and the hint that this will be supported later, or with a reply directed against one or two important points, he must keep his main time free for his own case.

The second speeches elaborate and carry on. If the

first speaker has elaborated one main point, as is usual, the second confirms this against attack, shows how the following points, assigned to him, follow and lead on to the next, and elaborates these points of his own most where there appears to be most need. As to rebuttal, though the counsels for the first speech on the negative hold good in general, the second speeches should be the most flexible because they have most room. They have the most favourable opportunity for breaking the opposite line if it has been forecast; and, if it is unexpected, the most favourable opportunity for meeting it by a change of emphasis and by larger use of rebuttal. Provided he leave time enough for that carrying forward of his own case which is essential in a middle speech, a second speaker may spend more or less time in reply according to the exigencies of the occasion. The ideal, as before, is to weave the reply into his own positive argument.

The third speakers have both to elaborate the final points and to conclude. The conclusion should sum up, of course; but it should also show that the final points complete a strong line, that they clinch the proof. The proportion of rebuttal must be determined, on consultation with the other speakers, from what has preceded and what seem to be the opportunities of the short speeches following. It is usually well to make clear by iteration that the strong points of the opposition are met; it is usually unwise to dissipate time over many separate points of rebuttal; it is always and above all necessary to make a strong conclusion of the whole.

The short second speeches of rebuttal depend for their strength so largely on skill in seeing opportunities, and this skill comes so largely from actual practice in

debate, that not much can be said in general counsel. But in general here is the place for filling gaps, especially in the evidence; on the other hand, for demanding particulars and exposing fallacies in detail or weaknesses in the sequence of the whole. Since it is not necessary to keep the same order of speakers as at first, it is wise to place at the end that man who can most readily turn unexpected currents of rebuttal into the channel of his own side. For the main speeches the first man should be the most lucid; the second, the readiest; the third, the steadiest: for the rebuttals the readiest is often put last; but this man must also know how, by rapid summary of both positions, to close with the iteration of his own. Principles and methods of refutation have been discussed already (§§ 114-128); but it is worth while to repeat that rebuttal which degenerates into scattering objections (§ 121) *seriatim* makes little total impression. Rebuttal, like everything else, must be massed on main points.

(e) *Emphasis*

139. Within the proof proper the arrangement must be determined by the exigencies of each case considered separately. There is no rule for determining whether to begin with refutation or with direct proof, whether to present the points of refutation together or separately. All questions of the order of main parts must be settled, partly by the tactics of the other side, mainly by the general principle of emphasis. The ancient maxim that weaker arguments should not come first nor last is only an application of the general law of emphasis by position (§§ 9, 21). More important is the emphasis by space (§§ 10, 22), the dwelling by greater fulness of evidence

and by iteration and illustration on the arguments of main dependence, and conversely, the compression, within the paragraphs that develop these arguments of main dependence, of subordinate arguments. Thus is answered the recurring question of technic, Shall this argument be combined in one paragraph with others or have a paragraph to itself, or be developed in several successive paragraphs? It is only the old problem of emphasis; but in persuasion emphasis, like the other principles of rhetoric, is of more immediate importance.

140. Emphasis is not less important in oral argumentation from the simple working plan; it is simply less obvious as emphasis of space, and more obvious as emphasis of position. As to space, the audience is conscious, indeed, that the speaker is devoting to an argument much or little time; but the estimate is rougher. Only when an adversary is able to reply, My opponent has spent a great deal of time on this point; but I fear it is time wasted, for I am not bound to meet him there, is the audience alive usually to the emphasis of space. Again, iteration is so far less obvious in oral argumentation that it may well be more frequent and more explicit. As to emphasis of position, on the other hand, though the paragraph is not present as a whole to an audience, nor always formally present to the speaker, still the close of that half-impromptu development of a given stage which may be called the oratorical paragraph is, more than in print, a position of emphasis, because it is, more than in print, a place of pause. And further, the emphasis that arises from position after a parenthesis (§ 44) is seen clearly in the oratorical trick of pausing before the delivery of a strong blow.

(f) Coherence

141. The next consideration is coherence, or, as it may be called literally in argumentation, logical progress. Arguments have force of themselves (*ex proprio vigore*); they derive force from the emphasis of presentation; and finally, they give force as leading on to others, as opening the way. Thus they must be made to hang together; and this appears in no other way more clearly than in the invariable attempt of an adversary to make them, according to Franklin's famous witticism, hang separately. The attempt in refutation of a strong sequence of arguments is always to draw attention from that sequence by attacking its members separately. Thus the persuasive force of any good piece of proof is more than the sum of the forces of its separate arguments. It is the force, not merely of addition, but almost of multiplication.

142. The importance attached to sequence by orators appears in their elaboration of connectives. In oral argument the links between the parts, the explicit reference (§ 17), must be fuller and more careful than in written argument, for the obvious reason that defects cannot be corrected by glancing back; but in both explicit reference is more important than in any other kind of composition, because more importance attaches to the sequence that it indicates. Logical progress is an added virtue in exposition (§ 74); in persuasion it is a practical necessity. Rhetorically there is all the difference in the world between an enumeration of arguments and a line, or chain, of proof. A speech must be something more even than the expansion of a well-ordered plan. In persuasion there are few victories by

sheer force of numbers, and many defeats from lack of good marshalling. Emphasis demands first consideration because coherence depends on emphasis (§ 24); but the more important is coherence, logical progress.

143. Nor must logical progress be taken to exclude either appeal to feeling or that constant means to clearness in speaking which is yet inexpressible in any scheme of purely logical analysis—iteration. Iteration, in fact, contributes alike to emphasis in speaking and to coherence; and it may serve both by an effect of cumulation. This is the theory of those sermons that come round again and again to the text. It may be applied more strikingly in almost any sort of public speaking by a plan somewhat as follows:

1. *Introduction and statement of the proposition.* In a sermon the proposition is the text; for other occasions it should be clear, of course, but also brief and striking.

2. *First approach.* The speaker starts apparently at a distance. A brief narrative or description, a detail of the proof, something whose bearing, though real, is not obvious, is used to pique curiosity. From this he proceeds inductively, after the fashion of the periodic paragraph (§ 21), and steadily to his proposition. The hearers, not seeing what he will be at, yet are carried on so naturally that they reach the goal, surprised indeed, but satisfied. The proposition is then repeated in the exact words of its first announcement.

3. *Second approach.* The speaker starts from a different direction, perhaps with a proverb or a reference to some conviction latent in the minds of his hearers. He moves again by the same plan back to

his proposition; and again he repeats it in the same words.

4. *Third approach.* The speaker leads in the same way from a third direction. By this the audience knows what is coming, at first does not know how, then divines, then seizes on the third iteration.

5. *Brief, pointed summary or application.*

This plan, by providing natural pauses for relaxing the attention (§ 151), combines the force of suspense with the force of variety. It also facilitates appeal to emotion; for the start may be made in each case from some point of popular concern, and the gradation of each part may prepare alike acceptance and sympathy. In fact, so far as concerns appeal, it has somewhat the effect of three or four perorations instead of one. Finally, if the successive approaches be arranged in ascending scale, the effect of the whole will be cumulative climax (§ 40). But observe that the plan demands the conception of the whole in a few carefully shaped masses. A series of many short approaches, far from having the same effect, might be both futile and wearisome. The hearer must have time in each case to feel progress. At bottom, then, is the same principle of coherence.

The technical means toward coherence have all been discussed (§§ 7, 17), and that constantly serviceable test, the paragraph summary (§ 76); but logical progress is not, of course, to be had by external means. It is a habit gained by discipline. The only way to gain the force of order is always to think of order, never to be content with looseness. Persuasion is most exacting; and for that very reason it is to all students of composition most repaying.

III. THE LITERARY FORMS OF PERSUASION

144. The literary forms of persuasion have in all times corresponded pretty closely to the kinds of persuasion distinguished by Aristotle according to the kinds of audiences. The first kind, says Aristotle, is *συμβουλευτικόν*, deliberative, proceeding by exhortation or dissuasion in the proof of expediency or in expediency, looking to the future, the speech of the senate and the platform; the second, *δικανικόν*, forensic, proceeding by accusation or defence in the proof of guilt or innocence, looking to the past, the speech of the bar; the third, *ἐπιδεικτικόν*, panegyric, proceeding by eulogy or censure in the proof of honour or dishonour, looking to the present, the speech of the occasion. The division is scientifically complete. To make a fourth class of sermons seems logically impossible; for sermons seem to fall sometimes in the third class, usually in the first, never, so far as they are persuasion, outside of both. In so far as it is persuasion, and of course it may be largely or even entirely exposition, a sermon seems not to be a distinct form. Examples of the first form are found in almost any morning paper, both in the reports of legislative proceedings and "campaign" speeches and in the editorials. The second form is equally obvious and common. Of the third form are Lincoln's Gettysburg speech, Webster's at Bunker Hill, and most prize speeches at college, together with "baccalaureate" and funeral sermons.

B. LITERARY COMPOSITION

(NARRATION AND DESCRIPTION)

CHAPTER IV

THE ELEMENTS OF LITERARY COMPOSITION

145. The principles of literary composition, though ultimately the same, perhaps, as the principles of logical composition, at least presume a different point of view and lead to different applications. This difference in view and application arises from a difference between the two kinds that is certainly essential. Logical composition proceeds by propositions (§ 2), by explicit statement; artistic composition proceeds by kindling the imagination to grasp without the aid of explanation, — proceeds, that is, by implicit suggestion. For the realization sought in artistic composition is not so much intellectual as emotional. It may, indeed, be both; but it is typically the latter.

An essay may seek either; for essay is in the borderland. It may be logical as in Bacon, or emotional as in Hazlitt, or both, and in infinitely variable proportions. But in structure, as a piece of composition, it is logical. Such artistic quality as it has is rather of diction; and this quality it may have, as appears through a large part of the eighteenth century, without much direct appeal to emotion. On the other hand, a purely artistic form, a form determined in its composition, as for example the short story, by considerations quite outside of logic, makes its appeal as a whole, whatever be the character of the diction or the space conceded to logic, distinctively to emotion.

A work of art attains its goal when the artist's conception becomes our conception, when we sympathize. If his object be at all to make us believe with him, still he seeks this incidentally to making us see and feel with him. This appeal primarily to emotion is more largely characteristic of the other arts, perhaps, than of literature, and is most direct in music; but it is also characteristic of literature. The primary aim, and therefore the method, of *Macbeth*, of *The Vicar of Wakefield*, of *Pilgrim's Progress*, widely different as these pieces of literature are, is in various degrees emotional; and the methods toward emotional realization, of whatever degree, are methods, not of explanation, but of suggestion.

146. Another aspect of the same distinction appears when we observe that the mode of logical composition is abstract; of literary composition, concrete. Character, emotion, scenery, in a work of art are not summed up after analysis; they are communicated somewhat as they are communicated in actual experience, by look, gesture, colour, action, — by what appeals to the intellect indirectly through the senses, — in a word, by the concrete (§ 226). Exposition sums up experience in the abstract, puts it into a formula; narration or description selects from experience the light, sound, colour, gesture, the physical details from which experience received suggestions and which may be suggestive to the experience of others, — puts experience into a parable. Both methods may be found in a single literary form, of course most commonly in the essay; but none the less for that the typically literary method differs thus from the typically logical method. The Book of Job is a poem of the soul made perfect through suffering; much the same idea is summed up abstractly in Bacon's

essay on adversity (§ 6). Logical composition, then, states in the abstract ; artistic composition suggests in the concrete.

I. UNITY

a. as arising from personal selection

147. From this essential difference, as between propounding or explaining experience and narrating or describing experience, ensues a different view of the cardinal principles, unity, emphasis, and coherence. These are principles of logic, but not exclusively. In artistic composition unity is regulated by logical relevancy but secondarily. Primarily the unity of artistic composition, whatever the art, is regulated by such selection of a few details as makes further detail and all explanation superfluous. Thus in narration unity means primarily the selection of such details as induce the intended mood and lead to the climax. The selection of these implies the omission of others ; for art is a simplification of life, arbitrary because it is personal. Art is not so much a transcript of experience as a coloured interpretation. Its truth is measured not so much by its literal accuracy, its faithfulness to the rules of evidence, as by its faithfulness to the impression of the writer, the colouring of his own vision. This that I saw myself, he seems to say, had this meaning to me. In a word, artistic unity is unity of conception. True, in literature the matter, the subject, must always be of relatively greater importance than in painting. In painting—sheep, fields, the human face, what difference? We care only for the painter's expression. In literature we care relatively more for subject-matter ; but even in

literature the measure is personal interpretation. Without some interpretation there is no artistic unity, indeed no art; and interpretation necessitates, consciously or unconsciously, the selection of this, the omission of that.

For selection is at once the limitation and the method of all art. The painter reduces a landscape to a few colours laid upon a square of canvas. For being ten times that size his picture would not be the nearer to rendering complete account of the infinite detail of nature. So the narrator, whether of fact or of fiction, can make no approach to complete rendering of that complicated succession of details, external and internal, which makes up a human life. Thus to render one day would demand the length of a novel. A painstaking biography is often far smaller than the bulk of the mere correspondence from which it is drawn; and a man's correspondence fills but a small part of his days. Mere physical necessity, then, demands selection. But even if the artist could present the detail of nature, he would not. That is not his way. To say that he is an artist is to say that he has the impulse to express his own view of life, his interpretation, his own personality. And the value of his work to us is measured but secondarily by the number and accuracy of its facts; that is the measure of science: it is measured primarily by the truth and beauty with which facts are interpreted by him; that is the measure of art. Art does not try to compete with the impressions of life, nor even to record them, such record being the business of laboratories for research in psychology, but to interpret them through the simplifying medium of personal selection.

b. as producing singleness of impression

148. The unity of literary composition, then, appearing in the essential artistic method of selection, is a unity not illogical, indeed, but not determined by logic. It is a unity of impression. The writer keeps us in a mood, leads us to a dominant emotion, makes the whole open a single vision. Unity in this sense often eludes formulation. *Macbeth* has unity. Will any one venture to sum up *Macbeth* in a sentence? The unity is felt, and, being felt, needs no statement. The *Ancient Mariner* seems to be summed up in :

“ He prayeth best who loveth best — ”

but reflection finds this stanza summary of the message, or moral, of the poem, not of its whole meaning. So *The Fall of the House of Usher* is a very subtle harmonization of the single theme of fear. But that word *fear*, or any nicer synonym, is quite inadequate to express the constant dominance of a single, strong impression. Whether formulation, then, is helpful or not, whether or not it is even possible, a work of art is unified only when the unity is felt.

II. COHERENCE

149. The principle of coherence again, though the statements of it at §§ 7, 17, 75, hold for both kinds, means in artistic composition more than logical progress. The progress of the *Sentimental Journey*, indeed, is even illogical; but, logical or not, the coherence of artistic composition must be something more. When the hero leaves the room he may be made to go anywhere. A ship leaving the wharf of a description

might be bound for the Indies or the Pole. But it must not seem so to the reader. To him the destination of everything must seem inevitable from what went before. This is the effect of artistic gradation, part so laid to part that the progress may seem inevitable, spontaneous because the connection seems almost organic.

150. Of artistic coherence most that is not detail (§ 192) may be summed up in the word *movement*. The arrangement and the transitions must be such that the composition may seem to move always, to move naturally, and to move without being from time to time wound up. In a word, artistic coherence is movement without interruption. The fine workman is known by his transitions; and where else are we so sure to detect the 'prentice hand? Explanatory interpolations ("where we arrived," "presents an appearance," "due to the discouragement of fatigue," see § 195) are not always pared off by the mere process of selection; and further, the information that remains necessary to clearness and yet is not really part of the action or scene to be suggested, must be provided without obvious intrusion (§§ 170-172). Thus the antecedent action of a story or drama is made to transpire through the action proper and the dialogue while both at the same time are moving on. Thus the necessary information in description is insinuated in subordinate clauses and suggested by the implication of the descriptive words. To describe as follows is distinctly inartistic:

I took an electric car from the green. When we reached the end of the line at Burgess Street I saw on the left a high bank of red clay. There were few trees anywhere except a grove of dark green pines at the top of this bank. Several street boys, having left their clothes under the trees, ran

down the bank and plunged into the river, which winds here through salt meadows before emptying into the harbour. Their naked bodies flashed in the sun; and they yelled as they ran down.

All that this expresses descriptively is :

From the dark grove of pines naked bodies flashed down the steep red clay bank into the river, till the salt harbour meadow was alive with the cries and splashing of street boys.

This very obvious case shows that artistic conciseness, which is primarily achieved through selective omission (§ 147), depends also on movement without interruption, that is on artistic coherence. Delicacy in this art of transitions is seen at its finest in the *Sentimental Journey* :

I looked at Monsieur Dessein through and through; eyed him as he walked along in profile, then *en face*; thought him like a Jew, then a Turk; disliked his wig; cursed him by my gods; wished him at the devil.

And is all this to be lighted up in the heart for a beggarly account of three or four louis d'ors, which is the most I can be overreached in? "Base passion!" said I, turning myself about as a man naturally does upon a sudden reverse of sentiment; "Base, ungentle passion! thy hand is against every man, and every man's hand against thee." "Heaven forbid!" said she, raising her hand up to her forehead; for I had turned full in front upon the lady whom I had seen in conversation with the monk: she had followed us unperceived. "Heaven forbid, indeed!" said I, offering her my own. She had a black pair of silk gloves, open only at the thumb and two fore-fingers — so accepted it without reserve, and I led her up to the door of the *remise*.

III. EMPHASIS

151. In like manner the principle of emphasis in artistic composition implies a subordination not merely, nor necessarily, logical. With this modification, however, the rules read for the one almost as for the other. A part must have space proportional to its significance, to the directness of its bearing in this sense on the main point (§§ 8-10), which in narrative is the issue, the event. In detail, too, the rules of climax (§§ 40, 41), of suspense (§ 37), of the prominence given by a pause to what follows (§§ 44, 140), are as good for the one kind as for the other. The single aspect that needs extension is variety, which has heretofore been considered only in its application to single paragraphs (§ 27). More largely applied, as to the order and relation of incidents, the principle of variety is not so much an exception to the principle of unity as an instance of that kind of emphasis which is seen most simply in the rule of contrast, more widely in the pleasure of surprise in stories and the relief of comic scenes in tragedy. Besides the force arising from strict subordination to one end, there is also a force arising from a just estimate of flux and reflux in our impressions, of the reaction that follows action. Unity and emphasis say, Never lose the key; variety says, Provide the relief of incidental change without letting the change be more than incidental.

152. These counsels of art have a value even for those who, without assurance of talent, practise artistic composition to the end of bettering their appreciation. No one understands quite so fully the beauty of picture or story as he that has worked, faithfully if feebly, with

his own brush or pen. It is not simply the craft of details that thus emerges from the study to express oneself, but, what is far more important, a sense of artistic structure, of adjustment, relations, proportion. Besides, almost every man of open mind has occasions beyond mere academic practice for expressing himself. Life would be richer if people extended and applied their education by informing their letters and conversation with their own personalities. That letters and conversation are commonly trite and colourless arises not so much from lack of personality as from indolence. The expression of oneself is the result oftener of perseverance than of effortless spontaneity; and something, at least, of this, the degree varying all the way from a sincere letter to a great novel, every one may learn. Thus the study of artistic composition, though it contributes little to the business of life, has for the average man in college a twofold value: it widens and deepens his criticism, and it opens some expression of his personality. In this aspect it is good for artisans as well as for artists.

CHAPTER V

NARRATION

153. Of artistic composition in words the type is narration. Narration is rather inclusive of description than distinct from it. True, the latter may appear without the former, as exposition may appear without argument; but the former cannot dispense with the latter, and which a given piece shall be called is often not worth deciding. An account of a boat race or a battle is usually as much one as the other. Moreover, the fact that most description is found within narration is not accidental; for description, having usually no motive of its own, is almost essentially dependent. It is typically but the stage setting of the story. Of the two, then, description is the subordinate, narration the principal.

154. No art for the pleasure of man is older or more nearly universal than story-telling; no other has flourished so constantly; no other is so common to-day. It is the perennial art. From the beginning it shows two vital sources of interest: the interest in human nature, in character; and the interest in the succession of events, in plot. From the beginning, too, these have never been sharply separated; but the expression of character has in most literatures matured earlier. This is epic. The basis of epic, as Aristotle says, is character. What gives vitality to the *Iliad*, to the *Song of Roland*, to *Beowulf*, is not so much the chain of incidents, the

adventure, as the vivid humanity of the heroes. Contrast with these the later heroes, Launcelot, Tristram, Percival, the heroes of the great mediæval romances. These do not appeal to us in the same way. They are habitually and typically personages rather than persons. They do not often manifest such traits as make them seem flesh and blood, or even very different one from another. Rather the interest of the romances is not so much in persons as in adventures, far less the interest of character than the interest of incident. These two main springs of narrative interest have predominated alternately in literary fashion through many centuries ; but, to speak generally, both are perennial. Even among people of wide culture and sympathies, one rather than the other will be the predilection of the individual reader ; but few stories rely on either exclusively. Story-telling requires, with whatever emphasis on the one or the other, both persons and incidents, both character and plot. These are its elements.

I. CHARACTER

155. The literary expression of character can as little be inculcated as the expression of feeling in persuasion. At its height it is what we significantly call creation, with equal significance applying the word also to the conception of a great character expressed by a great actor. Shakespeare's Hamlet is a creation, how marvellous a creation we learned much more fully from the Hamlet of Edwin Booth. Only a rare gift of insight into human nature could create, in print or on the stage, Hamlet or Becky Sharp, or even the least of the people that we know from novels as well as we know our friends in the flesh. But we have met men of an in-

sight into human nature suggesting genius who yet cannot write novels or plays. Besides the genius of insight there must be the genius of realization, of reduction to a few symbols suggestive for everybody. And when we say genius we say the incommunicable gift.

156. Still, below the level of creation, of the realizations of genius, there is wide room for fruitful presentation of character; and in this the achievements of genius may be made to yield at least general hints of method. Thus it is plain that character, like everything else in narration, must appear in the concrete,—in speech, action, gesture. In so far as character has to be explained in the abstract the story has failed. The personality must be felt without comment, must express itself. To say that John was prone to sentimentality, or that he had all the while been growing in self-control, is not the way of story. If the reader does not know that without explanation, he will not endure to read the explanation. In all literature one of the most poignant expressions of the coming of love is a dozen verses at the end of the fifth canto of Dante's *Inferno*:

One day, for pastime, we read of Lancelot, how love constrained him. We were alone, and without all suspicion. Several times that reading urged our eyes to meet, and changed the colour of our faces. But one moment alone it was that overcame us. When we read how the fond smile was kissed by such a lover, he, who shall never be divided from me, kissed my mouth all trembling. The book, and he who wrote it, was a Galeotto. That day we read in it no farther.—*Inferno*, v. 127–138, John Carlyle's translation.

157. Thus narrative expresses a man by significant actions and words, as, most crudely, by his mannerisms

or dialect (§ 161). It expresses him also by the reaction of other characters, by the attitude toward him of the few people chosen for the purposes of the story to represent his world. We learn Arthur Dimmesdale largely through Roger Chillingworth. Nay more, we learn each through the other; for in finer story-telling the characters come out by interaction. A simple means to this end is contrast, the making of one character a foil to another, as Blifil is a foil to Tom Jones, or George Osborne to Dobbin. A more convincing means, but one requiring also more space and more art, is what in drama is called the underplot, as in *King Lear* the contributory action of Edmund the Bastard; in the *Merchant of Venice*, that of Lorenzo and Jessica. The danger of this, except in skilled hands, is confusion, the multiplying of characters without sufficiently apparent purpose. In *David Copperfield*, the action of Steerforth seems intended to have some bearing on the character of David, but we do not clearly feel what bearing. There should be characters enough to help the illusion of reality, but not one more than is useful in developing the main character.

a. Dominance of One Main Character (Unity, Emphasis)

158. Developing the main character is a phrase of importance. For there must be one main character. A story must be the story, not merely of several people, but particularly of one person. The event, the issue of the story, must be the issue of his character; and all the play of character on character, as all the progress of incidents, is to have primary reference to him. He determines the point of view, and so all the light and colour and proportions. Two narratives of the same

incidents but different protagonists may differ as widely in effect as if they had nothing in common. One of the first questions in considering the promise of any material is, Whose story is this for me? Henry III. at Canossa, — is this for me the story of a great and proud king finally bent by his lifelong enemy? Or is it the story of a great and faithful Pope vindicating a right for which he would either suffer or make others suffer? Is it Henry's story or Gregory's? The stories of both lie there in the material; but no story emerges till the narrator is dominated by one.

Whether the incidents be fact or imagination makes no essential difference. In either case the story is a selection from the material. No two men make the same selection.

In one of the many Italian uprisings against Austria, a Sicilian youth, who had already exhibited great daring, is said to have volunteered as a spy. Discovered by the Austrians in their camp and summarily condemned to be shot, he lost his courage. His mother, permitted to visit his cell, found him in such agony of fear as to compel the contempt of his Austrian guards. After appealing vainly to his fortitude, she told him, in a feigned scorn, that the Austrians had at last rated him not worth shooting; that they intended, for the public exhibition of his cowardice, to go through the form with blank cartridges. Believing this lie, he stood up smiling next morning before the rifles — and, of course, was killed instantly.

Here is the bare material for a story. *Whose* story? Is your main figure the boy or the mother? The decision of this determines the proportion, the relief, as the painters say, due to every incident and every situation. For instance, if the story is primarily of the boy, is the climax presumably his death? If it is of the mother, after she has taken that lie on her soul, after she has, perhaps, seen her son fall, what then?

b. Development of Character (Coherence as Consistency)

159. And the word *developing* is itself full of significance. As a character must not be stated, formulated, but suggested by what he does and says and suffers, so he must be unfolded gradually and consistently. Here are Scylla and Charybdis; on the one hand the necessity of avoiding inconsistent suddenness, on the other hand the necessity of strictly limited space. Theoretically the issue is simple: first select only the most significant situations, trusting these to suggest others; secondly, let the indications of character be nicely graded. Gradation is the secret of most artistic illusion. By this a landscape painter suggests distance on his little flat bit of canvas, and even the carver of cameos manages the same effect with proportions almost infinitesimal. The brief actual time of reading appears like the immensely longer time assumed for the events of the story when, the insignificant having been pared away, a few significant incidents suggest that multitude of others with which in real life they would be involved, and when each incident and conversation, even each gesture, is a step in a determined progress to a determined end. The hints of the progress of character do not seem to come unnaturally fast, if each has had its way prepared. That a man's character should develop with the rapidity of reading about it, or even with the rapidity implied by the time limits of the action, may be even more preposterous than that within the same little space events should crowd so thickly and so significantly. But neither is felt to be preposterous when the sequence is cunningly graded. That coherence in characterization, then, which we call consistency of character, is largely an affair of gradation.

160. Theoretically this is the way. Practically it is a hard way to hit; but practically the difficulty is by most students evaded. For development of character almost demands greater length than is usually attempted in college. The type of college narrative is the short story (§ 181). This gives ample room for study of all narrative effects except the most ambitious, and is contributory even to these; but instead of developing character, it typically confines itself to a single situation or crisis. This situation may, indeed, suggest a whole life; but it cannot, as the novel does, give the impression of growth, of moral evolution. The practical counsel, then, as to presentation of character, amounts to this: Having drawn from the material of your choice or invention the main person and his crisis, grade as nicely as you can within your limits of time; be very carefully consistent; but rely rather on the suggestiveness of the main revelation than on such evolution as usually demands much greater space.

c. Dialogue

161. For whichever degree of development, character is expressed naturally by dialogue. Dialogue is typical of drama; but even in story, as a means of concreteness and also of conciseness, some dialogue is usually necessary, and a great deal is usually desirable. Variety in dialogue, which is sought as the surest means of differentiating characters, comes ultimately from such realization of each character as makes impossible his talking like any other. The differences appear on analysis, of course, to be in the length and form of sentences (§ 27) as much as in the choice of words; but, equally of course, analysis is not the way to create

them. Rather the realization of a character should be above all the realization of his habit of speech. Even a mannerism, like Uriah Heep's harping on the word *humble*, is directly useful. Above expression by mannerisms, which may be no more than caricature, range many degrees of fineness. The memorable Miss Bates in Jane Austen's *Emma* is distinguished almost entirely by the peculiar flavour of her prolixity; but the prolixity of Gratiano in the *Merchant of Venice* is suggested distinctly in a few lines. As in all other matters of characterization, Shakespeare is supreme in lifelike variety of speech.

162. The other task of dialogue, to forward the plot, is involved in the larger problem of transitions (§ 192), *i.e.* is largely a matter of mechanism. Futility in narration is marked by eternal *says I* and *said he*. The ways out of this are: first, to omit most of these explanatory transitions as unnecessary; second, simply to vary the terms, — *said, replied, rejoined, answered, ejaculated*, etc.; third, and surest of all, as often as possible to use terms suggestive of attitude, manner, or even character — *insisted the other, the boy blurted, whispered the girl, the child cried, clamoured the three*, and so *lisped, panted, stammered, coldly affirmed, warmly denied, went, screamed, hissed, bellowed*, and fifty other specific verbs (§ 226). In fact, what may be called the mechanism of variety in narration is part of the mechanism of description.

II. PLOT

a. Unity

163. Thus it is evident that unity in a story is secured mainly by the handling of the characters; that is, by

reducing so far as is feasible the number of characters, and by making the story primarily the story of one person. This leads incidentally to unity of tone, the jarring of incongruities in dialogue, and even in scene, being obviated by the clear realization of one dominant personality. But unity has also to be secured for the plot. Remembering that plot and character, the two elements of narration, are involved the one in the other; remembering also that unity is primarily a consideration of character, emphasis and coherence primarily considerations of plot,—the narrator must nevertheless take care to unify the plot. Toward this his first step is the reduction of both the time and the place of the action to manageable limits. He has to select a place natural for the meeting of his characters, and cut out a piece of time within which, by the artistic simplification of life, he can make the action run its artificially rapid course to a culmination. So much of what precedes the significant period of his selection (§ 171) as is necessary for the understanding of the action within that period he will contrive, by dialogue or otherwise, during the earlier part of the action, to hint. If he begin with the hero's parents for the sake of exhibiting heredity, he will burden his tale with some twenty-five useless years, when the result might be achieved by somebody's remark during the course of the action proper. Instead of transporting the reader from New York to San Francisco and back for the sake of contributory incidents there, he may much more effectively have those incidents reported by one of the characters on the spot chosen for the scene of the main incidents. Skill in omission, which is a large part of the art of narrative, begins by a strict cutting down of time and place.

164. The reason for this is ultimately that art is an arbitrary simplification of life (§ 147). Verisimilitude, the illusion of actuality, which is an aim of art, is gained not by inclusion, but by exclusion. To assist in spirit at the unfolding of even a great love, or a daring crime, or a shrewd policy, within the limits of four walls and one week, or even one day, usually tasks the imagination less than to move in spirit, for the same period of reading, from place to place and from year to year. Simplification of machinery (§ 150), which begins in this way, contributes directly to verisimilitude. Therefore for the short story the simplification may be carried even to the extent of the "dramatic unities" of action, place, and time. The great Attic tragedies are limited, not only to the unfolding of one main action, but also to one place, typically the palace-front, and to one day. The same limits are kept, not only by the French classical drama, but also by many of the best modern French farces. The value of this concentration is intensity; the danger of it is that the illusion should fail through too obvious artificiality. For the short story, and especially for students, its promise outweighs its danger; and in general the value of unity in plot, whether it be carried so far or not, may be summed up in two words: simplification intensifies.

165. Narrative unity may be furthered by the skilful choice of a narrator. Scott's *Kenilworth* might have been bound together by telling it all from the point of view of Tressilian. *David Copperfield* approaches unity solely through its form of autobiography; and the same device is employed much better in Stevenson's *Kidnapped* and *David Balfour* and in many of Kipling's short stories. It appears also, though veiled by the

third person, in *Henry Esmond*. Decide, then, first whether your story will be unified most easily by an impersonal narrator, as by a spectator whose character is not suggested, or by a personal narrator; and, if the latter, by one of the actors or by some person outside, a sailor talking in a tavern, an Adirondack guide "swapping yarns," a cynical man of the world, an enthusiastic priest. But the care in this must not appear in elaborate preparation, as in a long or formal introduction. Like every other part of the mechanism, this must seem simple, lest it mar both illusion and proportions. Care in the choice of a narrator, with care that this mechanism shall not appear as mechanism, insures at least unity of tone; it may contribute much more.

b. Emphasis

166. Unity in plot, then, means the simplification of time and place, and a skilful choice of the narrator. It is also involved, together with the principle of emphasis, in the fundamental idea of narration, that every story, and every part of a story, must proceed to one main event. This event, which determines the whole course of the story, without which, indeed, there is no story, is for both character and action the culmination, the issue, the solution. The fixing of the situation in which the story is to culminate, which is to be its outcome, serves the same purpose as the fixing of a conclusion in exposition or argument. It is the counsel of unity because it binds the whole into one; it is the counsel of emphasis because it involves the principle of climax. *Climax*, therefore, is the name commonly used of the story's close; and whether or not the story increase in force by

every stage, according to the literal meaning, the word still expresses conveniently the idea of progress to a culmination.

167. Another common term for the culmination of a story is the *situation*. The word *situation* suggests the necessity that the story culminate, not in a summary, but in an action. If the whole mood of narrative is concrete, not abstract, much more must the culmination be concrete. A story must close, not by logical solution of the action, by a "moral" summing up the whole, but by artistic solution of the action, that is by suggestion through word and deed. This situation is what the narrator imagines first. Until he can see this, he remains uncertain whether he has a story or not; when he sees this he may be fairly sure that the rest will come.

A frontiersman, coming home through the snow on lonely plains, finds his child crying at the breast of her dead mother. The horror of loneliness and privation is gathered into that scene. When the narrator has conceived that vividly—the sound of wailing in the silence as he approaches the door barred with snow, the action of the man at this crisis, giving the final revelation of his character—he has his story. For another narrator the climax of an action of the same import might be the insanity of the wife; and in either case, according to the narrator's conception, the climax, and therefore the whole story, might be either the man's or the woman's (§ 158). But for every narrator the goal is necessarily a situation.

C. Coherence

168. The same word *situation* is used also of the previous scenes leading successively to the great scene; for example, the scene on the plains would be just as much a situation if it were not *the* situation, the climax. Real-

izing first the situation, the narrator proceeds to realize the situations, the points in the story at which the actors are to be brought significantly together. Each one of these, according to the law of emphasis, is to be subordinated to the great situation, lest the interest come to an end before the close; according to the law of coherence is to lead naturally to the next, lest the action seem interrupted or inconsistent. In a novel there may be many situations. *Vanity Fair* has Becky's refusal of old Sir Pitt, at once an interesting complication of plot and a clear, though unobtrusive, indication of character; then the Waterloo chapter, with Brussels as a stage for the natural meeting of the principal persons, the character of each clearly displayed by this crisis; then Rawdon Crawley's branding of the Marquis of Steyne. These are some of the main situations; there are many minor ones, such as Becky's reception of visitors at the German inn. In a short story, the characters being fewer and the whole scale smaller, there is sometimes only one situation (§160), the climax. Indeed, the time limit of a short story is typically too strict to give room for more than hints of minor situations. But even in a short story the successive stages of advance, though they be not developed beyond a few lines, must in the narrator's mind be distinctly conceived and clearly ordered. The ordering of a story, its coherence of plot, is thus seen to be the arrangement of successive situations to bring about one main situation. This is what is meant by the movement of a story. Make the story move; make it move on.

Make the story move. Remember that a story is typically an action, a succession of events, by this mood of action marking off its domain from those of the other

arts. Since the reader naturally expects things to happen, of all faults he will least readily tolerate hanging and lagging. Make the story move on ; that is, so order its progress that each stage, besides interesting the reader for itself, shall also help to make the culmination seem inevitable.

169. But though the close should thus be made to seem inevitable, it should rarely be forecast. For part of the interest in story, sometimes a great part, is in wondering what the issue will be, in suspense. If the close be foreseen from too plain hints in the earlier action, the reader may not care to go on. On the other hand, the surprise that comes from inconsistency, from violation of coherence in character (§ 159), is cheap, sometimes exasperating. The close must seem worth waiting for. These two demands on narrative skill, often hard to reconcile, are not irreconcilable. The progress of the action, interesting from its liveliness, gives hints enough, not to forestall, but to foreshadow and prepare while they pique curiosity ; and all these together fall short of the final fulness of revelation. The method may be summed up in the word *culmination*. "The plot thickens ;" the progress of events gathers momentum enough to carry a reader on through the increasing clearness of his conjecture to an issue doubly satisfying in that it has been previously divined enough to be approved, but, till the end, not enough to relax his interest. That the last scene should seem inevitable, or, as the effect is sometimes called, convincing, and that on the other hand it should not be forecast, is the two-fold task of coherence in plot.

170. For the main movement of an action there are two typical modes, which may be called respectively the

mode of drama and the mode of story. The mode of drama has the climax in the middle; the mode of story has the climax at the end. It is not meant that all dramas have the one, all stories the other; but that the modes are generally characteristic. Thus the formal parts of a Greek tragedy may be called :

antecedent action, what has happened before the curtain rises, and has thus to be made clear by allusions early in the action;

rise, the succession of situations leading up to the climax;

climax,

fall, the succession of situations ensuing upon the climax;

conclusion, the solution, or final result of the climax, called by the Greeks *catastrophe*.

Immediately after the climax is "the scene of dramatic reverse," where, in tragedy, the fortunes of the hero are seen to turn suddenly from good to bad; in comedy, from bad to good. For example, in *Macbeth* the climax is the throne scene, Macbeth at the summit of his ambition. Immediately follows the scene of dramatic reverse, the ghost of Banquo. The antecedent action is Macbeth's career before the battle on the heath, which is sufficiently explained in the opening scenes. The conclusion is his ruin. The rise and fall are obvious. A story, on the other hand, differs typically in that it so manipulates a climax as to make it suggest also the conclusion. A narrative climax is both culmination and solution. Typically, then, it suppresses the fall. Up to the climax the action is unfolded; after the climax it is merely hinted. The solution of a drama, the working out of character in results, is pro-

portionally much fuller. The solution of a story is left largely to the reader's imagination. We are convinced that the hero, having mastered his world at the chosen crisis, will succeed ; but we are not told, and nowadays we do not usually care to be told, just how. The narrator habitually suppresses the stages of the result ; he works out only the stages of the preparation. This habit is implied in the trite, "So they lived happily ever after." And since the climax is thus made, as it were, to do double duty, it is, oftener than in drama, elaborated. What is thus generally the habit of story is particularly the habit of the short-story.

But there are, on each side, exceptions, stories that proceed upon the dramatic pattern of rise and fall, dramas that proceed upon the narrative pattern of the inclined plane. The *Ancient Mariner*, which is a great narrative as well as a great poem, is in construction dramatic. From the wonderfully concise antecedent action in the opening stanzas it proceeds by a definite rise to the climax of utter isolation, cut off from man and God, isolation of body and of soul. The scene of dramatic reverse is the mariner's half-voluntary ejaculation of prayer, blessing the water-snakes. Follows a very full fall, quite as long as the rise, down to a rounded conclusion of expiation, a full, even a formulated, solution. Stories of this pattern, and dramas of the other, such as *Twelfth Night*, show the feasibility of both modes for both purposes ; but it remains true that the mode of story, as in the *Pardoner's Tale* of Chaucer, is typically different from the mode of drama.

171. For story and drama alike, one of the chief ways to make the action move without interruption is a skilful arrangement of the antecedent action. For story and

for drama this problem is essentially the same, — how to make an artificially brief action clear. The most obvious solution is to begin with a summary exposition of what has already happened before the curtain rises, and a summary description of the scene. This is not to solve the problem, but to give it up. That drama or story has failed which needs any sort of preface. We rightly expect either to begin forthwith. A story must be complete in itself, must make itself plain without explaining. The antecedent action must be inside, not outside. Therefore, like everything else in the story, it must be suggested in the concrete as part of the constant movement forward. Instead of delaying or interrupting the movement, it must fall into step. The story glances back as it moves on. An incident, the betrayal of a habit, an attitude, a mere word, carries the two-fold suggestion of what has been and what is or may be. Narrative is crammed with connotation (§ 222). The characters as they talk and act together, revealing their present, incidentally reveal enough of their past. The scene, the physical environment, appears in the same way through their eyes, directly supports their actions. Separate elaboration of these appears less natural because their interest for us is not in themselves, but in their bearing. Since it is somewhat after this incidental fashion that we pick up in real life knowledge of people's antecedents and impressions of their environment, the incidental method helps the illusion. Within the first few moments of reading a good story we know what the place is and who the persons, except in so far as the withholding of some past fact will further suspense without hindering clearness; and we know persons and place, all that makes

their present situation clear, without a moment's delay of their present action. None of this is formally explained; it transpires.

In the following the antecedent action is cleverly conveyed in dialogue, which at the same time suggests the main character, strikes the key of the whole tale, and whets curiosity.

THE BEACH OF FALESÀ, BEING THE NARRATIVE OF A SOUTH SEA TRADER

CHAPTER I — A SOUTH SEA BRIDAL

I saw that island first when it was neither night nor morning. The moon was to the west, setting, but still broad and bright. To the east, and right amidships of the dawn, which was all pink, the daystar sparkled like a diamond. The land breeze blew in our faces, and smelt strong of wild lime and vanilla: other things besides, but these were the most plain; and the chill of it set me sneezing. I should say I had been for years on a low island near the line, living for the most part solitary among natives. Here was a fresh experience: even the tongue would be quite strange to me; and the look of these woods and mountains, and the rare smell of them, renewed my blood.

The captain blew out the binnacle lamp.

"There!" said he, "there goes a bit of smoke, Mr. Wiltshire, behind the break of the reef. That's Falesà, where your station is, the last village to the east — nobody lives to windward — I don't know why. Take my glass, and you can make the house out."

I took the glass; and the shores leaped nearer, and I saw the tangle of the woods and the breach of the surf, and the brown roofs and the black insides of houses peeped among the trees.

"Do you catch a bit of white there to the east'ard?" the captain continued. "That's your house. Coral built, stands high, veranda you could walk on three abreast; best station in the South Pacific. When old Adams saw it, he took and shook me by the hand. 'I've dropped into a soft thing here,' says he. — 'So you have,' says I, 'and time too.' Poor Johnny! I never saw him again but the once, — and then he had changed his tune, — couldn't get on with the natives, or the whites, or something; and the next time we came around he was dead and buried. I took and put up a bit of stick to him: 'John Adams, *obit* eighteen and sixty-eight. Go thou and do likewise.' I missed that man. I never could see much harm in Johnny."

"What did he die of?" I inquired.

"Some kind of sickness," says the captain. "It appears it took him sudden. Seems he got up in the night, and filled up on Pain-Killer and Kennedy's Discovery. No go; he was booked beyond Kennedy. Then he had tried to open a case of gin. No go again: not strong enough. Then he must have turned to and run out on the veranda, and cap-sized over the rail. When they found him, the next day, he was clean crazy — carried on all the time about some one watering his copra. Poor John."

"Was it thought to be the island?" I asked.

"Well, it was thought to be the island, or the trouble, or something," he replied. "I never could hear but what it was a healthy place. Our last man, Vigours, never turned a hair. He left because of the beach — said he was afraid of Black Jack and Case and Whistling Jimmie, who was still alive at the time, but got drowned soon afterward when drunk. As for old Captain Randall, he's been here any time since eighteen-forty, forty-five. I could never see much harm in Billy, nor much change. Seems as if he might live to be as old as Kafoozleum. No, I guess it's healthy."

"There's a boat coming now," said I. "She's right in the

pass; looks to be a sixteen-foot whale; two white men in the stern-sheets."

"That's the boat that drowned Whistling Jimmie," cried the captain; "let's see the glass. Yes, that's Case, sure enough, and the darkie. They've got a gallows bad reputation, but you know what a place the beach is for talking."

ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON.

172. The necessity for uninterrupted movement also controls dialogue. In dialogue character and plot come together, and the revelation of the one must not trench on the forwarding of the other. While it avoids such compression as might seem too sententious to be natural, it must strenuously avoid prolixity. Easy, fluent, it ought to be; but first of all it must be significant. No part of narrative skill is more difficult than to make the dialogue suggest plot and character simultaneously, the one by the other, and none is better worth acquiring. For the best dialogue is the very type of that beautiful and significant simplification of life which is art. It is essence of life.

"This is good. I hoped I should find you. I came down on purpose." St. George was there, without a change of dress and with a kind face—his graver one—to which Overt eagerly responded. He explained that it was only for the Master—the idea of a little talk—that he had sat up, and that, not finding him, he had been on the point of going to bed.

"Well, you know, I don't smoke—my wife doesn't let me," said St. George, looking for a place to sit down. "It's very good for me—very good for me. Let us take that sofa."

"Do you mean smoking is good for you?"

"No, no, her not letting me. It's a great thing to have a wife who proves to one all the things one can do without.

One might never find them out for oneself. She doesn't allow me to touch a cigarette."

They took possession of the sofa, which was at a distance from the group of smokers, and St. George went on: "Have you got one yourself?"

"Do you mean a cigarette?"

"Dear, no! a wife."

"No; and yet I would give up my cigarette for one."

"You would give up a good deal more than that," said St. George. "However, you would get a great deal in return. There is a great deal to be said for wives," he added, folding his arms and crossing his outstretched legs. He declined tobacco altogether and sat there without returning fire. Paul Overt stopped smoking, touched by his courtesy; and after all they were out of the fumes, their sofa was in a far-away corner. It would have been a mistake, St. George went on, a great mistake for them to have separated without a little chat; "for I know all about you," he said, "I know you've written a very distinguished book."

"And how do you know it?" Overt asked.

"Why, my dear fellow, it's in the air, it's in the papers, it's everywhere," St. George replied, with the immediate familiarity of a confrère—a tone that seemed to his companion the very rustle of the laurel. "You're on all men's lips, and, what's better, you're on all women's. And I've just been reading your book."

"Just? You hadn't read it this afternoon," said Overt.

"How do you know that?"

"You know how I know it," the young man answered, laughing.

"I suppose Miss Fancourt told you."

"No, indeed; she led me rather to suppose that you had."

"Yes; that's much more what she would do. Doesn't she shed a rosy glow over life? But you didn't believe her?" asked St. George.

"No, not when you came to see us."

"Did I pretend? did I pretend badly?" But without waiting for an answer to this St. George went on: "You ought always to believe such a girl as that — always, always. Some women are meant to be taken with allowances and reserves; but you must take her just as she is."

"I like her very much," said Paul Overt.

Something in his tone appeared to excite on his companion's part a momentary sense of the absurd; perhaps it was the air of deliberation attending this judgment. St. George broke into a laugh and returned: "It's the best thing you can do with her. She's a rare young lady! In point of fact, however, I confess I hadn't read you this afternoon."

"Then you see how right I was in this particular case not to believe Miss Fancourt."

"How right? how can I agree to that, when I lost credit by it?"

"Do you wish to pass for exactly what she represents you? Certainly you needn't be afraid," Paul said.

"Ah, my dear young man, don't talk about passing — for the likes of me! I'm passing away — nothing else than that. She has a better use for her young imagination (isn't it fine?) than in representing in any way such a weary, wasted, used-up animal!" St. George spoke with a sudden sadness which produced a protest on Paul's part; but before the protest could be uttered he went on, reverting to the latter's successful novel:

"I had no idea you were so good — one hears of so many things. But you're surprisingly good."

"I'm going to be surprisingly better," said Overt.

"I see that, and it's what fetches me. I don't see so much else — as one looks about — that's going to be surprisingly better. They're going to be consistently worse — most of the things. It's so much easier to be worse — heaven knows I've found it so. I'm not in a great glow, you know, about

what's attempted, what's being done. But you must be better — you must keep it up." — HENRY JAMES: *The Lesson of the Master*, pages 26-29.

What every skilful story-teller tries to accomplish in the speech of his characters George Meredith attempts even for their thoughts. Thoughts that would naturally be unexpressed are for every writer intractable material. Flatly to expound them, or artificially to express them in "asides" or forced dialogue, either way is a makeshift — often necessary, but still a makeshift. Meredith has a way of making us think the thoughts of his imaginary persons by supplying the physical details, the *stimuli*, by which those thoughts were suggested. Thus the reader is put into the person's place with peculiar intimacy, forgets himself in the other, for a few moments almost becomes that person. Thus also description, action, explanation, are all interwoven. Superficially the cunning web seems a simple carrying forward of plot; but the weaving is subtle enough to be worth minute examination.

Redworth struck on a southward line from the chalk-ridge to sand, where he had a pleasant footing in familiar country, under beeches that browned the ways, along beside a meadow-brook fed by the heights, through pines and across deep sand-ruts to full view of weald and downs. Diana had been with him here in her maiden days. The coloured back of a coach put an end to that dream. He lightened his pocket, surveying the land as he munched. A favourable land for rails: and she had looked over it: and he was now becoming a wealthy man: and she was a married woman straining the leash. His errand would not bear examination, it seemed such a desperate long shot. He shut his inner vision on it, and pricked forward. When the burning sunset shot waves above

the juniper and yews behind him, he was far on the weald, trotting down an interminable road. That the people opposing railways were not people of business was his reflection, and it returned persistently: for practical men, even the most devoted among them, will think for themselves; their army, which is the rational, calls them to its banners, in opposition to the sentimental; and Redworth joined it in the abstract, summoning the horrible state of the roads to testify against an enemy wanting almost in common humanness. A slip of his excellent stepper in one of the half-frozen pits of the highway was the principal cause of his confusion of logic; she was half on her knees. Beyond the market-town the roads were so bad that he quitted them, and with the indifference of an engineer struck a line of his own southeastward over fields and ditches, favoured by a round horizon moon on his left. So for a couple of hours he went ahead over rolling fallow land to the meadow flats and a pale shining of freshets; then hit on a lane skirting the water, and reached an amphibious village; five miles from Storling, he was informed, and a clear traverse of lanes, not to be mistaken, "if he kept a sharp eye open." The sharpness of his eyes was divided between the sword-belt of the starry Hunter and the shifting lanes that zigzagged his course below. The downs were softly illumined; still it amazed him to think of a woman like Diana Warwick having an attachment to this district, so hard of yield, mucky, featureless, fit but for the rails she sided with her friend in detesting. Reasonable women, too! The moon stood high on her march as he entered Storling. He led his good beast to the stables of The Three Ravens, thanking her and caressing her. The ostler conjectured, from the look of the mare, that he had been out with the hounds and lost his way. It appeared to Redworth singular that, near the ending of a wild-geese chase, his plight was pretty well described by the fellow. However, he had to knock at the door of The Cross-

ways now, in the silent night time, a certainly empty house, to his fancy. He fed on a snack of cold meat and tea, standing, and set forth, clearly directed, "if he kept a sharp eye open." Hitherto he had proved his capacity, and he rather smiled at the repetition of the formula to him, of all men. A turning to the right was taken, one to the left, and through the churchyard, out of the gate, round to the right, and on. By this route, after an hour, he found himself passing beneath the bare chestnuts of the churchyard wall of Storling, *and the sparkle of the edges of the dead chestnut-leaves at his feet reminded him* of the very ideas he had entertained when treading them. — GEORGE MEREDITH : *Diana of the Crossways*, Chapter viii.

III. THE LITERARY FORMS OF NARRATION

a. The Novel in its Two Typical Moods

173. Besides narrative poems, which in most periods, and especially in the earlier periods, have exhibited some of the best narrative in literature, the literary forms of narration show variations so subtle as to defy any classification except the most general. The typical narrative form during the last two centuries, in fact the predominant literary form, has been the novel; but this word *novel* is applied with a very loose inclusiveness. It is used of narratives so different that they seem to agree in nothing but length, and in this but roughly. A novel is a story long enough for consecutive development of character (§§ 159, 160), and for revolutions in the plot. It corresponds to what Aristotle calls a "complicated fable." Further definition seems impossible. And the classifications suggested for the novel hardly approach logical distinctness. The classes overlap one another, and yet fail to provide for

all cases. Perhaps it is as well, giving over all other attempt at classification, to pursue the results of that historical and essential division which is based upon the predominance of one or the other element of all story-telling, the predominance of the interest of character or of the interest of plot, epic and romance (§ 154). The predominance of the epic interest, the interest of character, tends toward what has lately been called realism; the predominance of the interest of plot tends toward romanticism. The one has produced *Tom Jones*, *Pride and Prejudice*, *Vanity Fair*, *Diana of the Crossways*; the type of the other is the novels of Scott. It will be seen readily enough that even this division is not scientific. For *Tom Jones* has much interest of plot; *Vittoria*, though it was written by a realist of the realists, derives perhaps half its interest from plot; and many of the stories of Stevenson, a professed romanticist, have strong interest of character. But the division is approximately and generally true; and, since it is based on a vital distinction, it promises to be permanent.

174. Modern realism has been led through its pursuit of character very deep into philosophy and psychology. Its danger, therefore, is to rely not so much on the artistic interest as on the scientific. Indeed, the pre-occupation with the material rather than with its significance, with facts rather than the conception of facts, has produced some novels whose interest is purely documentary. The danger is thus real, and it is very great. Such productions are published note-books, not novels. The accumulation of facts, however new or important they may be, never in itself makes a work of art. Art demands the shaping hand, the personal interpretation, the unified conception, just as much

when its details are from the laboratory or the newspaper, as when they too, as well as the plan, are from the imagination. Imagination is the final test of any author, whichever be his preoccupation. The masters of the realistic novel have reached their eminence mainly through this. Without it all their philosophy and psychology, all their intimate experience of the actual details of human life around them, would have remained mere material for some one else. *Vanity Fair* is just as much a work of imagination as *Ivanhoe*; the greatness of *Middlemarch* is not in its literal, detailed truth to English life; and Balzac fails, when he does fail, from trusting too much to his marvellous accumulation of the facts of Paris life. Truth in art, as has been said already (§ 147) is something more than accuracy of fact; and this appears in every realistic novel that has had more than a transitory vogue. Realism may well add the scientific interest to the artistic, may well protest against such departure from fact as leads to falsity of conception; these are the marks of realism as a school; but the marks of a school, if they be mere mannerism, or if they cover poverty of conception, will not make literature.

175. What gives any vogue at all to realism that is not artistic is usually a reaction against the extravagances of romanticism. For just as these two literary motives have predominated alternately, with a kind of ebb and flow, before as well as since "Cervantes laughed Spain's chivalry away," so the extravagances of the one have led by reaction to the extravagances of the other, the romanticism that had become a meaningless accumulation of the marvellous to the realism that was a meaningless accumulation of the commonplace.

The spirit of realism is character, its furniture facts; the spirit of romance is adventure, its furniture pagantry. The descriptive interest of romance, the pomp and circumstance which appear at their best in the novels of Scott, is sometimes so manipulated, by hands too feeble to construct a significant plot, as to please a passing fancy for swords and great names. Or a half-conscious popular reaction from the tyranny of fact over art will give vogue to what has the sole merit of imaginative freedom, to what the next generation finds without form and void of human significance. Thus in both realism and romanticism inferior imitators palm off the furniture for the spirit; in both the only vitality is in the spirit.

176. Why the spirit of realism, the interest in character, endures these changes of literary fashion is obvious. Human nature must always be interesting, the humanity of Becky Sharp and Richard Feverel as well as the humanity of Ulysses. But why the spirit of romance, the spirit of adventure and plot, has always reasserted its vitality appears only upon further consideration. Stevenson sees the reason in our inborn love of finding critical events in the scenes that seem to demand them; murders in deserted houses, highwaymen on desolate moors, manuscripts in bottles washed up by the sea. These are crude and childish, but none the less persistently recurring, instances of that imaginative sense of fitness which Stevenson shows to be a motive at once constantly human and constantly artistic. Our satisfaction in a great scene of history like Henry's standing in the snow at the barred door of Gregory, or Joan of Arc before the council, or Wolfe and Montcalm dying together on the heights of Quebec, has its roots

in a sense of artistic significance. This appears more fully in that where the authentic record lacks this fitness the gap is sooner or later filled by myth. Did Tell shoot an apple from the head of his son? If not, the latent popular sense of art did it for him. And this is of the same stuff, however inferior the weaving, as the curse of Meg Merrilies.

177. Closely akin is that typical phase of the spirit of adventure, the love of the marvellous and mysterious. Mystery has been from the beginning the mood of romance and one of its surest charms. That thrill many men will laugh at who will yet spend much to win it. And in the days when the long old romances were compiled it is patent that men listened for little else. Launcelot or Gareth moves apart from the everyday world, "out of space," for he has no human measure of distance; "out of time," for he belongs to any age, provided it be past. His weapons may be from fairy hands. He passes through black valleys, by lion-guarded castles, along unknown shores. He drinks wine and eats spices. Think of the good Homeric meals! The people he meets are giants or dwarfs, or damsels equally fantastic, since they are all alike fair and all alike featureless. Whereas the gods of epic are busy in the deeds of men without ever being essential in the story or even the least mysterious, romance is full of enchantment. The enchantment is now merely so much marvellous incident, now plainly symbolical, as in the parable of Sir Percival and the demon-lady, now in vaguer symbols, as of the sword Excalibur and Arthur's departure in the barge, not distinct enough to reveal the mystery. Why were these moon-struck tales ever popular? Rather, why are they popular, they and

their legitimate descendants? Because we never entirely admit, many of us, that the facts of life make the whole of life. When we travel, it is not only for education, nor without hope of some challenge to our imaginations. From childhood on many of us build shy hopes on that something in the farther shadow of the wood.

178. Stronger and more widespread than the love of mystery is the homage to untrammelled generosity, even to extravagant generosity, for even Don Quixote is a lovable soul. The heroes of romance, if they are all alike, are all gentlemen. They embody our protest against a debit-and-credit estimate of life. Free from all motives to work for a living, they never seek their own advantage. The epic hero sets out for gain of some sort — cattle, lands, a golden fleece: for very earthly love; for revenge; reasonable motives. So he joys and we joy with him, in the good real world, horses and ships, eating and drinking, the good craft of men. He has comparatively little dignity of place; he could not have understood Launcelot's mortification at having to ride in a cart. He is brave — brave enough to meet great odds; but he never gives odds and always takes them. The romantic hero seeks adventure for its own sake, sets himself a quest, travels and fights with no ulterior aim. Instead of seeking advantage, he delights to undertake the impossible. With him stupendous labours are paid by a rose, a token, a smile — or rather not paid, forgotten. And the patent fact that love of this pitch appeals as an ideal even to men and women unwilling to pursue it, that the thousandth repetition of the one tale of romantic love is sure of readers, means perhaps that we are all at heart romantic enough,

especially while we are young, to cherish the ideal of romance.

179. The sense of situation, the taste for adventure, the secret revolt from the dominion of fact, irrational abnegation for love, are three strong reasons for the vitality of romance. At least equally vital is the idea of devotion to the righting of wrongs. Most of the heroes of romance are deliverers; and for every knight the vow of service at his knighting had the highest sanctions of religion. In short, romance is the literary expression of chivalry. Thus perhaps the most typical of all the mediæval romances, as it was the most popular, both separately and through the attachment of it to almost all the great cycles, is the story of the Holy Grail. As every knight had his quest and every knight a damsel for whom he risked his life, so there was one greatest quest, and one transcendent reward. Every knight was sworn to a life nobler than that of common men; but not every knight might venture on this quest. He that should see the heavenly vision must be without spot of sin. The legend of the Holy Grail is the apotheosis of chivalry, and the romantic parable of the Christian life. Realism began with the beginning of literature; romance, though it appears sporadically from early times, as in some suggestions of the Phæacian episode in the *Odyssey*, and again in the fourth book of the *Æneid*, thrived only after it was planted upon Christianity.

180. The characteristics of romance thus drawn from the mediæval romances are not all, but they are the essential ones, the notes of romance in all time since and to-day, the reasons for its vitality. Contemporary symbolism is one aspect of what appears in another

aspect in the perennial popularity of tales of adventure. Even a detective story differs only in taste. Poe's *Gold Bug*, which prevails by sheer plot, is at one edge; Poe's *Ligeia* at the other. Between range varieties of proportion enough to justify at once the many definitions of romance and its indefinite continuance.

b. The Short-Story

181. The same two moods run through the short-story; but in either mood the short-story is a more definite form than the novel, and it is a new form. Potentially it has existed for centuries, as in Boccaccio; Chaucer's *Pardoner's Tale* is a perfect short-story in verse; but the full realization of it is quite recent. The form may be said to have been set by Poe, the extraordinary vogue to have been given by the American magazine. Once recognized as a distinct form, it was brought to its finest, perhaps, in France, as in the work of Mérimée and Maupassant, and to some of its strongest effects in England, by Mr. Kipling. The short-story is the modern expression of what Aristotle calls a "simple fable"; that is, an action without revolutions or consecutive development of character. Much of its peculiar force resides in a strict interpretation, stricter than is usual with the novel, of the principle of unity. It carries the principle of selection (§ 147) to the extreme limit of omission, is in prose a simplification of life approaching the method of poetry. Though by this it is peculiarly apt to the expression of fancy and pure imagination, to symbolistic romance, it has embodied also some of the strongest realism. In fact, it has shown extraordinary scope. The narrative idea, what-

ever its nature, that is conceived as culminating swiftly, as a single pregnant situation rather than a slower development (§ 160), demands the short-story. Some novels are tiresome merely from missing the form, from mistaking a short-story idea for a novel idea; and the recent time has found the former more common than the latter.

CHAPTER VI

DESCRIPTION

I. DEFINITION: THE LIMITS OF DESCRIPTION

182. The word *description* has several meanings equally approved by the dictionary; but of these only one defines description as a distinct kind of composition. The description of the steam-engine in a text-book of physics, the description of a plot of land in a mortgage deed, these are obviously what we have called exposition. But Mr. Kipling's description of Engine .007, and any novelist's description of a house and grounds, these are obviously what we currently mean by description when we use the word distinctively. The distinctive mark or note, then, of description is the attempt to suggest how the thing strikes the eye or ear. There is no such attempt in the text-book of physics or the mortgage deed. The one details how the engine works, the other exactly where the land lies. Mr. Kipling's phrase of a locomotive, that it "took the eighty-foot bridge without the guard rail like a hunted cat on the top of a fence," would be as far out of place in the one as, in the other, Stevenson's "thin distant spires of pine along the edge of the hill." But these two phrases are essentially descriptive. They reveal the writer stirring the memories of familiar sights in order to suggest a new image. How closely the reader's

image corresponds to the writer's depends upon the store in the mind of the one and the descriptive skill of the other. Perhaps it never corresponds exactly, if it be a new image, not the awakened memory of an old one; it often corresponds in all main points; it may always correspond far enough for the writer's purpose of suggestion. In any case, the attempt, the aim, is the same. Description, then, is that kind of writing which, by appeal to memories of sight or sound or odour, suggest new imaginings.

183. If the image be of an action, why have we not narration? The answer must be uncertain, for between the two kinds there is no boundary. Typically, description suggests action only as a means; narration, as its proper end. Defoe describes Crusoe's hut by telling how Crusoe built it. The means here is the suggestion of actions; but the end is the suggestion of the hut, the look of it. In narration, action is an end in itself. We must see things happen and each happening lead to another. The difference may be summed up by saying that the description of Crusoe's hut has no plot. The actions have no meaning except a purely descriptive meaning. Sterne's *Sentimental Journey* is thus seen to be description rather than narration. It is full of action without plot, of action whose only significance is descriptive. But to say of whole pieces that this one is description, that one narration, leads finally to bewilderment; for many are as much one as the other, or now one, now the other. And, what is more, the descriptive aim is not often pursued singly; usually description is for purposes of narration. The main exception is books of travel, which are usually more descriptive than narrative. Beyond the few books of travel which have

a place in literature, pieces of the length of the *Sentimental Journey* — and that has no great length — whose aim is description for itself, are so rare in English literature as hardly to demand modification of the general statement that description is incidental to narrative.

184. Practically, that is, description is the setting of the story. In the days before scene-painting and stage machinery it was also the staging of the play, as appears in the abundant description of the Elizabethan dramatists. Being thus commonly incidental, subordinate, description is commonly both brief and fragmentary. Though it has an aim of its own, it has usually no form of its own; for it is merged in the forms of narration. It is brief and fragmentary in order that the movement of the story may not be interrupted (§§ 150, 168, 172). Long descriptions, and in general any solid block of description in a story, — for very few even of what seem long descriptions have any great absolute length, — are tacitly resented by most readers, and usually skimmed, if not skipped. Being usually subordinate, description should usually be brief. Realized, indeed, the scene must be always; but it must be emphasized only so far as is demanded by the action or the character, must never be emphasized for itself.

185. Description, then, is at once distinguishable from narration, and usually subordinate to it. It is much more easily distinguishable from the other arts. Indeed, the difference would hardly seem worth making, if we did not hear still that phrase *word-painting*. This figure of speech arises from a confusion of ideas. Painting represents a landscape or a face; description suggests one. The methods and the results of the one have no essential likeness to the methods and the results

of the other. Representing a visual image by line and colour in a fixed combination seen at one glance is not like suggesting a visual image by words following one after another. All that the two have in common is the essential principle of all art, whatever its kind, the principle of selection (§ 147). Moreover, visual images are only part of the suggestions employed by description. Perhaps they should be only a small part. Form, colour, attitude, indeed are matter of description, as they are matter of painting; but the matter of description is also motion and odour, which are impossible to painting. Above all, sound, which is equally impossible to painting, is the very mainstay of description, its most fertile field of suggestion, what may be called its proper domain. Instead of wasting effort in the attempt to rival the representation of form, colour, and attitude by the mere suggestion of these, description properly regards these as only a small part of its material, seeks also from motion and odour to achieve by range of suggestion what it cannot achieve by visual distinctness of suggestion, and above all relies on suggestions of sound.

II. THE DETAILS AND THE WHOLE (UNITY AND EMPHASIS)

186. Every subject of description thus presents to the writer a complexity of details. It appeals with a multitude of suggestions to eye and ear. To set down all these would be both impossible and futile. He cannot write at all, much less compose, without selection. And the selection must be personal, not a mere record of the physical facts, but a conception from his own impressions. Finally, the details exist only for the whole.

Either the choice is determined by the unifying impression desired for the narrative to which the descriptions are contributory, or the same unity of impression dominates in pure description. Else description lapses into formless catalogue. The prerequisite for unity and due emphasis is to remember always the point of view; the mental point of view which is the writer's conception, and the physical point of view limiting the details which the writer, and therefore his reader, can see clearly at a given time and place (Examine in this regard the first passage quoted at § 171). By error in the latter, that is through such vagueness of his own image as lets him forget what he can really see from a given point, a writer as well as a painter may confuse his suggestions. He may insert details which he knows to be there, but which, from the point of view fixed by him, are not visible or audible. This may be called the error of the false elaboration of background. It is impossible only when the writer's image is quite distinct. Since a reader is not likely to see the suggested image any more distinctly than the writer, distinct description can come only from constant realization.

187. But this is only an extension of the general principle of selection; and certain details may fairly be said to have value in themselves. In description, more than in painting, the constant consideration of the whole effect does not preclude the insertion of some details merely because they are salient to all observers or characteristically local, or what we loosely call "picturesque" in themselves. These must never be felt to intrude, to disturb the whole impression; but, on the other hand, to choose an impression that ignores them is sometimes felt to be artificial. In a word, description,

though its final measure is artistic, makes more legitimate use than painting of the scientific interest also, of the interest of curiosity and novelty, the interest of the record. Since many well-approved descriptions prevail largely by this, by our interest, that is, in details that are locally peculiar or striking, it is hardly just to call this interest extraneous.

Thus Fromentin's sketches of Algiers and the Sahara were dominated by his eye for the eternally human rather than the local and accidental; but his written descriptions of these regions derive much of their charm from details which in painting he omitted. And, in general, books of travel, which contain the bulk of pure description in English, rely largely on what in painting is called *genre* and in stories and plays local colour. A story, to be sure, ought to have an interest above the mere interest in local peculiarities of habit and feeling, and the best stories are best because they are interesting to all times and places; but even in story we expect the locality to be described at least clearly enough to put us into sympathy with that too. Even *The Vicar of Wakefield*, which relies on this very little, has a distinct flavour of locality. *Genre* painting may be, as Fromentin says, a divergence from the ways of true art, and many *genre* stories are futile because they achieve nothing beyond — are hardly stories at all; but none the less *genre* must always demand some thought in description.

Thus the description of a New Orleans street, if the description be part of a story, and still more if it be pure description for its own sake, is fairly bound to mention details that are peculiar to New Orleans, details that would not be true of Chicago or San Francisco. Every

place may thus be individualized, and of course every person must be, under pain of failing to be a person. The mention of mule-cars, of latticed balconies, of the clatter of traffic over cobblestones, or its even grumbling over wood, of the recurring volleys of high-pitched bells or the heavy single notes of low ones, of high stoops to brownstone blocks of houses, of gardens and foliage about English cathedrals or the lack of them about French cathedrals, — details like these help us to realize a place in somewhat the same way as thick lips, or eyes wide apart, or still better a nervous gait, or slow, deep speech, or any other physical habit, help us to realize a man (§ 157).

188. Of the same effect are allusions to history; for the character of a place, its local colour, is very often an inheritance. Use of this field of suggestions is tiresome when, instead of allusion, it is bald reference or expository comment; but this is rather the abuse of it than the use. Thus to interlard scenery with history is tolerable only in a guide-book, which is not in our sense descriptive at all, but expository. The facts of history must be presented in description just as the facts of observation are presented, by suggestion. The sense of immemorial antiquity, which Lafcadio Hearn desires for his description of the Japanese Dance of Souls, is suggested as follows:

Those who sleep the sleep of centuries out there, under the gray stones where the white lanterns are, and their fathers, and the fathers of their fathers' fathers, and the unknown generations behind them, buried in cemeteries of which the place has been forgotten for a thousand years, doubtless looked upon a scene like this. Nay! *the dust stirred by those young feet was life, and so smiled and so sang* under this self-

same moon, "with woven paces, and with waving hands." — *Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan*, Chapter vi., § v.

Thus presented, — and such presentation implies brevity, they may even heighten the effect of the whole.

. 189. Some descriptions add details for mere love of the details, seek, that is, not only the impression of the whole and the indication of locality, but also what is vaguely called picturesqueness, the effect of details for themselves. In Landor's *Pentameron*, which is very largely description, each chapter fairly keeps a single tone and is fairly local; but many of the details serve neither of these purposes. They are there simply because they are striking:

She entered with a willow twig in her hand, from the middle of which willow twig (for she held the two ends together) hung a fish, shining with green and gold. — *Second Day*.

The dropping of soft rain on the leaves of the fig tree at the window, and the chirping of a little bird, to tell another there was shelter under them, brought me repose and slumber. — *Fifth Day*.

Of the same sort is the following:

As they crept along, stooping low to discern the plant, a soft, yellow gleam was reflected from the buttercups into their shaded faces, giving them an elfish, moonlit aspect, though the sun was pouring upon their backs in all the strength of noon. — THOMAS HARDY, *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*.

Among poets the type of this habit is Virgil. Part of the charm of the *Æneid* is in detail that has little reason beyond its loveliness.

Adspirant auræ in noctem, nec candida cursus
Luna negat; splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus.

— *Æneid*, VII. 8.

190. The value of detail both for itself and as contributory to a single conception implies the value of observation. The masters of description see minutely. Whether they select many details or few, they have seen many; and to see is for most of us the acquirement of patience. It often begins in a gift of nature; but, whether more from nature or more from perseverance, it is always a habit acquired by practice. Only, the artistic view looks rather for the artistic relations, as the scientific view, the view so wonderfully perfected in Darwin, looks for the scientific relations. Both while they observe generalize, but in ways very different. The scientist scents a classification; the artist scents another kind of import. The cry of a bird does not suggest to him a sub-species; it expresses the solitary depths of the wood, or harmonizes with meadows in the twilight, or jars the silence of the lake. Thus the observer of literary bent, while he trains his observation to a precision as nice as the scientist's, does well to remember always that the accumulation of details is not in itself literary; that the artistic value of detail is its significance. The better stored his memory with close observations of nature and man, the readier he, perhaps years afterward, to make any scene vivid. But, immensely valuable as it is in training, not in literature even so much as in science is the hoarding of observations an end in itself; and merely to catalogue observations, though it may have some scientific value in aiding the classifications of abler minds, is not in any degree literary.

191. Rather the student of letters learns to see many things only in order that he may the more surely choose a few. Multiplicity of detail is rarely the way of descrip-

tion, and this not merely because selection is necessary, nor because description is commonly incidental, but also because there is a natural difficulty in holding more than a few details together. Even the painter must unify by simplification, though his result is seen all together and all at once. How much more the describer, who, because he is obliged to present his suggestions one after another, must always be anxious lest the beginning be forgotten before the end.

I may tell you his eyes are pale blue, his features regular, his hair silky, brownish, his legs long, his head rather stooping (only the head), his mouth commonly closed; these are the facts, and you have seen much the same in a nursery doll. Such literary craft is of the nursery. So with landscapes. The art of the pen (we write on darkness) is to rouse the inward vision, instead of labouring with a drop-scene brush, as if it were to the eye; because our flying minds cannot contain a protracted description. That is why the poets, who spring imagination with a word or a phrase, paint lasting pictures. The Shakespearian, the Dantesque, are in a line, two at most. — GEORGE MEREDITH, *Diana of the Crossways*, Chapter xv.

Now to describe without much detail is, first to choose the few details that will be most suggestive of the whole, and secondly, to cut out of every descriptive sentence every word that is not descriptive. The first must be left as a general counsel, to be achieved by much practice. For what details will be the most suggestive of a given effect no one can tell but the man that conceives the effect; and he can be sure only from habit.

III. THE MECHANISM (COHERENCE)

192. The second counsel means to avoid explanatory interpolations (§ 150).

When we had reached the bare little station we were refreshed by the sight of wooded mountains all around it, is a typical instance of description clogged by worthless lumber. All it means is,

The sight of wooded mountains all around the bare little station was refreshing ;

and it ought to be still further reduced by combination with what follows.

The refreshment from wooded mountains all around the bare little station prepared us to enjoy the view of far blue peaks from the first ridge.

This is the negative way of descriptive conciseness. The positive way is to charge each word with suggestion ; instead of depending altogether on nouns and adjectives, to force contribution from the verbs too (§ 162). The best-stored mind has not adjectives enough for description. The exhaustion of epithets overtaking a coaching party in new country is typical of what happens to every student of letters very early in his practice. Happy he, if he learns then and there that the effort to make adjectives suffice is futile. From time to time a passing success is achieved thus by the sensational torturing of language. But the strain of this kind of writing is no more obvious than its failure. The surer way is to exact of each word its share.

A waft from the pines darkening the hills about the station shanty stimulated us to laugh at the far glimpse of our own blue peaks from the first rise.

This is better than the first sentence because it accomplishes more in the same space by cutting out the lum-

ber; but also better than the second because *pin*es is more concrete and specific (§ 226) than *wooded*, *waft* and *laugh* than *refreshment* and *enjoy*, *stimulated* than *prepared*. The description is both stronger and easier because nearly every word is suggestive.

193. These methods of conciseness hold for description of whatever length. A description that is long simply because it is bungled is of course not worth considering. The only excuse for length is increased suggestiveness. Further, where it seems advisable or necessary to enlarge the scale, it is often advisable also to indicate a simple plan by which the details may be mentally grouped. The most famous instance of this device for clearness is the capital A by which Victor Hugo clarifies his long description of the field of Waterloo. Thus a description of a city from a height, as of Montreal from Mount Royal, may be clarified by some general suggestion of shape and the use of prominent buildings as points in a plan. But there is need of two cautions. First, panoramas are not often successful in description. Generally speaking, all that description can suggest of a large prospect it can suggest as well by the rapid impression of a first glance as by labouring with many details.

We saw a broad plain, half sand, half pale grass; on the rim by the Nile rose a pale yellow dome, clear above everything. That was the Mahdi's tomb, divined from Gebel Royan, now seen. It was the centre of a purple stain on the yellow sand, going out for miles and miles on every side — the mud-houses of Omdurman.—G. W. STEEVENS: *With Kitchener to Khartum*, Chapter xxxi.

Second, all detailed descriptions of large scope are at least as much expository as descriptive. This does not

make them the less legitimate, nor does it relieve us from the occasional necessity of describing so ; but in general the expository in description must be strictly limited (§§ 146, 171), and it must never be felt to intrude.

Even shorter descriptions, however, need the clearness of orderly arrangement ; for even a comparatively few details may else be confusing. The device for clearness, like all other machinery, should not usually be apparent ; but the writer cannot afford to forget this part of his obligation. To this end the principal means has already been suggested (§ 186), a constant awareness of the point of view. It must always be remembered that the first view is only a general impression or the seizure of a single salient feature. Details, being seen afterward, should be described afterward. Of devices, one of the most common is contrast, as in Ruskin's description of St. Mark's. Equally simple and unobtrusive is to give the details, of a building for instance, from the bottom up or the top down. But all this may be summed up in the counsel to have an order, and to say as little about it as possible.

194. Of the methods, besides that of formal plan, for holding a detailed description together as a whole, the easiest and most natural is the narrative. By this is meant, not story, but the use of a narrative order of details in order to an easier employment of the descriptive force of the verb (§ 162). One of the simplest instances is the description of Robinson Crusoe's hut :

I found a little plain. . . . Before I set up my tent, I drew a half-circle. . . . In this . . . I pitched two rows of strong stakes. . . . Then I took the pieces of cable, etc.

195. This exhibits also the danger of the method, the danger of letting the narrative parts, which for purposes of description are mere transitions, mere machinery, occupy too much space. "I went," "we saw," "took the train at half-past six," "arrived later than we expected," — all such as this must be cut out (§§ 150, 172, 192). Description never needs to go, or arrive, or take a train, in order to be anywhere it pleases. If the journey be part of the description, if it be interesting in itself, well; but if it be intended only as a means, let it be suppressed as entirely unnecessary. Books of travel are sometimes tiresome from this sort of clumsiness; the best books of travel use the narrative machinery with far better skill.

A gentle splashing of water, which mingles with the rustling of the trees and the quiet echoes of the pavement, comes from the end of the court where its edge is a descent filled with high forest trees. — JOHN LA FARGE: *An Artist's Letters from Japan*, page 64.

Our train skirted the great hill of Uyèno, and its dark shadow, which did not quite reach us. Monuments and gravestones, gray or mossy, blurred here and there the green wall of trees. . . . From the rustling of leaves and reëchoing of trees we passed into the open country, and into free air and heat. In the blur of hot air, trembling beneath the sun, lay plantations and rice-fields; the latter, vast sheets of water dotted with innumerable spikes of green. Little paths raised above them made a network of irregular geometry. Occasionally a crane spread a shining wing and sank again.

— *ibid.*, pages 30, 31.

One of the finest examples of the method is Sterne's *Sentimental Journey* (See the quotation at § 150); and

it is of the finest because the narrative machinery so constantly furthers the descriptive aim that it is never felt as machinery.

196. The large use of dialogue in Sterne's exquisite descriptions shows also, and very strikingly, that description may borrow machinery, not only from narrative proper, but also from drama. And besides dialogue, which is formally dramatic, description may use very effectively another device that is, not formally indeed, but essentially, dramatic. This is the method of suggesting something by its effects upon the actors or bystanders. Just as we feel the madness of Lear through its effect upon Kent and Edgar, upon the fool, upon Cordelia, so we feel, more quickly than in any other way we could be made to feel, the doom written upon the face of the Ancient Mariner by the effect of that face upon the wedding guest, who "cannot chuse but hear," and upon the pilot and his boy :

I moved my lips — the Pilot shrieked,
And fell down in a fit ;
The holy Hermit raised his eyes,
And pray'd where he did sit.

I took the oars : the Pilot's boy,
Who now doth crazy go,
Laughed loud and long, and all the while
His eyes went to and fro.

This is Stevenson's method of suggesting the appearance of Mr. Hyde. Direct suggestion by details — the hairy hand, the dwarfish stature suggested by the ill-fitting clothes of Dr. Jekyll — he uses too ; but his main means of securing the impression of horror is through the invariable effect of Hyde upon the various people

that met him. Indeed, certain suggestions, as these of terror and horror, seem almost to demand this indirect method. For these, adjectives sound feeble, and even the cleverest choice of details sometimes insufficient. And even for less violent suggestions description may often rely on the dramatic method by effects.

197. Not only may a man be described by his effects, but also a scene. Thus description of nature tells sometimes not so much what the writer saw, but how it made him, or the persons of his story, feel.

The sunlit peace was now withdrawn almost to the horizon. As the sun reluctantly sank behind us, the nearer trees sighed uneasily; and to the foot of the hill stole foreboding gloom.

By this method nature may easily be bent to a mood. So soon as the warping is felt to be artificial, so soon, that is, as we become aware of the effort to harmonize scene and feeling as either deliberate or extravagant, our sympathy is turned to resentment.

198. Ruskin, who invented for this emotional method the term *pathetic fallacy*, divides authors according to their attitude toward it into three degrees. Lowest he places those who use the pathetic fallacy as mere machinery, who use it, not because they feel at all, but because they think the literary convention of their time expects them to write of certain things as if they felt in certain ways. This may be called second-hand pathetic fallacy. Like all else that is trite and insincere, it should be abhorred by every honest artist.

Ruskin's second degree is of those who warp what they see by force of their own real feeling, who "see falsely because they feel truly." It includes the majority of poets and emotional prose writers. Description

being in any case (though Ruskin would have denied this) the presentation not so much of nature as of the author's conception of nature (§ 147), it must always be coloured by the author's personality. If he be emotional, as the majority of authors are, his description will be emotional. But when he shows himself too emotional to be master of his expression, he pays the penalty of all extravagance. Ruskin's highest degree is of those few who feel truly and yet see truly, whose emotions, though greater than those of other men, do not warp their expression of fact. Here, of course, he places Shakespeare. He adds that when, at exceptional moments, Shakespeare does suffer himself to be carried away, the force of this rare pathetic fallacy is prodigious; and that it is the eminence of Dante never to be carried away at all, to preserve in the strongest emotion an almost literal accuracy.

199. This division of Ruskin's, though it proceeds from a mistaken view of truth in art, is suggestive of sound counsel. No student can safely try to describe in a tone of emotion that is not naturally his. The futility of most figurative language lies in the fact that it corresponds to no image in the writer's own mind. The first virtue of style is sincerity. And the danger is not so much that a young writer should be consciously insincere as that he should be so unconsciously. The force of literary environment is so great that sincerity is often the achievement of years. In order to speak out of his own eyes and his own heart a writer has first to find himself. Therefore he must never take his eyes from that goal. Further, there is no danger in studying descriptive methods, or any other literary methods, by imitation. So long as a man when he attempts to

describe his own scenes is faithful to his own vision, he may study the descriptions of other scenes, day in, day out, with nothing but profit. Such study is the study of methods, which are open to every one; the danger is to borrow personal tricks of words, forgetting or ignoring that they are not transferable.

Finally, it is but wise to chasten emotional expression by the habit of observation. There is not commonly so much danger of seeming emotionally below an extraordinary situation, as of seeming emotionally above an ordinary one. In any case the impression of emotional height is not gained by devices of language without the writer's having known the height himself. Now flights are for few men and rare times. They are not for any one in our time a habit. To write as if they were, and in general to write above one's feeling, is to begin wrong. That a man should not pretend to be what he is not, applies with peculiar force to the assumption of an emotional style. If a man be unemotional, any other guise of expression will be grotesque; if a man be emotional, his style need not for that be Asiatic. Rather, if he is to express his emotion with real force, he must learn first to repress it.

IV. THE TERMS

200. It is already sufficiently evident that the study of description, as of any other kind of composition, leads inevitably to the study of words. The study of words, that is, of words and phrases separately, in contradistinction to their larger combinations, is the subject matter of Part II. Meantime, the natural anticipations of this study in its bearing on artistic composition may be summed up here. The artistic method of suggestion

being essentially by the concrete (§ 146), description should studiously avoid abstract terms. The abstract is summary, not usually suggestive. What bird is described in the following?

The bird was not far away in the bushy wood, and its singing was most charming. It trilled and gurgled and whistled with many quick and unexpected changes. The song had the freedom and strength of noble music. Some of the notes were of the utmost purity and clearness, and they seemed to penetrate into all the region about.—CLIFTON JOHNSTON: *Among English Hedgerows*, pages 46-7.

The concrete method proper to description leads often to figures of speech (§ 228), but not necessarily. It is an error to suppose that description must be figurative. Not only may it be concrete and specific without figure, but the specific mention of concrete details without figure is in the average run of writing surer. Do not eschew figure; but beware of leaning on it too heavily. Let the main work of suggestion be by the simpler way. Figures must usually be very good to be good at all; and they have their happiest effects when they are infrequent. Again, it follows from the principle of artistic truth (§ 147) that descriptive precision means aptness to the conception rather than accuracy to the facts. Artistic precision is not necessarily scientific precision. The latter demands only a dictionary; the former demands that the dictionary be searched for that one of a group of synonyms which is nearest the desired tone. Stated technically, descriptive precision looks as much to the connotation (§ 222) of words as to their denotation. Finally, a large part of the effect of description comes, not only through

suggestions of sound, but through suggestions by sound. That the sounds of words are effective as well as their meanings (§ 230) is none the less true because it ought not to preoccupy novices; and nowhere is it more obvious than in description. The last and finest touch of descriptive art is that the sounds of the words should delicately further the harmony of the whole.

V. THE LITERARY FORMS OF DESCRIPTION

From its very nature description can hardly have literary forms of its own. As the most essentially dependent kind of writing, it is incorporated in the forms of the other kinds. Besides supporting stories, it often supports essays; and when the expository end is sought largely through the concrete the piece is often called a descriptive essay or a sketch. Such are some of Hawthorne's short pieces (called Tales) and the introduction to *The Scarlet Letter*. Such also are many "essays" of Lamb, Hazlitt, Thackeray, and Stevenson, and, in a thin guise of story, Henry James's *Brooksmith*. In books of travel and letters the form is usually narrative, the content descriptive and expository in proportions infinitely variable, all the way from Dr. Johnson's *Scotland* to Lafcadio Hearn's *Japan*. Books of the form of Stevenson's *Across the Plains* are in effect series of descriptions, the incidental exposition smaller in proportion as the aim (*e.g.* in *Travels with a Donkey*) is more artistic; others are in effect series of expositions livened by incidental description. Matthews's *Vignettes of Manhattan*, Janvier's *Colour Studies*, George Wharton Edwards's *Thumb-nail Sketches* show that pure description is still practised; but it has never been common.

PART II
PROSE DICTION

CHAPTER VII

PROSE DICTION

I. USAGE

201. Diction includes all separate consideration of words, phrases, and clauses. The sentence, being independent, self-supporting, may be conveniently taken as the smallest unit of composition. Everything below that, every consideration not included in the previous chapters, falls properly under the head of diction. By a man's diction we mean his choice of words as distinct from his method of composition.

202. The use of words to express meaning, to convey information, is determined by usage. Usage, from country to country using the same language, and from age to age, shows considerable variation. Language is at no time and place fixed. The invention of printing and other means of communication have retarded change; but they have not stopped it. Every spoken language, like the nation that speaks it, is in motion. Consciously or unconsciously, each generation is adapting to itself the inheritance of all generations. But since there is an inheritance, and since the change is slow, there is for every generation a consensus as to what has been kept intact, what has been fitly added, and finally what of old or new remains in doubt. This consensus, more or less

definite, more or less binding, according to the temper of the particular nation, is called usage or good use.

203. The record of usage in spelling, punctuation, meaning, is the dictionary. The dictionary does not properly legislate; it records. Its office is to say, not—"This word shall be used in such and such a sense;" but—"This word is used in such and such a sense now. The eighteenth-century use to mean so-and-so is now so far obsolescent as hardly to appear outside of verse. The application to so-and-so has not yet been recognized by good authors." Noah Webster's promulgation of new spellings, for the sake of uniformity and of his views of etymologies, was usurpation. To reform is no part of the lexicographer's business. We look into the dictionary for an accurate tabular view, not of what should be, but sometimes of what has been, sometimes of what seems about to be, always and above all of what is.

204. Thus faithfully and impersonally to reflect usage is a task both large and hard; and even harder than for French or Italian is the task for English. The wide dissemination of English-speaking peoples operates, in spite of the ease of modern interchange, toward disintegration. Local peculiarities can no longer, indeed, ripen into distinct dialects; but they grow enough to be quite distinguishable in speech. Still stronger against uniformity is the English temper of individualism. Speaking generally, the man of English race has always taken more liberties with his mother tongue than the man of Latin race. If correctness stand in the way of a use that seems to his present urgency forcible, he is impatient of correctness. And since such arbitrary extensions of meaning

are obvious in the speech, not only of the careless and illiterate, but also of recognized men of letters, a dictionary of English, having behind it less weight of conservative restraint, has less weight of sanction than a dictionary of French. Recording more varieties of extension, it sometimes leaves so far less plain what usage is as to encourage a propensity to further variation.

205. The freedom of English has led some scholars even to deny the reality of an English good use. Finding in every use of English the scientific interest of unconscious changes according to physical tendencies and of conscious changes according to social tendencies, they question the authority by which any one use is made superior to the others. But it remains true in English, only less than in some other languages, that the effect alike of popular lapse and of the innovation of individuals is always checked, and sometimes counteracted, by conservative custom. This custom, the consensus of those whose knowledge of the language and skill in its use gives them a kind of professional assurance, does in fact still rule the mass of writers, though the mass is now enormously increased. For being less definite and less visible, the authority of usage in English is less strong, indeed, but not less real.

206. The authority is less definite and accessible in that it oftener needs interpretation. No one city holds for English the place of Athens for Greek, or Paris for French. Social eminence is marked, especially in this country, by nothing else so little as by purity of speech; and the purest use is not reflected for the mass of the people, as in Germany, by the stage. There remains, of course, as a standard the consentient use of English

men of letters everywhere, of writers and scholars whose preëminence has been recognized; but precisely what this use is may sometimes in a particular case be in doubt. Its most direct expression seems at present to be through critical reviews, such as the London *Spectator*, and the New York *Nation*. An authoritative record, however, is more difficult. We do not accept our dictionaries as final, because they have not proved themselves final. Where they agree we may probably rest assured; but they too sometimes disagree. In fact, since the great dictionary of Dr. Johnson, English lexicography has not faithfully kept before the people, with adequate discrimination and reference, the actual progress of the language. For scholarship it has sometimes given us pedantry; for usage, sometimes the preference of the lexicographer. The discredit thus accruing to the dictionary must in time give way to the more faithful scholarship of the present. Meantime the native individualism of Englishmen can find warrant for vagary.

207. Yet all this concerns mainly the outlying provinces and new dependencies of the language. As to the great body of law no one need be in doubt for lack of recorded decisions; no one can fairly plead ignorance. For correction and confirmation the dictionary is quite adequate to ordinary need. As to the acquiring of good use, that, in language as in everything else, is by good breeding and good company. A man may be correct without scientific scholarship. Even the converse is possible, that a man may have much science of his language without habitual correctness. And the cultivation of correctness, the conscious refining of speech, progresses not more by consultation of dictionaries than by living studiously with pure speech and pure writing.

208. The study of correctness, sometimes supposed to be narrowing, restrictive, is rather for most men broadening. Vulgarity of speech, even if it were defensible in itself, would yet be indefensible because of its looseness. Nothing is more characteristic of slang, for instance, than its indefiniteness; and in general, the lapse into vulgarity is oftenest from indolent unwillingness to express a distinction. On the other hand, every correction implies, probably an increase in accuracy, almost necessarily an increase in range. Those men are most impatient of correctness in language who are most impatient of closeness in thought.

209. Moreover, violations of usage are not generally found in speech that has habitual force. Since every step in acquaintance with the language is a further remove from satisfaction with phrase that is striking simply because it is new or violent, the surest ground of force—so far as force can be said to reside in expression—is intimacy. Usage never restricts homeliness. The scholarly habit, which is most conservative in and of a language, especially cherishes homely idioms. The people that fancy correctness bars plain speech are those who for homeliness have taken up with vulgarity.

210. A foreigner, a man not nurtured in the speech, may easily master it so far as to avoid solecism; but, not being able so easily to acquire idiom, he is likely enough to confuse idiom with slang. His weakness is from lack of intimacy. That is precisely the weakness that no man should permit himself in his own tongue. Not to know the custom of the country is perpetually to risk being found in bad taste; but not to know the custom of one's own country is to be in bad taste.

A man may, indeed, have a certain force in his bad taste ; but he forfeits the force that carries beyond the coterie and the day, that is felt by all of kindred speech.

II. STYLE

a. The Personal Use of Language

211. What has been said thus far of words refers to their use by every one alike. Everybody's use for language is to express his meaning. Some men have a further use, to express themselves (§ 147). In so far as a writer makes his words express himself as well as his message he has what we call style. For style is the personal use of language. Writing is said to have no style when it might have been written by anybody, when it is, as we say, colourless. Colour is but a figurative term for the tinge of personality. That words are thus matter of art as well as of science can be questioned only in theory. Practically we see and hear every day the artistic use of language. A book of science loses nothing by translation into another tongue ; a book of literature always loses much. The meaning may be all preserved, but the style is impaired or even lost ; the expression of personality is not transferable. Style, then, might be defined as that use of words by which they convey more than their dictionary meaning, the stamp by which they have more than their bullion value. The personal use of language, the artistic use of language, this is style.

212. It follows that style is what we call literary quality, is the measure of any work of literature. True, a work of literature may have other than literary merits ; true also that in literature the matter, the subject, has

relatively greater importance than in painting (§ 187); but what distinguishes a work of literature, what gives it its approved value, is its style. This must be our final measure of its excellence. The sermons of Bossuet, to take an extreme case, set forth important truths of religion. That reason has sufficed for the publication of many sermons which no one has thought of calling literary; but it is not the reason for Bossuet's becoming classic. In his case, as in the case of Jeremy Taylor, it may be doubtful which has been the stronger reason for permanence, the moral value, or the literary. The two are closely intertwined. But when we talk of literary value we mean style; the literary eminence of these two bishops is eminence of style.

And, to swing to the other extreme, style has secured eminence for some works whose substance is thin, or base, or even offensive. How mawkish the *Sentimental Journey* or *Manon Lescaut*; but how exquisite! One who holds that the second chorus of Swinburne's *Atalanta in Calydon* enunciates a monstrous lie may yet have a purely literary enjoyment in the pulse of the stanza and the grandeur of the imagery. Loathing of Mr. Hardy's fate-machine may not preclude admiration of his art. Even in literature there is such a thing as art for the sake of art. But since, in literature at any rate, such art is not the highest, these extreme cases are cited, not to prove that the greatest triumphs of literature are triumphs of pure style, but only to make more obvious that the literary value of any work is in its style. Other value it may have. The facts of Cellini's autobiography are, indeed, interesting in themselves; but what gives that work permanence, what makes us for the time forget the hideous moral obliquity, what makes of a gar-

rulous narrative literature, is the marvellous assertion of a creative personality. That figure, vividly realized at every moment, and at every moment moving in a vividly realized world of many colours and forms of beauty, that is literature because it is Cellini. Other value, then, literature may have, and great style, to use Pater's phrase, may be good style dealing with great matter; but its literary value is determined, not by its expression of fact, not even by its expression of scientific truth, but by its expression of personality — by its style.

213. Not that the man of letters must write confessions, like Rousseau, but that we should hear in his words the inflection and the harmony that give them new meaning. The style of Jane Austen has been called impersonal because she never wrote about herself, hardly even projected herself imaginatively into her characters, as Charlotte Brontë did; but no novels have a more distinct flavour of personality. Bunyan expresses his views, aspirations, struggles, Shakespeare conceals his; but both express themselves. To express himself the artist need not write about himself. This he may or may not do; but always he writes himself.

214. It follows also that there is much truth in the saying that most men can have no style. Most men have not the creative assertion of individuality which we call the artistic impulse; and, without that, style can no more be learned or taught than it can be translated. But observe that we here imply that highest range of literary quality or style which is the expression of genius. There are degrees below. We may, indeed, reserve the phrase *literary quality* for the highest range; but we then tacitly admit for the word *style* a wider meaning. We say habitually and properly of

minor performances, such as a story now and then in a college magazine or an essay in a monthly review, that they have style. We mean, not necessarily that they are literature, but that they have some degree of literary quality, some stamp of personality. If there be no discontent with commonplace expression, no desire to make words tell more than everybody else makes them tell, then of course there can be no style at all; but in every college class or other equally large community of the educated, there are men enough with some degree of personal expression to make the study of style practical.

215. Thus that most men have not genius does not mean that style cannot be learned. For even genius has to learn. A child with a piece of chalk and a board may show more genius than a man with years of studio at his back; but that does not dispense the child from learning to draw. There is little style without the gift; but the gift does not dispense any one from learning his instrument. Technic must be learned in writing as well as in painting or music. Nowadays, for the earlier stages, one may even have a teacher. Training follows bent; but that is far from implying that nature should be left to force its own way unaided.

And that study of style which is pursued by genius with swift progress and eminent result is worth the slower labour of those who feel that they too have somewhat to say which cannot be said as well by any one else, which cannot be expressed at all except through the medium of their personalities. It is worth the still humbler labour of those who hold that a man of culture, since he does not think like everybody else, should not be content to speak like everybody else; that since edu-

cation is not a mechanical process applicable to every one alike, but has for ultimate aim the development of personality, the study to express one's personality, the study of style, has more than a special, professional bearing.

Such men will have the same aversion from strained or affected language as from commonplace language. They study style because they wish to avoid the one as much as the other. An added motive with them is the heightening and clarifying of their appreciation of literature (§ 152); but their main aim is better personal expression.

For these different degrees and for these different purposes, how is style to be studied? Personality being so elusive and manifold as to defy analysis, no one should expect recipes for its expression. The final reason for a literary effect must always be lacking precisely because of the mystery of personality. But so far as all artists have travelled the same road we may travel it after them. And this road is longer, as it is more profitable, than appears to a hasty view. Effects of style are not all mysterious. The many that must be learned by every artist through imitation (§ 199) may be learned in the same way by any artisan. It is even possible to abridge this labour by certain general inferences from general practice.

216. The first of these general inferences is that style is not a personal use of language in the sense of a forcing or distorting of words. In this sense style would be eccentricity. The artist has to take the language as he finds it. His distinction is that he finds in it more than other men. With some natural scent for latent possibilities, and with much patient exploration, he is learning

the resources of his inheritance. He does not make words for himself ; he finds and applies them for himself. Eccentric forcing of language, the coining of words, the violation of usage, has indeed been charged against some men of literary eminence, notably, among the prose writers of our time, against Carlyle and George Meredith.

Thousands have reflected on a diarist's power to cancel our Burial Service. Not alone the cleric's good work is upset by him, but the sexton's as well. He howks the graves, and transforms the quiet worms, busy on a single poor peaceable body, into winged serpents that disorder sky and earth with a deadly flight of zigzags, like military rockets, among the living. And if these are given to cry too much to have their tender sentiments considered, it cannot be said that history requires the flaying of them. A gouty diarist, a sheer gossip diarist, may thus, in the quest of a trail of reminiscences, explode our temples (for our very temples have powder in store), our treasures, our homesteads, alive with dynamitic stuff ; nay, disconcert our inherited veneration, dislocate the intimate connection between the tugged flaxen forelock and a title.

—GEORGE MEREDITH, *Diana of the Crossways*, Chapter i.

And how may you know that you have reached to philosophy? You touch her skirts when you share her hatred of the sham decent, her derision of sentimentalism. You are one with her when — but I would not have you a thousand years older ! Get to her, if in no other way, by the sentimental route — that very winding path, which again and again brings you round to the point of original impetus, where you have to be unwound for another whirl, your point of original impetus being the grossly material, not at all the spiritual. It is more true that sentimentalism springs from the former,

merely and badly aping the latter. Fine flower, or pinnacle flame-spire, of sensualism that it is, could it do other? And accompanying the former it traverses tracts of desert, here and there crouching in a garden, catching with one hand at fruits, with another at colours; imagining a secret ahead, and goaded by an appetite sustained by sheer gratifications. Fiddle in harmonics as it may, it will have these gratifications at all costs. Should none be discoverable, at once you are at the Cave of Despair, beneath the funereal orb of Glaucoma, in the thick midst of poniarded, slit-throat, rope-dependent figures, placarded across the bosom Disillusioned, Infidel, Agnostic, Miserrimus. That is the sentimental route to advancement. Spirituality does not light it; evanescent dreams are its oil-lamps, often with wick askant in the socket. — *ibid.*

These passages are undoubtedly eccentric, and they are therefore somewhat obscure; but the reason is not so much the alleged coining of words and violation of usage as it is surcharging, the pushing of selective omission too far, either by undue compression or by intemperance in figure (§ 200). Thus, even when the literary expression of personality is carried to the point of eccentricity, it rarely ventures to make words or to unmake usage.

217. In fact, the search for novelty is no essential part of any art. Literature is neither new things nor new words. Originality is not there, but in the personal aspects of things recorded, perhaps, a hundred times, and in the personal application of words used certainly many thousands of times. How men of letters make old words express new aspects may be summed up primarily as twofold, first, by having a large store from which to select what is most apt to the mood, by literary scholarship; secondly, by original combinations of

phrase. First, for the large store. The plainest mark of commonplace expression is poverty of vocabulary. Be it admitted at once that poverty of vocabulary may be due simply and solely to poverty of ideas. A man's vocabulary is the accumulation of his experience. He will have no more words than he has found necessary. But it is also true, both that the acquisition of new words and the acquisition of new ideas and facts go on together, the former clarifying and classifying the latter, and also, since words have a further value than the scientific, that any man may, in a very real sense, have something to say for which he has not the words. The study of words, then, the pursuit of vocabulary, has the scientific use of defining knowledge, the artistic use of enabling one to approach more and more nearly to the ideal of expressing himself.

For in implying escape from the commonplace any degree of style implies scholarship. Range of vocabulary comes from wide reading, but not merely from reading many kinds of books. The reader must always be alert for a fitness, a modification, an extension ; and this alertness implies in turn some knowledge of the history and genius of the language. See Rufus Choate practising at translation, Browning and Chatham grubbing in the dictionary. The "feeling for words" is an acquirement as well as a gift. It is not by a leap that one's expression escapes, on the one hand the random, the loose, the cheap, and on the other hand the pompous or pedantic. That simplicity which the ignorant credit to untamed nature comes from much reading and writing. Such scholarship is not in the science of language, though it may well learn from that, but in the art. That is, its method is not classification, but imitation. Imitation, the

artistic study of models, applies more to composition than to diction ; but it has its use for phrase, too, as well as for form. To borrow phrase, indeed, is as futile as it is dishonest, but to note phrase effects is a direct and natural means to the broadening of one's own range.

218. Thus range of vocabulary is indirectly a means to the expression of personality. The application of this, the general mode of personal expression, is originality in phrase combination. Commonplace expression is marked, quite as much as by poverty of vocabulary, by stereotyped combinations. Forms of words like *a delightful evening, a long-felt want, not much in evidence, an uneventful career, popular demonstration, a motley crowd, a good fellow*, pass from lip to lip until they are conventionally fixed. Everybody finds these conventional locutions sufficient except the man that desires to express himself. He cannot invent new words for his view of these ideas, and he is properly unwilling to supplant even a trite, colourless, and feeble expression by bombast or pedantry. What he can do is apparent from what he is made to do in fiction. Even realism of the school is usually unwilling to bore readers by literal reproduction of what often bores them in actual life. That dialogue may be original without being either eccentric or stilted is exhibited in the quotation at § 172.

If it be objected that this is to talk book, the rejoinder is ready that most men would better talk book than talk shop. Even the most conventional society finds relief in the conventional phrases of another society, because these have for a time the charm of novelty. Thus inexpressive Britons and Canadians have been surprised to find their speech piquant in the United States ; and all Americans are credited with raciness in England.

But if by book-talk be meant either pedantry or the artificial compression of literary dialogue, the objection holds no better; for neither of these is implied in originality of phrase. All that is necessary is discontent with the vulgar, some sense of the apt turn, and a willingness to study. The best general opportunity is in letters; and patient effort to inform one's letters with character will surely react on speech.

219. The crudest result of this effort is mannerism. Mannerism is indeed personal expression; but it merely substitutes for the general conventions personal conventions. It is style, but fixed style; and style, to have any considerable worth, must be flexible. Mannerism is style in a state of arrested development. To go on is to widen the scope; and to widen the scope is on the one hand to widen and define observation, and on the other hand always to be strenuous for the phrase that is personally right and always to be enlarging and sharpening one's armory by reading. All this implies unremitting practice. A very little idleness may bring stiffness, and no art demands more strictly the keeping of one's hand in than the art of literature.

b. Elegance

220. The qualities that generally ensue from the pursuit, to whatever extent, of personal expression may be called the marks of good style. Of course the very definition of style as personal expression shows that there cannot be any one best style. The best style, if we admit the phrase at all, can mean only the style best for a particular conception. The estimate of style being relative, no style can be absolutely best. It will not do to look toward some ideal use of language

as the acme of all expression. Every man must be looking toward what is relatively best, best for him, nearest to his meaning and mood. This point of view might lead to the rejection even of the phrase *good style*. And indeed style is good relatively, not absolutely. But first, all worthy style is precise, honest with the meaning, and faithfully patient in finding the right word; and secondly, through the infinite variations of personality in literature run certain qualities, not in fixed proportions, but almost always in some proportion, as if inevitably. The persistence of these qualities suggests that everybody's style needs them.

221. In other words, that heightening of language which results from personal use of it, and which we call style, has usually three traits, has always at least one of these three: elegance, emotional directness, harmony. Elegance, taken etymologically, is almost implied in personal selection. It starts from discontent with the vulgar. But elegance means more than choice; it means choiceness. That is, it means both habitual selection of phrases nicely apt to the conception, and also an habitual preference of phrases that shall be evidently select.

222. The selection of words for purposes of logic, that is for the uses of science and business, is determined simply by their dictionary meanings, by their denotation. Whether, for instance, I use *libel* or *slander* in an argument, *accessory* or *contributory*, *benevolent* or *beneficent*, is absolutely determined by authority, is purely a matter of accepted meaning, of denotation. But whether I use *motherly* or *maternal*, *daybreak* or *sunrise*, *decorous* or *seemly*, is also matter of connotation, of what the word suggests as well as what it denotes. I choose

one rather than the other because I find its suggestion nearer to the mood of my conception, or less trite in the connection, or larger in emotion, or more harmonious. Most words have thus a twofold meaning, a denotation and a connotation; and the degree of connotation, as well as the kind, varies immensely from word to word in a group of what for purposes of denotation we call synonyms. The artistic or personal selection of words, then, which produces style is on the basis of their connotation; and elegance is the effect of words whose connotation is delicate and reserved.

223. Elegance thus implies a shunning of the cheap and tawdry, of careless glibness and second-hand pathetic fallacy (§ 199). It expresses a gentleman's abhorrence toward all manner of display, especially display of feeling. Instead of being hail, fellow, well met with any reader, the elegant writer keeps a gentlemanly reserve. This is the most obvious difference between Thackeray and Dickens. In general, elegance is good taste in style. In particular, elegance expresses a conservative attitude toward language, not merely insisting on correctness, but rather finding its account in old approved connotations than venturing new ones, an attitude chary of figures, relying habitually on the force of mere aptness. A writer for whom elegance is the main virtue of style will often tacitly insist on scholarship in his readers, by indulgence in the recondite and reliance on the suggestions of etymology; and this habit is too allusive for the patience of most readers.

True kingship, as Plato, the old master of Aurelius, had understood it, was essentially of the nature of a service. If so be, you can discover a mode of life more desirable than the

being a king, for those who shall be kings ; then the true ideal of the state will become a possibility, but not otherwise. And if the life of Beatific Vision be indeed possible, if philosophy really "concludes in an ecstasy," affording full fruition to the entire nature of man ; then, for certain elect souls at least, a mode of life will have been discovered more desirable than to be a king. By love or fear you might induce such persons to forego their privilege ; to take upon them the distasteful task of governing other men, or even of leading them to victory in battle. But, by the very conditions of its tenure, their dominion would be wholly a ministry to others ; they would have taken upon them "the form of a servant" ; they would be reigning for the well-being of others rather than their own. The true king, the righteous king, would be Saint Lewis, exiling himself from the better land and its perfected company—so real a thing to him, definite and real as the pictured scenes of his psalter—to take part in or to arbitrate men's quarrels, about the transitory appearances of things. In a lower degree (lower, in proportion as the highest Platonic dream is lower than any Christian vision) the true king would be Marcus Aurelius, drawn from the meditation of books, to be the ruler of the Roman people in peace and, still more, in war. — PATER : *Marius the Epicurean*, Chapter xix.

224. Here looms the danger in the pursuit of elegance, the danger of obscurity and pedantry. To insist that one's reader shall ponder one's words is an attitude of greater serenity than is supportable except by real eminence. Moreover, it brings a temptation to debase elegance with preciousness. So soon as the reader feels his attention called to the choiceness of the phrase, he has a right to revolt ; for this is making style an end in itself. The other affectation that is supposed to arise from the pursuit of elegance is the pompous, the inflated, that cutting of clothes too large for the thought

which is called bombast. But pedantry, preciosity, bombast, are false elegance. They all arise from thinking of the phrase apart from the meaning. As elegance is that delicacy of aptness which arises from good taste in style and is pursued properly toward fine taste, so this false elegance comes from false taste. False taste is inconsistent with the right view of elegance.

225. These dangers are for most men very slight, not comparable with the danger of random looseness and vulgarity. Manuals of rhetoric are sometimes condemned without discrimination as leading through their inculcation of elegance to affectation; and doubtless some of them, for instance the lectures of Dr. Blair, lay too much stress upon the conservative quality of good style. The eighteenth century, again, is often summarily accused of forfeiting by a sort of academic repression all force of natural directness. But the rhetoricians and the eighteenth century have much to answer. It remains true that for most men the study of style necessitates repression and thrives upon choiceness. Impatience of restraint, unwillingness to study, is never the way to begin. That elegance is not all does not dispense any one from learning how far it goes. As for the eighteenth century, the strictures apply only to the narrow view that saw elegance only in certain conventions, and they apply very slightly to eighteenth-century prose. Moreover the prose of Addison, which is admired no less than in his own day, prevails almost entirely by elegance. Swift and Steele have more force, but are none the less obviously inferior. It was once the fashion to smile at Dr. Johnson's prose as pompous and pedantic. So it is sometimes, and is thereby the less elegant; but even our present pre-

occupation with emotional directness has not prevented us from recognizing as a permanent quality what Dr. Johnson pursued as his ideal.

We were now treading that illustrious island which was once the luminary of the Caledonian regions, whence savage clans and roving barbarians derived the benefits of knowledge and the blessings of religion. To abstract the mind from all local emotion would be impossible if it were endeavoured, and would be foolish if it were possible. Whatever withdraws us from the power of our senses, whatever makes the past, the distant, or the future predominate over the present, advances us in the dignity of thinking beings. Far from me and from my friends be such frigid philosophy as may conduct us indifferent and unmoved over any ground which has been dignified by wisdom, bravery, or virtue. That man is little to be envied whose patriotism would not gain force upon the plain of Marathon, or whose piety would not grow warmer among the ruins of Iona. — JOHNSON: *A Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland, Icolmkill.*

The man who wrote that knew more about style than his detractors; and his famous praise of Addison, —

He who would acquire a style familiar but not coarse, and elegant but not ostentatious, should give his days and nights to the study of Addison.

remains good counsel for the study of style.

c. Force

226. Still it is not all. The study to become “familiar, but not coarse, elegant, but not ostentatious,” is practically compulsory, both in general for culture and in particular for any real mastery of style. But, having

this, a writer may still be lacking. He may still lack that quality of appeal, of emotional directness, which we call vivacity or vividness, strength or force. He may still leave his readers cold. Therefore, in proportion as his object is to move men directly, to be striking — and this is an object in speeches at least as much as in novels — he will be discontented with elegance only. The connotation of words and phrases (§ 222), which is their meaning for style, as distinguished from their denotation, which is their meaning for business and logic, as it measures elegance measures also strength. Strong words and phrases are such as suggest emotions. The pursuit of force, then, is the pursuit of emotional connotations. Now emotional connotations attach especially to words familiar and specifically concrete. These most readily suggest images. Words like *home*, *church*, *fight*, have for everybody many associations. They are vague in denotation precisely because they are rich in connotation. They will not do in exposition for the same reason that makes them strong in description. Thus the native words of English are proverbially, though not always, stronger than the additions from French and Latin; *brotherly* than *fraternal*, *belly* than *abdomen*, *lively* than *vivacious*. Again, words like *fire-side*, *daybreak*, *bow-legged*, *squirt*, *plunge*, *shamble*, *glare*, have the force of specific suggestion. Vaguer and slower suggestion comes from the abstract and general — *warmth*, *early*, *deformed*, *enter*, etc. Strength compels us to call a spade a spade. Further, to call a man sad, or miserable, or dispirited, agonized, melancholy, or whatever is demanded by the shade of meaning, is of little force beside saying that he wept like a child, or tried to smooth a drawn face, or forced a smile, or

quivered, or sat with his head on his breast (§§ 146, 156). Which method shall be followed in a given case may be determined also by elegance; but there is no doubt as to which is usually stronger.

227. The habit of the concrete and specific is the force of Homer, the force of Dante and of Chaucer, the force of all great writers that choose to move our imaginations directly. It is the strong way of narration and description because it is the way of emotional suggestion (§ 146). Even the most diverse styles, in so far as they have force, will be found to have it by these means.

. . . when the sun approaches toward the gates of the morning he first opens a little eye of heaven, and sends away the spirits of darkness, and gives light to a cock, and calls up the lark to matins, and by and by gilds the fringes of a cloud, and peeps over the eastern hills, thrusting out his golden horns, like those which decked the brow of Moses when he was forced to wear a veil because himself had seen the face of God. — JEREMY TAYLOR: *Holy Dying*, Chapter i.

Suppose a man to dig up a galleon on the Coromandel coast, his rakish schooner keeping the while an offing under easy sail, and he, by the blaze of a great fire of wreckwood, to measure ingots by the bucketful on the uproarious beach.

— STEVENSON: *The Wrecker*, Chapter vii.

228. The strength of phraseology that suggests images leads naturally to such as specifies images, that is, to figures of speech. Though the term *figure* includes every departure from the literal, its common application is but twofold. First, the force inherent in specific words may be applied by mentioning the part for the whole, or the symbol for what it habitually sym-

bolizes: *Three sail beat in against the east wind. A briefless lawyer. A man in his cups.* Secondly, and more commonly, the force inherent in concrete words may be applied by comparison: "*like a hunted cat on the top of a fence*," "*thin, distant spires of pine*" (§ 182). The former has for general name *metonymy*; the latter, according as it is direct or indirect, *simile* or *metaphor*. Everybody's speech is more or less figurative. The counsel of style is to reject all trite or crude figure, *babbling brooks* and *sentinel mountains*; that is, to be sincere and personal in figure as in all other phrase, and not to rely on figure habitually. For frequent use the appeal of figure is too direct, fatiguing the reader, as typically in Carlyle, by overstimulus. Superabundance of figure is like repeatedly pulling a reader by the sleeve. He often prefers to have some trust reposed in the activity of his own imagination.

d. The Balance of Elegance and Force in Classic Prose

229. The quality of strength and the quality of elegance, though they are not incompatible, are found to prevail separately more often than together. Every writer has need of both; but every writer is likely to prefer one to the other according to his natural bent. Swift expresses himself, not inelegantly, indeed, but above all forcibly; Addison has much force of specific and concrete, but leans to the side of elegance. And the predominance of the one quality or the other marks the variation, not only of personal temper, but also of literary fashion, of the taste of successive literary periods. The eighteenth century in general preferred elegance just as evidently as our own time prefers

emotional directness. So the fault of lesser writers in the earlier time was false elegance, as their fault in our time is the exaltation of mere strenuousness. Typical excellence and typical fault alike reveal that the conception of good style tends to be limited in any particular time by the taste of that time. It is an almost inevitable provincialism that each age should tend to exalt the quality of its preference to be the sum of all excellence in style.

No less marked is the provincialism of place. Only the greatest authors pass freely over the world; and even these usually suffer detention at the frontier. Dante had not long to wait for homage in England; but Homer has in times and places been forgotten, and Shakespeare was long an offence to France. "Insist, if you will," said the French in effect, "on his elemental force; but do not talk of his good style. He may be a great barbarian; but he is a barbarian." And, for all our progress in the interchange of ideas since those more provincial days, good style is not yet an international, interchangeable term. In fact, the conception of good style in any nation is of necessity so modified by the habits and resources of its own language that it must always have something national.

Yet the conception of great style, though it too be tinged by time and place, cannot be thus confined. The fact that great authors ultimately surmount these barriers indicates a certain quality or combination of qualities which, constituting great style in the view of all times and places, may be taken as the ideal of good style. Comparative criticism looks to that which has passed from age to age and from nation to nation to correct any provincial view of style; and the student of

style may best escape the domineering of fashion by learning the ways of art from the classics. What he thus learns, so far as it can be formulated, has been long embodied in general principles of composition; but much that cannot easily be formulated he will find for the truer expression of his own personality through familiarity with classic diction. The classic quality of diction, the quality that gives permanence, can be felt and assimilated, indeed, more easily than it can be defined; but it is important to observe in general that it connotes the balance of elegance and strength. Excellence in either may bring temporary or local vogue; wider prevalence demands that one shall correct and support the other.

Thus the counsel of classic diction to the student of good style is that elegance, corrected by emotional directness, shall keep simplicity; that emotional directness, corrected by elegance, shall keep composure. For observe how each quality is hindered by its defect from widely prevailing alone. The characteristic elegance of some authors eminent in France does not suffice to make them read of Englishmen and Germans; for, lacking simplicity, it seems to men of other nations to offer for the grand the grandiose. Racine is a great dramatist; but he has never held English audiences. On the other side, the characteristic emotional directness of Elizabethan dramatists such as Ford and Webster for lack of composure cannot win approval from the French. But Molière will crowd the house in London or New York as well as in Paris; and Shakespeare, if not so frequently played on either side of the Channel, is read on both sides. It is the same with the differences of time. Authors eminent for the quality preferred in

their time may, for lack of correction by the other quality, fail of speaking to the future. The same defect that hinders Ford and Webster among the French has kept them minor authors, though critically admired, among ourselves. It is not meant that the preoccupations of time and place will ever cease to have weight, nor that works of international vogue, like the *Sentimental Journey* and Poe's tales, are, by this fact alone, great; but only that every serious student of style, whatever his predilection or his native capacity, needs to keep as his ideal that just balance of elegance and emotional directness which is the lesson of the classics.

And it is by the effort toward this balance that even the humble student of style, who will never become classic, who does not even expect any sort of eminence beyond the distinction of expressing himself well, will make his progress sure. Otherwise the pursuit of strong language may degenerate into slang figure or other mere violence.

"Some of the boys regretted her not being fair. But, as they felt, and sought to explain, in the manner of the wag of a tail, with elbows and eyebrows to one another's understanding, fair girls could never have let fly such a look. Fair girls are softer, woollier, and when they mean to look serious, overdo it by craping solemn; or they pinafore a jiggling eagerness, or hoist propriety on a chubby flaxen grin; or else they dart an eye, or they mince and prim and pout, and are sigh-away and dying-ducky, given to girls' tricks. Brownny, after all, was the girl for Matey.

She won a victory right away and out of hand, on behalf of her cloud-and-moon sisters, as against the sunny-meadowy; for slanting intermediates are not espied of boys in anything. Conquered by Brownny, they went over to her colour, equal to

arguing that Venus at her mightiest must have been dark, or she would not have stood a comparison with the forest Goddess of the Crescent, swanning it through a lake—on the leap for the run of the chase—watching the dart, with her humming bow at breast. The fair are simple, sugary things, prone to fat, like bread-sops in milk; but the others are milky nuts, good to bite, Lacedæmonian virgins, hard to beat, putting us on our mettle; and they are for heroes, and they can be brave. So these boys felt, conquered by Browny. A sneaking native taste for the forsaken side, known to renegades, hauled at them if her image waned a little; but Sunday restored and stamped it. — GEORGE MEREDITH: *Lord Ormont and his Aminta*.

This has a certain force; but it has no real strength because it has no composure, because the author, like a sensational orator, seems to be talking at the top of his lungs. We rarely receive this impression from the masters. When the emotional appeal is in danger of being too direct can be determined only by a cultivated taste in language; and a cultivated taste in language comes from the pursuit of elegance. But the exclusive pursuit of elegance may lead to a habit of indirectness, and therefore to coldness and feebleness.

I was yesterday about sunset walking in the open fields, till the night insensibly fell upon me. I at first amused myself with all the richness and variety of colours which appeared in the western parts of heaven. In proportion as they faded away and went out, several stars and planets appeared one after another, till the whole firmament was in a glow. The blueness of the ether was exceedingly heightened and enlivened by the season of the year and by the rays of all those luminaries that passed through it. The galaxy appeared in its most beautiful white. To complete the scene, the full

moon rose at length in that clouded majesty which Milton takes notice of, and opened to the eye a new picture of nature, which was more finely shaded, and disposed among softer lights, than that which the sun had before discovered to us.

— ADDISON: *Spectator*, 565.

This is pretty, and rather futile. But it is only the incidental weakness of a great writer. The masters at their best show always that they love simplicity too much to think of phrase except as the medium for their readers. And even an author that is too much preoccupied with elegance will attain his best when he salts it with direct, homely strength.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE EARL OF CHESTERFIELD.

February 7, 1775.

My Lord, —

I have been lately informed by the proprietor of the *World* that two papers in which my Dictionary is recommended to the publick were written by your Lordship. To be so distinguished is an honour which, being very little accustomed to favours from the great, I know not well how to receive, or in what terms to acknowledge.

When, upon some slight encouragement, I first visited your Lordship, I was overpowered, like the rest of mankind, by the enchantment of your address, and could not forbear to wish that I might boast myself *Le vainqueur du vainqueur de la terre*, — that I might obtain that regard for which I saw the world contending; but I found my attendance so little encouraged that neither pride nor modesty would suffer me to continue it. When I had once addressed your Lordship in publick I had exhausted all the art of pleasing which a retired and uncourtly scholar can possess. I had done all that I could; and no man is well pleased to have his all neglected, be it ever so little.

Seven years, my Lord, have now past since I waited in your outward rooms, or was repulsed from your door ; during which time I have been pushing on my work through difficulties of which it is useless to complain, and have brought it, at last, to the verge of publication, without one act of assistance, one word of encouragement, or one smile of favour. Such treatment I did not expect, for I never had a Patron before.

The shepherd in Virgil grew at last acquainted with Love, and found him a native of the rocks.

Is not a Patron, my Lord, one who looks with unconcern on a man struggling for life in the water, and, when he has reached ground, encumbers him with help ? The notice which you have been pleased to take of my labours, had it been early, had been kind ; but it has been delayed till I am indifferent, and cannot enjoy it ; till I am solitary, and cannot impart it ; till I am known, and do not want it. I hope it is no very cynical asperity not to confess obligations where no benefit has been received, or to be unwilling that the Publick should consider me as owing that to a Patron which Providence has enabled me to do for myself.

Having carried on my work thus far with so little obligation to any favourer of learning, I shall not be disappointed though I should conclude it, if less be possible, with less ; for I have been long wakened from that dream of hope in which I once boasted myself with so much exultation,

My Lord,
Your Lordship's most humble,
Most obedient servant,
SAM. JOHNSON.

This twofold character of the best English prose is an example to all wise endeavour in style.

e. Harmony

230. There is a third quality which, though less obvious than the other two, is none the less generally a mark of good style. This is harmony. In fact, whereas the dominance of elegance or of strength is likely to be the mark of one style or another, almost every good style has the mark of harmony. The approved authors who, like Carlyle, ignore harmony are very rare. There are others, Macaulay and Dickens for instance, whose ear is defective; but even these at least seek harmony. Harmony, then, might almost be called the constant quality of good style. The other qualities may roughly be said to consist in adapting the connotation of the phrase to the connotation of the whole. Harmony consists in thus adapting the sound of the phrase. The sound, indeed, is itself a sort of connotation. The suggestion of the sound may partly, or even wholly, determine whether the choice fall on *harsh*, for instance, or *raucous*, on *grewsome* or *ghastly*. And the choice may be of the sound either for itself or, more commonly, for its accord or discord with its neighbours. There is no doubt, either that we childishly prefer certain words for the mere sound of them, or that which words recur to our memories when we halt in choice is partly determined by the sound of the words preceding. This unconscious or half-conscious suggestion by sound is increased by an artist's conscious attention to harmony.

I. EUPHONY

231. The simplest manifestation of the attention proper to the mere sounds of words is certain habitual corrections for euphony. Even the feeblest conception

of style revises such phrases as *a complication threatening the disintegration of the nation, only partly, merely habitually*, because of the jingling recurrence. The alliteration of newspaper head-lines is a device of style, though it be applied there so crudely as to bring any use of it into question. In a higher range are the balanced sentence (§ 46) and the putting of the longer phrase or clause after the shorter. The impulse to round a sentence reveals, in whatever degree, the artistic sense of measure and cadence. Untrained, it may lead to bombast, the sound overreaching the sense; but it is none the less an impulse of art. Cadence, measure, — from Aristotle down these are the terms of the classical rhetoric in speaking of sentences; and they are terms of music. Not for that are they to be regarded as figurative. Let no one think the point of view they imply either fanciful or outworn. There never has been any fine prose without measure.

2. RHYTHM

232. This is not to say that the classical rules of the sentence are always valid and sufficient for English. The classical rules are based on a quantitative system of verse; the English system of verse is accentual. But in English prose, as in Greek or Latin, the phrase or clause, like the verse in poetry, is a unit of rhythm. Upon the distribution of these units, and upon the beat of each, depends what is called the flow of prose. Slow or quick, smooth or rough, varied or monotonous, and all the finer adaptations of sound to sense, are largely matters of prose rhythm. *Quod carmen artificiosa verborum conclusione aptius* (Cicero, *de Oratore*, II. viii) was

said by a poor poet who was one of the greatest masters of the technic of prose.

233. Prose rhythm is not metre. Occasionally, indeed, a verse breaks out in highly emotional prose, for example in our sympathetic English translation of the Psalms and Prophets :

Is it time for you, O ye, to dwell in your ceiled houses ?

— *Haggai* i. 4.

They shall fly as the eagle that hasteth to eat.

— *Habakkuk* i. 8.

God is gone up with a shout, the Lord with the sound of a trumpet.

— *Psalms* xlvii. 5.

234. But even in emotional prose this is accident; and, except as occasional accident, it is displeasing. The half-metrical rhythm of certain pieces of pathos in *The Old Curiosity Shop* is a sign of crude art. That the measures proper to prose are larger, more freely adaptable, appears quite simply in the same context as the second passage above :

Woe to him | that buildeth a town with blood
and | stablisheth a city by iniquity.

— *Habakkuk* ii. 12.

Indicated by the classical symbols, the macron standing for a stressed syllable, the breve for one unstressed, this shows the prose opportunity for a succession of three unstressed syllables :

— ˘ — | ˘ — ˘ ˘ — ˘ —
˘ | — ˘ ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘

Of the two following, the first is a more flowing rhythm, rising and quickening, then subsiding, with

fine adaptation to the emotion; the second, forcibly abrupt:

For the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the glory
of the Lord,
as the waters cover the sea. — *Habakkuk* ii. 14.

u u | _ u u _ u u _ u u u _ u u u _
 u u | _ u _ u u _

Woe unto him that saith to the wood, Awake;
to the dumb stone, Arise,
it shall teach!
— *Habakkuk* ii. 19.

_ u u _ u _ u u _ u _
 u u _ _ u _
 u u _

Of course behind these solemn rhythms is the balanced construction of their Hebrew originals. They are thus the more obvious as measures, and the more readily monotonous. But monotony, even where the balance is close, is often avoided through a main means of variety in English verse, variation at the cæsural pause, as in the second passage below. Not so here:

O Lord, I have heard thy speech, and was afraid.
O Lord, revive thy work in the midst of the years.
In the midst of the years make known;
in wrath remember mercy. — *Habakkuk* iii. 2.

_ _ | u u _ u _ | u u u _
 _ _ | u _ u _ | u u _ u _
 u u | _ u u _ u _ | u _ u _ u _

The simple lesson of these simple rhythms is also first in importance: vary the cadences.

How much of the finer connotation of style may pro-

ceed from rhythm appears strikingly in the prose of Sir Thomas Browne :

1. 'Tis opportune to look back upon old times
 ∪ | — ∪ — ∪ — — ∪ ∪ — — (6)
 2. and contemplate our forefathers.
 ∪ ∪ | — ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ (2)
 3. Great examples grow thin
 — ∪ — ∪ ∪ — (3)
 4. and to be fetched from the passed world.
 ∪ ∪ ∪ | — ∪ ∪ — — (3)
 5. Simplicity flies away ;
 ∪ | — ∪ ∪ — ∪ — (3)
 6. and iniquity comes at long strides upon us.
 ∪ ∪ | — ∪ ∪ — ∪ — — ∪ — ∪ (5)
 7. We have enough to do to make up ourselves from
 present and passed times ;
 ∪ ∪ ∪ | — ∪ — ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ — ∪ ∪ — — (7)
 8. and the whole stage of things scarce serveth for our
 instruction.
 ∪ ∪ | — — ∪ ∪ — — ∪ ∪ — ∪ — ∪ (6)
 9. A complete piece of virtue must be made from the
 Centos of all ages,
 ∪ ∪ | — — ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ — — ∪ (7)
 10. as all the beauties of Greece could make but one hand-
 some Venus.
 ∪ | — ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ — ∪ — — ∪ — ∪ (7)
- SIR THOMAS BROWNE, *Urn Burial*, Epistle Dedicatory.

In this paragraph of five sentences, though **every** sentence has two members, and though every **sentence** but one has these two members joined by *and*, yet variety appears: (1) in the length of the members,

growing toward the close; (2) in the places of the cæsuras; (3) in the closing cadences. The juxtaposition of stressed syllables has a grave and weighty effect, like that of the Greek spondee; and this effect is increased by the asyndeton. Every member but one begins with an unstressed syllable. Therefore this one ("Great examples") throws emphasis upon its first word by the break in the movement.

More freely varied, and at the same time more finely harmonized, is the famous opening of the fifth chapter :

1. Now since these dead bones have already outlasted the
living ones of Methuselah,

∪ | — — — ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ (8)

2. and in a yard underground and thin walls of clay out-
worn all the strong and spacious buildings above it,

∪ ∪ ∪ | — ∪ ∪ — ∪ — — ∪ — ∪ — — ∪ — ∪ — ∪ ∪
— ∪ (11)

3. and quietly rested under the drums and trappings of
three conquests,

∪ | — ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ — ∪ ∪ — — ∪ (7)

4. what prince can promise such diuturnity unto his relics,

— — ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ (7)

5. or might not gladly say,

∪ | — ∪ — ∪ — (3)

Sic ego componi versus in ossa velim?

6. Time, which antiquates antiquities,

— ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ (3)

7. and hath an art to make dust of all things,

∪ ∪ ∪ | — ∪ — — ∪ — ∪ (4)

8. hath yet spared these minor monuments.

∪ | — — ∪ — ∪ — ∪ ∪ (4)

— SIR THOMAS BROWNE: *Urn Burial*, Chapter v.

3. OTHER RECURRENCES

235. But it will not have escaped an attentive ear that the noble harmony of this passage has something more than rhythm. Besides the grave measure that attunes us to the contemplation of death, we are aware of other recurrences and correspondences of sound. In the first four members it is not hard to discover that $N(M)$ — $L(R)$ — $D(T, Th)$ run through in various combinations, that the labials (B, P) come in rarely, and that the sibilants are uncommonly few. Thus the fine sonority of the whole cannot be thought haphazard. It is as if harmonized upon the word *diuturnity*. Stevenson goes so far as to say: "Each phrase in literature is built of sounds, as each phrase in music consists of notes. One sound suggests, echoes, demands, and harmonizes with another; and the art of rightly using these concordances is the final art in literature."

The pattern, to use Stevenson's word, of De Quincey's "impassioned prose" often shows equally striking recurrences:

1. Her eyes are sweet and subtle, wild and sleepy, by turns;
 ∪ | — ∪ — ∪ — ∪ — ∪ — ∪ — (6)
2. oftentimes rising to the clouds,
 — ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — (3)
3. oftentimes challenging the heavens.
 — ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ (4)
4. She wears a diadem round her head.
 ∪ | — ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ — (4)
5. And I knew by childish memories that she could go
 abroad upon the winds,
 ∪ ∪ | — ∪ — ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — (6)

6. when she heard the sobbing of litanies or the thundering of organs,

∪ ∪ | — ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ (5)

7. and when she beheld the mustering of summer clouds.

∪ ∪ ∪ ∪ | — ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ — (4)

— DE QUINCEY, *Levana and our Ladies of Sorrow*.

Dropping the least frequent consonants, we may exhibit the remainder thus :

1. HR Z R SWT ND STL WLD ND SLP TRNZ
2. TMZ RZNG LDZ
3. TMZ CHLLNG H NZ
4. WRZ DDM RND HR HD
5. ND N CHLD MMRZ D'BRD WNDZ
6. HRD SBNG LTNS ND NDRNG RGNZ
7. HLD MSTRNG SMR LDZ

If the similar S and Z, N and NG, be counted together, the series of combinations is quite remarkable—S R STNDSTL LDNDSTL TRNS, etc., liquid, dental, nasal, sibilant, as in *litanies*.

But the dominance of the long *i* (ai) in the first four measures should make us aware also of recurrences among the accented vowels :

1. ai ī ũ ai ī ũ
2. q(ai) ai ou
3. q(ai) ă ě
4. ę ai(ě) ou ě
5. (ai) ū ai ě ō q ĭ
6. ũ ő ĭ ũ q
7. ě ũ ũ ou

236. These harmonies, evidently beautiful, are yet somewhat too marked in rhythm and alliteration for

a long-sustained passage of prose. Like Swinburne, De Quincey runs too near the artificial. In general, the finer harmony of prose is typically freer, less obvious, more implicit; in particular, the recurrences should be felt rather than remarked. In sound, as in sense, that effect of which we are separately conscious is less than perfect. The ideal is that no feature of style should call attention to itself, that each should be felt only as chiming with the effect of the whole.

But so have I seen a rose newly springing from the clefts of its hood; and at first it was fair as the morning and full with the dew of heaven, as a lamb's fleece. But when a ruder breath had forced open its virgin modesty and dismantled its too youthful and unripe retirements, it began to put on darkness, and to decline to softness and the symptoms of a sickly age. It bowed the head and broke its stalk; and at night, having lost some of its leaves and all its beauty, it fell into the portion of weeds and outworn faces.

—JEREMY TAYLOR: *The Rule and Exercises of Holy Dying*, Chapter i., § 2.

f. Sincerity

237. Elegance, strength, harmony, are thus seen to demand the cultivation of every student of style. But as the primary and ultimate meaning of style is the artistic expression of personality, so the proportion of these qualities in any style is quite beyond rules, is the choice of the particular artist. Rather we should not speak of proportion at all, as if style might be produced by judicious mixture, but only of the different points of view which we may assume for revision. And never can any one safely permit himself to forget that his object is not to make style, as if style were something

separate from himself and his message, but only to attain style by better and better truth to what moves him to speak. Style conceived as something separable, as ornament applicable after the thing is done, is a delusion as immoral as it is inartistic. All ornament, in any art, that does not spring as if organically from the conception of the whole is an offence to good taste; but in literature it is worse than anywhere else. For words are so far the necessary expression of all men, they involve so much of life, that what in other arts is bad taste, in literature is bad morals. To study style as a mechanism of extraneous ornament would be both futile and insincere. Few men, we must presume, can ever be so misguided; but there is some danger for almost every one of lapsing in that direction. Every time a writer determines a phrase purely by its elegance, strength, or harmony, apart from its faithfulness to his message, he is guilty of malfeasance; and a habit of phrase-seeking, in this sense of those words, is usually punished, not only by loss of self-respect, but also by loss of artistic power. *Naïveté* is a different matter, the gift of directness which we call unconscious art. Some men never lose the child's unconsciousness of how his expression appears to a conventional world, never lose it or can recall it at will. So they "pretend" singly and fully—and that is sincere art. But sincere art is not confined to this happy birthright. Indeed, for most men, even for most artists, it is an attainment of conscious striving. The popular idea that for sincerity of expression the only need is something to say and a plentiful lack of training in how to say it, is a fallacy refuted over and over again by authors who, with the abundance of matter both new and personal, for lack of

training give it forth in feeble conventionalities. A "rhetorical" style, indeed, in the sense of a style whose ornament is extraneous, whose heightening of language is for its own sake, arises not so often from skill in technic as from clumsiness. It is typically the fault of the untrained. Native or acquired, then, or native *and* acquired, sincerity is the final virtue of style. An artist's only safety and his constant duty is to abhor cant, always to be sincere.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

CHAPTER I

THEMES AND EXERCISES

A

Subjects for unified essays of about one hundred and fifty words, to be written, some in class, some outside, but without previous reading. They may, of course, be adapted freely.

1. A war correspondent has the most adventurous life possible in our time.
2. The overhead electric wire is a menace.
3. The contemporary newspaper in this country does not try to tell the truth.
4. The leisure class in this country is increasing.
5. The raising of alfalfa on dry lands is receiving much attention in the West.
6. The present condition of our track athletics is —.
7. The real issue between the parties in national (or state) politics is —.
8. The United States has done — for Cuba.
9. The traffic on our canals is changing, not decreasing.
10. — is a novel of unusual interest.
11. Filtering beds are a simple and adequate device for the disposal of sewage.

12. The — bill is not likely to pass the present Congress (or legislature).
13. The — bill is not adequate to its purpose.
14. Vaudeville is a degrading recreation.
15. Electric traction can be largely applied in handling freight within cities.
16. A preacher to college students should be —.
17. Private dormitories injure democratic spirit.
18. Walt Whitman's coarseness is venial.
19. The average student finds it difficult to get sufficient exercise.
20. The hardest athletic training is that for the crew.
21. The college magazines are narrow.
22. Blue laws for Sunday are relics of bigotry.
23. A college man is usually a gentleman.
24. Our college politics are not so black as they are painted.
25. Fraternities have (would have) a valuable function here.
26. Ministers are underpaid.
27. Railroading offers to a poor man peculiar opportunities of rising.
28. The South has great natural resources.
29. Strikes of coal-miners are partly due to company stores.
30. Chesterfield's letters to his son are depressing.
31. The people of Cuba can be Americanized.
32. Achilles is not, in the modern sense, a hero.
33. The county store is typically American.
34. The Ohio River trade has sadly decreased.
35. Boys should be sent to college away from home.
36. The spirit of work is characteristic of our college.

37. A summer's business experience brings a fuller appreciation of college life.
38. The formation of college political clubs should be encouraged.
39. Public courtesy to women is more common in the West than in the East.
40. Thanksgiving Day has changed its character.
41. Christmas is celebrated universally.
42. Habitual reading of the Bible is a good training in style.

B

- I. Write an essay of five paragraphs as follows :

My Town (city or village)

- I. The look of my town is typical of New England (or of the Middle West, the Pacific Slope, etc.).
- II. Its principal industries are —.
- III. The results of its abundant (or deficient) communication with — are —.
- IV. Thus the main characteristics of the population are —.
- V. In short, my town is —. (Sum up.)

N.B. This kind of exercise is a regular method of instruction in the French *lycées*. The prescribed plan is known as a *matière*. See, e.g., *Cours Pratique et Raisonné de Style et de Composition*, etc., par M. A. Henry, Part II. Chapter ii.

2. Draw up a paragraph summary as above, for another essay of five paragraphs on the same topic, considering the proportion of foreigners in the population, the provisions for schools, the religious life, etc., and leading to a natural conclusion.

3. The exercise of summary by paragraphs may profitably be repeated with other available essays, and extended to reports of speeches, lectures, or sermons. Applied to one's own composition, it is an admirable test of coherence.

A summary of Selection I would proceed somewhat as follows :

TREES IN THE FOREST

- I. The silvicultural character of a tree is the sum of its inborn qualities.
- II. The native country of a species of tree, as of a race of men, is partly determined by temperature.
- III. Temperature also determines their distribution within smaller areas.
- IV. In both cases their distribution is also determined by moisture.
- V. But the thriving of the individual tree depends much more on its tolerance.
- VI. Tolerance thus determines the proportion of different species in a forest.
- VII. Tolerance is affected not only by the quantity of light, but also by the kind of light, and the vigour of the young shoot.
- VIII. Thus of two intolerant trees that one will survive which grows fastest.
- IX. And the rate of growth depends again largely on the place.
- X. The reproductive power of a species, and therefore the succession of species, depends largely on whether the seeds are heavy, or light and winged.
- XI. The character of the seeds thus largely determines whether a species is gregarious or scattered.
- XII. And, with the other conditions mentioned before, makes certain species practically always gregarious.

4. Write an essay following one of the paragraph summaries below.

A REVIEW OF (a novel recently read)

- I. The plot of this novel (Summarize the plot in one hundred words.) shows that it is a tale of adventure (or a study of manners or character).
- II. The description is full and interesting (or dull. Note whether the author brings out the local peculiarities of the scene).
- III. The characters are ——. (Summarize your impressions of the principal characters as to whether they seem distinct and true to life.)
- IV. The plot is so well constructed as to hold the interest throughout (or weak, loosely constructed, uninteresting, or inconsistent. Mention some of the principal situations).
- V. Thus the book succeeds (or fails) by its plot (or its characterization). If the book is occupied mainly with the presentation of character, transpose III and IV.

THE AMERICAN SUNDAY

- I. The term *American Sunday* is used in contradistinction to the European Sunday. (Define and contrast these two ideas.)
- II. Thus the distinguishing characteristics of the American Sunday seemed to be derived from the Puritans.
- III. But these are not characteristic of Sunday in the West. (Give examples.)
- IV. Thus there is no uniform practice warranting thoroughly the term *American Sunday*.
- V. Still, certain points of observance are common enough to warrant the colloquial use of the term.

5. Draw up a paragraph summary for another essay treating this topic differently.

C

Selecting from the subjects given at the opening of this Appendix for short essays one that suggests to you more extended discussion, note under it whatever topics from time to time occur to you; *e.g.*:

Notes for an Essay on the Leisure Class in the United States

Theoretically no classes in U. S.

"Aristocracy of wealth"? Strong feeling of labour against capital *class* feeling?

Travellers not divided into classes — but Pullman cars? "tourist" sleeping-cars? "*otium cum dignitate*."

General feeling against a man that does nothing with his money except live on it.

Increase of sports requiring leisure (and money) — golf. Leisure class in England usually marked by rank?

Opportunities for men of leisure — scholarship. Word *gentleman* with us does not necessarily imply leisure.

Etc., etc.

Group these notes roughly for development by paragraphs (It is a saving of time to group, at least partially, during the note-taking; and to this end it is better to take notes on small slips, cards, or blank books with removable leaves, so that the grouping may be done so far as possible by mere sorting without copying.); *e.g.*:

I. We have a leisure class.

Theoretically no classes in U. S.

but "aristocracy of wealth." Leisure class in England still marked usually by rank?

.

Wealth means freedom as well as power.
increase of sports demanding leisure — golf.
increase of travel and of living abroad.

- II. Our leisure class is still considered un-American.
feeling against Americans living abroad.
feeling against Americans doing nothing with their
incomes except for their own benefit.

III. Etc., etc.

Fix the conclusion, and arrange these paragraph schemes in such order as will lead to it naturally.

When the development of any one of these paragraph schemes works out to much greater length than was at first intended, divide this stage into two stages; but keep in mind the proportions of the whole, *e.g.* do not give undue space to a minor part (§§ 13, 14). Remember that there is no necessary correspondence between the number of topics or points in an essay and the number of paragraphs. The subject of a paragraph is, not a topic, but a sentence. Whether a given topic should occupy one paragraph or two, or half a paragraph or a quarter, depends on the proportions of the whole essay.

[N.B. Practice in dividing topics into parts for discussion may profitably be carried farther on the blackboard.]

NOTES, REFERENCES, EXAMPLES

[N.B. The section numbers correspond to those of the text.]

2. (*Introduction.*) Quintilian, *Institutes*, VIII, introduction, "Cicero is of opinion that, whereas invention and orderly arrangement may be had by any man of

intelligence, eloquence belongs to the orator." But Quintilian adds, "Therefore Cicero worked out with especial pains the precepts for the *latter*." (Et Marcus Tullius inventionem quidem ac dispositionem prudentis hominis putat, eloquentiam oratoris. Ideoque praecepit circa praecepta partis hujus laboravit.)

See De Quincey's distinction, in the essay on Pope, between literature of knowledge and literature of power; and Gardiner's between literature of thought and literature of feeling, *The Forms of Prose Literature*, page 11. Albalat (*la Formation du Style par l'Assimilation des Auteurs*, page 88) cites from G. Renard (*la Méthode Scientifique de l'Histoire Littéraire*, page 385) a distinction of H. Balzac's between *les écrivains d'idées* and *les écrivains d'images*.

That Aristotle does not mean to confine his theory in the *Poetics* to verse is plain from Chapters i ("For we should otherwise have no general name," etc. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔχοιμεν . . .), vi ("diction . . . the power and effect of which is the same whether in verse or prose." Τέταρτον . . . ἡ λέξις —), ix ("For it is not by writing in verse or prose that the historian and the poet are distinguished." Ὁ γὰρ ἱστορικὸς —).

11. In Selection II, paragraph III opens with reference to the preceding and statement of its own subject in one short, explicit sentence. So paragraphs IV (marking an advance in importance) and V. In VI the transition is longer, three sentences (because V has a less essential place in the development of the whole?). Examine the transitional references at the beginning of the other paragraphs.

13. In Section II, paragraph VIII is undeveloped. Might not this matter have been subordinately intro-

duced after the second sentence of paragraph VII? In Selection IV, paragraph XLI is undeveloped. Compare the opening of paragraph XVI, where an undiscussed point is incorporated.

14. In Selection III, paragraph IX is an example; paragraphs XIV and XVIII are transitional summaries. In Selection IV, paragraph XXV sums up XIV-XXIV. Compare the similar office of the opening of paragraph XIX, where the transitional summary is too short to be a paragraph. XXXV might logically be printed as three paragraphs, and with equal logic as part of XXXIV; but in the latter case the lack of spacing would too much conceal the component parts, which if the author had intended to combine he would have linked more closely.

15. In Selection III, paragraph II opens and closes with the subject; so in Selection IV, paragraphs VI, XVII, XXXII, XXXIII. In Selection IV also, paragraph XII opens with the subject and reference to the preceding. XI is an admirable short paragraph. The subject, stated at the beginning, is repeated at the end as a logical conclusion.

Macaulay often opens a paragraph with a sentence that forecasts, not only that paragraph, but also several following. This habit of indicating larger groups is not peculiar, indeed, to him; but is more easily observed than in most other authors. It is like the process called by sailors *warping*, which is to cast an anchor ahead, pull the ship up to it, cast ahead again, and so on. In like manner the end of any paragraph may sum up both that paragraph and several preceding.

16. Scott and Denney, *Paragraph Writing*, pages 24-36; *Composition Rhetoric* (much fuller statement and

exemplification), Chapter iii; E. H. Lewis, *A First Book in Writing English*, Chapter vii.

An example is an instance of the principle expounded, as in § 21 the instance of paragraph emphasis, or in Selection IV, paragraph VIII, the instance of the embargo; an illustration is a parallel from outside, as the instructive fact that the principle of emphasis has its parallel in architecture. Both are needed in inverse proportion to the knowledge of the audience; but to some extent both are always needed and, whether needed or not, give scope for liveliness and originality.

In Selection I, the development of the paragraphs is mainly by example. Of development by illustration almost any of Bacon's essays offers admirable instances. Naturally, few paragraphs in any author are developed by any one means exclusively; and some paragraphs might be found to exhibit them all. Macaulay uses a single, or a very simple, development oftener, perhaps, than any other famous author. Being thus more obvious, his method is very profitable for study at the beginning. The following paragraph, for example, merely iterates and exemplifies a contrast and then closes with a striking illustration:

So judged those who were ignorant of the character and habits of the Spanish people. There is no country in Europe which it is so easy to overrun as Spain; there is no country in Europe which it is more difficult to conquer. Nothing can be more contemptible than the regular military resistance which Spain offers to an invader; nothing more formidable than the energy which she puts forth when her regular military resistance has been beaten down. Her armies have long borne too much resemblance to mobs; but her mobs have had, in an unusual degree, the spirit of armies. The soldier, as compared

with other soldiers, is deficient in military qualities ; but the peasant has as much of those qualities as the soldier. In no country have such strong fortresses been taken by surprise ; in no country have unfortified towns made so furious and obstinate a resistance to great armies. War in Spain has, from the days of the Romans, had a character of its own : it is a fire which cannot be raked out ; it burns fiercely under the embers ; and long after it has, to all seeming, been extinguished, bursts forth more violently than ever. This was seen in the last war. Spain had no army which could have looked in the face an equal number of French or Prussian soldiers ; but one day laid the Prussian monarchy in the dust ; one day put the crown of France at the disposal of invaders. No Jena, no Waterloo, would have enabled Joseph to reign quiet at Madrid. — MACAULAY : *Lord Mahon's War of the Succession in Spain*.

So in Macaulay's *Machiavelli*, one of his most pointed and interesting essays, paragraph XXXII is wholly illustration ; XXXIV, wholly example ; VI, developed by contrast ; XI, developed by iteration, example, and illustration.

17-20. In Selection IV, paragraph V makes explicit reference largely by iteration of *commerce*, leading up logically to *commerce including navigation*. Paragraphs VI, VII (except in one sentence), and IX have explicit reference throughout ; paragraph VIII has hardly any. Careful and extended examination of paragraph coherence in this and the other selections, especially Selection III, will be found repaying.

Macaulay's habitual asyndeton is as characteristic as Burke's habitual explicit reference. Page after page of Macaulay's *Machiavelli*, for instance, has no conjunction between sentences except *but*, and hardly any other connective.

21. In Selection II, paragraph V ends with an epigram. VI ends with an exception, and is besides left hanging; so III. IV ends with the logical conclusion. In Selection III, paragraph VIII ends with an illustration; paragraph X, with an epigram.

In Selection I, paragraph VIII seems to demand a conclusion. (See note on this selection under § 24 of this appendix.)

Selection IV is remarkable for the clearness of paragraph emphasis. The ends of paragraphs III, XVII, and XXIX, for instance, are both conclusive and summary. Examine other paragraphs, and compare § 24.

22. In Selection II, paragraph II, the illustration from trees seems somewhat forced in, to the injury of proportion.

Professor Wendell gives a formula for paragraph emphasis: "A paragraph whose unity can be demonstrated by summarizing its substance in a sentence whose subject shall be a summary of its opening sentence, and whose predicate shall be a summary of its closing sentence, is theoretically well massed." — *English Composition*, page 129.

24. In Selection IV, paragraph XXI closes with the key-word of the whole. Study farther in this selection the relation between paragraph emphasis and the coherence of the whole.

In Selection II, the first paragraph is admirably rounded, complete in itself, but does not lead well to the next paragraph; for its emphasis is divided between the demonstration that Japanese art has influence (which is taken up by paragraph II), and that the influence is not essential. Paragraph II, after a formal transition,

brings in the new aspect *unique* with the help of the old *incident*. So III takes up *uniqueness*.

In Selection I the paragraphs all lack emphasis, partly because, the method being almost of necessity enumeration, the coherence of the whole is not vital.

26. E. H. Lewis, *A First Book in Writing English*, Chapter v.

In Selection II, paragraph V, should not the sentence beginning, "Thus the two artists," be a clause? In paragraph IX, should not the clause, "and grace and strength,—" be a sentence? In Selection I, paragraph V, "But there is always this difference . . . with intolerant trees" — recast these sentences.

Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, III, xii (page 272 of Welldon's translation), shows that asyndeton is a means of amplification. Conversely, observe that the paragraph from Emerson in § 25 is not, as some people would affirm, concise. Each sentence is easily read; but after four or five sentences the accumulation of statements with no bearing expressed is extremely fatiguing. Try the effect of combining these detached statements into sentences that shall express the relations of the thoughts as you understand the relations. A dozen people trying the experiment without reference to one another and then comparing their results will be surprised at the divergence.

For the effect of short, detached sentences on the movement, or flow, of the paragraph, see the summary of Aristotle under § 37 of his appendix. The significant sentence is, τὸ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν προσπταίνει πολλάκις ποιεῖ τὸν ἀκροατὴν, "For the short makes the hearers often stumble." (Compare § 27.)

As to redundancy not much more can be laid down.

The habit is to be broken only by painstaking correction of particular case after particular case; but in general the only principle (beyond the obvious cutting out of merely superfluous words) is to reduce a redundant sentence to a clause, a clause to a phrase, a phrase to a single precise word.

Superfluous words intrude most readily in careless conventional expressions :

(There is) another thing (which) is quite significant in this report.

The game was (a) brilliant (one).

The island is (in a) poverty-stricken (condition).

This transaction is (of a) very reprehensible (character).

The other species is (of a) deep red (colour).

We (would) suggest that a canvass be made.

(It is) very often (true that) the Indians make some show of reform.

A more subtle, and consequently a more dangerous, sort of redundancy is the avoidance by change of term of a repetition which ought to be avoided by recasting, as of clause in phrase, etc.; *e.g.* :

Although *London* is still ahead of *New York* in population, yet if the entire metropolitan district around the mouth of the Hudson were counted as one city, as (it is) in the case of *the big town on the Thames*, the *British city* would not contain more inhabitants than *the American town*. In many respects *the American city* is getting ahead of *its rival on the other side of the ocean*. *New York's* imports and exports are greater than *London's*. The aggregate of *its* bank clearances is much larger than those of *England's city*. *Its* growth in these respects too is much in excess of that of its rival.

This is not merely an absurd loss of directness, but positive falsification of meaning in calling New York a *town* and London a *rival*. Recast by reduction and balance (§ 45). Where repetition is really necessary, it is clearer and more emphatic to repeat explicitly *New York* and *London*.

Redundancy arises also from a habit of illogical compound sentences (compare § 33 *f* of this Appendix):

The[re is a] large number of men who keep the stores and markets, [and] deal in great part with the farmers and lumbermen.

Point out redundancies in Selection I, paragraph I, third sentence; II, fourth sentence; IV, second sentence; and in the paragraph from Macaulay quoted in § 16 of this appendix. Revise the following:

The recent lamentable assassination of President McKinley by the hand of a violent anarchist has brought home to us all the realization of the danger existing in allowing anarchy to live unmolested among us. To what horrible crimes its villainous teachings may entice its willing followers by its insidious suggestions we all shudder to contemplate. The question of how to deal with this crime naturally suggests itself at this time and proves to offer serious difficulty for solution.

M. Albalat explains redundancy as follows: "A man uses too many words where he is hesitating, doubtful of his idea, trying it in this way and that. But when all those words are written down, forthwith they are so fastened to the idea that he cannot see it any longer except with them. Then the only way is brutally to pull out what he really means and shake off the earth that sticks to it." — *L'Art d'Écrire*, Chapter vi.

27. In Selection IV, paragraph XII, note the variety in the length and form of sentences. Study this aspect of sentence-length in Selection III, noting also the emphasis gained at certain points by short sentences.

Monotony from preponderance of a favourite form (§ 47) is the fault of Macaulay and of Dr. Johnson. This, being a matter of rhythm, is discussed at § 234. Compare Hazlitt's stricture on Johnson, quoted in § 232 of this appendix.

28. This idea of mind is not new. It has had a following and a certain influence from the days of the Sophists down to the present time. Hobbes founded the modern school, which was carried forward by Spencer. The tendency until the most recent years, when there has been a return toward the spiritualistic theory, has been toward sensationalism.

That the lack of coherence in this passage is due in great part to faulty sentence emphasis may be seen by transposing the second sentence to read: "From the days of the Sophists it has had a certain influence down to the present day. The modern school founded by Hobbes was carried forward," etc.

In Selection IV, would not a similar transposition in the second sentence of paragraph XI clarify both the emphasis of that sentence and the coherence of the paragraph? Try the experiment also in Selection II, paragraph IV, with the sentence beginning "Its place is its significance."

In Selection I, paragraph V, readjust the positions of the word *light* so as to make it conspicuously a key-word throughout. In paragraph XI, bring out in the same way the contrast between *pure forest* and *mixed forest*.

Revise the following passage to improve at the same time the emphasis of the separate sentences and the coherence of the whole :

Every one who can should live on the campus because the growth of college spirit is hindered by private dormitories. One is sure to know more of what goes on and to make more friends on the campus. We are in college to learn, not merely books, but also men.

33. (a) *The hanging participle ; e.g.* "Coming nearer, the shores were seen to be wooded."

(b) The combination *and which* is correct only when *which*-clauses are coördinated, as in the last sentence of the paragraph quoted in § 28. In like manner there must be no half-clauses (*i.e.* locutions beginning with a conjunction but having no predicate). Either complete the clause by adding a verb, or else reduce it to a phrase.

When in Rome he saw the late King Humbert.

should drop the conjunction :

In Rome he saw the late King Humbert.

When driving through the province of Quebec one must not expect good hotels.

should be either :

When one is driving . . .

or better :

In driving . . .

The last sentence of Selection IV shows that the difficulty may be partly obviated by change of position. If the sentence read, by transposition, "and to make them, when sustained," the construction of the participle could hardly be called doubtful. But even in such a

case it is clearer to say "when they are sustained." (Compare § 26.)

(c) The rule for *correlatives* (*either . . . or, neither . . . nor, rather . . . than, partly . . . partly*, etc.) is that they should stand in positions absolutely corresponding, each to each. (Compare § 37, *b, c*.) The error is the slipshod "neither by sea nor land," as in the following:

We learn that Mr. Poultney Bigelow will lecture at the University of Minnesota and other American institutions and elsewhere, *not* upon the relations between colonies and their mother countries, as was recently announced from London, *but* he will present a subject which, besides being thoroughly timely, has a peculiar personal bearing as far as the lecturer himself is concerned.

This should be either ". . . will not lecture . . . but will present"; or, as is obviously intended, ". . . lecture . . . not upon . . . but upon . . ."

Essentially the same is the error of the following compound sentences, in which a part correlative in thought with one phrase of the first member is made the second member; *i.e.* is made in form correlative with the whole:

While the Dutch were masters of the vicinity all religious sects were tolerated, excepting at first the Jews; but even these were finally allowed to build a synagogue.

Next we came to a deserted school-house, but in my mind's eye I could see the children there.

Clause must be correlated with clause, never clause with phrase or sentence.

(d) *Sequence of tenses; e.g.* "He intended to have gone," for "He intended to go." Professor Genung states the rule thus: "In dependent clauses and infini-

tives the tense is to be counted relatively to the principal assertion, not absolutely in itself."—*Practical Elements of Rhetoric*, page 112.

(e) Not incorrect, but loose, is the unnecessary change of subject in a sentence like the following, in which *detectives* should be the subject throughout :

The detectives were baffled by the many complications, and, had it not been for outside help, the murders would not have been solved to this day.

Compare the sentence quoted in § 45.

(f) Of course the deeper fault in the sentence above is the *false coördination*. It should read :

The detectives were so baffled . . . that . . .

The habit of loose coördination is the habit of undeveloped style. Thus it is characteristic of the earlier efforts, not only of individual writers, but of a nation as a whole. Compare in this respect the style of any elder chronicler in any language with the style of the fully developed prose of that language. See also the summary of Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, III, ix, in § 37 of this Appendix. The difference is sometimes expressed in the Greek terms *parataxis* (coördination) and *hypotaxis* (subordination).

35. A relative clause is said to be restrictive when it is essential to the sense; *i.e.* when the omission of it would change the sense. It is a practice with some careful writers to accentuate this distinction by confining *who* and *which*, so far as is possible, to non-restrictive clauses; *i.e.* by using *that* always for restrictive clauses. Though this practice may not be insisted on, it is undoubtedly useful. In the following, for example, the

difference expressed by the punctuation may be accentuated by difference of relative :

It is better not to carry papers, *which* might by mishap lend colour to the rumour (*i.e.* better not carry any papers).

It is better not to carry papers *that* might by mishap lend colour to the rumour (*i.e.* better not carry papers of a particular kind).

36. Quintilian, IX, iv (Bohn, §§ 29–32).

In Selection I try the effect of transposition to throw to the end the emphatic word in each of the following sentences: in paragraph I, the last sentence; in III, the second sentence and the last sentence; in X, the second sentence. In the case of a sentence ending a paragraph note the effect of this transposition on the emphasis of the paragraph.

37. *Periodic*; *i.e.* composed by periods (περίοδοι) or definite units, composed with the end in view. Aristotle's doctrine, which is the ultimate source, is in *Rhetoric*, III, ix (Welldon's translation, pages 251–256. See also Cope's *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, pages 306–316). It is, in sum:—

A measure or sentence (λέξις) is either :

(a) *loosely joined* (εἰρομένη), *i.e.* united only by its connecting particles (τῷ συνδέσμῳ μίαν). This is the old measure. It has no end except when its matter runs out (οὐδὲν ἔχει τέλος καθ' αὐτήν ἂν μὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα λεγόμενον τελειωθῇ). It is tuneless (ἄηδὲς) because it has no definite limits (διὰ τὸ ἄπειρον), and everybody likes to descry the end.

(b) *compact* (κατεστραμμένη) or *periodic* (ἡ ἐν περιόδοις; *i.e.* composed by "periods," or definite units). By a περίοδος I mean a construction that has its beginning

and end in itself, and a length to be "easily comprehended at a glance." Such a measure is both agreeable and easy to learn. The *περίοδος* should close with the sense, not fall in two. It may be composed of members (*κῶλα*) or simple. Composed of members, it must still be complete; *i.e.* distinct as to its parts, but so united as to be easily pronounced upon a breath, not member by member, but as a whole. Both members and *περίοδοι* as wholes must avoid being so short as to check the hearer's stride or so long as to make him lag (leave him waiting at the expected turn).

Aristotle's twofold division appears in the French rhetorics as *style périodique* and *style coupé*. The idea is carried out at large in Spencer's *Philosophy of Style*.

41. On the climax sentence, Quintilian, *Institutes*, IX, iv, 23.

44. In this aspect compare the sentences beginning respectively, "The soldier, as compared," etc., and "War in Spain has," etc., in the paragraph from Macaulay quoted in § 16 of this Appendix.

45. The passage from Aristotle (*Rhetoric*, III, ix) summarized in § 37 of this Appendix, goes on:

The construction composed of members (*τῆς δὲ ἐν κώλοις λέξεως*) may be either parallel (? *διηρημένη*, literally "divided") or antithetical. Antithesis is agreeable because the juxtaposition of two contraries (1) makes both clearer, and (2) has a certain syllogistic force, as of refutation. With or without antithesis, the members may be balanced.

46. The Hebrew parallelism often appears in our English Bible, notably throughout the Book of Proverbs. See also the twenty-third and twenty-fourth chapters of the Book of Numbers, and compare many familiar pas-

sages in the Prophets and Psalms. The final paragraph of Selection II makes effective use of balance. The value of balance for clearness appears in Selection I, paragraph V, "Tolerant trees are those," etc.; paragraph VII, the second sentence; in Selection IV, paragraph XIX, "That inspection laws may have," etc.; paragraph XXXVII, "If by the former, the waters," etc. Compare the paragraph from Macaulay in § 16 of this Appendix.

A somewhat crude use of balance appears at length in the opening of Dickens's *Tale of Two Cities*; again in Book III, Chapter xiv ("Lying hidden in her bosom was a loaded pistol," etc.).

47. Perhaps the best-known instance of chiasmus in modern English is Keats's "Beauty is truth, truth beauty."

The maxim that figures will not lie having been aduced in a dispute about statistics, a witty man retorted: "The trouble is not so much that figures will lie as that liars will figure."

48. Examine the Selections, especially Selection III, sentence by sentence, for the study of sentence emphasis, noting both whether a given sentence is periodical or not, whether it has climax or balance, and what is the advantage of the particular form in the particular case. The length of time that can profitably be devoted to this study varies much, of course, from class to class; but it should always be carried far enough to give thorough grasp of adjustment for emphasis, connection, and variety.

CHAPTER II

[N.B. Any available topics noted under Chapter i and not used in that connection, may of course be used here ; and in general, since few of the topics are gauged exactly to a particular point in the text, any topic in either chapter may be used wherever it suits a particular student. How much writing shall correspond to a given quantity of theory must be determined by each teacher. In general, it is better to make practice frequent and copious, recitation comparatively small ; but this presupposes frequent and systematic criticism, man by man. With such natural modifications the themes and exercises in this Appendix are meant to be taken in order. The order of kinds is believed to be practically profitable ; but the topics noted under each kind may often be used elsewhere.]

SUBJECTS FOR EXPOSITORY ESSAYS

I. REPORTS AND OTHER ESSAYS BASED ON PERSONAL OBSERVATION AND CURRENT READING, ESPECIALLY OF NEWSPAPERS, WITHOUT RESEARCH.

[N.B. Advanced students in technical courses, as in forestry, will find no better material than that of these courses. The idea is simply to give at this stage clear and forcible form to what one already knows well. Each essay may well be accompanied by a marginal summary, one sentence for each paragraph.]

1. The Water Supply of ——. (Explain the extent of the supply, its purity, its cost, etc.)
2. The Present Condition of our Track Athletics (or Crew, etc.).
3. The "Honour" System in Examinations at ——— College.
4. Commons and Boarding Houses.

5. Our College Journals.
6. The Effects of our Secret Societies.
7. Debating.
8. My Choice of Elective Courses (aims, points of view).
9. Present Tactics in Football.
10. The Roads and Parks of —.
11. The Political Situation in —.
12. Religion at — College.
13. New Methods in Mining.
14. The Atlantic Coasting Trade.
15. The Race Problem in the United States.
16. The Italians (or other foreigners) in the United States.
17. Lumbering in Maine.
18. Rapid Transit in —.
19. The Effects of the Recent Election on Business.
20. The Advantages of Suburban Life.
21. Abandoned Farms.
22. "Squatters."
23. House-boats on the Ohio and Mississippi.
24. The Street Railway Strike in —.
25. Northern Negroes and Southern Negroes.
26. The Destruction of Forests in —
27. The Chinese in California.
28. Lynching.
29. The Beet Sugar Industry.
30. Ritual in —.
31. University Settlements.
32. The Cowboy.
33. Adirondack (or Swiss) Guides.
34. The Sailor Farmers of New England.
35. Electric Railroads in the Country.

36. The Pennsylvania "Dutch."
37. "Model Tenements."
38. The Hill Towns of Connecticut.
39. Tramps.
40. Militia and Regulars.
41. The Tennessee Mountaineers.
42. Bee-keeping.
43. Faith Cures.
44. A Great Preparatory School.
45. The Management of a Summer Hotel.
46. The Spread of Vaudeville.
47. The Democratic Idea in College Life.
48. Working One's Way through College.

II. ESSAYS SUPPORTED BY ELEMENTARY RESEARCH (*i.e.* Gazetteers, Atlases, Short Cyclopædias, Reviews).

[N.B. Most of these subjects demand limitation. It is profitable to require a preliminary sheet of notes carefully cited and arranged in the proposed order of treatment. This may be done in connection with the expository plan (§ 77); but for many pupils the expository plan is better after the essay is written out in the rough than as a preliminary brief.]

1. The Trans-Siberian Railway.
2. Some General Characteristics of the Philippines.
3. The Resources of Arizona.
4. The Indian Reservations.
5. Our Commerce with Argentina.
6. The European Dominion of Turkey.
7. European Influence in China.
8. English Influence in Africa.
9. Hawaii.
10. The Political Position of Greece.
11. United States Wheat.

12. Japan in Commerce.
13. The Duties of our Consul at —.
14. Alaska.
15. The Present Importance of Mexico.

III. ESSAYS BASED ON MORE EXTENDED RESEARCH (*i.e.* Short Cyclopædias, etc., as before, and also Manuals, as of History and Literature).

[N.B. Those topics are most easily available which fall within such courses as a student is pursuing at the time. The topics should be freely adapted and limited.]

1. The Relations of the President, the Senate, and the House.
2. The British Cabinet System.
3. A Mediæval Town.
4. A Monastery.
5. A Cathedral.
6. A Bank.
7. Chivalry.
8. The Feudal System.
9. The Dramatic Unities.
10. What is Epic Poetry?
11. The Causes of the First Crusade.
12. A Greek Temple.
13. A Roman Province under the Empire.
14. Characteristics of the Normans in England in the Twelfth Century.
15. The Presentation of a Greek Tragedy in the Time of Sophocles. (See IV, 1, below.)
16. Russia as an Asiatic Power.
17. The Turbine Wheel.
18. The Theory of Cyclonic Storms.

19. The Theory of the Ice Machine.
20. Electric Traction.
21. The Duties of a United States Consul.
22. United States Agencies for the Indians.
23. The New England Town Meeting.

IV. ESSAYS INVOLVING CONSULTATION OF AUTHORITIES ON SPECIAL TOPICS.

[N.B. The following subjects are not sharply differentiated from the preceding, but suggest fuller treatment and are intended to give more scope for individuality in selection and interpretation. Individuality, indeed, ought to be cultivated from the start; but the average student leans a good deal at first on direction.]

1. The Place of Greek Tragedy in Greek Life.

(For this, as for III, 15, above, the following books will serve :

Smith's (or Seyffert's, or Harper's, etc.)
 Dictionary of Classical Antiquities, articles
theatre (theatrum), *chorus*, etc.
 Grote's History of Greece, vol. viii.
 Jevons's History of Greek Literature.
 Haigh's *Attic Theatre*.
 Moulton's *Ancient Classical Drama*.
 Jebb's *Classical Greek Poetry*.
 Symonds's *Studies of the Greek Poets*.
 Verrall's *The Student's Greek Tragedy*.
 Henry Norman's *The Harvard Greek Play*.

Only two or three of these monographs should be read at length. The rest should be consulted for special points. Judiciously used, they may all be consulted in a reasonable time.)

2. The Chorus in Greek Tragedy.
3. The Plot of *Ædipus the King*.

4. Greek Tragedy and English Tragedy.
5. The Dramatic Construction of Shakespeare's *Othello*.

(Consult, *e.g.*, some of the following :

Hudson's *Lectures on Shakspeare*.

Dowden's *Shakspeare : His Mind and Art*.

Ransome's *Short Studies in Shakspeare's Plots*.

Wendell's *William Shakspeare*.

Coleridge's *Shakspeare Notes and Lectures*.

Moulton's *Shakspeare as a Dramatic Artist*.

Furness's "Variorum" edition.)

6. *King Lear* and *Le Père Goriot*.
7. The Italian Plays of Shakespeare.
8. The Presentation of an Elizabethan Play.

(Consult some of the following :

Ward's *History of English Dramatic Literature*.

Saintsbury's *Elizabethan Literature*.

Dowden's *Shakspeare Primer*.

Halliwell-Phillipps's (or Fleay's or Lee's) *Life of Shakspeare*.

Ordish's *Old London Theaters*.

Collier's *History of English Dramatic Poetry*.

G. P. Baker's edition of *A Midsummer Night's Dream* (the introduction).)

9. London at the Time of the *Spectator* considered in some striking aspects, *e.g.* :
 - (a) The Political Situation.
 - (b) Some Main Characteristics of Society.
 - (c) The Literary Clubs and the Coffee-houses.
 - (d) The Standards of Morals and Taste.

10. The Puritans of the Time of Milton.
11. The Position of Archbishop Laud.
12. The Construction of *Paradise Lost*.
13. The Allegory of the *Faery Queene*.
14. Wiclif and the Lollards.
15. Wagner's Conception of Opera.
16. Brahms (or Gounod, Chopin, etc.).
17. The Armada.
18. The Romany.
19. The Friars (their idea and their first activities).
20. The Monroe Doctrine.
21. "States Rights."
22. The Moravians among the American Indians.
23. An English Public School.
24. The Pirates of Louisiana and the West Indies.
25. The Covenanters.
26. The Jacobites.
27. Daniel and the Captivity.
28. Practical Politics and the "Machine."
29. The Development of the Northwest.
30. An American City : Chicago (or St. Louis, etc.).
31. The Future of the South American Republics.
32. The Maccabees.
33. The Opening of Africa.
34. The English Explorers of the Sixteenth Century.
35. The American Whalemens.
36. The Significance of the Battle of Tours (or Hastings, etc.).
37. Sir Thomas More and William Tyndale.
38. Maximilian in Mexico.
39. The American Navy in the War of 1812.
40. English Admirals of the Eighteenth Century.
41. Joan of Arc.

42. The Prophets of Israel as Statesmen and Reformers.
43. Women in the Athens of Pericles.
44. Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality in 1793.
45. Zionism.
46. The Salvation Army.
47. Chaucer's England (a single aspect).
48. A Colonial Governor in New England.
49. English-speaking Peoples in the East (a single aspect).
50. Babylon in the Time of the Captivity.
51. Louisbourg.
52. William Caxton.
53. Franklin as a Typical American.
54. Montcalm and Wolfe.

V. LONGER ESSAYS FOR ADVANCED STUDENTS

[N.B. These topics are meant to be suggestive of reflection on one's "general" reading. They may emerge in quite various limitations and be handled with quite various research, or in some cases without research.]

1. The Holy Grail.
2. English Ballads.
3. The Brontës.
4. Some American Literary Traditions.
5. The Celtic in English Poetry.
6. English Martial Poetry of the First Half of the Nineteenth Century.
7. Bede.
8. The Revival of Romance.
9. Alcestis.
10. Notre Dame de Paris.
11. Erasmus in England.
12. The Plays of Sudermann (Hauptmann or Ibsen).

13. Quebec.
14. The Social and Religious Creed of William Langland.
15. Edwin Booth.
16. Chopin, Liszt, and George Sand.
17. Florence.
18. The Troubadours.
19. Ste. Anne de Beaupré.
20. Elder Historians (Herodotus, Villani, Froissart, etc.).
21. Literary Socialism in the Nineteenth Century (Ruskin, William Morris, etc.).
22. Carlyle and Newman.
23. The Popularity of Dickens.
24. Romantic Music.
25. Dante and Milton.
26. The Obedience of a Christian Man.
27. The Development of Artistic Appreciation in College.
28. Aristocracy in America.
29. Thackeray's *Esmond* and Subsequent Historical Novels.
30. The Puritans of *The Scarlet Letter*.
31. Chevy Chase.
32. The Cavaliers of Scott.
33. Pater's View of Life.
34. Contemporary English Love Poetry.
35. Thackeray's Conception of a Gentleman.
36. Satire in Chaucer.
37. National Spirit in Irish Poetry.
38. Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra*, and Dryden's *All for Love*.
39. Oxford.

DIVISION

The most practical exercise in division is the expository plan (§ 77). For further exemplification of this see the introduction to Lamont's *Specimens of Exposition*. Brewster's *Studies in Structure and Style*, pages 210-217, makes a very instructive comparison, on the basis of John Morley's *Macaulay*, between the summary by paragraphs and the expository plan. Make the same comparison between an expository plan and a summary by paragraphs of any essay printed in this book or prepared by a student.

See also the tabular view prefixed to Wright's edition (Clarendon Press) of Bacon's *Advancement of Learning*, the one prefixed to Cook's edition (Ginn & Co.) of Newman's *Poetry considered with reference to Aristotle's Poetics*, and the plan prefixed to this book.

DEFINITION

A good deal of class practice in written definition, with subsequent oral discussion, of familiar terms will be found very profitable; *e.g.*:

(1) *In one sentence*: corporation, bank, church, consul, hero, courtesy, income, novel.

(2) *In three or four sentences*: (any of the above, and also) gentleman, militia, romance, amateur athletics, faith, marines, Congress, drama, chivalry.

Of more extended definition Selections I, II, III, and IV all furnish instances for study. See further the distinction between "notional" and "real" apprehension in Newman's *Grammar of Assent*, pages 30-35. (The examples are happily used to make an abstruse

matter clear to any intelligent reader); and the distinction between primitive and artificial personification in Pater's *Demeter and Persephone* (*Greek Studies*, pages 96-100). Matthew Arnold's *Sweetness and Light* (in *Culture and Anarchy*) proceeds throughout the first part by successively larger and clearer definitions of culture.

COMPILATION

Professor Albert Bushnell Hart's *Revised Suggestions on the Study of the History and Government of the United States* (Cambridge, Mass., University Press) is a suggestive guide to research, not only in its own field, but also in other fields of history. Many of its topics are available for comparatively brief expository essays.

Any fairly large library may be expected to have the following regular means of research :

1. A guide to the system of classification, showing how and where the books are grouped.
2. A card catalogue by authors and subjects, with cross-references enough to show exhaustively all that the library contains by a given author, for instance, and about him.
3. The published catalogues of other libraries and especially the catalogue of the British Museum, which in many topics is practically a complete bibliography.
4. Bibliographies :
 - (a) General; *e.g.* Sonnenschein's *The Best Books* (and its supplement, *A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literature*), or the small and concise *Handbook for Readers in the Boston Public Library*.

- (b) Special, as Larned's *History for Ready Reference and Topical Reading*, or Cordier's *Bibliotheca Sinica* (bibliography of books on China).

EXAMPLE OF SIMPLE RESEARCH

Notes for an Essay on the Roman Legion

[N.B. The writer started with such general notions of the Roman legion as may be gathered in preparation for college. He drew his material from the "classical" dictionaries of Smith and Seyffert and from James Gow's *A Companion to School Classics*. Finding Gow's account more compact and systematic than the others, he used that as a basis and the others for comparison. In Smith he found, under *legio*, a reference to *exercitus*. This was found to contain (I) many pages on the Greek army; (II) an account of the Roman army down to Septimius Severus, of which § i (Romulus to Marius) contained practically all the necessary information.

Everything as to the method of levy (*i.e.* property qualification, etc.) was ruled out from the start, as beside the writer's purpose. After reading Smith he reviewed the material, settled the title (determined roughly by Gow) and decided on the following provisional order:

1. Camp.
2. Three lines.
3. Manipular formation.

The notes were taken in a small blank-book. (The numbers below indicate successive pages of this blank-book) so far as possible under heads. The pages were then cut out, all notes on the same head brought together, and the heads arranged in order.]

(1) *Organization*

Gow, § 168, "at all times — one or more legions, divided each into 30 companies (*manipuli*)."

Commanded by 6 *tribuni militum*, each chief in turn, month by month or day by day.

300 cavalry besides, in 10 squadrons (*turmæ*), each *decuria* of a *turma* commanded by a *decurio*.

Gow, §§ 169–171, make-up of the army in successive times, levies, *socii*.

(2) *Line*, etc.

Gow, § 172, after Camillus (? so Smith, II, i, 3), 3 lines.

1. Young men *hastati*, javelins (*pila*).
2. Prime of life *principes*, javelins (*pila*).
3. Middle life, (veterans, Seyffert), *triarii* or *pilani*, lances (*hastæ*).

Names not indicative, perhaps derived from an earlier arrangement (Smith, II, i, 4).

1. 10 maniples of 120, 1200.
2. 10 maniples of 120, 1200.
3. 10 maniples of 60, 600.

A *centuria* usually = 60; hence, except in 3, 2 *centuriæ* to a maniple, commanded by the *centurio prior* & *c. posterior*.

(3) *Line*, etc.

Gow, § 172 (cont.). In addition:

4. *velites*, "skirmishers" throwing light javelins.

30 maniples of 40, 1200.

Thus total infantry of a legion 4200 (from Servius Tullius down, Smith, II, i, 4; from the time of Marius 6200). Order of maniples *quincunx*; i.e. five-spot in cards, or better like black squares on chess-board (Seyffert), since spaces = width of maniple.

(4) *Line*, etc.

Gow, § 172 (cont.). *Socii* formed the wings (*alæ*) after B.C. 338, "each contingent a cohort commanded by its own *præfectus*, and all the cohorts of a wing, considered as one legion, were commanded by 3 Roman officers, *præfecti socium*."

Maniple abandoned by Marius? (Seyffert, pp. 346–347). Gow says not.

Idea to relieve successively. *Triarii*, unless the other lines fell back, knelt behind their shields (Seyffert, page 346).

(5) *Organization*

Gow, § 173 (after Marius), 10 cohorts, each commanded by the senior centurion in it, to each standard.

Standard (*aquila*) and number for whole legion "preserved identity."

§§ 175-176, pay, honours. §§ 177-179, recruiting, names of legions, prætorian guard.

(6) *Title*

The Roman Legion after Marius (Infantry only?) "most flourishing period of the Republic; viz. the sixth century of the city," Smith, II, ii, 3.

The Roman Legion as described by Polybius.

The Roman Legion in the fourth century B.C.

The Roman Infantry in the second century B.C.

The Roman Infantry immediately before Marius.

(7) *Camp*

Gow, § 174, auspices, surveyors (*agrimensores*, *gromatici*, cf. *groma*).

Square, gate in each side, subdivided into squares by roads, *prætorium* (general's quarters) at the centre; i.e. at intersection of the main cross-roads from gate to gate.

Gates 1. *porta prætoria*, nearest the enemy.

2. *porta decumana*, opposite.

3. *porta principalis dextra*.

4. *porta principalis sinistra*.

Palisade, ditch; outposts (*stationes*), *custodes* (at gates).

(8) *Camp*

Gow, § 174 (cont.).

Excubiæ along the palisades, *vigiles*, *signum* (*tesseræ*).

See cuts, Seyffert, page 117; Smith, pages 371-372.

(9) *Equipment*

Seyffert, page 346 ; Smith, II, i, 4, page 783.

(10) *Line*, etc.

Maniple recognized even after cohorts, Smith, II, i, 4.

20 *velites* to each *centuria*, Smith, II, i, 4.

Usual opening of battle by *pila* or *hastati* at 10 or 20 paces, Smith, II, i, 4.

Smith, I, page 807, *acies*, account of battle array.

Manipular plan fulfilled three great military principles :

(1) Reserve (*triarii*).

(2) Combined distant and close fighting.

(3) Combined offensive and defensive fighting.

(Mommсен, quoted by Smith, II, i, 4.) Use this for introd.?

In general, mobility with small risk of disorder, whereas the phalanx was unwieldy.

After arrangement, the essay emerged as follows :

THE ROMAN INFANTRY IMMEDIATELY BEFORE MARIUS

The Romans, being a nation of soldiers, developed long before their great conquests a very systematic art of war. Since their system was perfected in all its essentials before the time of Marius, our attention may be confined to the second century B.C. ; and since their cavalry was neither very different from any other cavalry nor ever a main branch of the service, we will consider only the infantry.

The Roman system and discipline appears graphically in their camps. The ground plan of the *castra* shows a perfect square of earthworks (*vallum*) with an outside ditch (*fossa*) and a gate in the middle of each side. Within, the soldiers encamped in parallel rows. The main passageways, or streets, ran straight across from gate to gate. Where they crossed in the centre was the *prætorium*, the quarters of the commanding

officer. With such order within, guards at the gates, sentries along the *vallum*, and outposts besides, a Roman camp was not easily taken by surprise.

Their organization never had anything corresponding to our regiment. *Legio* (legion), from being at first a roughly descriptive title for the whole fighting force on a given occasion, came to mean definitely a body of 4200 infantry. In numbers, therefore, it corresponds to a modern brigade of four regiments; but its division for fighting was into three lines. The front was composed of 1200 *hastati*, the young men, armed with javelins; the second line, of 1200 *principes* in the prime of life, armed like the first line; the third, of 600 *triarii*, veterans armed with lances. Besides these distinctive weapons, each Roman foot-soldier had . . . [Follows an account of equipment.]

The main fighting force of 3000 had as auxiliary force 1200 light-armed skirmishers, called *velites*, and distributed throughout the three lines. The idea of the three lines was successive relief. The first usually opened the battle by casting their javelins at ten or twenty paces and then advancing with drawn swords. They were supported by the second line. The third line was the reserve. Unless the other two fell back, the *triarii* remained kneeling behind their shields.

This system of fighting was based upon the division of the whole legion into squads (*manipuli*) of one or two *centuriae* (60 or 120 men) each, the lining up of these squads so as to leave between each two a space equal to the front of one, and the arrangement of the second and third lines so that their squads would stand behind the open spaces of the line ahead. Thus a Roman line of battle was arranged like the black squares on a chess-board. The Romans called it *quincunx*, because it was like the five-spot in dice.

Evidently the Romans believed in room to fight and chance to move quickly. Even within the squads every soldier had three feet on each side of him in what they called close order

(*compactis ordinibus*) ; in open order (*laxatis ordinibus*) he had six. They came to this principle from seeing how unwieldy was the solid Greek phalanx, how subject to disorder from rough ground, how easily broken as a whole by the breaking of any part. The Roman array was just as orderly as the Greek, and it was much more adaptable to circumstances. It was equally ready for distant or close fighting, for offensive fighting, or for defensive ; and it always had a fixed body of the best men for a reserve. These have been called the three great principles of warfare. No wonder the Roman legion was an effective fighting machine.

[Unnecessarily bare, this essay is at least concise and clear.]

From the material displayed above write an essay following a different order from the one printed ; *e.g.* :

1. The three great military requirements involved.
2. How these were met by the phalanx.
3. How they were met by the legion.
4. (close) The essence of the legion was the *manipulus*.

Or again :

Draw up a plan for an essay on another part of the material ; *e.g.* :

The Imperial Legions.

The Life of a Roman Soldier under the Empire.

Marius's Reorganization on the Basis of the Cohort.

The Discipline of a Roman Army.

THE WRITING OF CRITICISM

The range of subjects suggested in this chapter will show that rhetoric is regarded as subsidiary to the whole curriculum, as the *organon* of any course of study. Criticism, it will be seen, is regarded as denoting, not a

separate kind, but only one of the many fields of exposition. It may receive greater or less attention according to the degree of closeness with which the teaching of rhetoric is associated with the teaching of English literature. It is of doubtful value as discipline in writing when it is required, especially when it is required of younger students or of the unwilling; but for the fairly capable and the enthusiastic it is of all fields most fertile. The study of composition should not be confined to the subject-matter of English literature; but it may well be led in that direction. So led, it should serve not only to define vague judgments, but also personally to express appreciations. That exposition is essentially logical in structure should not be suffered to encourage the bald and perfunctory; and from this a ready escape may often be found in the writing of criticism.

Criticism is separately discussed in Fletcher and Carpenter's *Theme Writing* and in Gardiner's *The Forms of Prose Literature*.

CHAPTER III

THEMES AND EXERCISES

(The section numbers correspond to those of the text.)

90. Draw up a petition to authority for the correction of some abuse or the granting of some favour, stating in a proposition exactly what is wished and subjoining reasons.

91. Topics for brief argumentative plans to be written in class without research, as follows :

(a) expressed in propositions.

(b) scrutinized as to the terms (*e.g.* on the black-board) in themselves and as expressing a real issue.

(c) worked out in argumentative plans.

(d) tested and corrected in this form.

1. "Imperialism" or "expansion."
2. Anarchy as a creed.
3. Large colleges and small.
4. College education for a business man.
5. The comparative importance of religious creed.
6. Shortening the college term to three years.
7. Church fairs.
8. The noisy celebration of Independence Day.
9. The "honour system" in college examinations.
10. Going to a college far from home.
11. Rules as to eligibility for intercollegiate athletics.

12. Restrictions on signs and placards for advertising.

13. Game laws.

In like manner notes brought into class on propositions chosen or assigned may be revised on the basis of class discussion and arranged in argumentative plans.

92. From their argument, as cited by Chief Justice Marshall, draw up an argumentative plan for Ogden's side.

Draw up an argumentative plan for either side of the discussion given at § 129.

93. Draw up an argumentative plan from :

1. notes of a line of argument dictated for refutation.
2. a speech as reported in a newspaper.
3. a selection assigned from argumentative literature (this last to be analyzed in full by careful subdivision).

Draw up an argumentative plan of the following, and another in refutation of it :

THE FLUMMERY OF COLLEGE CAPS AND GOWNS

By way of such explanation as may avert confusion of mind, the *Springfield Republican* has thought it well, in its issue of October 20, to devote half a column of space to an explanation of the meaning of academic costumes, in the matter of stuffs, colours, forms, facings, linings, and the like.

In our very practical age one wonders as to the why and wherefore of these things ; and, very reverently and respectfully, I venture to ask Columbia University, whose statutes are cited as authoritative in such matters, why it should pass any such statutes, and why it should not recognise popular education and the universal ability to read, instead of cherishing those means of communication which were necessary in

mediæval times when kings who knew not how to write dipped their hands into ink and impressed them upon documents as a verification of their validity.

We all know how the cotton-velvet-clad stage king certifies his will by giving his signet ring to the hero as an attestation. We wonder what he does for another signet ring in the meanwhile. But in our time men know how to read and write. If King Edward of England or John D. Rockefeller or J. P. Morgan or any other ruler of men wishes to make his will known, he takes up a pad and writes on it what he wishes to say and signs his name at the bottom, and that half sheet of paper is potent to transfer multitudinous millions or to change the policy of great corporations or to do anything else that the writer directs.

Why should our colleges and universities—which are founded upon the idea of the ability of men to read and write—cherish and preserve the traditions of a more ignorant age and dignify them with the recognition of university statutes? Why should not these great agencies of modern education be the foremost leaders in the use of modern means for the communication of ideas?

Thus we are told that on a college platform a hood faced with scarlet means that its wearer has a degree in divinity; that one faced with purple means a degree in law; one in green a degree in medicine, and so on to the end of the curious chapter. But why all this flummery in an age when all men know how to read? Why should not the several bachelors and doctors of divinity, law, medicine, and the rest simply inscribe their respective degrees on the dressing-gowns or bath robes that they wear at commencements and upon other occasions of scholastic state? Then everybody would understand. Or, better still, why should not our universities put aside this mediæval flummery altogether and stand bravely upon their merits as institutions that educate modern men for modern life? The cap and gown are simply relics of a time when

education was monastic and its recipients were clerics. In our time they are lies. Why not be honest and abolish them? The newspapers every year record the names of those who receive degrees at the hands of our great universities—whether real degrees, conferred as the recognition and reward of actual study, or honorary degrees, conferred for less worthy reasons. The cyclopædias and dictionaries of biography never omit to give one who achieves anything worth while credit for all his degrees, as well as for all his actual achievements in scholarship. Why not leave the matter at that? What is the use of all this millinery of caps and gowns, with their silk or their fustian, their purples and yellows, their dark and light blues, their scarlets, and all the rest of it?

Are not these flummeries distinctly unworthy of the universities of an age and country that looks more to the future than to the past and regards condition as a thing of greater worth than tradition?

Is it not the duty of our educational institutions to teach young men to “look forward, not backward, out and not in, up and not down?”

—GEORGE CARY EGGLESTON, in *New York Times (Saturday Review)*, November 2, 1901.

Compare opposing argumentative plans (1) as to fairness and fulness in meeting on the main issues, (2) as to relative emphasis of certain points, (3) as to relative force. This may be done by exchange of plans, by reading aloud in class, and by assigning outside study for summary report. For this last may be used:—

1. The speeches of Brutus and of Antony in *Julius Cæsar*.
2. Macaulay's refutation of arguments for the *Civil Disabilities of Jews* (*Essays*, Vol. i.)
3. Mr. J. Charton Collins's summary of the question whether Swift married Stella (in his *Jonathan Swift*, pages 146–157).

4. The appendix to the *Federalist*; i.e. the letters of Pacificus (Hamilton) on Washington's proclamation of neutrality in 1793, and those of Helvidius (Madison).

After such analysis, the two opposing plans may be combined in one plan for either side, thus to secure fullness in refutation.

129. For a proposition given in class draw up a trial introduction (see § 136) by *a priori* analysis; i.e. what are the main issues? the line of proof? of refutation? What evidence will be sufficient (for the necessary degree of proof)? Where is it to be found?

Sum up in a trial plan (fifteen minutes) the results of this discussion. Exchange these plans for brief endorsement of criticism in class.

For example, *The consecration of Archbishop Parker was valid*. What is the ultimate question here? The validity of Anglican orders, Anglicans claiming unbroken apostolic succession, Roman Catholics claiming a breach, a schism. Are the terms, then, precise? Do not *consecration* and *Archbishop* beg the question, which is whether he was really consecrated and thereupon really archbishop? Can both sides agree as to what constitutes a consecration? If not, there can be no argument. Supposing agreement possible, try more precise wording; e.g. *The forms and persons concerned in the elevation of Parker constituted a valid consecration*. (In seeking precision, however, be careful to avoid quibbling.) Is this simply a question of fact, of what happened at a certain time; or is it also a question of right? The evidence, manifestly, will be conflicting. If the opposing briefs are to be more than arrays of counter-assertions, there must be sought (1) points in which both sides agree (for example, they may be found to agree on most of the facts. Then the issue is mainly as to right); (2) historians belonging to neither camp and generally accepted as

veracious and accurate. If the question is found to be merely of right, can it be profitably argued without training in theology? A negative answer in this and in many other cases makes the practice in approaching a subject none the less valuable. An affirmative shows the ground clear for further investigation.

See also, in Newman's *Grammar of Assent*, pages 271-277, an *a priori* analysis of Theobald's emendation in Shakespeare's *Henry V*, act ii, scene 3.

133. Class exercise: (*a*) comparative analysis of the diverging accounts of the same event, or series of events, by different historians (*e.g.* compare Clarendon's account of some act of Cromwell with Carlyle's, J. R. Green's, etc.).

(*b*) Comparative analysis of different newspaper accounts of the same event.

135. From notes analysed in class make a simple plan from which to speak.

Reduce the argument in § 92 to four main points.

NOTES, EXAMPLES, AND REFERENCES

For this chapter the classic book of reference is of course the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle. Welldon's translation (The Macmillan Co.) is prefaced by a good tabular summary. The best exposition is Cope's admirable *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, which is so full in discussion and citation as to be itself a fairly complete manual of the Greek rhetoric. Quintilian's *Institutes of Oratory* (*de Institutione Oratoria*), though very elaborate and very much quoted, is separately useful only for an occasional definition or discussion. It contains nothing essential that is not said more concisely and more suggestively by Aristotle. Cicero (*de Oratore*) is valuable

mainly for memorable phrase. As a whole it is hardly a contribution to the subject; but many parts, of course, have eminent force of presentation.

Text-books of logic are cited here only to facilitate reference to particular topics, not to extend the consideration of what is here subordinate. On the other hand, a teacher of rhetoric can well afford all the time necessary for familiarity with Mill's *Logic*. Students that lack the training in formal logic, which in many colleges is given without any reference to the practice of argumentation, will find their account in the Rev. A. H. Killick's excellent tabular summary, *The Student's Handbook Synoptical and Explanatory of Mr. J. S. Mill's System of Logic* (Longmans, Green & Co.). Of recent manuals presenting both deductive and inductive logic perhaps the best is Carveth Read's *Logic Deductive and Inductive* (London: Grant Richards). In proportions, in exemplification, in practical application, and above all in sequence of treatment, it is most profitable.

Of practical manuals for argumentation the best—in fact almost the only separate and complete guide to practice—is Professor George P. Baker's *Principles of Argumentation* (Ginn & Co.). With this may be used the same author's *Specimens of Argumentation* (Henry Holt & Co.) and Brooking and Ringwalt's *Briefs for Debate* (Longmans, Green & Co.). Professor R. M. Alden's *The Art of Debate* has the special value indicated by its title, and also some general value for the whole subject. Mr. R. C. Ringwalt published in the "Bachelor of Arts" magazine for September, 1897, a brief discussion of rebuttal in college debating. His collection entitled *Modern American Oratory* (Henry Holt & Co.) has an introduction of ninety pages on the theory of oratory.

82. Brunetière, *Apologie pour la Rhétorique*, in *Littérature Contemporaine*, page 298: "The 'rhetoricians' of the sixteenth century made the Reformation; the 'rhetoricians' of the seventeenth, the Revolution—things rather great, at least, whatever else may be thought of them. That is because they acted, as 'rhetoricians,' on the sources of all great resolutions, because their power was as it were inherent in the very depths of human nature. We live not only by bread, algebra, and exegesis, but by every word that cometh from the hearts of men like ourselves and penetrates to our own. If *rhetoric is the art of making that word tell* (de faire valoir la parole)—and I suppose no one could dispute that definition—neither logic nor dialectics shall ever prevail against it."

83. "Rhetoric is not confined to any one special and definite field, but is universally applicable; . . . likewise, its object and special function is . . . to discover and put in practice the available means of persuasion on any subject" (τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πιθανά περὶ ἕκαστον, Bekker's text, page 4, line 30; ἔστω δὴ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν, *ibid.* page 5, line 11). Cope, *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, pages 147–8.

These "means of persuasion" or "rhetorical proofs," called by Aristotle *πίστεις*, are divided by him (*Rhetoric*, I, ii) into :

1. *inartificial* (ἄτεχνου, inartistic), such as are supplied or preëxistent independently of ourselves; *i.e.* evidence.
2. *artificial* (ἐντεχνου, artistic), "those that may be conducted and established by the processes and rules of the art and by our own agency;" *i.e.* the char-

acter of the speaker, the disposition of the audience, and the argument (Bekker's text, page 5; Cope's *Introduction*, pages 150 *et seq.*, and 205–207, for parallel divisions in Cicero and Quintilian).

Aristotle goes on in this chapter to say that the reasoning of persuasion is from generally accepted premises (τόποι, commonplaces. Compare §§ 107 *et seq.* of this manual) applicable alike to many branches of knowledge, as distinguished from the premises peculiar to each science (ἴδια). It is just here that Aristotle is usually attacked, his "topics," as they are commonly called, being derided as platitudes. But his distinction touches that eternal debate presented in Cicero's *de Oratore* as to whether the orator is characteristically a man of encyclopædic learning, and so able to convince in any subject, or characteristically a man of a certain peculiar skill, an artist. That the latter is the true view no one can doubt long. Practically, moreover, the latter is the true *point* of view. What every student of persuasion properly sets himself to acquire, what alone he can acquire, is a skilful habit of bringing to bear upon a particular audience any subject whatsoever. This habit of effective presentation does, indeed, include a habit of skilful analysis; but the study of persuasion has nothing to do with subject-matter except, as Aristotle says, in the most general way. A skilful pleader, for instance, can present powerfully the case of a copper mine or a company for electric traction without any more knowledge of the science involved than he has gained in a few weeks' well-directed reading, whereas a man familiar with the technical details of a dozen sciences, if there be any longer such a man, might fail utterly. What one seeks in the study of persuasion, as of rhetoric

in the wider sense, and what alone he can gain, is a way of presenting things, a skill, an art. And this is something available in a particular case only because it is available generally.

Cicero, *de Oratore*, I, xiii: *illud tamen oratori tribuam et dabo, ut eadem, de quibus illi tenui quodam exsanguique sermone disputant, hic cum omni gravitate et jucunditate explicet* ["But this I will assign and give to the orator, that the things which they (the philosophers and scientists) argue thinly and bloodlessly he will set forth with all dignity and charm"]; *i.e.* the office of the orator is to make knowledge effective, to energize knowledge. Cicero should not, I think, be taken here to mean mere ornamentation. Compare also *de Oratore*, I, xv, 64: "Therefore if it be desired to define comprehensively the universal, peculiar power of the orator, he, to my thinking, is an orator worthy of the proud name who, whatever the subject to be unfolded by his expression, will express it warily (*prudenter*), orderly (*compositer*), beautifully (*ornate*), and fluently (*memoriter*), and with some impressiveness, too, of gesture (*actionis*).

On speaking without manuscript, and on its relation to writing, Quintilian, *Institutes*, X, vii, especially § 28; Brander Matthews, *Speech-making*. On delivery in general, Quintilian, *Institutes*, XI, iii; Legouv  , *L'Art de la Lecture*.

84. Aristotle's chapters on the feelings, and on the characteristics resulting from time of life and environment, are ii-xvii of *Rhetoric*, Book II. For further references see Cope's *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric* on these chapters. Bain has a good summary, *Composition and Rhetoric*, pages 244-256 (of Appleton's one-volume edition). On consideration of the audience, in

general, Bain, pages 220–223 (Bain quotes from Milton's *Areopagitica*, with Macaulay's comments); Robinson, *Forensic Oratory*, §§ 94–100. (Compare § 160.) For the idea of § 84 I am indebted to the Rev. Prof. Charles Harris Hayes of the General Theological Seminary, New York.

Cicero's chapters on appeal to the feelings are xlii–l of Book II (*de Oratore*). In substance they are as follows:

Appeal to the feelings

- A. is more important than proof.
 - 1. Men are moved more by feeling than by reason.
 - 2. Hostile feeling is harder to meet than arguments.
- B. is surest when the orator feels,
 - 1. unless he have the highest art.
 - 2. The assertion that the orator cannot work himself up again and again to the pitch demanded by such a maxim is untrue;
 - a. for the orator is carried away by his own eloquence, by the effect of his own words [This seems to be mere counter-assertion].
- C. requires careful management.
 - 1. The only general rule is that the speaker must impress all hearers with his own probity.
 - a. In one case he may prevail by a modest and gentle zeal for the probity of his client;
 - b. in another, by a direct attack upon the feelings of the judge [jury in our conditions].

2. The pathetic must be gradually led up to, and down from.
2. Appeal on trifling occasions is disastrous to the orator's influence.

D. [proceeds with a catalogue of the feelings.]

Quintilian, *Institutes*, VI, ii, 2-7, emotions the proper field of oratory; 25 *et seq.*, the speaker must himself be moved, and thus needs imagination.

85. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, I, ii (page 11 of Welldon's translation).

94. Mill, *Logic*, II, i, § 3, for the distinction between induction and deduction. Compare III, i (with the prefatory quotation from Herschel), and Sidgwick, *The Process of Argument*, Chapters viii, ix.

Fletcher and Carpenter, *Theme Writing* (Boston, Allyn & Bacon), page 125, make the following suggestive divisions:

- (1) Ought it (the proposition) to be true? (*a priori*).
- (2) Is it true? (*a posteriori*).
- (3) Is it like other cases that were true? (analogy).

95. Carveth Read, *Logic Inductive and Deductive*, pages 200-207 (on the "historical" method); Robinson, *Forensic Oratory*, § 61 (on the value of deduction as well as induction); Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, pages 285-6.

96. Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, pages 381-3.

98. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, I, ii; Welldon's translation, page 15, bottom; Cope, *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, pages 155-7; De Quincey's essay on Rhetoric, paragraphs 4-9. Compare also Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, II, xxii, and Cope thereon.

99. Mill, *Logic*, III, viii; Killick, *The Student's Handbook, Synoptical and Explanatory of Mr. J. S. Mill's*

System of Logic; Carveth Read, *Logic Deductive and Inductive*, Chapters xv and xvi (The exemplification of Mill's canons is especially happy); Sidgwick, *The Process of Argument*, Chapter xi (with an excellent instance of investigation by experiment), pages 95-7, a good instance of error in the method of difference. Whately, *Rhetoric*, Chapter ii, § 6, exemplifies "concomitant variations" under the suggestive term "progressive approach."

100. Mill, *Logic*, II, v (Mathematical certainty is an illusion); III, iii (uniformity of nature), xxi. Compare III, x, 5.

Sidgwick, *The Process of Argument*, page 46; Carveth Read, *Logic Deductive and Inductive*, pages 141-2, 145-6, and Chapter xix.

101. Carveth Read, *Logic Deductive and Inductive*, Chapter xv (on inductive method), especially § 6; Chapter xviii (hypotheses), § 3, especially (3) on "crucial instances."

102. Circumstantial evidence is here defined according to common use. Huxley, in his essay *On the Physical Basis of Life*, gives it a far wider sense; and Hyslop, *Logic and Argument*, page 210, seems to admit the extension.

103. Sidgwick (*The Process of Argument*), following Butler (introduction to *The Analogy of Religion*), regards analogy as a less explicit form of induction. Bain (*English Composition and Rhetoric*, pages 234-5), on the other hand seems to imply that it is hardly more than illustration. Compare Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, II, xx-xxi (and also xviii, xix); Quintilian, *Institutes*, I, i, 6; Whately, *Rhetoric*, Part I, Chapter ii, § 7; Mill, *Logic*, III, xx. The best statement of analogy is Carveth

Read's (*Logic Deductive and Inductive*, Chapter xix, § 8). It begins as follows :

"Analogy is a kind of probable proof based upon imperfect similarity (as the best that can be discovered) between the *data* of comparison and the subject of our inference. Like Deduction and Induction, it assumes that things which are alike in some respects are also alike in others ; but it differs from them in not assigning the essential points of resemblance upon which the argument relies."

Examine the following instance :

A movement is on foot in the Province of Quebec to build up a national drama by offering prizes annually out of the public treasury for the best drama and the best comedy written by citizens of the province. A bill providing for an appropriation to pay the prizes, \$600 for each of the favoured plays, will be introduced at the next session of the Legislature. Presumably a committee composed of persons reputed to have artistic taste will examine the plays and award the prizes. Undoubtedly the plan was conceived in the right spirit, and it seems impolite even to hint at putting a damper upon it.

But, setting aside all opinions of the possibility of getting by offering prizes art work which cannot be as easily obtained without prizes, look squarely at the facts. In 1844 Benjamin Webster, manager of the Haymarket Theatre in London, offered a prize of \$2500 for "the best modern comedy, illustrative in plot and character of British manners and customs." A committee, which included Charles Kemble, G. P. R. James, and the Rev. Alexander Dyce, read ninety-eight plays and unanimously awarded the prize to Mrs. Gore, the novelist, for a play entitled "Quid Pro Quo ; or, the Day of Dupes." When the play was acted, with a cast including some of the best actors of an era rich in good actors, it was received with wild derision.

About forty-six years later *The New York Herald* offered a

prize of \$10,000 for the best one-act play submitted to a committee as notable in its time and place as Mr. Webster's. The choice fell to "Hearts," written by Richard Golden. This was produced at the Garden Theatre, and failed dismally. Nor has Mr. Golden ever written a successful play.

— *New York Times*, January 11, 1901.

106. Mill's *Logic*, V, xx, on the value of analogy in forming hypotheses.

107. Persuasion, that is, must constantly be regarded, not as absolute and abstract, but as relative and concrete. It presupposes primarily some one to be persuaded, and not so much a particular person as a class; and consequently it presupposes also "subjects of ordinary deliberation" (ἐκ τῶν ἤδη βουλευέσθαι εἰωθότων, Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, I, iv, on the subject-matter of deliberative oratory). It addresses itself to a popular audience (ἀκροαταῖς οἱ οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολλῶν συνορᾶν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν. Compare III, i, τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν) on "things which appear . . . to admit the possibility of opposite conclusions, views and results . . . for no one ever deliberates about things which offer no alternative, which can exist or issue in only one way" (βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέρως ἔχειν). Cope, *Introduction*, pages 155-7. Quintilian, V, xiv, 27-32, sets forth the impracticability of absolute demonstration for purposes of persuasion, but does not go to the root of the matter.

Mill, *Logic*, III, x, especially § 5.

110. Brunetière, *Apologie pour la Rhétorique*, in *Littérature Contemporaine*, pages 296-9; Robinson, *Forensic Oratory*, § 137; Sidgwick, *The Process of Argument*, page 102; Carveth Read, *Logic Deductive and Inductive*, Chapter xx (on probability); Newman, *Grammar of*

Assent, pages 322–329, three instances of what he calls “informal inference.”

114. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, II, xxv; Cope, *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, pages 267–276; Quintilian, V, xiii; VI, iv; VII, i, 31.

117. Robinson, *Forensic Oratory*, §§ 223 and the following (on cross-examination).

118. Cicero, *de Oratore*, II, xxxviii. *In hac arte (i.e. logic) . . . nullum est præceptum quo modo verum invenitur, sed tantum est quo modo judicetur.* (“This art has no rule for finding truth, only for judging it.”) Mill, *Logic*, II, iii, § 5; Read, *Logic Deductive and Inductive*, Chapter xiii, § 7, and Chapter xxiv, § 2.

119. For fallacies of induction the authority is Mill's *Logic*, Book V. Of this there is an admirable tabular analysis in Killick, *Student's Handbook to Mill*, pages 234–250. See also Read, *Logic Deductive and Inductive*, Chapter xxiv, § 3, comparing Chapter xiv, § 4.

121. Bain, *Rhetoric*, pages 240–241, shows a more legitimate use of *argumentum ad hominem*. For the fallacy of objections, Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, II, xxv.

122. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, II, xxiii; Bain (as above), page 238; Read (as above), Chapter xxiv, § 4.

123. Reynolds's *Stephen on Evidence*, Chapter xiii; Alden, *Art of Debate* (New York: Henry Holt & Co.), Chapter iv.

124. Quintilian, *Institutes*, V, x, 67, 68.

125. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, II, xxiii (Bekker's text, 1399; Welldon's translation, pages 204–5). In Selection IV paragraph III is in effect dilemma; paragraph V, *reductio ad absurdum*.

127. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, II, xxiii, the closing paragraph (Welldon's translation, page 212. On this and

the immediately preceding sections, see also Cope, *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, pages 264-6).

129. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, III, xvii. Cicero's summary (*de Oratore*, II, xxiv-xxxi) may be tabulated in full as follows:

- I. What kind of case is it (*naturam causæ*, § xxx)?
 1. Is the question of facts (*i.e.* whether a thing has been done or not)?
 2. or, the facts being admitted, of their interpretation?
 - a. Here no scholastic definition is called for, but oratorical amplification (§ xxv),
 - b. and skilful use of documentary evidence (§ xxvi).
 3. The distinction between general and specific cases is not valid (§ xxxi).
 - a. Every specific case has to be referred to general principles.
 - b. It is precisely by such classification that one masters pleading.
- II. On what does it turn (*quid faciat causam; id est, quo sublato controversia stare non possit*; § xxx)?
 1. What is the point of my speech (§ xxvii)?
 - a. In other words, what must be the line of attack or defence (§ xxx)?
- III. Why is it a case at all (*quid veniat in iudicium*; § xxx)?
 1. How will my opponent meet my line (§ xxiv)?

See also Robinson, *Forensic Oratory*, §§ 77-83; Quintilian, *Institutes*, VII, i, 5; Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, III, xvii.

Sidgwick, *The Process of Argument*, Chapter v, "the discovery of underlying theories," treats of definition

(the distinguishing of "essence" or peculiar properties) as part of what he calls the three processes of argument: generalization, analogy, circumstantial evidence.

130. Sidgwick, *The Process of Argument*, Chapter xii, quantity and quality of evidence.

131. Carveth Read, *Logic Inductive and Deductive*, page 227; Sidgwick, *The Process of Argument*, Chapter ii, on the running together of fact and inference; Chapters viii and ix—observation, generalization, and criticism of the generalization go on together; Whately, *Rhetoric*, I, ii, § 4.

133. Robinson, *Forensic Oratory*, §§ 223–8, may be summed up as follows:

Cross-examination

- A. attacks the testimony, as to
 - 1. inaccuracy of expression,
 - 2. confusion of fact with inference,
 - 3. positive error;
- B. attacks the witness, as to
 - 1. intelligence,
 - 2. uprightness;
- C. seeks a damaging admission;
 - 1. a witness's contradiction of himself,
 - 2. a witness's contradiction of another witness.

An admirable, and at the same time an obvious, instance of skill in analyzing testimony is Lord Erskine's Defence of Lord George Gordon, reprinted at page 86 of Professor Baker's *Specimens of Argumentation*.

134. Reynolds's *Stephen on Evidence*, xviii, and Appendix, note 1. On the "historical" method, combining induction with deduction, see Mill, *Logic*, VI, x;

Read, *Logic Deductive and Inductive*, Chapter xvii, §§ 5, 6; and compare § 95 of this book.

On the value of logic and rhetoric in persuasion, see Mill, *Logic*, III, i, § 2. The *locus classicus* for this matter is the *de Oratore* of Cicero (Book I) with the rival definitions of Crassus (§ xv) and Antonius (§ xlix). Compare also Book II, §§ xxvii and following.

135. Chief Justice Marshall's summary of *The Cherokees vs. the State of Georgia* (5 Peters's Reports, 1-80) has only one main point.

136. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, III, xiii, to end of book (and compare Cope). For the argumentative use of definition, see Quintilian, *Institutes*, V, x, 54 and following; VII, iii; Bain, *Rhetoric*, page 227.

137. A strong and simple instance of the office of the peroration is the close of Selection IV.

138. Cicero, *de Oratore*, II, lxxvi *et seq.*; Quintilian, V, xii, 4, 5, 14; VII, i, 10-12; Robinson, *Forensic Oratory*, § 163.

For the Yale-Princeton debate of 1901 the subject was: *Resolved that the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States has been justified.* Mr. Josiah Sibley opened the negative for Yale as follows:—

The gentleman of the affirmative has spoken of the suffrage given to the negro by the Reconstruction Acts of 1867. He has told us of evils which followed these Acts, which followed from this giving of suffrage to the negro; but he has not told us why it was necessary for Congress to make the evils of those acts permanent in the Fifteenth Amendment. He has not told us anything which would show that the Fifteenth Amendment was necessary. The gentleman of the affirmative has given us a somewhat historical sketch leading up to the

adoption of the Amendment. We, too, shall try to shed a little light upon this amendment.

In 1865 all the Southern states, save one, adopted the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery. The legislatures taking this action were composed entirely of white men, of the late Confederates, who thus gave evidence of their acceptance of the results of the war in good faith. In seeming contradiction to the spirit of this action, these same legislatures passed stringent laws of vagrancy and apprenticeship, apparently singling out the negro for exceptional restraints. Not to defend these laws, but to show that they were not altogether the result of prejudice against the negro, to whom as a rule the white people of the South felt grateful for kindly conduct during the war, we quote the opinion of an eminent authority. Professor Woodrow Wilson, in speaking of these very laws, says: "In most respects the negroes were put at once upon a footing of equitable equality with the whites in all civil rights; but the Southern legislatures could not but view with profound apprehension the new, unaccustomed, unpractised, and yet wholly unrestrained liberty of so vast a labouring, landless, homeless class. Restraint and compulsion seemed to be demanded by the merest prudence for the control and at least temporary discipline of a race so recently slaves and hence so unfit to exercise their new liberty even with advantage to themselves without some check." James Bryce expresses a similar opinion in his *American Commonwealth*; and indeed there were good grounds for the Southern fears when the negroes, refusing to work, were gathering in idle hordes in the centres of population, waiting each of them for the government allotment of forty acres and a mule, which unscrupulous carpet-baggers had taught them to expect, and believing that the day of their labour was past. This justifiable apprehension was kept from going to an unjustifiable extreme by the Freedmen's Bureau.

To make such protection permanent, Congress now pro-

posed a fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, which declared the negro a citizen and guaranteed him equal protection before the law. This amendment the Southern states rejected — not, however, because it gave the negro civil rights, but because of its further provisions. It declared the leading men of the South politically dead, repudiated the Confederate debt, compelled the seceded states to share the debt incurred by the Union to bring about their defeat, and refused them compensation for the loss of their slaves. For the purpose of securing the adoption of the amendment, Congress not only enfranchised the negro, but disfranchised large numbers of the Southern whites by the Reconstruction Act of 1867. The amendment was then ratified, and immediately and for all time protection was guaranteed to the negro. Under it no state could deprive him of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ; nor could a state deny to him the equal protection of the law. In the eye of the state the negro was thus considered the absolute equal of the white man in all civil rights. The amendment furthermore empowered Congress to enact all legislation necessary for the enforcement of its provisions. Infractions of the amendment were subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. There could be no state law applying to the negro alone ; and if judge or sheriff or any other state officer should habitually attempt to administer equitable laws in a manner discriminating against the negro, the court would interfere. So the Supreme Court has decided, saying in the case of *Henderson vs. Mayor of New York* (92 U.S., page 259), “if a law or ordinance be systematically administered so as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court will interfere.” Here was a condition, then, in which every civil right was guaranteed to the negro by organic law, in which Congress was in possession of a power to make those rights effective, in which the Supreme Court stood ready to enforce these laws by its decisions, and in which the public sentiment of the United States and of the better element of the

Southern states gave moral support to the protection sought. It was evident that the negro problem was in process of solution.

But instead of sticking to this policy of the Fourteenth Amendment, what did Congress do? It departed from that policy without giving it a fair trial. Only seven months after the proclamation of the Fourteenth Amendment Congress passed the Fifteenth Amendment! This is too brief a time in which to try any policy. It was an extraordinary piece of legislation, thus prematurely to supersede a definite line of action by another amendment radical in the extreme. The Fifteenth Amendment was radical because the immediate effect of placing the black man on the same suffrage plane with the white man was to insure the ballot to a whole race of ignorant freedmen. It guaranteed to hundreds of thousands of unfit voters participation in a republican government whose very existence depended on the intelligence of the voter. The Fifteenth Amendment was radical because it insured the ballot to hundreds of thousands of ex-slaves, who had no idea of its value or of how to use it; to hundreds of thousands of bondmen, ignorant, irresponsible, without property, who had not even had the training of caring for themselves! Could anything be more radical or dangerous than permanently to insure the sovereign rights of an American voter to such a mass of incompetency? Such a step even the great Emancipator never contemplated. But three days before his death he said: "It is also unsatisfactory to some that the elective franchise is not given to the coloured man. I would myself prefer that it were given to the very intelligent and to those who have served our cause as soldiers." Nor did a majority of the people in the Northern states favour universal suffrage more than did Lincoln. For after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment such states as Connecticut, New Jersey, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, by overwhelming popular majorities, refused to grant suffrage to the negro. It is extremely

doubtful whether the Fifteenth Amendment would have been passed, had it been submitted to the people instead of to state legislatures of the same party with the Congressional majority.

Our forms of government were designed for whites with centuries of political growth behind them. No one had ever thought of doing for the white man what was here done for the untrained black man. It cannot be asserted that in so doing the Fifteenth Amendment was anything but radical. That it was extremely radical is evident again from the fact that it insured to these unfit blacks not only political rights but political control. Its actual result was the continuation of negro rule in every Southern state ; for in three states the blacks actually outnumbered the whites, and in others the already existing Federal disfranchisement gave them the balance of power. Congress must have foreseen that the result of the Fifteenth Amendment would be the supremacy of ignorance and vice over property and intelligence.

All will agree that an amendment so extraordinarily radical must have produced extremely good results, and results obtainable in no other way, in order to have been justified. On the contrary, the results have been such that its former advocates have become convinced of its unwisdom. President Grant in his message of 1875 said, "It is evident that unrestricted suffrage should not be continued." Senator John Sherman, who was earnestly in favour of the amendment's adoption, after having seen its results for nearly thirty years, said, "Though the Fifteenth Amendment was right in principle, there is grave doubt as to whether its adoption has proved wise or expedient." The Republican party has refused to carry out the principle of unrestricted race suffrage in Hawaii to-day ; and the whole country tacitly acquiesces in the efforts that the South is making for the subverting of the purposes of the Amendment. Could any stronger proof be given that history has failed to justify the adoption of a law ?

We have seen on good authority that there was no great

prejudice against the negro before he received the suffrage ; that every protection was guaranteed to the negro by the Fourteenth Amendment, under which he was the absolute equal of the white in all civil rights, and Congress was in possession of a power to make those rights effective. Hence there was no necessity for a further amendment. We have seen that notwithstanding the lack of necessity, the Fifteenth Amendment was passed, that this Fifteenth Amendment was dangerously radical, that far from its adoption having been justified, its results have been such as to convince its former advocates of its unwisdom.

Subsequent speakers, tracing the history of the Amendment, will show that when it has been best enforced it has been most injurious, and that it has been at all times detrimental to the best interests of the state and the nation, of the white man and the black man, offering not an aid but a hindrance in the solution of the negro problem.

143. For iteration in general, Cicero, *Orator*, 40-137 : *Sic igitur dicet ille quem expetimus ut verset saepe multis modis eadem et una in re haereat in eademque commoretur sententia*, etc. For the particular form of iteration suggested in the text I am indebted to the Rev. Prof. Charles Harris Hayes of the General Theological Seminary, New York.

144. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, I, iii. Cicero (*de Oratore*, II, xi, and following) objects to the division, but not convincingly.

CHAPTER IV

THE ELEMENTS OF LITERARY COMPOSITION

(The section numbers are those of the main body of text.)

145. Express in the concrete (*i.e.* by details of motion, attitude, sound, colour, odour, or action make a scene) fatigue, disdain, slyness, courage, cowardice, fear, hate, restlessness, resignation, pluck, presence of mind, resource, contentment, devotion, greed, faith, envy, sloth, cruelty, depravity, foolhardiness, dignity, despair, courtesy, patriotism, enthusiasm, fascination, vanity.

Express in the concrete and specific the following account of what was felt on the illness of the emperor Justinian :

During his sickness the public consternation was expressed in the habits of the citizens ; and their idleness and despondence occasioned a general scarcity in the capital of the East.

— GIBBON : *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*,
Chapter xliii.

What did men do? How did they look?

Express in the concrete and specific also the following :

On all without a lordly host sustains
The care of empire, and observant reigns.
The parting guest beholds him at his side
With pomp obsequious, bending in his pride.
Round all the place his eyes all objects meet,

Attentive, silent, civil and discreet.
 O'er all within the lady-hostess rules ;
 Her bar she governs and her kitchen schools.
 To every guest th' appropriate speech is made,
 And every duty with distinction paid ;
 Respectful, easy, pleasant or polite —
 "Your Honour's servant — Mister Smith, good night."
 — CRABBE, *The Borough*, Letter 11.

The superiority of Poe over Hawthorne is largely in that his unity is more artistic. Hawthorne too often sums up his import in a moral; Poe makes us feel it without formulation.

146. "somewhat as they are communicated in actual experience." Perhaps this fairly translates the general idea of Aristotle's *μίμησις*. At any rate I think it is included therein.

The extreme of suggestion by the concrete is symbolism.

The essays of Lamb, artistic of course in diction, have little enough of the logical in construction. In truth, many of them are hardly essays, but rather descriptions. It should be remembered, too, that Lamb's charm is almost entirely of phrase. So weak in form he is sometimes that his eminence seems to be in spite of form.

147. The principle of selection, of the relation of art to nature, is admirably summarized in Eugène Fromentin's *Une Année dans le Sahel*, page 149: "La vraisemblance du vrai plutôt que le vrai. Il n'y a guère, que je sache, d'autre réel en fait d'art que cette vérité d'élection" ("The thing must seem true rather than be true. In art there is hardly any other reality, so far as I know, than this truth of selection." Compare pages

214–227). Nature, says he, initiates the beautiful (page 214); art conceives and reveals it. Diversion from the conception to the material facts (pages 216–217) leads to absorption in local colour and so to *une impasse*. Art is not a record of facts (page 218; cf. *document*, page 224), has no value of material, does not aim to be new, is essentially (page 224) an interpretation. Preoccupation with recording leads to exhibiting one's notes (page 227) instead of their result. Cf. Newman, in Selection IV, especially paragraphs II, III, VIII, XVII. Pater, *Style*, pages 6, 7; Charles F. Johnson, *Elements of Literary Criticism*, Chapter ii (on the distinction between "organic" and "formal" unity); John La Farge, *Considerations on Painting*, Lecture ii (Personality and Choice), *Ruskin's Art and Truth* (*International Monthly*, Vol. ii, page 510). Aristotle, *Poetics*, Chapter iv (v in Twining's translation), assigns to art a value as record; but any undue inference from this is offset by Chapter ix (cf. xxv, 20).

As examples of artistic selection, a few details used to suggest many others, few narratives are more striking or more easily available for quotation than the best of the old ballads: *Sir Patrick Spence*, *Kinmont Willie*, *Clerk Saunders*, etc.

For the contrast between "propounding or explaining," and "narrating or describing," compare Stephen Phillips's *Herod* with the bald exposition or *scenario* of the plot in Number 171 of the *Spectator*.

148. Pater, *Style*, page 18 ("That architectural conception," etc., to the end of the paragraph).

150. Contrast with the ease and swiftness of the passage quoted from Sterne this from *An Idyll of the Honey-Bee*, by John Burroughs:

Several crows are walking about a newly sowed wheat field, and we pause to note their graceful movements and glossy coats. I have seen no bird walk the ground with just the same air the crow does (!) It is not exactly pride ; there is no strut or swagger in it, though, perhaps, just a little condescension ; it is the contented, complaisant, and self-possessed gait of a lord over his domains. . . . The hawk looks awkward and out of place on the ground ; the game birds hurry and skulk, but the crow is at home.

Hurry and skulk is admirable ; the parts actually descriptive of the crows are fairly suggestive ; but what a labour and waste to bring them in !

As an exercise, simplify the mechanism of Extract E at the end of the next chapter of this appendix (*Plots for Stories, E*).

151. Herbert Spencer, *The Philosophy of Style*, opening of Part II. Aristotle, *Poetics*, Chapter xxiv, says epic has the advantage over tragedy in room for variety.

152. Compare de Quincey's essay on Conversation.

CHAPTER V

NARRATION

154. For a full discussion of this important difference see W. P. Ker, *Epic and Romance*, Chapter i, § 1, especially pages 5–8, from which this section is drawn. Professor Ker's excellent examples may well be read aloud or assigned for report in class.

Stevenson, in *A Gossip on Romance* (page 259 of the Edinburgh edition), makes almost the same distinction between romance and drama as Mr. Ker between romance and epic.

Compare Aristotle, *Poetics*, Chapter vi, on the comparative importance of plot (σύστασις) and character in tragedy. Mr. Ker discusses this at Chapter i, § 2, pages 19, 20.

155. Charles F. Johnson, *Elements of Literary Criticism*, Chapter iii.

156. An interesting discussion of this passage from the *Inferno* will be found in Landor's *Pentameron* (*First Day*).

158. The distinction in Fletcher and Carpenter's *Theme-Writing* (chapter on narration), and in other manuals, between narrative of fact and narrative of fiction seems hardly essential. In so far as history is narrative it has much the same problems of composition as a novel. The chief differences appear in that a large proportion of history as it is written nowadays is expository, not narrative at all.

Compare Aristotle's distinction between poet and historian, *Poetics*, Chapter ix.

159. Albert S. Cook, introduction to Newman's *Poetry Considered with reference to Aristotle's Poetics*, page iv.

Aristotle, *Poetics*, Chapter xv (on ἡθῆ in tragedy), fourth point (τὸ ὁμαλόν, consistency).

A pretty piece of gradation within very brief space is Stevenson's *The Sire de Malétroit's Door*.

160. The short-story corresponds to what Aristotle calls a "simple" action or fable in tragedy (ἀπλός). See Brander Matthews, *The Short-Story*, pages 51-52.

161. Essentially the same, of course, as the use of mannerism is the use of dialect. The danger of this is in sacrificing artistic importance to documentary importance.

For finer differentiation of speech compare Mr. Casaubon's letter with Dorothea's in the fifth chapter of George Eliot's *Middlemarch*.

163. Aristotle (*Poetics*, Chapter vi) marks a difference between tragedy and epic in extent of time, the former being strictly limited as to time, the latter indefinite. But the difference hardly holds as between modern drama and modern story, the former being less limited than the ancient drama, the latter more limited than the ancient epic or the mediæval romance. Thus Aristotle's famous definition of tragedy as "an imitation of some action that is important, entire, and of a proper magnitude" ("Ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας, μέγεθος ἔχουσης, Chapter vi; and again, *κεῖται δ' ἡμῖν τὴν τραγῳδίαν τελείας καὶ ὅλης πράξεως εἶναι μίμησιν*, Chapter vii) is suggestive also for story. In Chapter xviii he warns against constructing "a tragedy upon an epic plan" (μὴ ποιεῖν ἐποποιικόν

σύστημα τραγῳδίας); but this is not to say that a story, especially a short-story, may not be constructed upon his tragic plan. Indeed, in Chapter xxiii he repeats for epic some of his general counsels for tragedy.

In unification George Eliot achieved a superiority over any preceding English novelist, except perhaps Jane Austen. *Middlemarch*, barring the chapters (xix-xxii) in Rome, hardly changes the scene; the general effect is of unity of place. So also of time, the action occupying a little more than one year. Compare this with the looseness of Scott, as in the irrelevant six chapters appended to *The Heart of Midlothian*, and in his frequently ineffectual struggles, seen throughout his novels, to bring his characters together for "situations." In this aspect Scott is inferior to Fielding, whose scene, in *Tom Jones*, at the Upton Inn remains one of the most lively, natural, and clever in English fiction.

The defect of Dickens, by which his novels are often confused, appears typically in the many stories involved in *David Copperfield*: (1) David (Dora, Agnes, and Betsy Trotwood), (2) Steerforth and Emily, (3) Dr. Strong, (4) the Micawbers, (5) Martha, (6) Traddles, (7) Wickfield and Heep. It can hardly be said that these are drawn together into a unity. True, there is some of the effect of fulness which comes from actual life; but this effect is achieved by George Meredith without the repeated addition of new characters. In *David Copperfield* the only persons, besides David himself, who go fairly through the book, are Betsy Trotwood, Peggotty and her brother, and Traddles. Dickens's attempt to unify his heterogeneous story is by heaping the climaxes: the exposure of Heep, the death of Dora, the death of Steerforth, the emigration. Then follows

the conclusion in seven chapters more, with the marriage to Agnes as the solution of David's life. The heaping of climaxes, though certainly effective, is less so than the similar heaping in *Middlemarch*; the book is cut in two by the flight of Emily; and the weakness of the whole structure as a whole is felt in the lagging close.

164. "The classical unities," sometimes called Aristotelian, depend mainly for Aristotle's sanction on the general counsels of Chapters vii and viii of the *Poetics*. Unity of action is the only one on which Aristotle lays stress. The others were kept, however, in the usual practice of the great Greek tragedians. An excellent exposition of the unities may be found in the *Grand Dictionnaire Universel* of Larousse, article *unité*, sub-heading *littérature*. This comprises translation of Aristotle, summary, and application. See also Egger, *Histoire de la Critique chez les Grecs*, Appendix, page 422; and Butcher's edition of the *Poetics*, Chapter vii.

These "unities" are kept in Poe's *The Masque of the Red Death* and *The Cask of Amontillado*, and in Stevenson's *Markheim* and, barring the brief introduction, *The Sire de Malétroit's Door*. Many other short-stories keep the unities of action and time.

See Brander Matthews, *The Short-Story*, page 16.

165. Aristotle (*Poetics*, Chapter xxiv) deprecates the epic poet's speaking in his own person, and praises Homer for avoiding this.

In Kipling's extraordinarily concise tale *Little Tobrah*, the time-limit is made very short by the clever shifting from an impersonal outside narrator in the first part to a personal narrator within the tale for the latter part.

166. Aristotle, *Poetics*, Chapter xvi, on the five kinds of "discovery" (*ἀναγνώρισις*) or solution. "But of all

discoveries," he says at the end of the chapter, "the best is that which arises from the action itself."

Brander Matthews (*The Short-Story*, Appendix, page 79) compares a passage in Poe's review of Hawthorne's *Tales* with a passage in one of Stevenson's *Vailima Letters* (Vol. i, page 147). Stevenson thinks this doctrine of unity to be true typically of the short-story, not of the novel.

168. Aristotle, *Poetics*, Chapters viii (end), ix (on episodic fables), xv (Φανερόν οὐ ὅτι καὶ τὰς λύσεις, κ.τ.λ.), xxiv (Προαιρεῖσθαι τε δεῖ ἀδύνατα εἰκότα κ.τ.λ.).

Charles F. Johnson, *Elements of Literary Criticism*, Chapter ii, page 32.

On action as essential in narrative, see Lessing, *Laokoon*, Chapter xvi; Brewster, *Specimens of Narration*, page vii.

169. The crudity of Defoe's form appears strikingly in his ignoring of suspense. He has a strange habit of going rapidly over an incident before narrating it in detail. Thus even the dramatic incident of the discovery of Friday's footprint is forecast. In fact, Defoe's whole force is in verisimilitude and variety of incident. He can hardly be said to have form at all.

170. As to the typical stages of dramatic movement, see Aristotle, *Poetics*, Chapters vii (general statement, "beginning, middle, and end"), xi ("dramatic reverse" — περιπέτεια, and "recognition" — ἀναγνώρισις), xii (prologue, episode, exode, etc.), xviii (complication — δέσις, and solution — λύσις. In § 1 of this chapter τὰ μὲν ἔξωθεν is what is here called antecedent action).

See also Butcher's edition of the *Poetics*, Chapter vii.

The most explicit statement of the five stages is in Freytag, *die Technik des Dramas*, Chapter ii, § 2 (*Fünf*

Theile und Drei Stellen des Dramas ; i.e. (a) Einleitung, (b) Steigerung, (c) Höhenpunkt, (d) Fall oder Umkehr, (e) Katastrophe). Compare MacEwan's translation, pages 114 and following. ((a) introduction, (b) rise, (c) climax, (d) return or fall, (e) catastrophe.)

The development of the *Ancient Mariner*, more fully expressed, is as follows :

1. *antecedent action*, the crime (narrated in the course of 2, with its culmination in "I shot the albatross");
2. *rise*, (a) the curse of thirst, (b) the curse of death, (c) the curse of the dead;
3. *climax*, the curse of life in death — utter isolation ; *the dramatic reverse*, the water snakes — "I blessed them unawares" — the beginning of expiation in love for living things;
4. *fall*, expiation by penance — (a) working with the dead, (b) recognition of the blessed spirits;
5. *conclusion*, the curse finally snapped. The blessed spirits bring the mariner to haven; but he is forever to preach the moral of his terrible experience.

171. Aristotle, *Poetics*, Chapter xv (as in note to § 168), "The proper application of machinery (*μηχανή*, especially the '*deus ex machina*') is to such circumstances as are extraneous to the drama; such as either happened before the time of action," etc. (Twining's translation.)

How nice this machinery is in good narrative will appear on careful study of the passage quoted in the text. The first words of Poe's *Tell-Tale Heart* suggest what has already happened, and the tone of what is to follow, without a moment's delay :

True ! — nervous — very, very dreadfully nervous I had been and am ; but why *will* you say that I am mad? The disease had sharpened my senses — not destroyed — nor dulled them. Above all was the sense of hearing acute. I heard all things in the heaven and in the earth. I heard many things in hell. How, then, am I mad? Hearken ! and observe how healthily — how calmly, I can tell you the whole story.

Similarly swift are the openings of Kipling's *Without Benefit of Clergy* and Stevenson's *Markheim*. On the other hand, Kipling's *Georgie Porgie* opens with satirical reflections, forecasting the moral, as George Meredith does on a larger scale in the introduction to *Diana of the Crossways*. Both are careful to make very plain the moral tone. Kipling's *Dinah Shadd* is of still another sort, an elaborate opening for setting and character. This instance, though quite disproportionately long, has its separate effectiveness as a description of British army life. *On Greenhow Hill* has a long opening to use the setting as a kind of underplot for contrast.

Of openings to attune the reader to a mood Stevenson notes that of *The Lady of the Lake*,

The stag at eve had drunk his fill,

as typically romantic. Equally romantic is the opening of *Kenilworth* in the Bear Inn at Cumnor. But of all preparations for a story the best are those which seem not to be preparations at all, which take us unawares, in which the first moments of the action are so cunningly arranged as to suggest time, place, tone, past history, without stopping or turning aside. In this few tales are better than *The Ancient Mariner*.

173. Against arbitrary limitation of the term *novel* a

sufficient protest is the preface to Maupassant's *Pierre et Jean*.

"Complicated fable": Aristotle, *Poetics*, Chapter x: *Εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν μυθῶν οἱ μὲν ἀπλοῖ οἱ δὲ πεπληγμένοι.*

A classification of novels may be found in Brander Matthews's *Historical Novel* (*The Study of Fiction*), and in Brewster's *Specimens of Narration*, pages xxvi and following. Compare pages 36-37 of Brander Matthews's *The Short-Story*.

The superior importance of plot or of characterization is the contention of the romanticists or the realists. The most pointed and interesting English essays in this dispute are, on the one side, Mr. Henry James's *The Art of Fiction* (in *Partial Portraits*), and, on the other, three essays in Stevenson's *Memories and Portraits*; i.e. *A Gossip on Romance*, *A Gossip on a Novel of Dumas's*, *A Humble Remonstrance*.

174. "Purely documentary" seems the interest in the stories, for instance, of Mr. George Moore. Compare Brander Matthews on Zola, *The Short-Story*, page 33. This aspect of realism is discussed in M. Brunetière's *Le Roman Naturaliste*, pages 29 (*L'Érudition dans le Roman*) and 111 (*Le Reportage dans le Roman*).

176. Stevenson on the natural love of situation: *A Gossip on Romance*, page 251 (Edinburgh edition of *Memories and Portraits*).

177. W. P. Ker, *Epic and Romance*, Chapters i and ii, especially pages 21-22.

178. *Ibid.*, Chapter i, § 1, page 9.

181. The fullest, and at the same time the most concise, presentation is Brander Matthews's *The Short-Story*. This essay is now published (Longmans, Green & Co.) in a separate volume, with valuable notes and

appendices. For the greater distinctness of form in the short-story, see Chapter viii; for its sporadic appearances in the Middle Ages, pages 75, 81. As to Poe, note Chapters iv and v; but to Poe seems to belong the conception of the short-story as a distinct form of narrative. His narrative sense was unerring, Hawthorne's much feebler.

See also Henry S. Canby, *The Short-Story*, Yale Studies in English, XII.

SIX VERSIONS OF THE TALE OF THE SICILIAN SPY (§ 158)

[These were written impromptu, in forty-five minutes, from a bald oral statement of the plot.]

(1)

Maro was brave. He came of a brave race. What did the Austrians know of bravery? They were not Sicilians. Maro was. He would fight and die. There was an exhilaration in entering the enemy's lines, in facing danger and making grimaces at it, that Maro loved. Maro was so brave that he grew careless. Those Austrians, dull fellows that he despised, laid hands upon him. Now that Maro was caught he must die.

It was frightful there in prison with nothing to do but think of death, to count so many hours and think of death always there at the end. It was Maro's mother who came and saw tears on his face. It was she who knew that Maro was afraid, that her Maro had turned coward. "Maro, little fool, you think they are going to kill you. It is not so. They are merry fellows, those Austrians, I have heard. It is only a game that they play. Their cartridges are blank, Maro, empty as the noonday sky."

So Maro went in the morning and stood against the white wall. He laughed and spread out his hands, "No, why should they tie them?" There to one side was his mother. She must enjoy his little farce. "He had some courage, that little

Sicilian," said the Austrians, when Maro lay still against the wall.

[This has the merit of conciseness, and the corresponding defect of being too summary. Except at the close, it has no concrete detail and hardly any specific phrase.]

(2)

Lorenzo started on his dangerous tramp about eight o'clock in the evening. A cloudy fall sky made it quite dark, save for the few lights of the Italians' camp; and he was soon past these and off at a brisk walk in the direction of the Austrians, — for they must have been Austrians who came in sight just before sunset. Ten miles or more from his own camp he had seen them there, and had asked his general to let him ascertain their strength. Before he had gone two miles rain began to fall heavily and the turf almost gave way under him. At the end of five miles he was tired out. As he sat on a bridge for a minute's rest and thought, he was surprised by three men walking leisurely along the road toward him. He dropped over the bridge into three feet of water, and started for the nearest shore. He soon reached the other end of the bridge, and waited for the men to pass by. He could not see their faces; but he heard them discussing the Italian army and camp carefully. Recognizing one of the voices, he spoke. They waited while he climbed up the bank; and he found himself in the hands of three deserters from his own camp. He grasped his dirk; but his three adversaries soon overpowered him. He was a captured spy in the Austrian camp.

When his three former friends came with the guard next morning to his cell, they found him completely unstrung. He lay in a heap on the floor of his cell, his bravery all gone. They had known him well, and asked the Austrian commander to bring his mother to see him. In the cell the scene was almost as if he were only six years old again. Soon his mother began to upbraid him. "Where is the pride of my boy's heart

now? Have you lost your love of country? Are you ashamed of your mother's name? I'll be shot in your stead. But your three friends told me that the cartridges are to be blank; and they are making sport of your cowardice."

On this assurance Lorenzo went out again the next day, seeming to have all his bravery back again. Asking that he might not be blindfolded, he stood with fearless eye before the six Austrian rifles. At the signal the six rifles spoke, and he fell forward in his death agony.

[This has far more concrete detail. What of the proportions?]

(3)

What a change the presence of the Sicilian mother had made upon her son! Before her coming the only sign of life given by that slender figure was now and then a low moan accompanied by the nervous jerking of some uncontrolled muscle. His thoughts were not upon the service he had rendered his country, but upon the horror of death,—the awful moment of parting and the unknown eternity. Now all was changed. Could it be that his mother's information was true? Would his captors break the inevitable rule in regard to spies? It must be; for the mother had given her word. What if some rifle should by chance contain a ball? At the thought of that a shudder passed over him. Now the door of the prison is thrown open, admitting the warm sunlight. His guards and appointed executioner, gleefully expecting a scene of shrieking cowardice, lead him out. They hardly know their captive. His step is firm, his form erect. He sets his back to the wall. He refuses to be blindfolded; and only for a moment when his eye rests upon the rude coffin in waiting, does his face lose its confidence. Many an eye is wet with sympathy for the boy so young who meets his fate so calmly. The order is given. There is a roar, a shriek; and a tender form lies outstretched with blood trickling from a dozen wounds. Did some one

blunder? No. Look at the expression of exultation mingled with sorrow upon the face of that Spartan mother as she bends over her last born.

[Observe the time-limits, and compare the conciseness with that of (1).]

(4)

The darkness stifled him. His temples were throbbing furiously as he flung back and forth on the wretched cot which was the only furniture of the cell. Still, hadn't he at the sacrifice of his life often done his country a service? the country that he loved above all else. He raised himself up, and a smile went over his face. He was himself again. He got up and walked unsteadily across the room. A thought arrested him at the far-away note of a bird. It reminded him of the joy of freedom; and a wave of grief swept over him. He was about to give this all up—freedom, hope, life. It was well enough to do things for your country; but wasn't he doing more than was necessary? He had only one life. At the thought his nerve left him, and he shouted: "I'll confess. I'll tell you the Italian plans. I know all about them. Let me out." The door opened to a figure in black. He rushed towards it, and in a paroxysm of fear cried: "Listen. On the fourteenth a Sicilian is to kill the general. The guard is already bribed."

"My son, what are you saying? Sit here." She led him back to the pallet. "No," he protested. "I was never saner in my life. I was delirious before—before, when I said I would undertake that mission. I didn't know."

"My son, sit down." Then all the blood of her race rose in her as she continued: "Calm yourself. I am only glad, too proud, to think a son of mine has done as you've done. You've given your life for your country. What could be more glorious? At home"—patting him affectionately—"you should hear how they speak of you." "I know, mother; but I don't care. I tell you I want life." Almost roughly she seized him by the shoulder. "Listen. I heard outside from an officer

who thought I was one of them that the guns are to be loaded with blank cartridges. This order for your shooting was given only to shake that coolness and nerve. Dear, you did behave as a son of mine should. After the mock shooting they intend sending you to Veleja till the end of the war, and —”

“What a fool I am ! I’ll show them” — with a laugh towards her — “that a man of our house behaves like a man. You understand?” “I do, my son. Go.” He kissed her as the guard broke in, and was gone. She slowly walked across the room, and then, as the door closed, fell forward. “God pardon the lie. God be praised.”

[Since this is evidently conceived as the story of the mother, the climax is hers. Might the whole have been told from her point of view?]

(5)

The men lay about their tents, chatting, gambling, swearing. The day before had been so cruelly full of fatigue and the myriad anguishes of a long, heavy march that the sunny afternoon of rest was very grateful. The harsh challenge of the outer sentries made the lolling men turn with heavy-lidded interest to where, amid a choking cloud of dust, the scouting party were making their jingling entrance. Almost without words, before the dust had fairly settled, the company street knew that a prisoner had been taken, and that prisoner a spy. For all the twenty-five years of his life Luca had been the most living man of his village. He feared nothing. Should a cliff be scaled to rob an eagle’s nest? he was ever ready. Must a boat be launched and worked to the aid of drowning men? all, even the men who used to toss him, a fat, kicking baby, into the air, turned to him for leadership. And now that the war had come, had he not been chosen for the most dangerous work, most dangerous for a man glittering with honour or blotched with disgrace? Had not his daring made all glittering honour his? He had trusted a little too far ; he had dared a little too much ; and disgrace had in its turn met him, flaunting its eyesores

before his horror-staring eyes. What would they do? He had heard many tales of the death of spies; and he shuddered, turning to the scenes about him. The Austrians looked at him sleepily and unconcernedly. "More scurvy target practice," he heard one laugh to his neighbour. These soldiers were inhuman. He did not dread their threats or even so much their hatred; but that among a whole company there should be no smile for him, not one look of admiration, somehow chilled him more than the sight of the armed guard and the fetters upon his wrists. Luca awoke on the third day of his captivity to find his mother beside him. He had wept himself to sleep. (Before his capture he had often wondered why women were so silly as to cry.) And the streaks of tears were still upon his cheeks. He looked in a daze at his mother standing there, and unconsciously touched his soiled fingers to his face to wipe away the tear stains. His mother's eyes were red, too; but she no longer wept; and there was something in the flush of her cheek that made Luca, anxious as he was for all her comfort, drop his eyes to the sand of the floor. Thus they remained in silence. The past three days flooded over him with sickening force. To fear death was new and bitter. If he could only have fought, or moved in the least way for his defence, he could have been very brave; but that he should be quietly led out and shot, simply snuffed like a flickering candle, was not to be understood or endured. He was utterly afraid. He glanced up timidly at his mother and shuddered again. If there was any mother pity in her face, he could not see it. He threw himself sobbing at her feet, crying for her to speak, to bless or curse him. She raised him untenderly. "My son, you are the first coward of the family." Luca grovelled. "And all for nothing." Luca looked up. "Fool! they have been jesting with you, these Austrians. They will jest with you to-day. They will make a Fabre scream with blank cartridges." In an hour she left him, to escape his love and to weep out her heart. She left him the Luca of old, tall, proud, straight, with

a laugh for danger and a great pride of birth. She left him to be shot within the hour.

[Quite as evidently the boy's story. How, then, of the point of view at the close? The details are realized. Do they focus on one main impression, or do they scatter?]

(6)

In the time of the Austrian occupation of Italy it was my—shall I say good fortune?—to be attached to the main body of General Casco's following as an aide-de-camp. Though the Italians made no actual resistance, still it became more and more apparent as the days wore into months that they were in continual touch with our plans, for they always eluded us when they seemed almost in our grasp. Of course every one said there was a spy, and every one was right; for late one evening a party of sappers who were digging fortifications saw a strange man wrapped in an Austrian army cloak making his way slowly along the ramparts, taking in every detail, and even jotting on a little map. He even came up to them and spoke. His nerve was wonderful; and for the time being, though his face was not familiar, they believed him one of the officers. The boldness of the man was his tower of strength. But his luck changed a little later when he met me. Since I knew every man on all the staffs, his disguise was easy to see through. A whistle brought the guard; and a drumhead court martial, held at daybreak, condemned the spy, for spy he was, to death. The general had barely spoken the condemnation when the Sicilian broke down. Before, he had been composed, calm, and outwardly brave; but now every muscle in his bronzed face twitched, and he cried like a baby. He seemed almost like another man. His one request was that he might see his mother before he died; and, as she was living in the vicinity, she was sent for. I stood in the room during that last meeting, and, though the voice was low, I could catch now and then a word. His mother was like him in every feature except the

mouth, which was straight, hard, and determined, lacking the slightly weak downward turn at the corners. She chided him for his weakness and cowardice and told him that he was already the laughing-stock of the army. Her time was short. Just as she turned to go, she whispered : "Be brave. You have served your country well and have a clean record. Besides, they are only going to use blank cartridges to scare you." The next morning the young spy was led out into the garden of our quarters and placed with his back to the whitewashed stone wall. He was smiling ; his eye was bright and reflected in a degree the glories of the autumn. A hush fell over the crowd. Only the sergeant's voice could be heard : "Ready." The six rifles were levelled. "Aim. Fire." There was a roar, one long, wailing cry ; and as the smoke lifted the spy fell dead.

[Is there gain or loss in the choice of the narrator? Note the feebleness of the mother's words.]

PLOTS FOR STORIES

Histories, biographies, and memoirs teem, of course, with material for stories. Nathan Hale, Jean Lafitte, André, Aaron Burr, the "'49" in California, the Jesuit missions in Canada, the Moravians in Ohio, will yield profit, but no more than hundreds of other fields in the history of this continent alone. Almost any morning's newspaper, again, may furnish a hint. For beginners in narration, those plots are easiest to handle which offer a striking climax. No material should be attempted of which the writer cannot imaginatively realize the details, for a story can hardly succeed without being specific. If the religious attitude and feelings of a Jesuit missionary, for instance, his environment in Canada, some typical details of his daily life, cannot be seen and felt in the mind of the narrator, he should turn away to other material.

The following may be useful, not more for themselves than as suggesting others.

A

At a switch-tower by the junction of a branch railroad with the main line this telegram was received : " No. 2 freight broke in two on mountain. Running away. Clear tracks." The tower-man shouted the news to the engineer of a freight engine standing just below on the branch line, adding that the local passenger train, having just passed that block, could not be warned in time. The engineer, instantly uncoupling his tender and dismissing his fireman, started up the steep grade of the branch line to intercept the runaway. Making all speed possible to his slow engine until he saw the runaway approaching, he then stopped and ran ahead, to lessen the impact. The shock almost threw his engine from the track. Immediately reversing, he fought the train all the way down the hill, and finally brought it to a stand on the level. The company rewarded his bravery.

[Imagine these scenes in as specific detail as possible. For example, how did the runaway train look and sound as it approached? Tell the story from the point of view of one character. What is your climax? Will the story gain by being told in the first person? Use dialogue.]

B

King Richard Lion-heart, on his return from Palestine wrecked off the coast of Dalmatia, fell into the hands of Leopold of Austria, whom he had mortally offended in the Holy Land. Henry II bought him from Leopold, and kept him prisoner in the castle of Trifels.

Blondel the minstrel, his favourite, went in quest of him from castle to castle all over Europe. At last, on some vague surmise, stopping at the foot of the fortress rock of Trifels, Blondel began to sing a lay that they two had composed together. From within a voice finished the couplet. Richard was found. Not

long afterward he was ransomed. (From Henry, *Cours Pratique et Raisonné de Style*, page 358.)

C

Scudéry on his way to Paris with his sister was planning with her a new novel. Stopping for the night at Aix, they went on with the discussion in their room. Should they stab the hero, or poison him? One of the inn servants, overhearing, denounced them to the police. The Scudérys were arrested and examined — and of course acquitted. (*Ibid.*, page 360.)

D

A solitary foreigner, commonly said to be French, spent many years in ceaseless wandering on a fixed circuit between the Hudson River and the Connecticut. His clothing, even his hat, was made of bits of leather fastened together with thongs. He never begged, even refused money; but he accepted tobacco and food, and at farmhouses where he had first been received kindly he would stop for meals with absolute regularity, no matter what the weather. He would never go indoors, always eating outside and sleeping in the huts that he had built, with the skill of a woodsman, in woodlands remote from any road. Thus he had a well-established line of stations, from which he never departed. He rarely spoke. Sometimes he would write on stray pieces of brown paper unintelligible lines of characters, some letters, some numbers, some neither. In the blizzard of 1888 he was apprehended by the Connecticut Humane Society, lest he should die of exposure. But, no charge standing against him, he was necessarily released and took up his circuit. Not many years later he was found dead, from cancer of the throat, in one of his huts near Sing-Sing-on-Hudson. The newspapers thereupon invented various romances to explain his eccentric career, the commonest being of disappointed love; but no facts have ever transpired. The people that had fed him found after

his death that they had been fond of him, for they missed him more than a little.

E

One of our aids at Broad and Cherry streets was Mrs. Mills, who devoted two afternoons in every week to the work of caring for the soldiers. She was a stranger when she came among us ; but we soon learned to respect her and to lean upon her in emergencies. She had four young children whom she supported by her needle ; she was brought to us by a lady whom we all knew.

One afternoon quite late we received a message that two hundred men would arrive that evening at nine o'clock, and that all things necessary for their comfort must be in readiness. I could not stay, and many of the ladies had left. I ran over the whole building and found four who could remain and see that the beef-tea was hot and the milk-punch not tasted by the orderlies. Mrs. Patterson was at her post, and Mrs. Mills agreed to stay in my place. The next morning I heard that Mrs. Mills had fainted while the men were being carried in. I found the beds all full of sufferers from wounds or disease, and was absorbed all day in caring for them. Early the next day Dr. Neill sent for me and asked me whether I had noticed a man named Miller on my floor, not wounded, but quite feeble. I told him "Yes," but that he was very quiet and did not want anything that I could do for him. Then Dr. Neill told me a pitiful history. Mrs. Mills was an Englishwoman, her husband the son of a clergyman. They had come to this country to settle, when her husband, being unfortunate in business, became dissipated, enlisted in the army, and was sent to the frontier to fight the Indians. She lived on here, working for her children's daily bread. At first her husband wrote to her ; but for seven years she had heard nothing from him and believed him dead. A year before, the father of her husband had died leaving property to his son, which (he being in the eye of the law dead) was to come to the Mills children.

On the night when Mrs. Mills took my place she was turning from giving milk-punch to a patient, when she saw a man carried past her and knew it was her husband. She fled away and fainted ; but, being determined to convince herself that she was right, after she recovered she went back and saw that it was surely he. She left the hospital and advised with the lady who had brought her to us as to her next course. This lady was with Dr. Neill while they told me this tale ; and they both asked me to do what I could to gather from the man his history, and above all to try to persuade him to give up to his children the little property. Day after day I went to that man and did what I could to cheer him ; but he seemed indifferent and cold. At length when he was stronger I asked him if he would like me to write to any of his friends. I added : " Have you no wife ? No children ? " He looked at me for a moment and then said, " I know what you are driving at ; I saw my wife the night I came here peeping at me from behind that pillar." I said, " Yes, you did see her ; but why have you been so cruel toward her ? "

Then he told me he was a wretch and did not deserve his wife. I broke gently to him his father's death, and proposed that he should give to his wife and children the little property left by his father. The death of his father did not move him ; but he was amused at my proposition with regard to the money. Finally, after much persuasion, he signed a paper giving up one-half the property on condition that two of his children should be allowed to come and see him twice a week. This was done, and he left the hospital to return to the front, and died shortly after in Baltimore.

— MRS. E. D. GILLESPIE, *A Book of Remembrance*, Chapter ix.

F

A decent sum had Peter Nottage made
By joining bricks — to him a thriving trade.

* * * * *

The house of kings and heroes lacked repairs,
And Peter, though reluctant, served the players.
Connected thus, he heard in way polite —
“Come, Master Nottage, see us play to-night.”
At first ’twas “Folly, nonsense, idle stuff ;”
But, seen for nothing, it grew well enough ;
And better now — now best ; and every night
In this fool’s paradise he drank delight.
And, as he felt the bliss, he wished to know
Whence all this rapture and these joys could flow.
For if the seeing could such pleasure bring,
What must the feeling — feeling like a king ?
In vain his wife, his uncle, and his friend
Cried “Peter, Peter, let such follies end.
’Tis well enough these vagabonds to see ;
But would you partner with a showman be ?”
“Showman !” said Peter. “Did not Quin and Clive
And Roscius-Garrick by the science thrive ?
Showman ! ’Tis scandal. I’m by genius led
To join a class who’ve Shakespeare at their head.”
Poor Peter thus by easy steps became
A dreaming candidate for scenic fame.
And after years consumed, infirm and poor,
He sits and takes the tickets at the door.

— CRABBE, *The Borough*, Letter xii.

G

He wore his coat till bare was every thread,
And with the meanest fare his body fed.
He had a female cousin, who with care
Walked in his steps and learned of him to spare.
With emulation and success they strove,
Improving still, still seeking to improve,
As if that useful knowledge they would gain,
How little food would human life sustain.

No pauper came their table's crumbs to crave.
Scraping they lived ; but not a scrap they gave.
When beggars saw the frugal merchant pass
It moved their pity ; and they said, " Alas !
Hard is thy fate, my brother ; " and they felt
A beggar's pride as they that pity dealt.
The dogs, who learn of man to scorn the poor,
Barked him away from every decent door ;
While they who saw him bare, but thought him rich,
To show respect or scorn they knew not which.
But while our merchant seemed so base and mean
He had his wanderings, sometimes " not unseen."
To give in secret was a favourite act ;
Yet more than once they took him in the fact.
To scenes of various woe he nightly went,
And serious sums in healing misery spent.
Oft has he cheered the wretched at a rate
For which he daily might have dined on plate.

— *Ibid.*, Letter xiii.

H

A ship, whereof William Laiton was master, bound from Piscataqua in New England to Barbadoes, being two hundred and fifty leagues off the coast, sprang a leak ; which, notwithstanding their constant plying of the pump for fourteen hours together, so filled the vessel with water that all the eight persons aboard betook themselves to their boat, with a good supply of bread to live upon. The master would utter a strange persuasion that they should meet with a ship at sea, whereby they should be relieved ; but before they did so, they had so far spent their small supply of water that they were come to the allowance of each man a spoonful a day. In this boat they continued upon the Atlantic Ocean for nineteen days together ; after twelve of which they met with a storm which did much endanger their lives ; but God preserved them. At

the end of eighteen days a flying fish fell into their boat ; and, having with them a hook and line, they made use of that fish for bait, whereby they caught a couple of dolphins. A ship then at sea, whereof Mr. Samuel Scarlet was commander, apprehending a storm to be near, they suffered their vessel to drive before the wind while they were fitting of the rigging to entertain that approaching storm ; and by this means they met with a boat full of their distressed brethren. Captain Scarlet's vessel was then destitute of provisions ; only they had water enough and to spare. For which cause the mariners desired him that he would not go to take the men in, lest they should all die by famine. But the captain was a man of too generous a charity to follow the selfish proposals thus made unto him. He replied : "It may be these distressed creatures are our own countrymen ; or, however, they are distressed creatures. I am resolved I will take them in ; and I will trust in God, who is able to deliver us all." Nor was he a loser by this charitable resolution ; for Captain Scarlet had the water which Laiton wanted, and Mr. Laiton had the bread and fish that Scarlet wanted. So they refreshed one another, and in a few days arrived safe to New England. — COTTON MATHER : *Magnalia Christi Americana*, Book VI, Chapter I, § 8.

[Mather's *Magnalia* is a mine for narrative, both of striking incident, as of witchcraft and other marvels, and also of New England character during the colonial period. Both appear in the following, from the life of Sir William Phips in Book II. The material will yield several short stories.]

I

Having first informed himself that there was another Spanish wreck, wherein was lost a mighty treasure, hitherto undiscovered, he had a strong impression upon his mind that he must be the discoverer ; and he made such representations of his design at White-Hall that by the year 1683 he became the captain of a King's ship, and arrived at New England com-

mander of the *Algier-Rose*, a frigate of eighteen guns and ninety-five men.

* * * * *

While he was captain of the *Algier-Rose* his men, growing weary of their unsuccessful enterprise, made a mutiny, wherein they approached him on the quarter-deck with drawn swords in their hands, and required him to join them in running away with the ship, to drive a trade of piracy on the South Seas. Captain Phips, though he had not so much of a weapon as an ox-goad or a jaw-bone in his hands, yet, like another Shamgar or Samson, with a most undaunted fortitude he rushed in upon them, and with the blows of his bare hands felled many of them and quelled all the rest. . . . One day while his frigate lay careening, at a desolate Spanish island, by the side of a rock, from whence they had laid a bridge to the shore, the men, whereof he had about a hundred, went all but about eight or ten to divert themselves, as they pretended, in the woods, where they all entered into an agreement, which they signed in a ring, that about seven o'clock that evening they would seize the captain and those eight or ten which they knew to be true unto him, and leave them to perish on this island, and so be gone away unto the South Sea to seek their fortune. Will the reader now imagine that Captain Phips, having advice of this plot but about an hour and a half before it was to be put into execution, yet within two hours brought all these rogues down upon their knees to beg for their lives? But so it was! For these knaves, considering that they should want a carpenter with them in their villainous expedition, sent a messenger to fetch unto them the carpenter who was then at work upon the vessel; and unto him they showed their articles, telling him what he must look for if he did not subscribe among them. The carpenter, being an honest fellow, did with much importunity prevail for one half hour's time to consider of the matter; and, returning to work upon the vessel, with a spy by them set upon him, he feigned himself taken with a fit of the

colic, for the relief whereof he suddenly ran unto the captain in the great cabin for a dram ; where when he came his business was only in brief to tell the captain of the horrible distress which he was fallen into. But the captain bid him as briefly return to the rogues in the woods and sign their articles, and leave him to provide for the rest. The carpenter was no sooner gone but Captain Phips, calling together the few friends (it may be seven or eight) that were left him aboard, whereof the gunner was one, demanded of them whether they would stand by him in the extremity which he informed them was now come upon him. Whereunto they replied they would stand by him, if he could save them ; and he answered, by the help of God he did not fear it. All their provision had been carried ashore to a tent made for the purpose there, about which they had placed several great guns to defend it in case of any assault from Spaniards that might happen to come that way. Wherefore Captain Phips immediately ordered those guns to be silently drawn and turned ; and so, pulling up the bridge, he charged his great guns aboard, and brought them to bear on every side of the tent. By this time the army of rebels comes out of the woods ; but as they drew near to the tent of provisions, they saw such a change of circumstances that they cried out, "We are betrayed !" And they were soon confirmed in it when they heard the captain with a stern fury call to them, "Stand off, ye wretches, at your peril !" He quickly saw them cast into a more than ordinary confusion when they saw him ready to fire his great guns upon them if they offered one step further than he permitted them ; and when he had signified unto them his resolve to abandon them unto all the desolation which they had purposed for him, he caused the bridge to be again laid, and his men began to take the provisions aboard. When the wretches beheld what was coming upon them they fell to very humble entreaties ; and at last fell down upon their knees, protesting that they never had anything against him, except only his unwillingness to go away with the King's ship

upon the South-Sea designs, but upon all other accounts they would chuse rather to live and die with him than with any man in the world. However, since they saw how much he was dissatisfied at it, they would insist upon it no more, and humbly begged his pardon. And when he judged he had kept them on their knees long enough, he, having first secured their arms, received them aboard; but he immediately weighed anchor, and, arriving at Jamaica, he turned them off. Now, with a small company of other men he sailed from thence to Hispaniola, where by the policy of his address he fished out of a very old Spaniard (or Portuguese) a little advice about the true spot where lay the wreck which he had hitherto been seeking (as unprosperously as the chymists have their aurisick stone), that it was upon a reef of shoals a few leagues to the northward of Port de la Plata, upon Hispaniola, a port so called, it seems, from the landing of some of the shipwrecked company, with a boat full of plate saved out of their sinking frigate. Nevertheless, when he had searched very narrowly the spot whereof the old Spaniard had advised him, he had not hitherto exactly lit upon it. . . . Captain Phips arriving [in a second attempt] with a ship and a tender at Port de la Plata, made a stout canoe of a stately cotton tree, so large as to carry eight or ten oars; for the making of which periaga (as they call it) he did, with the same industry that he did everything else, employ his own hand and adse, and endure no little hardship, lying abroad in the woods many nights together. This periaga with the tender, being anchored at a place convenient, the periaga kept busking to and again, but could only discover a reef of rising shoals thereabouts called The Boilers, which, rising to be within two or three foot of the surface of the sea, were yet so steep that a ship striking on them would immediately sink down, who could say how many fathoms? into the ocean. Here they could get no other pay for their long peeping. . . . Nevertheless, as they were upon the return, one of the men looking over the side of the periaga into the calm

water, he spied a sea feather growing, as he judged, out of a rock. . . . The diver, bringing up the feather, brought therewithal a surprising story, that he perceived a number of great guns; the report of which great guns exceedingly astonished the whole company, and at once turned their despondencies for their ill success into assurances that they had now lit upon the true spot of ground which they had been looking for. And they were further confirmed in these assurances when upon further diving the Indian fetched up a sow, as they styled it, or a lump of silver, worth, perhaps, two or three hundred pounds. Upon this they prudently buoyed the place, that they might readily find it again; and they went back unto their captain, whom for some while they distressed with nothing but such bad news as they formerly thought they must have carried him. Nevertheless they so slipped in the sow of silver on one side under the table where they were now sitting with the captain and hearing him express his resolutions to wait still patiently upon the providence of God under these disappointments, that when he should look on one side he might see that odd thing before him. At last he saw it; seeing it, he cried out with some agony: "Why? What is this? Whence comes this?" And then, with changed countenances, they told him how and where they got it. "Then," said he, "thanks be to God! we are made;" and so away they went, all hands to work; wherein they had this one further piece of remarkable prosperity, that whereas if they had first fallen upon that part of the Spanish wreck where the pieces of eight had been stowed in bags among the ballast, they had seen a more laborious and less enriching time of it; now, most happily, they first fell upon that room in the wreck where the bullion had been stored up; and they so prospered in this new fishery that in a little while they had without the loss of any man's life brought up thirty-two tuns of silver; for it was now come to measuring of silver by tuns. Besides which one Adderly, of Providence, who had formerly been very helpful to Captain Phips in the search of

this wreck, did upon former agreement meet him now with a little vessel here ; and he with his few hands took up about six tuns of silver ; whereof nevertheless he made so little use that in a year or two he died at Bermudas, and, as I have heard, he ran distracted some while before he died. Thus did there once again come into the light of the sun a treasure which had been groaning under the waters. And in this time there was grown upon the plate a crust like limestone, to the thickness of several inches, which crust being broken open by irons contrived for that purpose, they knocked out whole bushels of rusty pieces of eight which were grown thereinto. Besides that incredible treasure of plate in various forms, thus fetched up from seven or eight fathom under water, there were vast riches of gold and pearls and jewels. . . . Thus did they continue fishing till, their provisions failing them, 'twas time to be gone ; but before they went Captain Phips caused Adderly and his folk to swear that they would none of them discover the place of the wreck, or come to the place any more till the next year, when he expected to be there again himself. . . .

But there was one extraordinary distress which Captain Phips now found himself plunged into. For his men were come out with him upon seamens' wages, at so much per month ; and when they saw such vast litters of silver sows and pigs, as they call them, come on board them at the captain's call, they knew not how to bear it that they should not share all among themselves, and be gone to lead a short life and a merry, in a climate where the arrest of those that had hired them should not reach them. In this terrible distress he made his vows unto Almighty God that if the Lord would carry him safe home to England with what he had now given him, to suck of the abundance of the seas, and of the treasures hid in the sands, he would for ever devote himself unto the interests of the Lord Jesus Christ, and of his people, especially in the country which he did himself originally belong unto. And he then used all the obliging arts imaginable to make his men true unto him, espe-

cially by assuring them that besides their wages they should have ample requitals made unto them ; which if the rest of his employers would not agree unto, he would himself distribute his own share among them. Relying upon the word of one whom they had ever found worthy of their love and of their trust, they declared themselves content ; but still keeping a most careful eye upon them, he hastened back for England with as much money as he thought he could then safely trust his vessel withal. — *Ibid.*, Book II, last section.

[Other sea-stories may be drawn from Chapters xxiv (Perry on Lake Erie) and xxv (the privateers in the War of 1812) of McMaster's *History of the People of the United States*, Vol. iv.]

CHAPTER VI

DESCRIPTION

DIRECTIONS FOR A COURSE OF FREQUENT SHORT THEMES

After a student has practical assurance in applying the larger principles to compositions of some length, he will gain much by frequent and more rapid writing of shorter pieces. Shorter pieces, of course, may be used with profit from the beginning; but, after the start has been fairly made, they seem most profitable through the earlier stages of study when they are (*a*) incidental, or (*b*) impromptu, as in class. For to realize the practical implications of logical coherence a student commonly needs the room of at least five consecutive paragraphs; and in this respect narrative makes demands quite similar to those of exposition or argument. But when composition has been grasped in this larger sense, it is at once an advantage and a relief to make of frequent short pieces a more direct and spontaneous means between impression and expression. The expression of personality which is thereby invited also furthers directly the study of style. These considerations suggest the beginning of frequent short themes with the study of description, which commonly has most promise when it is brief and personal, and the continuing of them throughout the study of style.

A particular application of this method has established

at Harvard the "daily theme." Unwise extension of this sort of practice to purposes for which it is not adapted has somewhat obscured its proper value, which is for fluency, point, personality. For this its proper purpose its position is definitely approved by careful experience. Practically, then, a course of "daily themes" may well be conducted as follows:

(1) A theme should be written and presented on every work-day, or at least five times a week, and should be read on the same day.

(2) A theme should be limited to about two hundred words, and may be shorter.

(3) It should not be limited at all as to kind; *i.e.* it may be expository or argumentative, as in brief editorial, or descriptive or narrative, though narrative has slight scope, or any combination of these. In fact, it is best to drop these formal divisions altogether, indifferently letting the student present whatever is on his mind in whatever form seems readiest. Naturally daily themes are oftenest descriptive; but in proportion as they develop a habit of personal expression they tend to record whatever makes Tuesday different in reflection or experience from Monday. It is not necessary to require even a title. That may be supplied by the instructor, who thereby may indicate his interpretation.

(4) But every daily theme must have a single point; in description or narrative, a single clear impression; in essay, a proposition, whether latent or explicit. This is sufficient guarantee of the cardinal principles of unity, coherence, and emphasis. Moreover, the point must be, not necessarily obvious or formulated, but at least distinct; for a daily theme should always be gauged to make its impression directly. Written within a com-

paratively short space, it should also be pretty directly clear. This is a safeguard for the combination of point with fluency.

(5) Therefore the criticism, too, should be single. Corrections of detail may be made incidentally; but the course presupposes mastery of the rudiments, and aims at a larger view. Thus the critic may note each day on each theme a brief characterization: "bald," "laboured," "sensational," "prolix," "sound, but feeble," "breaks in two," "more ingenious than plausible," "distinct," "scattering," "pretty," "harsh," "distorted," "conventional," "excellently simple," "direct," "turgid," "futile," "words, not an idea," "observant," etc.; or a bit of advice—"Try this again in the concrete," "Think less of phrase," "Use your own eyes," "This is not the way to persuade," "Read Pater's *Mona Lisa*," "Try a college topic," "Think for yourself," "What do you mean by *conversion*?" "Shun cant," "Read this aloud," etc.; and add an approximate rating. At the end of each week he should then, making up the five or six themes into a batch, give a more exact mark and sum up his criticism, making that always positive as well as negative, for the week as a whole, preparatory to discussing each batch with each student orally at a regularly appointed hour.

(6) All this implies entire frankness. The student should say quite directly what he thinks, should be accustomed to the same frankness from his instructor in criticism. Any undue liberty that may thus arise can be corrected for the individual in the privacy of conference. Daily themes, like other themes, should be freely read aloud for the benefit of the class, but not by name, nor where there is any risk of undesired pub-

licity. Students will not commonly write confessions or diatribes, and individual tendency to such writings can be checked; but in general they will not write at their best unless they feel free.

(7) Daily themes may be used as a self-sufficient course by themselves, or they may be combined (*a*) with longer pieces at intervals of a month or a fortnight, (*b*) with other short studies in style, as for example with short translations. Thus they may be freely adapted to various classes. In general, since to continue daily themes beyond a term of twelve or fifteen weeks is to run the risk of weariness and staleness, it is commonly better to offer a half-course, or one term, of daily themes in connection with some other half-course of longer pieces.

Subjects for Short Studies in Characteristic Detail
(local colour, professional manner, etc.).

A

a demagogue	a baggage-master
a priest	an American general
a customs officer	a policeman
an organ-grinder	a street urchin
a reporter	an actor
a commercial traveller	a hotel clerk
a gardener	a sailor
a lumberman	a New England fisherman
a Hungarian miner	a conductor
a cobbler	a blacksmith
a guide	a "cow-puncher"

B

a "boomed" town	a New England village
a western city	a smoking-car
the smoking-room of a steamer	a crowded ferryboat
an emigrant train	the steerage
a suburban house	a camp in the mountains
a river steamboat	a southern plantation
a baseball game	a farmhouse on the prairie
a "round-up"	a lumber camp
a freight yard	a railway station in the country
a city church	

183. Kipling's *The City of Dreadful Night* is essentially pure description by narrative method (§ 194). It has no plot.

185. Lessing's *Laokoön*, Chapters xvi, xvii; Brunetière, *l'Impressionisme dans le Roman*, pages 103-108 of *le Roman Naturaliste*— "il n'y a pas de commune mesure entre les sensations de l'oreille et celles de l'œil."

Fromentin recounts his experimental proof of the essential difference between painting and description in *Un Été dans le Sahara*, Preface, page xv.

On the futility of refining on the expression of colour see A. Albalat's analysis of a passage of George Sand, *l'Art d'Écrire*, page 87.

186. For a most suggestive illustration from painting see Fromentin's *Une Année dans le Sahel*, pages 219 and following. The passage is translated in La Farge's *Considerations on Painting*, pages 77 and following. Compare Fromentin's *Un Été dans le Sahara*, pages 73, 272-3.

187. At page 59 of the *Sahara*, apropos of painting scenes from the Bible, Fromentin touches on the comparatively slight importance of local colour in painting. The idea is more fully developed in the *Sahel*, pages 215 and following, of which the sum is that as in the progress of civilization, and especially of art, nature came out from behind man, painting after a time was perverted (*dénaturé*) to local colour and anecdote.

Many delicate examples of local colour may be quoted from Walter Pater; e.g. the descriptions of an English house and garden and of a Cathedral school, in *Emerald Uthwart* (*Miscellaneous Studies*, pages 172-174, 178-181).

See *Specimens of Prose Description* (Henry Holt & Co.), III, X, XII, XIII.

191. "Small minds prefer detail. Only the masters are come to an understanding with nature. So much they have observed her that in their turn they reveal her. From her they have learned that secret of simplicity which is the key of so many mysteries. She has taught them that the goal is to express, and that to attain expression the simplest means are the best."—FROMENTIN, *Un Été dans le Sahara*, pages 73-4.

"One of the grossest literary errors of our time has been to confuse the enumeration of parts with 'painting,' to believe that the interminable juxtaposition of details, even picturesque details, can in the end achieve a single image, make us sensible of the vast spectacles of the physical universe."—JULES LEMAÎTRE, *Impressions de Théâtre*, 8me Série (the review of a dramatization of Zola's *Une Page d'Amour*. The whole passage is quoted in *Specimens of Prose Description*, Henry Holt & Co., page xxxvi.).

With the passage from Meredith compare the opening of Chapter vii of George Eliot's *Adam Bede*. (See also § 193.)

192. Compress the following description by simplifying the mechanism (*i.e.* by omission, combination, dialogue) without sacrificing a single suggestive detail. (It may well be compared with Stevenson's of a similar monastery, *Travels with a Donkey in the Cevennes: Our Lady of Snows*.)

Having repeatedly heard of the extreme austerities to which the Cenobite monks at the abbey of *La Trappe*, on the confines of Normandy, submit themselves, I felt a most ardent desire to pay them a visit, and therefore set out for that purpose, and have been highly recompensed for my trouble.

As I approached the abbey, everything served to inspire me with religious terror. The hills, woods, lakes, and rivulets which surrounded the valley seemed placed on purpose to sequester those solitary monks from all commerce with the rest of mankind. The very silence seemed awful, a silence which has reigned uninterrupted for several centuries. The old Gothic buildings appeared more gloomy and solemn than I can express by words. The hollow sound caused by my horse's feet as I entered the gate of the convent made it appear a ruin long deserted by men.

I saw no person in the yard of the convent; and all appeared a silent, dreary ruin. On observing a cord hanging by an old Gothic door, I supposed it to be that of the bell, and therefore began to pull it pretty hard, and at length made the bell to toll, the flat and solemn sound of which, echoed through the long, damp cloisters, equalled the universal sadness of the place. After I had waited for some time, I perceived the door to open, and observed a tall, pale, meagre figure approach, hideous as a spectre. His head was entirely shaved, except a narrow circle of hair left like a band all round. He wore a robe such as the monks commonly wear, of very coarse, white cloth, which

reached down to the great wooden shoes he had upon his feet. With his eyes fixed upon the earth, and his hands joined together before his breast, he advanced slowly towards me, and bowing down his head to the earth, put his lips to my shoes. I was not prepared for such a reception, and was at a loss how to act. I could not bear to see a man like myself demean himself so much. He led me through a long Gothic cloister into a little room; and on my informing him of my business, he told me that he would go and inform the father abbot that a stranger was arrived, and wished to see the abbey, etc. He entreated me to suffer the two persons who should come to receive me to do with me as they would please, and by all means not to salute, nor even open my lips to them. He also asked me if I had any pistols or other weapons about me, requesting that if I had, I should leave them by, and not profane the abbey by bringing such abominations beneath its roof.

I had remained by myself for some minutes when I perceived two of the religious, dressed exactly like the former, moving slowly together through the cloister. They appeared pale and emaciated, and held prayer-books in their hands, which they attentively seemed to read. They prostrated themselves before me, and kissed my shoes like the former, and then in a slow and solemn pace conducted me to the chapel, without saying one word. On entering the chapel they kneeled down at each side of me, and made signs to me to do the same. The chapel appeared antique, Gothic, gloomy, and dark, with one or two dull lamps, which shed a pale and glimmering light upon the awful, ruinous place around. The choir was shut up on every side with planks, so that I could not see into it. The religious were at their devotion within the choir; and I heard them sing, the most mournful and dolorous *cuineaghān* it is possible to conceive. The sounds were sorrowful and slow; and the hollow voices, at the conclusion of each verse, seemed murmuring to die away, vibrating through the long, deep solitudes and awful cells. I felt a chill diffuse

itself through my whole frame, and conceived a melancholy terror, such a one as Spenser felt when he described the cave of Despair in his *Faerie Queene*.

After some time the two religious conducted me back in solemn silence to the little room from whence they had brought me. On entering the room I forgot myself a little, and could not help expressing my surprise by word of mouth to one of my conductors. But I immediately perceived my imprudence. He bowed his head, and made the sign of the cross upon his breast, and signified by signs that I was guilty of a profanation by having uttered my thoughts. The other made a sign to me to be seated, when, opening his prayer-book, with a most melancholy tone of voice he read over me a long Latin prayer, after which they turned from me and departed. I had not remained many minutes by myself, when another religious entered, and with the politest air in the world asked me was there anything he could do to serve me. I assure you I found it very agreeable to meet with a man to whom I could speak. He asked me if I wished to see any more of the abbey, and told me that my horse was taken care of by one of the religious, and that I should be satisfied to stay in the convent until the next day. He conducted me to see the refectory where the religious dine. In the refectory I saw a number of brown earthen vessels and wooden spoons, which they use at their repasts. He showed me the dormitories or cells in which they sleep. Each cell appeared a most wretched hovel, having for furniture a hard plank, with a straw mat, a pillow stuffed with straw, and a very coarse quilt, on which these sorrowful beings sleep without ever taking off their clothes. He informed me that they retire to their cells at eight of the clock in summer, and at seven in winter, and that they never drink wine, or beer, or any other spirituous liquor, nor ever eat any kind of animal food, and live merely on water and some herbs and roots dressed without even butter or oil.

We next went to see the environs of the abbey. Here I saw

the greater part of the valley more or less in a state of cultivation, due, as my conductor informed me, to the labours of the monks. They rise at two of the clock after midnight, and remain at prayers in the chapel until four or five ; after which they work at the spade, harrow, etc., for the space of an hour and a half, and labour in the same manner for another hour and a half after dinner. During their labour they observe the most rigid silence, esteeming it absolute blasphemy to open their lips. Although fatigued by labour, they never sit down to take rest ; which must be extremely mortifying to men who never drink any kind of fermented liquors, and only take once a day a bit of brown bread, with a cup of water, and a small plate of roots, or herbs, or perhaps *haricots*, or full-grown kidney beans, always the produce of their own labour. In the heat of the day when any of the monks finds himself much exhausted from his work, he does not presume to speak, but makes a sign to the *père abbé* by putting his hand to his mouth ; on which he generally is permitted to drink a little water.

We next went to see the burial-place of the monks. I observed there several wooden crosses, which marked the spots in which different bodies of the religious were interred. Among the stones and crosses I observed two of the monks, who were digging in separate trenches or graves. My conductor here informed me that when any of them fall sick, they take no care of themselves, nor have they any physician belonging to the abbey ; for they think it impious to attempt to cure themselves when God afflicts them with diseases and wishes to call them from the world. When they perceive themselves near their last moments, they stretch themselves in cinders and ashes, and meet their end with astonishing resolution, even smile in the agony of death. He also informed me that each of the religious digs the grave in which himself is to be buried ; and even some of them sleep in their graves at night, and that the two religious I perceived were then employed in opening the cold earth for this gloomy purpose.

I approached to view one of these uncommon persons. He appeared to be a man of about thirty years of age, and had something noble and interesting in his mien, though pale and haggard. Pining melancholy and dark despair seemed to sit heavy on his brow. He appeared to dig with ardour, wishing his last hour were come, and that the cold earth would open and embrace him forever. He did not take any notice of me, nor even perceive me when I approached; for his whole soul seemed engaged in opening his long home. Perhaps, said I, his hands have been stained with the blood of his aged father, or, wrongfully suspecting his gentle sister of dishonouring his family, he has laid violent hands upon her. Or rather perhaps his days are embittered by slighted and unhappy love. I thought I saw the unfortunate, the desperate Romeo tearing open the grave to lay himself by his much beloved Juliet. Never in my life did I see anything so shockingly sorrowful. I pitied him from my very heart: I felt my eyelids swell with tears — I turned from him, and gave vent to my grief.

—JAMES ST. JOHN, *Letters from France to a Gentleman in the South of Ireland* (Dublin, 1788), *Letter xl* (Paris, August 20th).

193. Victor Hugo, *Les Misérables*, Part II, Book ii, Chapter iv. In such scenes Scott is often methodical to the extent of formality. See, in the seventh chapter of *Ivanhoe*, the description of Ashby lists, and, in the third chapter, that of the hall of Cedric.

The following is one of the best in its kind:

From Monte Motterone you survey the Lombard plain. It is a towering dome of green among a hundred pinnacles of gray and rust-red crags. At dawn the summit of the mountain has an eagle eye for the far Venetian boundary and the barrier of the Apennines; but with sunrise come the mists. The vast brown level is seen narrowing in; the Ticino and the Sesia waters, nearest, quiver on the air like sleepy lakes; the plain

is engulfed up to the high ridges of the distant Southern mountain range, which lie stretched to a faint cloud-like line, in shape like a solitary monster of old seas crossing the deluge. Long arms of vapour stretch across the urn-like valleys, and, gradually thickening and swelling upward, enwrap the scored bodies of the ashen-faced peaks and the pastures of the green mountain, till the heights become islands over a forgotten earth. Bells of herds down the hidden run of the sweet grasses, and a continuous leaping of its rivulets, give the Motterone a voice of youth and homeliness amid the stern company of Titan-heads, for whom the hawk and the vulture cry. The storm has beaten at them until they have got the aspect of the storm. They take colour from sunlight, and are joyless in colour as in shade. When the lower world is under pushing steam, they wear the look of the revolted sons of Time, fast chained before scornful heaven in an iron peace. Day at last brings vigorous fire; arrows of light pierce the mist-wreaths, the dancing draperies, the floors of vapour; and the mountain of piled pasturages is seen with its foot on the shore of Lago Maggiore. Down an extreme gulf the full sunlight, as if darting on a jewel in the deeps, seizes the blue-green lake with its isles. The villages along the darkly-wooded borders of the lake show white as clustered swans. Here and there a tented boat is visible, shooting from terraces of vines, or hanging on its shadow.

Monte Boscero is unveiled; the semicircle of the Piedmontese and the Swiss peaks, covering Lake Orta, behind, on along the Ticinese and the Grisons, leftward toward and beyond the Lugano hills, stand bare in black and gray and rust-red and purple. You behold a burnished realm of mountain and plain beneath the royal sun of Italy.

In the foreground it shines hard as the lines of an irradiated Cellini shield. Farther away, over middle ranges that are soft and clear, it melts, confusing the waters with hot rays, and the forests with darkness, to where, wavering in and out of view

like flying wings, and shadowed like wings of archangels with rose and with orange and with violet, silver-white Alps are seen. You might take them for mystical streaming torches on the border-ground between vision and fancy. They lean as in a great flight forward upon Lombardy.

— GEORGE MEREDITH : *Vittoria*, Chapter i.

194. The advantage of the narrative method in utilizing the descriptive force of the verb seems to be glanced at in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, III, xi.

196. Genung, *The Working Principles of Rhetoric*, page 500.

198. Ruskin, *Modern Painters*, III, 4, § 4. Contrast with this sort of description the passage from Meredith quoted at § 172, and also chapter xliii of his *Richard Feverel*.

"Pathetic fallacy" is the descriptive habit of Dickens. Instances are abundant in any of his stories. See the quotation from Lemaître at § 227 of this appendix.

200. Of the descriptive value of concrete detail without figure, instances may be quoted abundantly from Chaucer; *e.g.* the description of the Prioress in the *Prologue*, verses 118–162. In Kipling's *Thrown Away* the horror of solitary death is suggested largely by the buzzing of flies in the empty room. Albalat cites a parallel passage in Turgénev (*l'Art d'Écrire*, page 242). Tennyson uses this detail much more delicately in *Mariana*.

Compare §§ 226–7 and the corresponding sections in this appendix.

The following description, being entirely conventional and general, is utterly vague. Liven it (*a*) by characteristic details (choosing a similar scene with which you are familiar), (*b*) by specific and concrete terms.

When we arrived at the middle of the bridge we were struck by the extent of the view. As far as the eye could reach stretched the beautiful expanse of water between the two crowded cities. The water was dotted with vessels of every sort and description. Here was a grand ocean steamship starting on its voyage across the broad Atlantic and filled with its many passengers. There was a tugboat, behind which came several barges in tow. The ferry boats plied back and forth at frequent intervals, bearing crowds of passengers in either direction. The tall buildings reminded us of the manifold business activities of the metropolis, and beside the wharves were the sailing vessels of the coasting trade. Directly before us was Governor's Island with its old fort and the houses of the officers, looking attractive among the surrounding trees. Everything suggested a great field of activity, and at the same time pleased the eye by light and colour.

CHAPTER VII

PROSE DICTION

DIRECTIONS FOR TRANSLATION

Though the enlarging and refining of one's diction is too intimately bound up with his growth in experience of life to be so directly inculcated as the principles of composition, yet two means are direct. The one, verse composition, is hardly within the scope of this book; the other is translation. Both compel exploration and discrimination of synonyms and the weighing of connotations. For translation has as its ideal the impossible (§ 211) but approachable realization of tone and spirit as well as letter. Since translation must be accurate, it cannot be "literal"; for a "literal" translation is jargon, meaning left in mid-air between the language of the author and that of the translator. Such false translation is conceivably useful for the study of a foreign language, never for the study of one's own. Nor should the translator bind himself to render sentence by sentence. This would be sometimes to violate English idiom, oftener to miss the emphasis of the original. Accuracy must be to the content of the original, but also to its stress.

But translation should be more than accurate. It should be faithful; that is, it should aim to convey, with the meaning and stress, also the spirit and tone. This, primarily, is what makes it a study of style. Faithfully to attempt the personal colour of the original is to select

each time, among perhaps many terms or phrases approximately sufficient, that one which answers best to the reserve or violence, the vividness or delicacy, the dignity or homely idiom, which the translator feels to be characteristic. Here, then, is abundant opportunity for exercise in problems purely technical, exercise not unlike that by which we learned to play on the piano, not unlike the copying of paintings. To render justly the composition of another, and then further to render it sympathetically, is to study the effects of style most practically. Honest pursuit of this refines always the translator's appreciation, and in most cases his dexterity at his own work.

If the translation be of verse, it is better in verse. The attempt to render verse by prose is generally foredoomed. Being at best an approximation, translation can ill afford to put itself one remove further from its original. And though metre may fail, of course, to increase the approximation, at least the attempt involves no greater risk than the attempt to do without it. The more poetical the poetry of the original, the less it will yield itself to the prose rendering of most students. Professor Norton's prose rendering of Dante, and even Butcher and Lang's of Homer, are achievements not less difficult than verse, and the verse translation of the Earl of Derby reminds us that they are not necessarily the more accurate. If the upshot of this advice be to put the student between Scylla and Charybdis, on the one hand the difficulty of making verse, on the other the difficulty of doing without it, he would best translate prose. But ten lines of Virgil in pentapody without sacrifice to the metre is likely to be worth at least the result of equal labour on forty lines turned to prose.

Whether of verse or of prose, the choice should always be of what is definitely literary within brief compass. The study being necessarily intensive, length is a mere burden. Short wholes, if possible, the passages should be, but at any rate short. Thus, by repeated revision, the exercise may within reasonable time contribute largely to force and elegance and harmony.

[See Pater's versions in *Demeter and Persephone: Greek Studies*, pages 82-90, of the Homeric Hymn; 129-30, of Theocritus; 135-6, of Claudian; 138-9, of Ovid. Compare several versions of the same passage of Homer or Dante; the Authorized Version of the Bible with the Revised Version, etc.]

201. This distinction underlies the division between "structure" and "style" in Brewster's *Studies in Structure and Style*.

202. On the shifting of language, see Michel Bréal, *Essai de Sémantique*, chapter ix, especially pages 116-17; and the Appendix, pages 281 and following (*Qu' appelle-t-on Pureté de la Langue?*).

Compare Daudet's chapter on Turgénev in *Trente Ans de Paris*, pages 328-9.

On the futility of binding oneself to the past of the language, see the passage from Landor (*Conversations, Third Series: Johnson and Horne Tooke*) quoted in Hill's *Principles of Rhetoric*, page 3.

Usage is discussed in general by almost every text-book of rhetoric. See also Brander Matthews, *Parts of Speech*. The authority of good use is summed up in Hill's *Principles of Rhetoric*, pages 22-24. Campbell's division of good use as (1) reputable, (2) national, (3) present (*Philosophy of Rhetoric*, Book II, Chapter i), has never been superseded.

204. On the English temper toward authority, see Matthew Arnold, *The Literary Influence of Academies* (*Essays in Criticism, First Series*).

206. On differences in usage between England and the United States, see Brander Matthews, *Parts of Speech*; Hill's *Principles of Rhetoric*, pages 13-15, especially the quotation from Freeman (*Longman's Magazine*, November, 1882, page 90) on page 13.

208-210. That violation of usage which is called by the books *barbarism* (*βάρβαρος*, un-Greek), the departure from purity in speech, does not, of course, comprehend every use of foreign words. The importation of the foreign term with the foreign thing has always been a natural process of growth in language. Barbarism is rather the gratuitous displacing of a native word by a foreign word for the same thing or action; *e.g.* *depot* for *station*. Thus it is often the mark of pedantry or grandiloquence, and almost always precludes simplicity and homely force. It is an easy refuge from triteness, but easiest for those who make words trite by abusing them.

On idiom, John Earle, *English Prose*, Chapter vii.

Quintilian repeats the story of the old woman who knew Theophrastus for a stranger "from his speaking in a manner too Attic" (Quintilian, *Institutes*, VIII, i, 2).

211. Compare, for example, Selection I, which is science, with the latter part of the second paragraph in Selection II. The subject-matter is the same; but the former, being deliberately impersonal, has no such phrases as *light and liberal leaf*, or *gathered in their station*. Or compare the scientific interest of Darwin's voyages with the personal interest of Cotton Mather's account of Sir William Phips's, *Plots for Stories*, I.

For the doctrine, see Selection III.

215. "In art spontaneity is impossible until the technical method has been so perfectly mastered that the creative impulse is unhampered by inability to express itself."—ARLO BATES: *Talks on Writing English*, page 211.

"Even 'the gift,' as it is called, is worth nothing, or very little and never for long, unless work, patience, time be added. No apprenticeship is longer than that of the art of writing, nor more laborious; and how many of us slave thirty or forty years only to die without having mastered it? Not only so, but the 'trade of letters' is one of those rare trades, perhaps indeed the only trade, in which, as in the way of perfection, if you cease to advance, you do not stop, you fall back."—BRUNETIÈRE: *Littérature (Littérature Contemporaine*, page 339).

Newman on acquiring a Latin style, *The Idea of a University*, pages 366–371 (*Elementary Studies*).

216–217. On originality, Brunetière, *Littérature Contemporaine (Apologie pour la Rhétorique)*, page 296, "Originality consists, not in being like no one else, but in charging one's writing with one's personal experience of the world and of life." Newman, *Poetry with Reference to Aristotle's Poetics*, § 6, "Originality may perhaps be defined as the power of abstracting for oneself, and is in thought what strength of mind is in action." Fromentin, *Une Année dans le Sahel*, page 33, "En fait d'art il n'y a pas de redites à craindre;" and again, at page 218, he says it is no part of art to be new, to present new facts. Compare John La Farge, *Considerations on Painting*, page 209; Hazlitt's essay on *Originality (Criticisms of Art*, Vol. ii, page 86). Poe's *Philosophy of*

Composition. Poe's doctrine of *acquiring* originality applies to the following sections.

On the relation of the artist to the language, see Pater, *Style (Appreciations)*, pages 9-14. Compare 16-17, 27, 31, on precision).

On the study of style by imitation, Stevenson, *A College Magazine (Memories and Portraits)*, A. Albalat, *La Formation du Style par l'Assimilation des Auteurs*. Compare De Quincey's study of Browne, Ruskin's of the Bible, Lamb's and Lowell's of the elder dramatists. M. Albalat urges the especial value of those good authors whose processes can somewhat readily be analyzed. Indeed, the greatest writers are not for every part of technique the best masters. And conversely some minor authors, De Quincey for instance, are good masters precisely because their technique is obvious.

Il y a des auteurs qui sont assimilables et d'autres qui ne le sont pas. . . . Mais au point de vue du métier, pour l'assimilation technique et le profit urgent, il faut surtout lire les auteurs qui nous laissent voir leur procédés ; chez lesquels on puisse discerner les moyens de travail, les artifices de structure, les détails de style. — A. ALBALAT : *l'Art d'Écrire*, pp. 22, 24.

See Edward Everett Hale, Jr., *A Constructive Rhetoric*, pages 211-232, on developing vocabulary.

218. See Brewster's notes on Stevenson's phrase, *Studies in Structure and Style*, pages 254-5.

The trite phrase *empty space* receives specific force in Oscar Wilde's *Ballad of Reading Gaol* by so slight a variation as the addition of the article :

He does not die a death of shame
On a day of dark disgrace,

Nor have a noose about his neck,
 Nor a cloth upon his face,
 Nor drop feet foremost through the floor
 Into *an* empty space.

• 219. The good Latin proverb is *nulla dies sine linea*. See Barrett Wendell, *English Composition*, pages 268–9; and the quotation from Brunetière at § 215 of this Appendix.

220. Compare Herbert Spencer on the ideal style (*Philosophy of Style*, last two paragraphs) with T. H. Wright's objections to this idea (*Style*, *Macmillan's Magazine*, xxxvii, 78). The two essays are reprinted together, with many suggestive notes, by F. N. Scott. (Boston: Allyn & Bacon.)

For the full implication of accuracy, see Pater's essay on *Style*, and Maupassant's reminiscences, in the preface to *Pierre et Jean*, of the doctrine of Flaubert.

The best helps toward precision, alongside of constant reference to a large standard dictionary, are the classified lists of synonyms, such as Smith's *Synonyms Discriminated*, Soule's *Synonyms*, and Roget's *Thesaurus of English Words*.

222. For the distinction between denotation and connotation, see Barrett Wendell, *English Composition*, pages 74–75. How far the connotation of familiar words changes with time appears, for instance, in the striking difference between the effect of *roar* and *naughty* to-day and the effect intended and produced by them in the time of Elizabeth and James: "I have *roared* for the very disquietness of my heart"; "this miserable and *naughty* world."

227. Quintilian, *Institutes*, VIII, iii: "Menelaus [Odysseus. See *Odyssey* xi, 522] says that the Greeks

descended into the horse . . . by that one word he shows the vastness of the horse; and . . . in Virgil,

Demissum lapsi per funem

. . . thus also the height of the horse is signified." (Watson's translation, 84. Quintilian calls this *ἐμφασις*. The context suggests that he had, imperfectly, the distinction between denotation and connotation.)

The precise suggestiveness of Homer in description makes him inexhaustibly profitable, even in translation, for the imitation of students. The same holds of Dante. It is decidedly worth while to read aloud typical passages, or to assign them for report.

M. Antoine Albalat has a lively diatribe, with many interesting examples, on the lack of the specific as the mark of the *style banal*: *l'Art d'Écrire*, pages 57 and following. He pursues the discussion, pages 195 and following, with many examples of recasting for concreteness. See also pages 231, 262, *La Formation du Style par l'Assimilation des Auteurs*, Chapters vii and viii; and a suggestive quotation from Lemaître (*Les Contemporains*, 1st Series, page 168) in Chapter ix; *e.g.*:

Or, le style pittoresque . . . me paraît consister essentiellement à saisir et à fixer la perception au moment où elle éclôt, avant qu'elle ne se décompose et qu'elle ne devienne sentiment.

228. For further classification of figures see almost any of the older manuals of rhetoric. The *locus classicus* is probably Quintilian, *Institutes*, VIII, vi. Compare IX, i and ii.

For the basis in psychology see Gertrude Buck, *Figures of Rhetoric: a Psychological Study* ("University of Michigan Contributions to Rhetorical Theory," I).

230. On testing style by reading aloud see Maupassant's reminiscence of the habit of Flaubert, *Lettres de Flaubert à George Sand, Preface*.

232. Aristotle's general doctrine as to prose rhythm is in *Rhetoric*, III, viii; his particular application to the period and the balance, in III, ix, which is largely quoted in § 37 of this Appendix. See also Cope's *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, pages 303-6 and Appendix C.

Chapter viii runs as follows:—

The system or rhythm of the diction (τὸ δὲ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως. Compare Stevenson's word "pattern") should be neither metrical nor unrhythmical (δεῖ μήτε ἔμμετρον εἶναι μήτε ἄρρυθμον). So soon as a definite measure is caught, the ear waits for it to recur. On the other hand, lack of rhythm is lack of completeness; and there should be a sense of completeness, though without metre (δεῖ δὲ πεπεράνθαι μέν, μὴ μέτρῳ δέ). Number (ἄριθμος) "imparts definiteness" (περαίνεται) to all things; and in the "pattern" of prose (σχῆμα) the number is rhythm, of which the metres are the several varieties.

Of definite rhythms:

(1) The *heroic* is solemn and deficient in conversational harmony (σεμνὸς καὶ λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας δεόμενος).

(2) the *iambic* is the very speech of the crowd; the *trochaic*, too tripping (τροχερός).

(3) There is left the *pæan*, which has been in use since Thrasymachus without being defined. The pæan stands between the other two; for it is 3:2, whereas they are respectively 1:1 and 2:1.

The heroic and the iambic-trochaic, then, are to be discarded, both for the reasons mentioned and because they are too metrical; but the pæan is to be chosen as

not obviously metrical. But whereas the same pæan is used indifferently for either beginning or ending, there should be a distinction. Of the two opposite sorts, the one in common use (—υυυ) is adapted to the beginning; the other (υυυ—) to the end. For the end should be marked by a long syllable.

Cicero on prose harmony, *de Oratore*, III, xliii–lxi. Note especially: *ut et verborum numero et vocum modo delectatione vincerent aurium satietatem. Haec igitur duo, vocis dico moderationem et verborum conclusionem, quoad orationis severitas pati posset, a poetica ad eloquentiam traducenda ducerunt. In quo illud est maximum, quod, versus in oratione si efficitur coniunctione verborum, vitium est, et tamen eam coniunctionem sicuti versus numerose cadere et quadrare et perfici volumus* (xliv, “that by the pleasantness of cadence and inflection they may overcome monotony. These two resources, then, inflection in delivery and a satisfying measure in the construction, should be borrowed, they think, so far as the severity of an oration will permit, from poetry. In this the main point is that, whereas a metrical combination is a fault, still we desire the combination harmoniously to fall, round out, and fulfil”). Such harmony, says Cicero (l, li), is enjoyed even by those that have not learning enough to know why they are pleased.

What is a little extraordinary, there is a want of *rhythmus* and cadence in what they write without the help of metrical rules. Like persons who have been accustomed to sing to music, they are at a loss in the absence of the habitual accompaniment and guide to their judgment. Their style halts, totters, is loose, disjointed, and without expressive pauses or rapid movements. The measured cadence and regular *sing-*

song of rhyme or blank verse have destroyed, as it were, their natural ear for the more characteristic harmony which ought to subsist between the sound and the sense. I should almost guess the author of *Waverley* to be a writer of ambling verses from the desultory vacillation and want of firmness in the march of his [prose] style. There is neither *momentum* nor elasticity in it; I mean as to the *score*, or effect upon the ear. He has improved since in his other works; to be sure, he has had practice enough. Poets either get into this incoherent, undetermined, shuffling style, made up of "unpleasing flats and sharps," of unaccountable starts and pauses, of doubtful odds and ends, flirted about like straws in a gust of wind; or, to avoid it and steady themselves, mount into a sustained and measured prose (like the translation of Ossian's *Poems*, or some parts of Shaftesbury's *Characteristics*) which is more odious still, and as bad as being at sea in a calm. Dr. Johnson's style (particularly in his *Rambler*) is not free from the last objection. There is a tune in it, a mechanical recurrence of the same rise and fall in the clauses of his sentences, independent of any reference to the meaning of the text, or progress or inflection of the sense. There is the alternate roll of his cumbrous cargo of words; his periods complete their revolutions at certain stated intervals, let the matter be longer or shorter, rough or smooth, round or square, different or the same. — HAZLITT: *On the Prose Style of Poets* (second paragraph).

For further exemplification of simple balanced measures of stately effect, see the prophecy of Balaam, *Numbers* xxiii, xxiv.

235. Stevenson, *On Some Technical Elements of Style in Literature; Contemporary Review*, xlvii, 548; *Edinburgh Edition, Miscellanies*, vol. iii, page 236.

(1) The most striking literary merit inheres in the choice of words. (549) 238.

(2) The arts may be divided as :

	<i>In Time</i>	<i>In Space</i>	<i>In Both</i>
Presentative	Music	Painting, Sculpture	Dance
Representative	Literature	Architecture	Acting

(3) "Each class, in right of this distinction, obeys principles apart ; yet both may claim a common ground of existence, and it may be said with sufficient justice that the motive and end of any art whatever is to make a pattern." (550) 239.

(4) The pattern of the sentence (rhythm). (550) 240.

(5) But the pattern of the sentence is "addressed throughout and first of all, to the demands of logic." (550-551) 241.

(6) "The web, then, or the pattern ; a web at once sensuous and logical, an elegant and pregnant texture ; that is style, that is the foundation of the art of literature." (551-552) 242.

(7) In verse the sensuous pattern is ready made.

(8) But in verse there is, besides the set pattern of the metre, the rhythm of the phrase. "Each phrase of each sentence, like an air or a recitative in music, should be so artfully compounded out of long and short, out of accented and unaccented, as to gratify the sensual ear." (553) 246.

(9) And in prose there must equally be rhythm of the phrase, but never metre. (555) 250.

(10) But there is another comeliness of phrase more important than rhythm—the apt recurrence of sounds. "Each phrase in literature is built of sounds, as each phrase in music consists of notes. One sound suggests, echoes, demands, and harmonizes with another ; and the art of rightly using these concordances is the final art in literature." (557) 252-253.

The clumsier effect of too frequent and too obvious recurrence appears in the following :

(a)

And some have said that when Constantine was gotten away
I was fallen for anger in a wonderful rage. But surely, though

I would not have suffered him go, if it would have pleased him to tarry still in the stocks, yet when he was neither so feeble for lack of meat but that he was strong enough to break the stocks, nor waxen so lame of his legs but that he was light enough to leap the walls, nor by any mishandling of his head so dulled or dazed in his brains but that he had wit enough, when he was once out, wisely to walk his way, neither was I then so heavy," etc. — SIR THOMAS MORE, *Apology*.

In the same chapter of the *Urn Burial* is a highly artificial passage, proceeding upon the antithesis of *life* and *death* in four variations, and graphic by its very formality:

(b)

1. If we begin to die while we live
 ∪ ∪ ∪ | — ∪ — ∪ ∪ — (3) G N D LV
2. and long life be but a prolongation of death,
 ∪ | — — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ — ∪ ∪ — (5) L N G LF PR(L N G) D Th
3. our life is a sad composition;
 ∪ | — ∪ ∪ — — ∪ — ∪ — (4) L F SD K M P Z Sh (N)
4. we live with death, and die not in a moment.
 ∪ | — ∪ — ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ — (4) L V D Th (N D) D M (N T)

Again in the same chapter is a passage in which the decrease in length of measure is accompanied by a decrease in the number of unstressed syllables. Sibilants make the main recurrences, but the effect is softened by nasals and liquids:

1. What time the persons of these ossuaries entered the famous mansions of the dead
 ∪ | — ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — (7)
 2. and slept with princes and counsellors,
 ∪ | — ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ (3)
 3. might admit a wide solution.
 ∪ ∪ | — ∪ — ∪ — ∪ (3)
1. — ∪ ∪ ∪
 2. — ∪ ∪
 3. — ∪

See Brewster on Ruskin's *Crown of Wild Olive* (*Studies in Structure and Style*, pages 272-275), and compare the three short paragraphs opening *The Stones of Venice*. In Selection II observe in the latter part of the second paragraph (1) the rhythm, (2) the recurrences — *p*, *sp*, *l*, *f*, (3) the half-onomatopoetic effect of this in suggesting the flutter of the leaves.

The following passages are worth studying for the finer harmonies:

(c)

- (1) The presence that thus rose so strangely beside the
 ∪ | — ∪ ∪ — — ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪
 waters |
 — ∪ 6
- (2) is expressive of what in the ways of a thousand years men
 ∪ ∪ | — ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ — —
 had come to desire.
 ∪ — ∪ ∪ — 8
- (3) Hers is the head upon which all "the ends of the world
 — ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ — — ∪ — ∪ ∪ —
 are come," |
 ∪ — 7
- (4) and the eyelids are a little weary.
 ∪ ∪ | — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ — ∪ 3 (24)
- (5) It is a beauty wrought out from within upon the flesh,
 ∪ ∪ ∪ | — ∪ — — ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ 5
- (6) the deposit, little cell by cell, of strange thoughts and
 ∪ ∪ | — ∪ — ∪ — ∪ — ∪ — — ∪
 fantastic reveries and exquisite passions.
 ∪ — ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ 10 (15)
- (7) Set it for a moment beside one of those white Greek god-
 — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ — — ∪ — ∪ — — —
 desses or beautiful women of antiquity, |
 ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ 10
- (8) and how they would be troubled by this beauty, |
 ∪ | — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ 3
- (9) into which the soul with all its maladies has passed!
 ∪ ∪ ∪ ∪ | — ∪ — ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ 4 (27)

- (10) All the thoughts and experience of the world have etched
 — ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ —
 and moulded there, |
 ∪ — ∪ — 7
- (11) in that which they have of power to refine and make
 ∪ | — ∪ — ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ —
 expressive the outward form, |
 ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ — 8
- (12) the animalism of Greece, the lust of Rome, |
 ∪ | — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ — ∪ — 4
- (13) the reverry of the middle age with its spiritual ambition
 ∪ | — ∪ ∪ — ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ —
 and imaginative loves, |
 ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ — 7
- (14) the return of the Pagan world, the sins of the Borgias.
 ∪ ∪ | — ∪ ∪ — ∪ — ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ 5 (31)
- (15) She is older than the rocks among which she sits ; |
 — ∪ | — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ — ∪ ∪ — 5
- (16) like the vampire, she has been dead many times, |
 ∪ ∪ | — ∪ — ∪ ∪ — — ∪ — 5
- (17) and learned the secrets of the grave ; |
 ∪ — ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — 3
- (18) and has been a diver in deep seas, |
 ∪ ∪ ∪ ∪ | — ∪ ∪ — — 3
- (19) and keeps their fallen day about her ; |
 ∪ | — ∪ — ∪ — ∪ — ∪ — 4
- (20) and trafficked for strange webs with Eastern merchants ; |
 ∪ | — ∪ ∪ — — ∪ — ∪ — ∪ — 5
- (21) and, as Leda, was the mother of Helen of Troy, |
 ∪ ∪ | — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ — 4
- (22) and, as Saint Anne, the mother of Mary ; |
 ∪ ∪ ∪ | — ∪ — ∪ ∪ — ∪ — 3
- (23) and all this has been to her but as the sound of lyres and
 ∪ | — — ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ — ∪ —
 flutes, |
 — 6
- (24) and lives only in the delicacy with which it has moulded
 ∪ | — — ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ — ∪ — ∪ —
 the changing lineaments, |
 ∪ — ∪ — ∪ ∪ — 7

- (25) and tinged the eyelids and the hands. 3 (49)
- (26) The fancy of a perpetual life, sweeping together ten
 thousand experiences is an old one ; | 9
- (27) and modern thought has conceived the idea of humanity
 as wrought upon by, and summing up in itself, all modes
 of thought and life. 13 (22)
- (28) Certainly, Lady Lisa might stand as the embodiment of
 the old fancy, | 7
- (29) the symbol of the modern idea. 3 (10)
- PATER, *The Renaissance*, page 129.

(d)

I drank ; and suddenly sprang forth before me, many groves and palaces and gardens, and their statues and their avenues and their labyrinths of alaternus and bay, and alcoves of citron and watchful loopholes in the retirements of impenetrable pomegranate. Farther off, just below where the fountain slipt away from its marble hall and guardian gods, arose, from their beds of moss and drosera and darkest grass, the sisterhood of oleanders, fond of tantalizing with their bosomed flowers and their moist and pouting blossoms the little shy rivulet, and of covering its face with all the colours of the dawn. My dream expanded and moved forward. I trod again the dust of Posilippo, soft as the feathers in the wings of Sleep. I emerged on Baia ; I crossed her innumerable arches ; I loitered in the breezy sunshine of her mole ; I trusted the faithful seclusion of her caverns, the keepers of so many secrets ; and I reposed on the buoyancy of her tepid sea. Then Naples, and her theatres

and her churches, and grottoes and dells and forts and promontories, rushed forward in confusion, now among soft whispers, now among sweetest sounds, and subsided, and sank, and disappeared. Yet a memory seemed to come fresh from every one ; each had time enough for its tale, for its pleasure, for its reflection, for its pang. As I mounted with silent steps the narrow staircase of the old palace, how distinctly did I feel against the palm of my hand the coldness of that smooth stonework, and the greater of the cramps of iron in it !

— LANDOR, *Pentameron*, Fifth Day.

(e)

Certainly at some hour, though perhaps not your hour, the waiting waters will stir ; in some shape, though perhaps not the shape you dreamed, which your heart loved, and for which it bled, the healing herald will descend ; the crippled and the blind and the dumb and the possessed will be led to bathe. Herald, come quickly.

— CHARLOTTE BRONTË, *Villette*, Chapter xvii.

237. Albalat observes that La Fontaine, the pattern of simplicity, revised untiringly : “ Il refaisait jusqu’à douze fois la même fable. Ses manuscrits sont noirs de ratures ” (*La Formation du Style par l’Assimilation des Auteurs*, page 301).

LONGER SELECTIONS

SELECTION I

TREES IN THE FOREST¹

GIFFORD PINCHOT

I. The nature of a tree, as shown by its behaviour in the forest, is called its silvicultural character. It is made up of all those qualities upon which the species as a whole—and every individual tree—depends in its struggle for existence. The regions in 5 which a tree will live, and the places where it will flourish best; the trees it will grow with, and those which it kills or is killed by; its abundance or scarcity; its size and rate of growth,—all these things are decided by the inborn qualities, or silvicultural character, of each particular kind of tree. 10

II. Different species of trees, like different races of men, have special requirements for the things upon which their life depends. Some races, like the Eskimos, live only in cold regions. Others, like the 15 South Sea Islanders, must have a very warm climate to be comfortable, and are short-lived in any other. So it is with trees, except that their different needs

¹ Chapter ii of *A Primer of Forestry*, Part I, "The Forest," by Gifford Pinchot (Bulletin 24, Division of Forestry, United States Department of Agriculture). The last paragraph is omitted. The numerous pictures of the original publication, though they quicken, of course, the comprehension of details, are not necessary to clearness.

are even more varied and distinct. Some of them, like the Willows, Birches, and Spruces of northern Canada, stand on the boundary of tree growth within the Arctic Circle. Other species grow only in tropical lands, and cannot resist even the lightest frost. 5 It is always the highest and lowest temperatures, rather than the average, which decide where a tree will or will not grow. Thus the average temperature of an island where it never freezes may be only 60°, while another place with an average of 70° may have 10 occasional frosts. Trees which could not live at all in the second of these places, on account of the frost, might flourish in the lower average warmth of the first.

III. In this way the bearing of trees toward heat 15 and cold has a great deal to do with their distribution over the surface of the whole earth. Their distribution within shorter distances also often depends largely upon it. In the United States, for example, the Live Oak does not grow in Maine, nor the Canoe 20 Birch in Florida. Even the opposite sides of the same hill may be covered with two different species, because one of them resists the late and early frosts and the fierce midday heat of summer, while the other requires the coolness and moisture of the north- 25 ern slope. On eastern slopes, where the sun strikes early in the day, frosts in the spring and fall are more apt to kill the young trees, or the blossoms and twigs of older ones, than on those which face to the west and north, where growth begins later in the 30 spring, and where rapid thawing, which does more harm than the freezing itself, is less likely to take place.

IV. Heat and moisture act together upon trees in such a way that it is sometimes hard to distinguish their effects. A dry country or a dry slope is apt to be hot as well, while a cool northern slope is almost always moister than one turned toward the south. 5 Still the results of the demand of trees for water can usually be distinguished from the results of their need of warmth; and it is found that moisture has almost as great an influence on the distribution of trees over the earth as heat itself. Indeed, within 10 any given region it is apt to be much more conspicuous; and the smaller the region the more noticeable often is its effect, because the contrast is more striking. Thus it is frequently easy to see the difference between the trees in a swamp and those on a 15 dry hillside near by, when it would be far less easy to distinguish the general character of the forest which includes both swamp and hillside from that of another forest at a distance. In many instances the demand for water controls distribution altogether. 20 For this reason the forests on the opposite sides of mountain ranges are often composed of entirely different trees. On the west slope of the Sierra Nevada of California, for example, where there is plenty of moisture, there is one of the most beautiful 25 of all forests. The east slope, on the contrary, has almost no trees, because its rainfall is very slight; and those which do grow there are small and stunted in comparison with the giants on the west. Again, certain trees, like the Bald Cypress and the River 30 Birch, grow only in very moist land; others, like the Mesquite and the Pinyon or Nut Pine, only on the driest soils; while still others, like the Red Cedar

and the Red Fir, seem to adapt themselves to almost any degree of moisture, and are found on very wet and dry soils alike. In this way the different demands for moisture often separate the kinds of trees which grow in the bottom of a valley from those 5 along its slopes, or even those in the gullies of hill-sides from those on the rolling land between. A mound not more than a foot above the level of a swamp is often covered with trees entirely different from those of the wetter lower land about it. Such 10 matters as these have far more to do with the places in which different trees grow than the chemical composition of the soil. But its mechanical nature—that is, whether it is stiff or loose, fine or coarse in grain, deep or shallow—is very important, because 15 it is directly connected with heat and moisture and the life of the roots in the soil.

V. The relations of trees to heat and moisture are thus largely responsible for their distribution upon the great divisions of the earth's surface, such as con- 20 tinents and mountain ranges, as well as over the smaller rises and depressions of every region where trees grow. But while heat and moisture decide where the different kinds of trees can grow, their influence has comparatively little to do with the 25 struggles of individuals or species against each other for the actual possession of the ground. The outcome of these struggles depends less on heat and moisture than on the possession of certain qualities, among which is the ability to bear shade. With 30 regard to this power, trees are roughly divided into two classes, often called shade-bearing and light-demanding, following the German, but better named

tolerant and intolerant of shade. Tolerant trees are those which flourish under more or less heavy shade in early youth; intolerant trees are those which demand a comparatively slight cover, or even unrestricted light. Later in life all trees require much 5 more light than at first; and usually those of both classes can live to old age only when they are altogether unshaded from above. But there is always this difference between them: the leaves of tolerant trees will bear more shade. Consequently those on 10 the lower and inner parts of the crown are more vigorous, plentiful, and persistent than is the case with intolerant trees. Thus the crown of a tolerant tree in the forest is usually denser and longer than that of one which bears less shade. It is usually true 15 that the seedlings of trees with dense crowns are able to flourish under cover, while those of light-crowned trees are intolerant. This rough general rule is often of use in the study of forests in a new country, or of trees whose silvicultural character is not known. 20

VI. The tolerance or intolerance of trees is one of their most important silvicultural characters. Frequently it is the first thing a forester seeks to learn about them, because what he can safely undertake in the woods depends so largely upon it. Thus tolerant 25 trees will often grow vigorously under the shade of light-crowned trees above them, while if the positions were reversed, the latter would speedily die. The proportion of different kinds of trees in a forest often depends on their tolerance. Thus Hemlock some- 30 times replaces White Pine in Pennsylvania, because it can grow beneath the pine, and so be ready to fill the opening whenever a Pine dies. But the Pine cannot

grow under the Hemlock, and can take possession of the ground only when a fire or a windfall makes an opening where it can have plenty of light. Some trees after being overshadowed can never recover their vigour when at last they are set free. Others do 5 recover, and grow more vigorously even after many years of starving under heavy shade. The Red Spruce, in the Adirondacks, has a wonderful power of this kind, and makes a fine tree after spending the first fifty or even one hundred years of its life in reaching 10 a diameter of a couple of inches.

VII. The relation of a tree to light changes, not only with its age, but also with the place where it is growing, and with its health. An intolerant tree will stand more cover where the light is intense than in a 15 cloudy northern region, and more if it has plenty of water than with a scanty supply. Vigorous seedlings will get along with less light than sickly ones. Seedlings of the same species will prosper under heavier shade if they have always grown under cover than if 20 they have had plenty of light at first and have been deprived of it afterwards.

VIII. The rate of growth of different trees often decides which one will survive in the forest. For example, if two intolerant kinds of trees should start 25 together on a burned area or an old field, that one which grew faster in height would overtop the other and destroy it in the end by cutting off the light. Some trees, like the Black Walnut, grow rapidly from their earliest youth. Others grow very slowly for the 30 first few years. The stem of the Longleaf Pine at four years old is usually not more than five inches in length. During this time the roots have been grow-

ing instead of the stem. The period of its rapid growth in height comes later.

IX. The place where a tree stands has a great influence on its rate of growth. Thus the trees on a hillside are often much smaller than those of equal age in the rich hollow below; and those on the upper slopes of a high mountain are commonly starved and stunted in comparison with the vigorous forest lower down. The Western Chinquapin, which reaches a height of a hundred and fifty feet in the coast valleys of northern California, is a mere shrub at high elevations in the Sierra Nevada. The same thing often appears in passing from the more temperate regions to the far north. Thus the Canoe Birch at its northern limit rises only a few inches above the ground, while farther south it becomes a tree sometimes a hundred and twenty feet in height.

X. Another matter which is of the deepest interest to the forester is the reproductive power of his trees. Except in the case of sprouts and other growth fed by old roots, this depends first of all on the quantity of the seed which each tree bears; but so many other considerations affect the result that a tree which bears seed abundantly may not reproduce itself very well. A part of the seed is always unsound, and sometimes much the larger part, as in the case of the Tulip Tree. But even a great abundance of sound seed does not always insure good reproduction. The seeds may not find the right surroundings for successful germination, or the infant trees may perish for the want of water, light, or suitable soil. Where there is a thick layer of dry leaves or needles on the ground, seedlings often perish in great numbers because their delicate rootlets

cannot reach the fertile soil beneath. The same thing happens when there is no humus at all and the surface is hard and dry. The weight of the seed also has a powerful influence on the character of reproduction. Trees with heavy seeds, like Oaks, Hickories, and 5 Chestnuts, can sow them only in their own neighbourhood, except when they stand on steep hillsides or on the banks of streams, or when birds and squirrels carry the nuts and acorns to a distance. Trees with light, winged seeds, like the Poplars, Birches, and Pines, 10 have a great advantage over the others, because they can drop their seeds a long way off. The wind is the means by which this is brought about, and the adaptation of the seeds themselves is often very curious and interesting. The wing of a Pine seed, for exam- 15 ple, is so placed that the seed whirls when it falls in such a way that it falls very slowly. Thus the wind has time to carry it away before it can reach the ground. In heavy winds Pine and other winged seeds are blown long distances — sometimes as much 20 as several miles. This explains how certain kinds of trees, like the Gray Birch and the White Pine, grow up in the middle of open pastures, and how others, such as the Lodgepole Pine, cover great areas, far from the parent trees, with young growth of even age. 25 Such facts help to explain why, in certain places, it happens that when Pines are cut down, Oaks succeed them, or when Oaks are removed, Pines occupy the ground. It is very often true that young trees of one kind are already growing unnoticed beneath old trees 30 of another, and so are ready to replace them whenever the upper story is cut away.

XI. The nature of the seed has much to do with

the distribution of trees in pure or mixed forests. It is the habit of some trees to grow in bodies of some extent containing only a single kind ; in other words, in pure forest. The Longleaf Pine of the South Atlantic and Gulf States is of this kind, and so is the 5 Lodgepole Pine of the West. Conifers are more apt to grow in pure forest than broadleaf trees, because it is more common for them to have winged seeds. The greater part of the heavy-seeded trees in the United States are deciduous, and most of the deciduous trees 10 grow in mixed forest, although there are some conspicuous exceptions. But even in mixed forest small groups of trees with heavy seeds are common, because the young trees naturally start up beneath and around the old ones. A heavy seed, dropping from the top 15 of a tall tree, often strikes the lower branches in its fall and bounds far outside the circle of the crown. Trees which are found only, or most often, in pure forest are the social or gregarious kinds ; those which grow in mixture with other trees are called scattered 20 kinds. Most of the hardwood forests in the United States are mixed ; and many mixed forests, like that in the Adirondacks, contain both broadleaf trees and conifers. The line between gregarious and scattered species is not always well marked, because it often 25 happens that a tree may be gregarious in one place, and live with many others elsewhere. The Western Yellow Pine, which forms, on the plateau of central Arizona, perhaps the largest pure Pine forest of the earth, is frequently found growing with other species 30 in the mountains, especially in the Sierra Nevada of central California.

XII. Trees which occupy the ground to the ex-

clusion of all others do so because they succeed better, under the conditions, than their competitors. It may be that they are able to get on with less water, or to grow on poorer soil; their rate of growth or power of reproduction may be greater, or there may be some 5 other reason why they are better fitted for their surroundings. But the gregarious trees are not all alike in their ability to sustain themselves in different situations, while the differences between some of the mixed-forest species are very marked indeed. Thus Black 10 Walnut, as a rule, grows only in rich, moist soil, and Beech only in damp situations. Fire Cherry, on the other hand, is most common on lands which have been devastated by fire, and the Rock Oak is most often found on dry, barren ridges. The Tupelo, or Black 15 Gum, and the Red Maple both grow best in swamps; but it is a common thing to find them also on dry, stony soils at a distance from water. The knowledge of such qualities as these is of great importance in the management of forest lands. 20

SELECTION II

SYMMETRY AND INCIDENT¹

ALICE MEYNELL

[This criticism is constructive and suggestive; *i.e.* large in generalization and imaginative in method. Its distinctive merit, among many contemporary criticisms that also have style, is its solid coherence. Without formality, indeed with as much ease as is found to redeem

¹ Reprinted by the kind permission of the publishers, from *The Colour of Life and Other Essays on Things Seen and Heard*: London, John Lane; Chicago, Way and Williams.

many rambling essays, it progresses logically to its conclusion. Thus it shows how exposition may be at once logical in composition and literary in diction.]

I. The art of Japan has none but an exterior part in the history of the art of nations. Being in its own methods and attitude the art of accident, it has, appropriately, an accidental value. It is of accidental value, and not of integral necessity. The virtual discovery of Japanese art during the later years of the second French Empire caused Europe to relearn how expedient, how delicate, and how lovely Incident may look when Symmetry has grown vulgar. The lesson was most welcome. Japan has had her full influence. European art has learnt the value of position and the tact of the unique. But Japan is unlessoned, and (in all her characteristic art) content with her own conventions; she is local, provincial, alien, remote, incapable of equal companionship with a world that has Greek art in its own history — Pericles “to its father.”

II. Nor is it pictorial art, or decorative art only, that has been touched by Japanese example of Incident and the Unique. Music had attained the noblest form of symmetry in the eighteenth century; but in music, too, symmetry had since grown dull, and momentary music, the music of phase and of fragment, succeeded. The sense of symmetry is strong in a complete melody — of symmetry in its most delicate and lively and least stationary form — balance; whereas the *leit-motif* is isolated. In domestic architecture Symmetry and Incident make a familiar antithesis — the very commonplace of rival methods of art. But the same antithesis exists in less

obvious forms. The poets have sought "irregular" metres. Incident hovers, in the very act of choosing its right place, in the most modern of modern portraits. In these we have, if not the Japanese suppression of minor emphasis, certainly the Japanese exaggeration of major emphasis; and with this a quickness and buoyancy. The smile, the figure, the drapery not yet settled from the arranging touch of a hand, and showing its mark, the restless and unstationary foot, and the unity of impulse that has passed everywhere like a single breeze, all these have a life that greatly transcends the life of Japanese art, yet has the nimble touch of Japanese incident. In passing, a charming comparison may be made between such portraiture and the aspect of an aspen or other tree of light and liberal leaf. Whether still or in motion the aspen and the free-leaved poplar have the alertness and expectancy of flight in all their flocks of leaves, while the oaks and elms are gathered in their station. All this is not Japanese; but from such accident is Japanese art inspired, with its good luck of perceptiveness.

III. What symmetry is to form, that is repetition in the art of ornament. Greek art and Gothic alike have series, with repetition or counterchange for their ruling motive. It is hardly necessary to draw the distinction between this motive and that of the Japanese. The Japanese motives may be defined as uniqueness and position. And these were not known as motives of decoration before the study of Japanese decoration. Repetition and counterchange, of course, have their place in Japanese ornament, as in the diaper patterns for which these people have

so singular an invention; but here, too, uniqueness and position are the principal inspiration. And it is quite worth while, and much to the present purpose, to call attention to the chief peculiarity of the Japanese diaper patterns, which is *interruption*. Repetition 5 there must necessarily be in these; but symmetry is avoided by an interruption which is, to the Western eye at least, perpetually and freshly unexpected. The place of the interruptions of lines, the variation of the place, and the avoidance of correspondence, 10 are precisely what makes Japanese design of this class inimitable. Thus, even in a repeating pattern, you have a curiously successful effect of impulse. It is as though a separate intention had been formed by the designer at every angle. Such renewed con- 15 sciousness does not make for greatness. Greatness in design has more peace than is found in the gentle abruptness of Japanese lines, in their curious brevity. It is scarcely necessary to say that a line, in all other schools of art, is long or short according to its place 20 and purpose; but only the Japanese designer so contrives his patterns that the line is always short; and many repeating designs are entirely composed of this various and variously occurring brevity, this prankish avoidance of the goal. Moreover, the Japanese 25 evade symmetry in the unit of their repeating patterns by another simple device, that of numbers. They make a small difference in the number of curves and of lines. A great difference would not make the same effect of variety; it would look too 30 much like a contrast. For example, three rods on one side and six on another would be something else than a mere variation, and variety would be lost by

the use of them. The Japanese decorator will vary three in this place by two in that, and a sense of the defeat of symmetry is immediately produced. With more violent means the idea of symmetry would have been neither suggested nor refuted. 5

IV. Leaving mere repeating patterns and diaper designs, you find in Japanese compositions complete designs in which there is no point of symmetry. It is a balance of suspension and of antithesis. There is no sense of lack of equilibrium, because place is most subtly made to have the effect of giving or of subtracting value. A small thing is arranged to reply to a large one, for the small thing is placed at the precise distance that makes it a (Japanese) equivalent. In Italy (and perhaps in other countries) the scales commonly in use are furnished with only a single weight that increases or diminishes in value according as you slide it nearer or farther upon a horizontal arm. It is equivalent to so many ounces when it is close to the upright, and to so many pounds when it hangs from the farther end of the horizontal rod. Distance plays some such part with the twig or the bird in the upper corner of a Japanese composition. Its place is its significance and its value. Such an art of position implies a great art of intervals. The Japanese chooses a few things and leaves the space between them free, as free as the pauses or silences in music. But as time, not silence, is the subject, or material, of contrast in musical pauses, so it is the measurement of space — that is, collocation — that makes the value of empty intervals. The space between this form and that, in a Japanese composition, is valuable because it is just so wide and no 30

more. And this, again, is only another way of saying that position is the principle of this apparently wilful art.

V. Moreover, the alien art of Japan, in its pictorial form, has helped to justify the more stenographic school of etching. Greatly transcending Japanese expression, the modern etcher has undoubtedly accepted moral support from the islands of the Japanese. He too etches a kind of shorthand, even though his notes appeal much to the spectator's knowledge, while the Oriental shorthand appeals to nothing but the spectator's simple vision. Thus the two artists work in ways dissimilar. Nevertheless, the French etcher would never have written his signs so freely had not the Japanese so freely drawn his own. Furthermore still, the transitory and destructible material of Japanese art has done as much as the multiplication of newspapers and the discovery of processes to reconcile the European designer, the black and white artist, to working for the day, the day of publication. Japan lives much of its daily life by means of paper, painted; so does Europe by means of paper, printed. But as we, unlike those Orientals, are a destructive people, paper with us means short life, quick abolition, transformation, re-appearance, a very circulation of life. This is our present way of surviving ourselves—the new version of that feat of life. Time was when to survive yourself meant to secure, for a time indefinitely longer than the life of man, such dull form as you had given to your work,—to intrude upon posterity. To survive yourself to-day is to let your work go into daily oblivion.

VI. Now, though the Japanese are not a destructive people, their paper does not last for ever, and that material has clearly suggested to them a different condition of ornament from that with which they adorned old lacquer, fine ivory, or other perdurable 5 things. For the transitory material they keep the more purely pictorial art of landscape. What of Japanese landscape? Assuredly it is too far reduced to a monotonous convention to merit the serious study of races that have produced Cotman and Corot. 10 Japanese landscape drawing reduces things seen to such fewness as must have made the art insufferably tedious to any people less fresh-spirited and more inclined to take themselves seriously than these Ori- entals. A preoccupied people would never endure 15 it. But a little closer attention from the Occidental student might find for their evasive attitude towards landscape — it is an attitude almost traitorously evasive — a more significant reason. It is that the distances, the greatness, the winds and the waves of 20 the world, coloured plains, and the flight of a sky, are all certainly alien to the perceptions of a people intent upon little deformities. Does it seem harsh to define by that phrase the curious Japanese search for accidents? Upon such search these people are avowedly 25 intent, even though they show themselves capable of exquisite appreciation of the form of a normal bird and the habit of growth of a normal flower. They are not in search of the perpetual slight novelty which was Aristotle's ideal of the language poetic ("a little 30 wildly, or with the flower of the mind," says Emerson of the way of a poet's speech) — and such novelty it is, like the frequent pulse of the pinion, that keeps

verse upon the wing: no, what the Japanese are intent upon is perpetual slight disorder. In Japan the man in the fields has eyes less for the sky and the crescent moon than for some stone in the path, of which the asymmetry strikes his curious sense of 5 pleasure in fortunate accident of form. For love of a little grotesque strangeness he will load himself with the stone and carry it home to his garden. The art of such a people is not liberal art, not the art of peace, and not the art of humanity. Look at the 10 curls and curves whereby this people conventionally signify wave or cloud. All these curls have an attitude which is like that of a figure slightly malformed, and not like that of a human body that is perfect, dominant, and if bent, bent at no lowly or niggling 15 labour. Why these curves should be so charming it would be hard to say. They have an exquisite prankishness of variety; the place where the upward or downward scrolls curl off from the main wave is delicately unexpected every time; and, especially in 20 gold embroideries, is sensitively fit for the material, catching and losing the light, while the lengths of waving line are such as the long gold threads take by nature.

VII. A moment ago this art was declared not 25 human. And, in fact, in no other art has the figure suffered such crooked handling. The Japanese have generally evaded even the local beauty of their own race for the sake of perpetual slight deformity. Their beauty is remote from our sympathy and admiration; 30 and it is quite possible that we might miss it in pictorial presentation, and that the Japanese artist may have intended human beauty where we do not recog-

nize it. But if it is not easy to recognize, it is certainly not difficult to guess at. And, accordingly, you are generally aware that the separate beauty of the race, and its separate dignity even, to be very generous, has been admired by the Japanese artist, 5 and is represented here and there occasionally, in the figure of warrior or mousmé. But even with this exception the habit of Japanese figure-drawing is evidently grotesque, derisive, and crooked. It is curious to observe that the search for slight deformity 10 is so constant as to make use for its purposes, not of action only, but of perspective foreshortening. With us it is to the youngest child only that there would appear to be mirth in the drawing of a man who, stooping violently forward, would seem to have his 15 head "beneath his shoulders." The European child would not see fun in the living man so presented; but, unused to the same effect "in the flat," he thinks it prodigiously humorous in a drawing. But so only when he is quite young. The Japanese keeps, 20 apparently, his sense of this kind of humour. It amuses him, but not perhaps altogether as it amuses the child, that the foreshortened figure should, in drawing and to the unpractised eye, seem distorted and dislocated. The simple Oriental appears to find 25 more derision in it than the simple child. The distortion is not without a suggestion of ignominy. And, moreover, the Japanese shows derision, but not precisely scorn. He does not hold himself superior to his hideous models. He makes free with them on 30 equal terms. He is familiar with them.

VIII. And if this is the conviction gathered from ordinary drawings, no need to insist upon

the ignoble character of those that are intentional caricatures.

IX. Perhaps the time has hardly come for writing anew the praises of symmetry. The world knows too much of the abuse of Greek decoration, and 5 would be glad to forget it, with the intention of learning that art afresh in a future age and of seeing it then anew. But whatever may be the phases of the arts, there is the abiding principle of symmetry in the body of man, that goes erect, like an upright soul. 10 Its balance is equal. Exterior human symmetry is surely a curious physiological fact where there is no symmetry interiorly. For the centres of life and movement within the body are placed with Oriental inequality. Man is Greek without and Japanese 15 within. But the absolute symmetry of the skeleton and of the beauty and life that cover it is accurately a principle. It controls, but not tyrannously, all the life of human action. Attitude and motion disturb perpetually, with infinite incidents — inequalities of 20 work, war, and pastime, inequalities of sleep — the symmetry of man. Only in death and “at attention” is that symmetry complete in attitude. Nevertheless, it rules the dance and the battle, and its rhythm is not to be destroyed. All the more because this hand 25 holds the goad and that the harrow, this the shield and that the sword, because this hand rocks the cradle and that caresses the unequal heads of children, is this rhythm the law; and grace and strength are inflections thereof. All human movement is a 30 variation upon symmetry, and without symmetry it would not be variation; it would be lawless, fortuitous, and as dull and broadcast as lawless art. The

order of inflection that is not infraction has been explained in a most authoritative sentence of criticism of literature, a sentence that should save the world the trouble of some of its futile, violent, and weak experiments: "Law, the rectitude of humanity," says 5 Mr. Coventry Patmore, "should be the poet's only subject, as, from time immemorial, it has been the subject of true art, though many a true artist has done the Muse's will and knew it not. As all the music of verse arises, not from infraction but from 10 inflection of the law of the set metre, so the greatest poets have been those the *modulus* of whose verse has been most variously and delicately inflected, in correspondence with feelings and passions which are the inflections of moral law in their theme. Law 15 puts a strain upon feeling, and feeling responds with a strain upon law. Furthermore, Aristotle says that the quality of poetic language is a continual *slight* novelty. In the highest poetry, like that of Milton, these three modes of inflection, metrical, linguistical, 20 and moral, all chime together in praise of the truer order of life."

And like that order is the order of the figure of man, an order most beautiful and most secure when it is put to the proof. That perpetual proof by 25 perpetual inflection is the very condition of life. Symmetry is a profound, if disregarded because perpetually inflected, condition of human life.

X. The nimble art of Japan is unessential; it may come and go, may settle or be fanned away. It 30 has life and it is not without law; it has an obvious life, and a less obvious law. But with Greece abides the obvious law and the less obvious life: symmetry

as apparent as the symmetry of the form of man, and life occult like his unequal heart. And this seems to be the nobler and the more perdurable relation.

SELECTION III

LITERATURE

JOHN HENRY, CARDINAL NEWMAN

[The second of Newman's *Lectures and Essays on University Subjects* comprises pages 268-294 in *The Idea of a University* (Longmans, Green & Co.). Its two opening sections, omitted from this reprint, set forth three fallacious views of literature: (1) Holy Writ being the greatest product of literature, therefore literature is measured by its subject matter; (2) Holy Writ being simple, literature of any real eminence cannot, like many classical compositions, be elaborate; (3) Holy Writ being readily translatable, the test of higher literary quality in other writings is how far they too can be translated.

From these as a point of departure Newman proceeds to the general considerations that follow. Two other omissions, which do not materially affect the general sequence, are noted in place.]

I. Here, then, in the first place, I observe, gentlemen, that literature from the derivation of the word 5 implies writing, not speaking. This, however, arises from the circumstance of the copiousness, variety, and public circulation of the matters of which it consists. What is spoken cannot outrun the range of the speaker's voice, and perishes in the uttering. When 10 words are in demand to express a long course of thought, when they have to be conveyed to the ends of the earth, or perpetuated for the benefit of posterity, they must be written down, that is reduced to the shape of literature. Still, properly speaking, the 15 terms by which we denote this characteristic gift of

man belong to its exhibition by means of the voice, not of handwriting. It addresses itself, in its primary idea, to the ear, not to the eye. We call it the power of speech; we call it language, that is, the use of the tongue; and even when we write we still keep in 5 mind what was its original instrument, for we use freely such terms in our books as "saying," "speaking," "telling," "talking," "calling"; we use the terms "phraseology" and "diction," as if we were still addressing ourselves to the ear. 10

II. Now I insist on this because it shows that speech, and therefore literature, which is its permanent record, is essentially a personal work. It is not some production or result attained by the partnership of several persons, or by machinery, or by any 15 natural process; but in its very idea it proceeds, and must proceed, from some one given individual. Two persons cannot be the authors of the sounds which strike our ear; and, as they cannot be speaking one and the same speech, neither can they be writing one 20 and the same lecture or discourse, — which must certainly belong to some one person or other, and is the expression of that one person's ideas and feelings, — ideas and feelings personal to himself, though others may have parallel and similar ones, — proper to him- 25 self in the same sense as his voice, his air, his countenance, his carriage, and his action, are personal. In other words, literature expresses, not objective truth, as it is called, but subjective; not things, but thoughts. 30

III. Now this doctrine will become clearer by considering another use of words, which does relate to objective truth, or to things; which relates to matters

not personal, not subjective to the individual, but which, even were there no individual man in the whole world to know them or to talk about them, would exist still. Such objects become the matter of science, and words indeed are used to express them ; 5 but such words are rather symbols than language, and however many we use, and however we may perpetuate them by writing, we never could make any kind of literature out of them, or call them by that name. Such, for instance, would be Euclid's 10 Elements. They relate to truths universal and eternal ; they are not mere thoughts, but things ; they exist in themselves, not by virtue of our understanding them, not in dependence upon our will, but in what is called the *nature* of things, or at least on conditions external 15 to us. The words, then, in which they are set forth are not language, speech, literature, but rather, as I have said, symbols. And, as a proof of it, you will recollect that it is possible, nay usual, to set forth the propositions of Euclid in algebraical notation, which, 20 as all would admit, has nothing to do with literature. What is true of mathematics is true also of every study, so far forth as it is scientific ; it makes use of words as the mere vehicle of things, and is thereby withdrawn from the province of literature. Thus 25 metaphysics, ethics, law, political economy, chemistry, theology, cease to be literature in the same degree as they are capable of a severe scientific treatment. And hence it is that Aristotle's works on the one hand, though at first sight literature, approach in 30 character, at least a great number of them, to mere science ; for even though the things which he treats of and exhibits may not always be real and true, yet

he treats them as if they were, not as if they were the thoughts of his own mind; that is, he treats them scientifically. On the other hand, law or natural history has before now been treated by an author with so much of colouring derived from his own mind 5 as to become a sort of literature. This is especially seen in the instance of theology, when it takes the shape of pulpit eloquence. It is seen too in historical composition, which becomes a mere specimen of chronology, or a chronicle, when divested of the philosophy, the skill, or the party and personal feelings 10 of the particular writer. Science, then, has to do with things, literature with thoughts; science is universal, literature is personal; science uses words merely as symbols, but literature uses language in its 15 full compass, as including phraseology, idiom, style, composition, rhythm, eloquence, and whatever other properties are included in it.

IV. Let us then put aside the scientific use of words when we are to speak of language and literature. 20 Literature is the personal use or exercise of language. That this is so is further proved from the fact that one author uses it so differently from another. Language itself in its very origination would seem to be traceable to individuals. Their 25 peculiarities have given it its character. We are often able in fact to trace particular phrases or idioms to individuals; we know the history of their rise. Slang surely, as it is called, comes of and breathes of the personal. The connection between the force of 30 words in particular languages and the habits and sentiments of the nations speaking them has often been pointed out. And, while the many use language as

they find it, the man of genius uses it indeed, but subjects it withal to his own purposes, and moulds it according to his own peculiarities. The throng and succession of ideas, thoughts, feelings, imaginations, aspirations, which pass within him, the abstractions, 5 the juxtapositions, the comparisons, the discriminations, the conceptions, which are so original in him, his views of external things, his judgments upon life, manners, and history, the exercises of his wit, of his humour, of his depth, of his sagacity,—all these innumerable and incessant creations, the very pulsation and throbbing of his intellect, does he image forth, to all does he give utterance, in a corresponding language, which is as multiform as this inward mental action itself and analogous to it, the faithful expression of his intense personality, attending on his own inward world of thought as its very shadow; so that we might as well say that one man's shadow is another's as that the style of a really gifted mind can belong to any but himself. It follows him about *as* 20 a shadow. His thought and feeling are personal, and so his language is personal.

V. Thought and speech are inseparable from each other; matter and expression are parts of one; style is a thinking out into language. This is what I have 25 been laying down, and this is literature; not *things*, not the verbal symbols of things; not on the other hand mere *words*, but thoughts expressed in language. Call to mind, gentlemen, the meaning of the Greek word which expresses this special prerogative 30 of man over the feeble intelligence of the inferior animals. It is called Logos. What does Logos mean? It stands both for *reason* and for *speech*; and it is diffi-

cult to say which it means more properly. It means both at once. Why? because really they cannot be divided,—because they are in a true sense one. When we can separate light and illumination, life and motion, the convex and the concave of a curve, then 5 will it be possible for thought to tread speech under foot, and to hope to do without it—then will it be conceivable that the vigorous and fertile intellect should renounce its own double, its instrument of expression, and the channel of its speculations and 10 emotions.

VI. Critics should consider this view of the subject before they lay down such canons of taste as the writer whose pages I have quoted. Such men as he is consider fine writing to be an *addition from with-* 15 *out* to the matter treated of, a sort of ornament superinduced, or a luxury indulged in, by those who have time and inclination for such vanities. They speak as if *one* man could do the thought, and *another* the style. We read in Persian travels of the way in 20 which young gentlemen go to work in the East when they would engage in correspondence with those who inspire them with hope or fear. They cannot write one sentence themselves; so they betake themselves to the professional letter-writer. They confide to him 25 the object they have in view. They have a point to gain from a superior, a favour to ask, an evil to deprecate; they have to approach a man in power, or to make court to some beautiful lady. The professional man manufactures words for them as they are 30 wanted, as a stationer sells them paper, or a school-master might cut their pens. Thought and word are, in their conception, two things; and thus there is a

division of labour. The man of thought comes to the man of words; and the man of words, duly instructed in the thought, dips the pen of desire into the ink of devotedness, and proceeds to spread it over the page of desolation. Then the nightingale of affection is heard to warble to the rose of loveliness, while the breeze of anxiety plays around the brow of expectation. This is what the Easterns are said to consider fine writing; and it seems pretty much the idea of the school of critics to whom I have been referring. 10

* * * * *

[The paragraph omitted here gives an actual English instance of this attempt at style by proxy.]

VII. But can they really think that Homer, or Pindar, or Shakespeare, or Dryden, or Walter Scott, were accustomed to aim at diction for its own sake, instead of being inspired with their subject and pouring forth beautiful words because they had beautiful thoughts? This is surely too great a paradox to be borne. Rather it is the fire within the author's breast which overflows in the torrent of his burning, irresistible eloquence; it is the poetry of his inner soul which relieves itself in the ode or the elegy; and his mental attitude and bearing, the beauty of his moral countenance, the force and keenness of his logic, are imaged in the tenderness, or energy, or richness of his language. Nay, according to the well-known line, "*facit indignatio versus*," not the words alone, but even the rhythm, the metre, the verse, will be the contemporaneous offspring of the emotion or imagination which possesses him. "*Poeta nascitur, non fit*," says the proverb; and this is in numerous instances true of his poems as well as of 30

himself. They are born, not framed; they are a strain rather than a composition; and their perfection is the monument, not so much of his skill as of his power. And this is true of prose as well as of verse in its degree. Who will not recognize in the ⁵ Vision of Mirza a delicacy and beauty of style which is very difficult to describe, but which is felt to be in exact correspondence to the ideas of which it is the expression?

VIII. And, since the thoughts and reasonings of ¹⁰ an author have, as I have said, a personal character, no wonder that his style is not only the image of his subject, but of his mind. That pomp of language, that full and tuneful diction, that felicitousness in the choice and exquisiteness in the collocation of words, ¹⁵ which to prosaic writers seem artificial, is nothing else but the mere habit and way of a lofty intellect. Aristotle, in his sketch of the magnanimous man, tells us that his voice is deep, his motions slow, and his stature commanding. In like manner the elocution ²⁰ of a great intellect is great. His language expresses, not only his great thoughts, but his great self. Certainly he might use fewer words than he uses; but he fertilizes his simplest ideas, and germinates into a multitude of details, and prolongs the march of his ²⁵ sentences, and sweeps round to the full diapason of his harmony, as if *κῦδεϊ γάλων*, rejoicing in his own vigour and richness of resource. I say a narrow critic will call it verbiage, when really it is a sort of fulness of heart, parallel to that which makes the ³⁰ merry boy whistle as he walks, or the strong man, like the smith in the novel, flourish his club when there is no one to fight with. •

IX. Shakespeare furnishes us with frequent instances of this peculiarity, and all so beautiful that it is difficult to select for quotation. For instance, in *Macbeth* :

“Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased,
Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow,
Raze out the written troubles of the brain,
And, with some sweet oblivious antidote,
Cleanse the foul bosom of that perilous stuff
Which weighs upon the heart?” 5
10

Here a simple idea, by a process which belongs to the orator rather than to the poet, but still comes from the native vigour of genius, is expanded into a many-membered period.

The following from *Hamlet* is of the same kind : 15

“’Tis not alone my inky cloak, good mother,
Nor customary suits of solemn black,
Nor windy suspiration of forced breath,
No, nor the fruitful river in the eye,
Nor the dejected haviour of the visage,
Together with all forms, modes, shows of grief,
That can denote me truly.” 20

X. Now if such declamation, for declamation it is, however noble, be allowable in a poet, whose genius is so far removed from pompousness or pretence, 25 much more is it allowable in an orator, whose very province it is to put forth words to the best advantage he can. Cicero has nothing more redundant in any part of his writings than these passages from Shakespeare. No lover then at least of Shakespeare 30 may fairly accuse Cicero of gorgeousness of phraseology or diffuseness of style. Nor will any sound critic be tempted to do so. As a certain unaffected

neatness and propriety and grace of diction may be required of any author who lays claim to be a classic, for the same reason that a certain attention to dress is expected of every gentleman, so to Cicero may be allowed the privilege of the "*os magna sonaturum*" 5 of which the ancient critic speaks. His copious, majestic, musical flow of language, even if sometimes beyond what the subject-matter demands, is never out of keeping with the occasion or with the speaker. It is the expression of lofty sentiments in lofty sentences, the "*mens magna in corpore magno*." It is the development of the inner man. Cicero vividly realized the *status* of a Roman senator and statesman, and the "pride of place" of Rome, in all the grace and grandeur which attached to her; and he imbibed, 15 and became, what he admired. As the exploits of Scipio or Pompey are the expression of this greatness in deed, so the language of Cicero is the expression of it in word. And, as the acts of the Roman ruler or soldier represent to us, in a manner special to 20 themselves, the characteristic magnanimity of the lords of the earth, so do the speeches or treatises of her accomplished orator bring it home to our imaginations as no other writing could do. Neither Livy, nor Tacitus, nor Terence, nor Seneca, nor Pliny, nor 25 Quintilian, is an adequate spokesman for the Imperial City. They write Latin; Cicero writes Roman.

XI. You will say that Cicero's language is undeniably studied, but that Shakespeare's is as undeniably natural and spontaneous; and that this is what 30 is meant when the classics are accused of being mere artists of words. Here we are introduced to a further large question, which gives me the opportunity of

anticipating a misapprehension of my meaning. I observe, then, that, not only is that lavish richness of style which I have noticed in Shakespeare justifiable on the principles which I have been laying down, but, what is less easy to receive, even elaborateness 5 in composition is no mark of trick or artifice in an author. Undoubtedly the works of the classics, particularly the Latin, *are* elaborate; they have cost a great deal of time, care, and trouble; they have had many rough copies; I grant it. I grant also that 10 there are writers of name, ancient and modern, who really are guilty of the absurdity of making sentences as the very end of their literary labour. Such was Isocrates; such were some of the sophists; they were set on words, to the neglect of thoughts or things; I 15 cannot defend them. If I must give an English instance of this fault, much as I love and revere the personal character and intellectual vigour of Dr. Johnson, I cannot deny that his style often outruns the sense and the occasion, and is wanting in that sim- 20 plicity which is the attribute of genius. Still, granting all this, I cannot grant, notwithstanding, that genius never need take pains, that genius may not improve by practice, that it never incurs failures, and succeeds the second time, that it never finishes 25 off at leisure what it has thrown off in the outline at a stroke.

XII. Take the instance of the painter or the sculptor. He has a conception in his mind which he wishes to represent in the medium of his art,—the Madonna 30 and Child, or Innocence, or Fortitude, or some historical character or event. Do you mean to say he does not study his subject? Does he not make

sketches? Does he not even call them "studies"? Does he not call his workroom a *studio*? Is he not ever designing, rejecting, adopting, correcting, perfecting? Are not the first attempts of Michael Angelo and Raffaele extant, in the case of some of 5 their most celebrated compositions? Will any one say that the Apollo Belvidere is not a conception patiently elaborated into its proper perfection? These departments of taste are, according to the received notions of the world, the very province of genius, and 10 yet we call them *arts*; they are the "Fine Arts." Why may not that be true of literary composition which is true of painting, sculpture, architecture, and music. Why may not language be wrought as well as the clay of the modeller? Why may not words be 15 worked up as well as colours? Why should not skill in diction be simply subservient and instrumental to the great prototypal ideas which are the contemplation of a Plato or a Virgil? Our greatest poet tells us,

"The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven;
And, as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name." 20 25

Now is it wonderful that that pen of his should sometimes be at fault for a while,—that it should pause, write, erase, rewrite, amend, complete, before he satisfies himself that his language has done justice to the conceptions which his mind's eye contemplated? 30

XIII. In this point of view, doubtless, many or most writers are elaborate, and those certainly not the least whose style is furthest removed from orna-

ment, being simple and natural, or vehement, or severely businesslike and practical. Who so energetic and manly as Demosthenes? yet he is said to have transcribed Thucydides many times over in the formation of his style. Who so gracefully natural as Herodotus? yet his very dialect is not his own, but chosen for the sake of the perfection of his narrative. Who exhibits such happy negligence as our own Addison? yet artistic fastidiousness was so notorious in his instance that the report has got abroad, truly or not, that he was too late in his issue of an important state paper, from his habit of revision and recomposition. Such great authors were working by a model which was before the eyes of their intellect; and they were labouring to say what they had to say, in such a way as would most exactly and suitably express it. It is not wonderful that other authors, whose style is not simple, should be instances of a similar literary diligence. Virgil wished his *Æneid* to be burned, elaborate as is its composition, because he felt it needed more labour still in order to make it perfect. The historian Gibbon in the last century is another instance in point. You must not suppose I am going to recommend his style for imitation, any more than his principles; but I refer to him as the example of a writer feeling the task which lay before him, feeling that he had to bring out into words for the comprehension of his readers a great and complicated scene, and wishing that those words should be adequate to his undertaking. I think he wrote the first chapter of his history three times over. It was not that he corrected or improved the first copy; but he put his first essay, and then his second, aside

— he recast his matter, till he had hit the precise exhibition of it which he thought demanded by his subject.

XIV. Now in all these instances I wish you to observe that what I have admitted about literary 5 workmanship differs from the doctrine which I am opposing in this,—that the mere dealer in words cares little or nothing for the subject which he is embellishing, but can paint and gild anything whatever to order; whereas the artist, whom I am acknowledg- 10 ing, has his great or rich visions before him, and his only aim is to bring out what he thinks or what he feels in a way adequate to the thing spoken of and appropriate to the speaker.

XV. The illustration which I have been borrowing 15 from the Fine Arts will enable me to go a step further. I have been showing the connection of the thought with the language in literary composition; and in doing so I have exposed the unphilosophical notion that the language was an extra which could be 20 dispensed with and provided to order according to the demand. But I have not yet brought out what immediately follows from this, and which was the second point which I had to show, viz., that to be 25 capable of easy translation is no test of the excellence of a composition. If I must say what I think, I should lay down, with little hesitation, that the truth was almost the reverse of this doctrine. Nor are many words required to show it. Such a doctrine as 30 is contained in the passage of the author whom I quoted when I began goes upon the assumption that one language is just like another language, that every language has all the ideas, turns of thought,

delicacies of expression, figures, associations, abstractions, points of view, which every other language has. Now, as far as regards science, it is true that all languages are pretty much alike for the purposes of science; but even in this respect some are more suitable than others, which have to coin words, or to borrow them, in order to express scientific ideas. But if languages are not all equally adapted even to furnish symbols for those universal and eternal truths in which Science consists, how can they reasonably be expected to be all equally rich, equally forcible, equally musical, equally exact, equally happy in expressing the idiosyncratic peculiarities of thought of some original and fertile mind who has availed himself of one of them? A great author takes his native language, masters it, partly throws himself into it, partly moulds and adapts it, and pours out his multitude of ideas through the variously ramified and delicately minute channels of expression which he has found or framed. Does it follow that this, his personal presence (as it may be called), can forthwith be transferred to every other language under the sun? Then may we reasonably maintain that Beethoven's *piano* music is not really beautiful, because it cannot be played on the hurdy-gurdy. Were not this astonishing doctrine maintained by persons far superior to the writer whom I have selected for animadversion, I should find it difficult to be patient under a gratuitous extravagance. It seems that a really great author must admit of translation, and that we have a test of his excellence when he reads to advantage in a foreign language as well as in his own. Then Shakespeare *is* a genius because he can be translated into

German, and *not* a genius because he cannot be translated into French. Then the multiplication table is the most gifted of all conceivable compositions, because it loses nothing by translation, and can hardly be said to belong to any one language whatever. 5
Whereas I should rather have conceived that in proportion as ideas are novel and recondite they would be difficult to put into words, and that the very fact of their having insinuated themselves into one language would diminish the chance of that happy accident being repeated in another. In the language of savages you can hardly express any idea or act of the intellect at all. Is the tongue of the Hottentot or Eskimo to be made the measure of the genius of Plato, Pindar, Tacitus, St. Jerome, Dante, or 15 Cervantes?

XVI. Let us recur, I say, to the illustration of the Fine Arts. I suppose you can express ideas in painting which you cannot express in sculpture; and the more an artist is of a painter, the less he is likely to be of a sculptor. The more he commits his genius to the methods and conditions of his own art, the less he will be able to throw himself into the circumstances of another. Is the genius of Fra Angelico, of Francia, or of Raffaele disparaged by the fact that he 25 was able to do that in colours which no man that ever lived, which no angel, could achieve in wood? Each of the Fine Arts has its own subject-matter. From the nature of the case you can do in one what you cannot do in another; you can do in painting 30 what you cannot do in carving; you can do in oils what you cannot do in fresco; you can do in marble what you cannot do in ivory; you can do in wax

what you cannot do in bronze. Then, I repeat, applying this to the case of languages, why should not genius be able to do in Greek what it cannot do in Latin? and why are its Greek and Latin works defective because they will not turn into English? 5 That genius of which we are speaking did not make English; it did not make all languages, present, past, and future; it did not make the laws of *any* language. Why is it to be judged of by that in which it had no part, over which it has no control? 10

* * * * *

[Section 8, omitted here, applies the previous considerations to Holy Scripture, showing that the test of translation, urged by Sterne in the sermon quoted as a point of departure (The introductory sections containing this quotation have been omitted.) is fallacious.]

XVII. I shall then merely sum up what I have said, and come to a conclusion. Reverting, then, to my original question, what is the meaning of letters, as contained, gentlemen, in the designation of your faculty, I have answered, that by letters or litera- 15 ture is meant the expression of thought in language, where by "thought" I mean the ideas, feelings, views, reasonings, and other operations of the human mind. And the art of letters is the method by which a speaker or writer brings out in words 20 worthy of his subject and sufficient for his audience or readers the thoughts which impress him. Literature, then, is of a personal character; it consists in the enunciations and teachings of those who have a right to speak as representatives of their kind, and in 25 whose words their brethren find an interpretation of their own sentiments, a record of their own experience, and a suggestion for their own judgments. A

great author, gentlemen, is not one who merely has a *copia verborum*, whether in prose or verse, and can, as it were, turn on at his will any number of splendid phrases and swelling sentences; but he is one who has something to say and knows how to say it. I do not claim for him, as such, any great depth of thought, or breadth of view, or philosophy, or sagacity, or knowledge of human nature, or experience of human life, though these additional gifts he may have, and the more he has of them the greater he is; but I ascribe to him, as his characteristic gift, in a large sense the faculty of expression. He is master of the twofold Logos, the thought and the word, distinct, but inseparable from each other. He may, if so be, elaborate his compositions, or he may pour out his improvisations; but in either case he has but one aim, which he keeps steadily before him, and is conscientious and single-minded in fulfilling. That aim is to give forth what he has within him; and from his very earnestness it comes to pass that, whatever be the splendour of his diction or the harmony of his periods, he has with him the charm of an incommunicable simplicity. Whatever be his subject, high or low, he treats it suitably and for its own sake. If he is a poet, "*nil molitur ineptè*." If he is an orator, then, too, he speaks, not only "*distinctè*" and "*splendidè*," but also "*aptè*." His page is the lucid mirror of his mind and life —

"Quo fit, ut omnis

Votivâ pateat veluti descripta tabellâ
Vita senis."

30

He writes passionately, because he feels keenly; forcibly, because he conceives vividly; he sees too

clearly to be vague ; he is too serious to be otiose ; he can analyze his subject, and therefore he is rich ; he embraces it as a whole and in its parts, and therefore he is consistent ; he has a firm hold of it, and therefore he is luminous. When his imagination wells up, it overflows in ornament ; when his heart is touched, it thrills along his verse. He always has the right word for the right idea, and never a word too much. If he is brief, it is because few words suffice ; when he is lavish of them, still each word has its mark, and aids, not embarrasses, the vigorous march of his elocution. He expresses what all feel, but all cannot say ; and his sayings pass into proverbs among his people, and his phrases become household words and idioms of their daily speech, which is tessellated with the rich fragments of his language, as we see in foreign lands the marbles of Roman grandeur worked into the walls and pavements of modern palaces.

XVIII. Such preëminently is Shakespeare among ourselves ; such preëminently Virgil among the Latins ; such in their degree are all those writers who in every nation go by the name of classics. To particular nations they are necessarily attached from the circumstance of the variety of tongues, and the peculiarities of each ; but so far they have a catholic and ecumenical character that what they express is common to the whole race of man, and they alone are able to express it.

XIX. If then the power of speech is a gift as great as any that can be named, — if the origin of language is by many philosophers even considered to be nothing short of divine, — if by means of words the secrets

of the heart are brought to light, pain of soul is relieved, hidden grief is carried off, sympathy conveyed, counsel imparted, experience recorded, and wisdom perpetuated,—if by great authors the many are drawn up into unity, national character is fixed, a people speaks, the past and the future, the East and the West, are brought into communication with each other,—if such men are, in a word, the spokesmen and prophets of the human family,—it will not answer to make light of literature or to neglect its study ; rather we may be sure that, in proportion as we master it in whatever language, and imbibe its spirit, we shall ourselves become in our own measure the ministers of like benefits to others, be they many or few, be they in the obscurer or the more distinguished walks of life, who are united to us by social ties and are within the sphere of our personal influence.

SELECTION IV

INTERSTATE COMMERCE

JOHN MARSHALL

The Opinion of the Supreme Court handed down by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of GIBBONS vs. OGDEN (9 Wheaton's Reports, page 1).

[This famous opinion, though legal, is almost free from technical terms, and is otherwise quite clear to attentive reading. Its interest and significance, moreover, reach far beyond its immediate purpose. Being derived from the very principles of our system of government, they remain vital to all Americans. For the student of composition the chief value of the piece is its force of coherence — coherence of the whole and in every paragraph. In this respect, even more than in the extraordinary precision and lucidity

of details, Marshall should always be rated among the foremost authors of our country.

The few legal terms are almost all either defined or self-defining. The *appellant* is of course Gibbons, the man that has made the *appeal* from the State courts to the federal court. So the *respondent* is Ogden, who is defending the exclusive privilege conferred to him by the State courts. The terms correspond to the more common *plaintiff* and *defendant*.

The proposition, the statement of the case, and an analysis are printed, above, at § 92 in the main body of this book.

I. The appellant contends that this decree is erroneous, because the laws which purport to give the exclusive privilege it sustains, are repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States.

They are said to be repugnant —

5

1st. to that clause in the Constitution which authorizes Congress to regulate commerce ;

2d. to that which authorizes Congress to promote the progress of science and useful arts.

The State of New York maintains the constitution- 10
ality of these laws; and their legislature, their council
of revision, and their judges, have repeatedly con-
curred in this opinion. It is supported by great
names — by names which have all the titles to con-
sideration that virtue, intelligence, and office can be- 15
stow. No tribunal can approach the decision of this
question without feeling a just and real respect for
that opinion which is sustained by such authority ;
but it is the province of this Court, while it respects,
not to bow to it implicitly ; and the judges must exer- 20
cise, in the examination of the subject, that under-
standing which Providence has bestowed upon them,
with that independence which the people of the
United States expect from this department of the
government. 25

II. As preliminary to the very able discussions of the Constitution which we have heard from the Bar, and as having some influence on its construction, reference has been made to the political situation of these States anterior to its formation. It has been 5 said that they were sovereign, were completely independent, and were connected with each other only by a league. This is true. But when these allied sovereigns converted their league into a government, when they converted their Congress of ambassadors, 10 deputed to deliberate on their common concerns and to recommend measures of general utility, into a legislature empowered to enact laws on the most interesting subjects, the whole character in which the States appear underwent a change, the extent of 15 which must be determined by a fair consideration of the instrument by which that change is effected.

III. This instrument contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government. It has been said that these powers ought 20 to be construed strictly. But why ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the Constitution which gives countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumerated powers, that which grants expressly the means for carrying all others into exe- 25 cution, Congress is authorized "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper" for that purpose. But this limitation on the means which may be used is not extended to the powers which are conferred; nor is there one sentence in the Constitu- 30 tion which has been pointed out by the gentlemen of the bar, or which we have been able to discern, that prescribes this rule. We do not therefore think our-

selves justified in adopting it. What do gentlemen mean by a strict construction? If they contend only against that enlarged construction which would extend words beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the application of the term, but 5 should not controvert the principle. If they contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some theory not to be found in the Constitution, would deny to the government those powers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, 10 and which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument, — for that narrow construction which would cripple the government and render it unequal to the objects for which it is declared to be instituted, and to which the powers given, as 15 fairly understood, render it competent, — then we cannot see perceive the propriety of this construction, nor adopt it as the rule by which the Constitution is to be expounded. As men whose intentions require no concealment generally employ the words which 20 most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution and the people who adopted it must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said. 25 If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a well-settled rule that the objects for which it was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great 30 influence in the construction. We know of no reason for excluding the rule from the present case. The grant does not convey power which might be benefi-

cial to the grantor, if retained by himself, or which can inure solely to the benefit of the grantee; but is an investment of power for the general advantage, in the hands of agents selected for that purpose; which power can never be exercised by the people them- 5 selves, but must be placed in the hands of agents or lie dormant. We know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers, other than is given by the language of the instrument which confers them, taken in connection with the purposes for which 10 they were conferred.

IV. The words are "Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The subject to be regulated is commerce; 15 and our Constitution being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of enumeration and not of definition, to ascertain the extent of the power it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word. The counsel for the appellee would limit it to traffic, to buying and 20 selling, or to interchange of commodities, and do not admit that it comprehends navigation. This would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its significations. Commerce undoubtedly is traffic; but it is something more; it is intercourse. 25 It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations, which 30 shall exclude all laws concerning navigation, which shall be silent on the admission of the vessels of the one nation into the ports of the other, and be confined

to prescribing rules for the conduct of individuals in the actual employment of buying and selling, or of barter.

V. If commerce does not include navigation, the government of the Union has no direct power over 5 that subject, and can make no law prescribing what shall constitute American vessels, or requiring that they shall be navigated by American seamen. Yet this power has been exercised from the commencement of the government, has been exercised with the 10 consent of all, and has been understood by all to be a commercial regulation. All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word "commerce" to comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must have been so understood, when the Consti- 15 tution was framed. The power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the people of America adopted their government, and must have been contemplated in forming it. The convention must have used the word in 20 that sense, because all have understood it in that sense; and the attempt to restrict it comes too late.

VI. If the opinion that "commerce," as the word is used in the Constitution, comprehends navigation 25 also, requires any additional confirmation, that additional confirmation is, we think, furnished by the words of the instrument itself. It is a rule of construction, acknowledged by all, that the exceptions from a power mark its extent; for it would be absurd as well as useless to except from a granted power 30 that which was not granted — that which the words of the grant could not comprehend. If, then, there are in the Constitution plain exceptions from the

power over navigation, plain inhibitions to the exercise of that power in a particular way, it is a proof that those who made these exceptions and prescribed these inhibitions understood the power to which they applied as being granted. The ninth section of the first article declares that "no preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State over those of another." This clause cannot be understood as applicable to those laws only which are passed for the purposes of revenue, because it is expressly applied to commercial regulations; and the most obvious preference which can be given to one port over another, in regulating commerce, relates to navigation. But the subsequent part of the sentence is still more explicit. It is, "nor shall vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties, in another." These words have a direct reference to navigation.

VII. The universally acknowledged power of the government to impose embargoes must also be considered as showing that all America is united in that construction which comprehends navigation in the word commerce. Gentlemen have said in argument that this is a branch of the war-making power, and that an embargo is an instrument of war, not a regulation of trade. That it may be, and often is, used as an instrument of war cannot be denied. An embargo may be imposed for the purpose of facilitating the equipment or manning of a fleet, or for the purpose of concealing the progress of an expedition preparing to sail from a particular port. In these, and in similar cases, it is a military instrument, and partakes of the nature of war. But all em-

barges are not of this description. They are sometimes resorted to without a view to war, and with a single view to commerce. In such case an embargo is no more a war measure than a merchantman is a ship of war because both are vessels which navigate the ocean with sails and seamen.

VIII. When Congress imposed that embargo which, for a time, engaged the attention of every man in the United States, the avowed object of the law was the protection of commerce and the avoiding of war. By its friends and its enemies it was treated as a commercial, not as a war measure. The persevering earnestness and zeal with which it was opposed, in a part of our country which supposed its interest to be vitally affected by the act, cannot be forgotten. A want of acuteness in discovering objections to a measure to which they felt the most deep-rooted hostility will not be imputed to those who were arrayed in opposition to this. Yet they never suspected that navigation was no branch of trade, and was, therefore, not comprehended in the power to regulate commerce. They did, indeed, contest the constitutionality of the act, but on a principle which admits the construction for which the appellant contends. They denied that the particular law in question was made in pursuance of the Constitution, not because the power could not act directly on vessels, but because a perpetual embargo was the annihilation and not the regulation of commerce. In terms they admitted the applicability of the words used in the Constitution to vessels, and that in a case which produced a degree and an extent of excitement calculated to draw forth every principle on which legit-

streams which penetrate our country in every direction pass through the interior of almost every State in the Union, and furnish the means of exercising this right. If Congress has the power to regulate it, that power must be exercised wherever the subject exists. 5 If it exists within the States, if a foreign voyage may commence or terminate at a port within a State, then the power of Congress may be exercised within a State.

XII. This principle is, if possible, still more clear when applied to commerce "among the several 10 States." They either join each other, in which case they are separated by a mathematical line, or they are remote from each other, in which case other States lie between them. What is commerce "among" them; and how is it to be conducted? Can a trading expe- 15 dition between two adjoining States, commence and terminate outside of each? And if the trading intercourse be between two States remote from each other, must it not commence in one, terminate in the other, and probably pass through a third? Com- 20 merce among the States must, of necessity, be commerce with the States. In the regulation of trade with the Indian tribes, the action of the law, especially when the Constitution was made, was chiefly within a State. The power of Congress, then, what- 25 ever it may be, must be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the several States. The sense of the nation on this subject is unequivocally manifested by the provisions made in the laws for transporting goods, by land, between Baltimore and Providence, 30 between New York and Philadelphia, and between Philadelphia and Baltimore.

XIII. We are now arrived at the inquiry, what is

this power? It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other 5 than are prescribed in the Constitution. These are expressed in plain terms, and do not affect the questions which arise in this case, or which have been discussed at the bar. If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited 10 to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations and among the several States is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government having in its Constitution the same restrictions on 15 the exercise of the power as are found in the Constitution of the United States. The wisdom and discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are in this, as in many other instances, as 20 that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely in all representative governments. The power of Congress, then, comprehends 25 navigation within the limits of every State in the Union, so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with "commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian tribes." It may, of consequence, pass the 30 jurisdictional line of New York, and act upon the very waters to which the prohibition now under consideration applies.

XIV. But it has been urged with great earnestness that, although the power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States be coextensive with the subject itself, and have no other limits than are prescribed in the Constitution, 5 yet the States may severally exercise the same power within their respective jurisdictions. In support of this argument it is said that they possessed it as an inseparable attribute of sovereignty before the formation of the Constitution, and still retain it, except so 10 far as they have surrendered it by that instrument; that this principle results from the nature of the government, and is secured by the tenth amendment; that an affirmative grant of power is not exclusive, unless in its own nature it be such that the continued 15 exercise of it by the former possessor is inconsistent with the grant, and that this is not of that description. The appellant, conceding these postulates, except the last, contends that full power to regulate a particular subject implies the whole power, and leaves no re- 20 siduum; that a grant of the whole is incompatible with the existence of a right in another to any part of it.

XV. Both parties have appealed to the Constitution, to legislative acts and judicial decisions, and 25 have drawn arguments from all these sources to support and illustrate the propositions they respectfully maintain. The grant of the power to lay and collect taxes is, like the power to regulate commerce, made in general terms, and has never been understood to 30 interfere with the exercise of the same power by the States; and hence has been drawn an argument which has been applied to the question under consideration.

But the two grants are not, it is conceived, similar in their terms or their nature. Although many of the powers formerly exercised by the States are transferred to the government of the Union, yet the State governments remain, and constitute a most important 5 part of our system. The power of taxation is indispensable to their existence, and is a power which, in its own nature, is capable of residing in and being exercised by different authorities at the same time. We are accustomed to see it placed, for different pur- 10 poses, in different hands. Taxation is the simple operation of taking small portions from a perpetually accumulating mass susceptible of almost infinite division; and a power in one to take what is necessary for certain purposes is not, in its nature, incompatible 15 with a power in another to take what is necessary for other purposes. Congress is authorized to lay and collect taxes, etc., to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States. This does not interfere with the 20 powers of the States to tax for the support of their own governments; nor is the exercise of that power by the States an exercise of any portion of the power that is granted to the United States. In imposing taxes for State purposes they are not doing what 25 Congress is empowered to do. Congress is not empowered to tax for those purposes which are within the exclusive province of the States. When, then, each government exercises the power of taxation, neither is exercising the power of the other. But 30 when a State proceeds to regulate commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, it is exercising the very power that is granted to Congress, and

is doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to do. There is no analogy, then, between the power of taxation and the power of regulating commerce.

XVI. In discussing the question whether this power is still in the States, in the case under consideration, 5 we may dismiss from it the inquiry whether it is surrendered by the mere grant to Congress, or is retained until Congress shall exercise the power. We may dismiss that inquiry because it has been exercised, and the regulations which Congress deemed it proper to 10 make are now in full operation. The sole question is, can a State regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the States while Congress is regulating it? The counsel for the respondent answer this question in the affirmative, and rely very much on the restric- 15 tions in the tenth section as supporting their opinion. They say, very truly, that limitations of a power furnish a strong argument in favour of the existence of that power, and that the section which prohibits the States from laying duties on imports or exports proves 20 that this power might have been exercised, had it not been expressly forbidden, and consequently that any other commercial regulation, not expressly forbidden, to which the original power of the State was competent, may still be made. That this restriction shows 25 the opinion of the convention that a State might impose duties on exports and imports, if not expressly forbidden, will be conceded; but that it follows as a consequence from the concession that a State may regulate commerce with foreign nations and among 30 the States cannot be admitted.

XVII. We must first determine whether the act of laying "duties or imposts on imports or exports" is

considered in the Constitution as a branch of the taxing power, or of the power to regulate commerce. We think it very clear that it is considered as a branch of the taxing power. It is so treated in the first clause of the eighth section : "Congress shall have power to 5 lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises ;" and, before commerce is mentioned, the rule by which the exercise of this power must be governed is declared. It is that all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform. In a separate clause of the enumeration, 10 the power to regulate commerce is given, as being entirely distinct from the right to levy taxes and imposts, and as being a new power, not before conferred. The Constitution, then, considers these powers as substantive, and distinct from each other, and so places 15 them in the enumeration it contains. The power of imposing duties on imports is classed with the power to levy taxes; and that seems to be its natural place. But the power to levy taxes could never be considered as abridging the right of the States on that subject; 20 and they might, consequently, have exercised it by levying duties on imports or exports, had the Constitution contained no prohibition on this subject. This prohibition, then, is an exception from the acknowledged power of the States to levy taxes, not from the 25 questionable power to regulate commerce.

XVIII. "A duty of tonnage" is as much a tax as a duty on imports or exports; and the reason which induced the prohibition of those taxes extends to this also. This tax may be imposed by a State with the 30 consent of Congress; and it may be admitted that Congress cannot give a right to a State in virtue of its own powers. But, a duty of tonnage being part

of the power of imposing taxes, its prohibition may certainly be made to depend on Congress without affording any implication respecting a power to regulate commerce. It is true that duties may often be, and in fact often are, imposed on tonnage with a view 5 to the regulation of commerce; but they may be also imposed with a view to revenue; and it was therefore a prudent precaution to prohibit the States from exercising this power. The idea that the same measure might, according to circumstances, be arranged with 10 different classes of power was no novelty to the framers of our Constitution. Those illustrious statesmen and patriots, had been, many of them, deeply engaged in the discussions which preceded the war of our Revolution; and all of them were well read in those 15 discussions. The right to regulate commerce, even by the imposition of duties, was not controverted; but the right to impose a duty for the purpose of revenue produced a war as important perhaps, in its consequences to the human race, as any the world has ever 20 witnessed.

XIX. These restrictions, then, are on the taxing power, not on that to regulate commerce; and presuppose the existence of that which they restrain, not of that which they do not purport to restrain. But 25 the inspection laws are said to be regulations of commerce, and are certainly recognized in the Constitution as being passed in the exercise of a power remaining with the States. That inspection laws may have a remote and considerable influence on 30 commerce will not be denied; but that a power to regulate commerce is the source from which the right to pass them is derived cannot be admitted. The

object of inspection laws is to improve the quality of articles produced by the labour of a country, to fit them for exportation, or, it may be, for domestic use. They act upon the subject before it becomes an article of foreign commerce, or of commerce among the States, and prepare it for that purpose. They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a State not surrendered to the general government, all which can be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and those which respect turnpike roads, ferries, etc., are competent parts of this mass.

XX. No direct general power over these objects is granted to Congress; and consequently they remain subject to State legislation. If the legislative power of the Union can reach them, it must be for national purposes; it must be where the power is expressly given for a special purpose, or is clearly incidental to some power which is expressly given. It is obvious that the government of the Union, in the exercise of its express powers, that, for example, of regulating commerce with foreign nations and among the States, may use means that may also be employed by a State in the exercise of its acknowledged powers, that, for example, of regulating commerce within the State. If Congress license vessels to sail from one port to another in the same State, the act is supposed to be, necessarily, incidental to the power expressly granted to Congress, and implies no claim of a direct power to regulate the purely inter-

nal commerce of a State, or to act directly on its system of police. So, if a State in passing laws on subjects acknowledged to be within its control, and with a view to those subjects, shall adopt a measure of the same character with one which Congress may 5 adopt, it does not derive its authority from the particular power which has been granted, but from some other, which remains with the State and may be executed by the same means. All experience shows that the same measures, or measures scarcely dis- 10 tinguishable from each other, may flow from distinct powers; but this does not prove that the powers themselves are identical. Although the means used in their execution may sometimes approach each other so nearly as to be confounded, there are other 15 situations in which they are sufficiently distinct to establish their individuality. In our complex system, presenting the rare and difficult scheme of one general government, whose action extends over the whole, but which possesses only certain enumerated 20 powers, and of numerous State governments, which retain and exercise all powers not delegated to the Union, contests respecting power must arise. Were it even otherwise, the measures taken by the respective governments to execute their acknowledged 25 powers would often be of the same description, and might sometimes interfere. This, however, does not prove that the one is exercising, or has a right to exercise, the powers of the other.

XXI. The acts of Congress passed in 1796 and 30 1799, 2 U. S. L., 345, 3 U. S. L., 126, empowering and directing the officers of the general government to conform to and assist in the execution of the

quarantine and health laws of a State, proceed, it is said, upon the idea, that these laws are constitutional. It is undoubtedly true that they do proceed upon that idea; and the constitutionality of such laws has never, so far as we are informed, been denied. But 5 they do not imply an acknowledgment that a State may rightfully regulate commerce with foreign nations, or among the States; for they do not imply that such laws are an exercise of that power, or enacted with a view to it. On the contrary, they 10 are treated as quarantine and health laws, are so denominated in the acts of Congress, and are considered as flowing from the acknowledged power of a State to provide for the health of its citizens. But as it was apparent that some of the provisions made 15 for this purpose, and in virtue of this power, might interfere with and be affected by the laws of the United States made for the regulation of commerce, Congress, in that spirit of harmony and conciliation which ought always to characterize the conduct of 20 governments standing in the relation which that of the Union and those of the States bear to each other, has directed its officers to aid in the execution of these laws; and has, in some measure, adapted its own legislation to this object by making provisions 25 in aid of those of the States. But in making these provisions the opinion is unequivocally manifested that Congress may control the State laws, so far as it may be necessary to control them, for the regulation of commerce.

30

XXII. The act passed in 1803, 3 U. S. L., 529, prohibiting the importation of slaves into any State which shall itself prohibit their importation, implies,

it is said, an admission that the States possessed the power to exclude or admit them; from which it is inferred that they possess the same power with respect to other articles. If this inference were correct, if this power was exercised, not under any particular clause in the Constitution, but in virtue of a general right over the subject of commerce, to exist as long as the Constitution itself, it might now be exercised. Any State might now import African slaves into its own territory. But it is obvious that the power of the States over this subject, previous to the year 1808, constitutes an exception to the power of Congress to regulate commerce; and the exception is expressed in such words as to manifest clearly the intention to continue the preëxisting right of the States to admit or exclude, for a limited period. The words are "the migration or importation of such persons as any of the States, now existing, shall think proper to admit shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year 1808." The whole object of the exception is to preserve the power to those States which might be disposed to exercise it; and its language seems to the court to convey this idea unequivocally. The possession of this particular power, then, during the time limited in the Constitution, cannot be admitted to prove the possession of any other similar power.

XXIII. It has been said that the act of August 7, 1789, acknowledges a concurrent power in the States to regulate the conduct of pilots; and hence is inferred an admission of their concurrent right with Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and amongst the States. But this inference is not, we

think, justified by the fact. Although Congress cannot enable a State to legislate, Congress may adopt the provisions of a State on any subject. When the government of the Union was brought into existence, it found a system for the regulation of its pilots in full force in every State. The act which has been mentioned adopts this system, and gives it the same validity as if its provisions had been specially made by Congress. But the act, it may be said, is prospective also; and the adoption of laws to be made in the future presupposes the right in the maker to legislate on the subject. The act unquestionably manifests an intention to leave this subject entirely to the States, until Congress should think proper to interpose; but the very enactment of such a law indicates an opinion that it was necessary,—that the existing system would not be applicable to the new state of things, unless expressly applied to it by Congress. But this section is confined to pilots within the “bays, inlets, rivers, harbours, and ports of the United States,” which are, of course, in whole or in part, also within the limits of some particular State. The acknowledged power of a State to regulate its police, its domestic trade, and to govern its own citizens, may enable it to legislate on this subject, to a considerable extent; and the adoption of its system by Congress, and the application of it to the whole subject of commerce, does not seem to the court to imply a right in the States so as to apply it of their own authority. But the adoption of the State system, being temporary, being only “until further legislative provision shall be made by Congress,” shows conclusively an opinion that Congress could control the whole subject,

and might adopt the system of the States, or provide one of its own.

XXIV. A State, it is said, or even a private citizen, may construct lighthouses. But gentlemen must be aware that if this proves a power in a State 5 to regulate commerce, it proves that the same power is in the citizen. States, or individuals who own lands, may, if not forbidden by law, erect on those lands what buildings they please; but this power is entirely distinct from that of regulating commerce, 10 and may, we presume, be restrained, if exercised so as to produce a public mischief.

XXV. These acts were cited at the bar for the purpose of showing an opinion in Congress that the States possess, concurrently with the legislature of 15 the Union, the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the States. Upon reviewing them we think they do not establish the proposition they were intended to prove. They show the opinion that the States retain powers enabling 20 them to pass the laws to which allusion has been made, not that those laws proceed from the particular power which has been delegated to Congress.

XXVI. It has been contended by the counsel for the appellant that, as the word "to regulate" implies 25 in its nature full power over the thing to be regulated, it excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the same operation on the same thing. That regulation is designed for the entire result, applying to those parts which remain as they 30 were, as well as to those which are altered. It produces a uniform whole, which is as much disturbed and deranged by changing what the regulating power

designs to leave untouched as that on which it has operated. There is great force in this argument, and the Court is not satisfied that it has been refuted.

XXVII. Since, however, in exercising the power of regulating their own purely internal affairs, whether 5 of trading or police, the States may sometimes enact laws the validity of which depends on their interfering with, and being contrary to, an act of Congress passed in pursuance of the Constitution, the Court will enter upon the inquiry whether the laws of New 10 York, as expounded by the highest tribunal of that State, have, in their application to this case, come into collision with an act of Congress, and deprived a citizen of a right to which that act entitles him. Should this collision exist, it will be immaterial 15 whether those laws were passed in virtue of a concurrent power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States" or in virtue of a power to regulate their domestic trade and police. In one case and the other, the acts of New York 20 must yield to the law of Congress; and the decision sustaining the privilege they confer against a right given by a law of the Union must be erroneous.

XXVIII. This opinion has been frequently expressed in this court, and is founded as well on the 25 nature of the government as on the words of the Constitution. In argument, however, it has been contended that if a law passed by a State in the exercise of its acknowledged sovereignty comes into conflict with a law passed by Congress in pursuance of the 30 Constitution, they affect the subject, and each other, like equal opposing powers. But the framers of our Constitution foresaw this state of things, and

provided for it by declaring the supremacy, not only of itself, but of the laws made in pursuance of it. The nullity of any act inconsistent with the Constitution is produced by the declaration that the Constitution is the supreme law. The appropriate application of that part of the clause which confers the same supremacy on laws and treaties is to such acts of the State legislatures as do not transcend their powers, but, though enacted in the execution of acknowledged State powers, interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress made in pursuance of the Constitution, or some treaty made under the authority of the United States. In every such case the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it. 5 10 15

XXIX. In pursuing this inquiry at the bar it has been said that the Constitution does not confer the right of intercourse between State and State. That right derives its authority from those laws whose authority is acknowledged by civilized man throughout the world. This is true. The Constitution found it an existing right, and gave to Congress the power to regulate it. In the exercise of this power Congress has passed "an act for enrolling or licensing ships or vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries, and for regulating the same." The counsel for the respondent contend that this act does not give the right to sail from port to port, but confines itself to regulating a preëxisting right, so far only as to confer certain privileges on enrolled and licensed vessels in its exercise. It will at once occur that, when a legislature attaches certain privileges 20 25 30

and exemptions to the exercise of a right over which its control is absolute, the law must imply a power to exercise the right. The privileges are gone, if the right itself be annihilated. It would be contrary to all reason, and to the course of human affairs, to say 5 that a State is unable to strip a vessel of the particular privileges attendant on the exercise of a right, and yet may annul the right itself,—that the State of New York cannot prevent an enrolled and licensed vessel proceeding from Elizabethtown, in New Jersey, 10 to New York from enjoying in her course, and on her entrance into port, all the privileges conferred by the act of Congress, but can shut her up in her own port, and prohibit altogether her entering the waters and ports of another State. To the Court it seems 15 very clear that the whole act on the subject of the coasting trade, according to those principles which govern the construction of statutes, implies unequivocally an authority to licensed vessels to carry on the coasting trade. 20

XXX. But we will proceed briefly to notice those sections which bear more directly on the subject. The first section declares that vessels enrolled by virtue of a previous law, and certain other vessels, enrolled as described in the act, and having a license 25 in force, as is by the act required, “and no others, shall be deemed ships or vessels of the United States, entitled to the privileges of ships or vessels employed in the coasting trade.” This section seems to the Court to sustain a positive enactment that the vessels 30 it describes shall be entitled to the privileges of ships or vessels employed in the coasting trade. These privileges cannot be separated from the trade, and

cannot be enjoyed unless the trade may be prosecuted. The grant of the privilege is an idle, empty form, conveying nothing, unless it conveys the right to which the privilege is attached, and in the exercise of which its whole value consists. To construe these 5 words otherwise than as entitling the ships or vessels described to carry on the coasting trade would be, we think, to disregard the apparent intent of the act.

XXXI. The fourth section directs the proper officer to grant to a vessel qualified to receive it "a 10 license for carrying on the coasting trade," and prescribes its form. After reciting the compliance of the applicant with the previous requisites of the law, the operative words of the instrument are, "license is hereby granted for the said steamboat 15 *Bellona*, to be employed for carrying on the coasting trade for one year from the date hereof, and no longer." These are not the words of the officer; they are the words of the legislature, and convey as explicitly the authority the act intended to give, 20 and operate as effectually, as if they had been inserted in any other part of the act than in the license itself. The word "license" means permission or authority; and a license to do any particular thing is a permission or authority to do that thing, and, if granted by 25 a person having power to grant it, transfers to the grantee the right to do whatever it purports to authorize. It certainly transfers to him all the right which the grantor can transfer to do what is within the terms of the license. Would the validity or effect 30 of such an instrument be questioned by the respondent, if issued by persons claiming regularly under the laws of New York? The license must be under-

stood to be what it purports to be, a legislative authority to the steamboat *Bellona* "to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade for one year from this date."

XXXII. It has been denied that these words 5 authorize a voyage from New Jersey to New York. It is true that no ports are specified; but it is equally true that the words used are perfectly intelligible, and do confer such authority as unquestionably as if the ports had been mentioned. The coasting trade 10 is a term well understood. The law has defined it; and all know its meaning perfectly. The act describes, with great minuteness, the various operations of a vessel engaged in it; and it cannot, we think, be doubted, that a voyage from New Jersey to New 15 York is one of those operations.

XXXIII. Notwithstanding the decided language of the license, it has also been maintained that it gives no right to trade, and that its sole purpose is to confer the American character. The answer given 20 to this argument, that the American character is conferred by the enrolment, and not by the license is, we think, founded too clearly in the words of the law to require the support of any additional observations. The enrolment of vessels designed for the coasting 25 trade corresponds precisely with the registration of vessels designed for the foreign trade, and requires every circumstance which can constitute the American character. The license can be granted only to vessels already enrolled, if they be of the burden of twenty 30 tons and upwards; and requires no circumstance essential to the American character. The object of the license, then, cannot be to ascertain the character

of the vessel, but to do what it professes to do — that is, to give permission to a vessel, already proved by her enrolment to be an American, to carry on the coasting trade.

XXXIV. But, if the license be a permit to carry 5
on the coasting trade, the respondent denies that these boats are engaged in that trade, or that the decree under consideration has restrained them from prosecuting it. The boats of the appellant were, we are told, employed in the transportation of passen- 10
gers; and this is no part of that commerce which Congress may regulate. If, as our whole course of legislation on this subject shows, the power of Congress has been universally understood in America to comprehend navigation, it is a very persuasive, if not 15
a conclusive argument to prove that the construction is correct; and if it be correct, no clear distinction is perceived between the power to regulate vessels employed in transporting men for hire, and property for hire. The subject is transferred to Congress; 20
and no exception to the grant can be admitted which is not proved by the words or the nature of the thing. A coasting vessel employed in the transportation of passengers is as much a portion of the American marine as one employed in the transporta- 25
tion of a cargo; and no reason is perceived why such vessel should be withdrawn from the regulating powers of the government which has been thought best fitted for the purpose generally. The provisions of the law respecting native seamen, and respecting 30
ownership, are as applicable to vessels carrying men as to vessels carrying manufactures; and no reason is perceived why the power over the subject should

not be placed in the same hands. The argument urged at the bar rests on the foundation that the power of Congress does not extend to navigation as a branch of commerce, and can only be applied to that subject incidentally and occasionally. But if ⁴ ₅ that foundation be removed, we must show some plain, intelligible distinction, supported by the Constitution or by reason, for discriminating between the power of Congress over vessels employed in navigating the same seas. We can perceive no such dis- ₁₀ tinction.

XXXV. If we refer to the Constitution, the inference to be drawn from it is rather against the distinction. The section which restrains Congress from prohibiting the migration or importation of such persons as any of the States may think proper to admit, until the year 1808, has always been considered as an exception from the power to regulate commerce, and certainly seems to class migration with importation. Migration applies as appropriately to voluntary as importation does to involuntary arrivals; and, so far as an exception from a power proves its existence, this section proves that the power to regulate commerce applies equally to the regulation of vessels employed in transporting men who pass from place ₂₅ to place voluntarily and to those who pass involuntarily. If the power reside in Congress as a portion of the general grant to regulate commerce, then acts applying that power to vessels generally must be construed as comprehending all vessels. If none appear ₃₀ to be excluded by the language of the act, none can be excluded by construction. Vessels have always been employed to a greater or less extent in the

transportation of passengers, and have never been supposed to be on that account withdrawn from the control or protection of Congress. Packets which ply along the coast, as well as those which make voyages between Europe and America, consider the transportation of passengers as an important part of their business. Yet it has never been suspected that the general laws of navigation did not apply to them. The duty act, sections twenty-three and forty-six, contains provisions respecting passengers, and shows that vessels which transport them have the same rights and must perform the same duties with other vessels. They are governed by the general laws of navigation.

XXXVI. In the progress of things this seems to have grown into a particular employment, and to have attracted the particular attention of government. Congress was no longer satisfied with comprehending vessels engaged specially in this business within those provisions which were intended for vessels generally; and, on the 2d of March, 1819, passed "an act regulating passenger ships and vessels." This wise and humane law provides for the safety and comfort of passengers, and for the communication of everything concerning them which may interest the government to the department of State, but makes no provision concerning the entry of the vessel, or her conduct in the waters of the United States. This, we think, shows conclusively the sense of Congress (if, indeed, any evidence to that point could be required) that the preëxisting regulations comprehended passenger ships among others; and in prescribing the same duties the legislature must have considered them as possessing the same rights.

XXXVII. If, then, it were even true that the *Bellona* and *Stoudinger* were employed exclusively in the conveyance of passengers between New York and New Jersey, it would not follow that this occupation did not constitute a part of the coasting trade of 5 the United States, and was not protected by the license annexed to the answer. But we cannot perceive how the occupation of these vessels can be drawn into question in the case before the Court. The laws of New York which grant the exclusive 10 privilege set up by the respondent take no notice of the employment of vessels, and relate only to the principle by which they are propelled. Those laws do not inquire whether vessels are engaged in transporting men or merchandise, but whether they are 15 moved by steam or wind. If by the former, the waters of New York are closed against them, though their cargoes be dutiable goods, which the laws of the United States permit them to enter and deliver in New York. If by the latter, those waters are free 20 to them, though they should carry passengers only. In conformity with the law is the bill of the plaintiff in the State Court. The bill does not complain that the *Bellona* and the *Stoudinger* carry passengers, but that they are moved by steam. This is the 25 injury of which he complains, and is the sole injury against the continuance of which he asks relief. The bill does not even allege, specially, that those vessels were employed in the transportation of passengers, but says, generally, that they were employed 30 "in the transportation of passengers, or otherwise." The answer avers only that they were employed in the coasting trade, and insists on the right to carry

on any trade authorized by the license. No testimony is taken, and the writ of injunction and decree restrain the licensed vessels, not from carrying passengers, but from being moved through the waters of New York by steam, for any purpose whatever. 5

XXXVIII. The questions, then, whether the conveyance of passengers be a part of the coasting trade, and whether a vessel can be protected in that occupation by a coasting license, are not, and cannot be, raised in this case. The real and sole question seems 10 to be whether a steam machine, in actual use, deprives the vessel of the privileges conferred by a license. In considering this question the first idea which presents itself is that the laws of Congress for the regulation of commerce do not look to the prin- 15 ciple by which vessels are moved. That subject is left entirely to individual discretion; and in that vast and complex system of legislative enactment concerning it, which embraces everything which the legislature thought it necessary to notice, there is not, 20 we believe, one word respecting the peculiar principle by which vessels are propelled through the water, except what may be found in a single act granting a peculiar privilege to steamboats. With this exception, every act, either prescribing duties, or granting 25 privileges, applies to every vessel, whether navigated by the instrumentality of wind or fire, of sails or machinery. The whole weight of proof, then, is thrown upon him who would introduce a distinction to which the words of the law give no countenance. 30

XXXIX. If a real difference could be admitted to exist between vessels carrying passengers and others, it has already been observed that there is no fact in

this case which can bring up that question. And, if the occupation of steamboats be a matter of such general notoriety that the Court may be presumed to know it, although not specially informed by the record, then we deny that the transportation of passengers is their exclusive occupation. It is a matter of general history that in our Western waters their principal employment is the transportation of merchandise; and all know that in the waters of the Atlantic they are frequently so employed. But all inquiry into this subject seems to the court to be put completely at rest by the act already mentioned, entitled "an act for the enrolling and licensing of steamboats." This act authorizes a steamboat employed, or intended to be employed, only in a river or bay of the United States, owned wholly or in part by an alien, resident within the United States, to be enrolled and licensed as if the same belonged to a citizen of the United States.

XL. This act demonstrates the opinion of Congress that steamboats may be enrolled and licensed, in common with vessels using sails. They are, of course, entitled to the same privileges, and can no more be restrained from navigating waters and entering ports which are free to such vessels than if they were wafted on their voyage by the winds, instead of being propelled by the agency of fire. The one element may be as legitimately used as the other for every commercial purpose authorized by the laws of the Union; and the act of a State inhibiting the use of either to any vessel having a license under the act of Congress comes, we think, in direct collision with that act.

XLI. As this decides the cause, it is unnecessary to enter into an examination of that part of the Constitution which empowers Congress to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.

XLII. The Court is aware that, in stating the strain of reasoning by which we have been conducted to this result, much time has been consumed in the attempt to demonstrate propositions which may have been thought axioms. It is felt that the tediousness inseparable from the endeavour to prove that which is already clear is imputable to a considerable part of this opinion. But it was unavoidable. The conclusion to which we have come depends on a chain of principles which it was necessary to preserve unbroken; and although some of them were thought nearly self-evident, the magnitude of the question, the weight of character belonging to those from whose judgment we dissent, and the argument at the bar, demanded that we should assume nothing.

XLIII. Powerful and ingenious minds, taking as postulates that the powers expressly granted to the government of the Union are to be contracted by construction into the narrowest possible compass, and that the original powers of the States are retained, if any possible construction will retain them, may, by a course of well digested, but refined and metaphysical reasoning, founded on these premises, explain away the Constitution of our country, and leave it, a magnificent structure, indeed, to look at, but totally unfit for use. They may so entangle and perplex the understanding as to obscure principles which were before thought quite plain, and induce doubts where, if the mind were to pursue its own

course, none would be perceived. In such a case, it is peculiarly necessary to recur to safe and fundamental principles to sustain those principles, and, when sustained, to make them the tests of the argument to be examined.

5

[Mr. Justice JOHNSON concurred in the judgment of the court, in a separate opinion. *Judgment reversed.*]

GENERAL INDEX

(References to citations and quotations are in *italics*)

A

- Abruptness, produced by asyndeton, 16; produced by many short sentences, 21; in measure, 223.
- abstract, and concrete, 130, 140, 149, 189, 213.
- accent determines English rhythm, 223.
- accumulation, never equivalent to composition, 7, 44, 46, 74, 104, 114, 122, 164, 175, 179.
- action, in narrative and description, 130, 172-173; must be uninterrupted, 134, 150, 160-162, 173; antecedent, 134, 146, 152, 153-157, 308; and reaction, 136; expressing character, 140; unity of, 145-148, 306; coherence of, 149-162, 308; the mode of narration, 150, 307; two modes of, drama and story, 151-153, 307-308.
- ADDISON, *The Spectator*, 219-220, 301.
- ad hominem*, argument, 99.
- adjectives, in description, not all sufficient, 181.
- ad terrorem*, argument, 99.
- adventure, characteristic of romance, 139, 165-166.
- a fortiori*, argument, 84.
- agreement, Mill's Canon of, 78; and difference (joint method), 79.
- ALBALAT, ANTOINE, *L'Art d'Écrire*, 249, 336, 344, 353; *la Formation du Style par l'Assimilation des Auteurs*, 242, 351, 362.
- ALDEN, R. M., *The Art of Debate*, 281, 290.
- alliteration, 223, 228-230, 358-362.
- allusion, the method of using history in description, 177; a habit of style, 209-210.
- analogy, argument, 84-85, 281-289.
- analysis, for exposition, in reading, 47; of the rough draught, by paragraphs, 53-54; by the expository plan, 55-56; for argument, argumentative plan, 64-74; destructive (*see* refutation); *a priori*, 104-109, 291; *a posteriori*, 109-114, 280, 292; working plan, 114-115.
- and which*, 251.
- antecedent action, 134, 146, 152, 153-157, 307-308.
- antecedent probability, 76.
- a pari*, argument, 84.
- a posteriori*, argument, 75; analysis, 109-114, 292.
- appeal, to feeling, 61-63, 116-117, 124; choice of words for (*see* force).
- appreciation, of literature, heightened by composition, 136-137, 202.
- a priori*, argument, 74-75; analysis, 104-109, 291.
- aptness, of diction, 205, 208 (*see* elegance).
- argument, 64-125 (*see* deduction, induction, antecedent probability, syllogism, and other sub-headings, as in Contents).
- argumentative plan, 64-74, 275-279.
- ARISTOTLE, *Rhetoric*, 77-78, 86, 115-116, 125, 247, 254-255, 282-284, 286-287, 289-291, 293, 298, 344, 354-355; *Poetics*, 138, 162, 169, 242, 300-304, 306-308.
- ARNOLD, MATTHEW, *The Literary Influence of Academies (Essays in Criticism, 1st Series)*, 33, 35, 349; *Sweetness and Light (Culture and Anarchy)*, 267.

art, for art's sake, 199.
 artificiality, from thinking too much of the process, 23, 147, 220, 230.
 artistic, form or structure (*see* literary).
 assent, the object of persuasion, 2, 60.
 asyndeton, 16, 247.
 attention, holding, 62.
 audience, determines exposition, 50; addressing individuals, 62.
 AUSTEN, JANE, *Emma*, 145; *Pride and Prejudice*, 163.
 authority, in testimony, 112; in usage, 195-196, 208.
 autobiography, form of, for unity, 147-148.

B

BACON, *Essays*, 7, 17, 130-131.
 BAIN, ALEXANDER, *Composition and Rhetoric* (Appleton's 1 vol. ed.), 284-285, 287, 290, 293.
 BAKER, GEORGE P., *Principles of Argumentation, Specimens of Argumentation*, 69, 281.
 balance, in detail, 18, 25, 34-36, 223, 225, 255-256, 356-358; of elegance and force in classic prose, 215-221.
 barbarism, 202-204, 349.
 begging the question, 95.
Beowulf, 138.
 beside the point, arguing, 99.
Bible, The, Numbers, 255, 356; *Job*, 130; *Psalms*, 224, 256; *Proverbs*, 255; *Habakkuk*, 224-225; *Haggai*, 224.
 bombast, 206, 210-211, 223.
 BRÉAL, MICHEL, *Essai de Sémantique*, 348.
 BREWSTER, W. T., *Studies in Structure and Style*, 266, 307, 348, 351, 359; *Specimens of Narration*, 310.
 BRONTË, CHARLOTTE, *Villette*, 362.
 BROOKINGS AND RINGWALT, *Briefs for Debate*, 281.
 BROWNE, SIR THOMAS, *Religio Medici*, 19, 30; *Urn Burial*, 226-227, 358-359.
 BRUNETIÈRE, FERDINAND, *Littérature Contemporaine*, 282, 289, 350; *Le Roman Naturaliste*, 310, 336.

BUCK, GERTRUDE, *Figures of Rhetoric: a Psychological Study*, 353.
 BUNYAN, JOHN, *Pilgrim's Progress*, 130.
 burden of proof, 100-101, 290.
 BURKE, EDMUND, *Conciliation with America*, 13, 32, 101; *The Middlesex Election*, 18; *The Revolution in France*, 22, 29, 30, 35; *The Present Discontents*, 29; *To the Electors of Bristol*, 102-103.
 BURROUGHS, JOHN, *An Idyll of the Honey-Bee*, 301-302.
 BUTCHER, S. H., edition of *Aristotle's Poetics*, 306-307.
 BUTLER, BISHOP, *The Analogy of Religion*, 84, 85, 87.

C

Cadence, 223, 354-355 (*see* rhythm).
 caesura, variety in placing, 225-227, 355-356.
 CAMPBELL, THOMAS, *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, 348.
 CANBY, H. S., *The Short-Story*, 311.
 Canons, Mill's, of induction, 78-81, 114, 286-287.
 CARPENTER, G. R., and FLETCHER, J. B., *Theme-Writing*, 274, 286, 303.
 catalogue (*see* accumulation).
 catastrophe, or conclusion, in drama and story, 152-153.
 cause, proof of (*see* Canons).
 CELLINI, BENVENUTO, *Autobiography*, 199-200.
 certitude, as an object of persuasion, 92-93.
 character (in narration), 139-145; creation, 139-140, 303; suggested, not summarized, 130—in the concrete, 140, 177—by reaction of character on character, 141; confusion of characters, 141, 305; dominance of one (unity), 141-142; development (coherence as consistency), 143-144, 304; dialogue, 134, 140-141, 144-145; predominance of interest in, marks realism, 163.
 characteristic detail, in description, 176-177, 344.

- CHAUCER, *The Pardoner's Tale*, 153, 169; *The Prologue*, 344.
- chiasmus, 35.
- chivalry, romance the literary expression of, 168.
- chronology, order of, unprofitable for exposition, 50.
- CICERO, *de Oratore*, 105, 116, 223, 280-281, 283-286, 290-291, 293, 298, 355; *Orator*, 298.
- circumstantial evidence, 82-83, 287.
- citation and quotation in exposition, 45.
- classic quality of style, 215-221.
- classical rhetoric (*see* rhetoric).
- classical rhythms, and English, 223.
- clause, or sentence? 21; as a unit of rhythm, 223.
- climax, 9; in a paragraph, 18; in a sentence, 32-33, 255; in narration, 141, 143-144, 148-150; of story and of drama compared, 151-153, 306-308.
- coherence, 9; dependent on paragraph emphasis, 19; of a paragraph, 13-17; of a sentence, 26-28, 30, 251-254; in exposition, 52; in persuasion, 122-124; in literary composition (general statement), 133-135; in narration, of character, 143-144, of plot, 149-162; mode of drama and mode of story, 151-153, 307-308; antecedent action, dialogue and description woven in, 153-162, 173; in description, 180-186; avoidance of explanatory interpolations, 180-182, 184, 302, 338; plan, 182-183; narrative method, 183-184; dialogue, 185; dramatic method "by effects," 185-186.
- coining, of words, 203-204.
- COLERIDGE, *The Ancient Mariner*, 133, 153, 185, 309.
- colour, in narration and description, 130.
- commonplace, predilection of realism for the, 164; style demands escape from, 201, 206, 353.
- "commonplaces" of persuasion, 283-284.
- complication and solution, in drama and story, 307.
- composition, kinds of, 1, 2, 129; forms of (*see* literary forms).
- composure, of style, 217, 219 (*see* elegance).
- conception, unity of, 130, 131-132, 163-164, 174-175, 189; determines diction, 209.
- conclusion, the goal and measure of composition, 10; in exposition, 52; in argument is a proposition, 65; involves appeal to feeling in the peroration, 117; in narration, 131, 136, 141, 148; in drama and in story, 152-153, 306-308.
- concomitant variations, Mill's Canon of, 80.
- concrete, the mode of literary expression, 130, 299, 300, 344; character expressed in, 140; dialogue, 144, 146; story must culminate in, 149; thought and emotion suggested by, 160-162; words, force of, 182, 189, 213, 215, 353.
- connotation, 154, 181, 189, 198, 208-209, 213, 222, 225-226.
- conservative tendency in usage, 195-196, 197, 209.
- consistency, necessary in testimony, 111; of character, in narration, 143-144, 304; of plot, in narration, 150, 151.
- contrast, as a means of paragraph development, 13, 244-245; in balanced sentences, 35; in general a means of emphasis, 136.
- conventionality, of diction, 206, 211, 215, 232, 244, 253.
- conversation (*see* dialogue).
- conviction and persuasion, 64.
- COOK, ALBERT S., *edition of Newman's "Poetry,"* 266, 304.
- coördination and subordination, in the paragraph, 21; in sentences, 25, 26, 251-252.
- COPE, E. M., *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, 280, 282, 283, 284, 286, 289, 290, 291, 293.
- correlatives, 252; in a periodic sentence, 29, 30.
- CRABBE, GEORGE, *The Borough*, 322-324.

creation, of character, 139-140; impulse to, 200.
 crisis (see climax, issue, situation).
 criticism, value of composition in improving, 136, 202; suggestions for the writing of, 273-274 (see review); suggestions for the criticism of daily themes, 334.
 cross-examination, 292.
 culmination, 151, 152 (see climax, conclusion).

D

Daily themes, 332, 335.
 DANTE, *Inferno*.
 DAUDET, ALPHONSE, *Trente ans de Paris*.
 debate, division among three speakers, 117-120, 293-298; rebuttal (see refutation), 105-109, 114-115, 117-118, 119-120.
 definition, 43, 44, 266-267, 291-292, 293.
 DEFOE, *Robinson Crusoe*, 172, 307.
 deliberative oratory, 125-126.
 demonstration, not usually attainable, 86, 88-89, 289.
 denotation, and connotation, 198, 208-209.
 DE QUINCEY, THOMAS, *The English Mail-Coach*, 15, 17, 29, 30; *Levana and Our Ladies of Sorrow*, 228-229; *Pope*, 242; *Rhetoric*, 286; *Conversation*, 302.
 description, 171-174, 332-345 (see sub-headings in Contents).
 details, and the whole, in logical composition, 45-46, 115-124; in literary composition, 131-132; in description, 174-180, 337; details for themselves, as salient, characteristic, or picturesque, 175-178.
 development, of character, 143, 162, 304; of plot, 149-153, 304.
 dialect, to express local or personal peculiarity, 140-141, 304.
 dialogue, 134, 140-141, 144-145, 146, 157-160, 185, 304.
 DICKENS, *David Copperfield*, 141, 145, 147, 305; *The Old Curiosity Shop*, 224; *A Tale of Two Cities*, 256.

diction (Part II), 193-232, 346-362.
 dictionaries, as records of usage, 194-196.
 difference, Mill's Canon of, 79.
 dilemma, 102-103, 290.
 directness (see force), natural and acquired, 231-232.
 division, for exposition, 40-42, 266; for three speakers in debate, 117-120, 293-298.
 drama, mode of, and mode of story, 151-153, 307-308; Greek, parts of, 152, 307-308.
 dramatic method ("by effects") in description, 185-186.
 dramatic reverse, 152, 307-308.
 dramatic unities, 147, 169.

E

EARLE, JOHN, *English Prose*, 349.
 EDWARDS, GEORGE WHARTON, *Thumbnail Sketches*, 190.
 effects, description by, 185-186.
 EGGER, E., *Histoire de la Critique chez les Grecs*, 306.
 eighteenth century, prose of the, 211, 215.
 elegance, 207-212; as choiceness, 208; as reserve, 209-210; preciosity, pedantry, and bombast, 210-211; stress on elegance in manuals of rhetoric, 211; stress in the eighteenth century, 211-212; corrected by force, 215-221.
 ELIOT, GEORGE, *Middlemarch*, 164, 304, 305; *Adam Bede*, 338.
 ellipsis, undue, 27.
 EMERSON, R. W., *Intellect*, 20.
 emotion (see feeling).
 emphasis, general, in logical composition, 9, 10; of a paragraph, position, 17, 121, 246, proportion, 18, 21, 120-121, 246-247, in relation to the coherence of the whole, 19, 246; of a sentence, 28-36, in relation to the coherence of the paragraph, 32, 36, 250-251, at the beginning, 33-34, after a pause, 34, 121; in argument, 120-121; general, in literary composition, 136; in narration, one main

- character, 141-142, dominance of climax, 148-150, 306-307, subordination of antecedent action, dialogue, and description, 153-162, 173; in description, 174-175.
- energizing knowledge, the office of persuasion, 40.
- enthymeme, 77, 86.
- epic, 138, 163-165, 302, 303, 304-305.
- epigram, in balanced sentences, 35, 256.
- ERSKINE, LORD, *Defence of Lord George Gordon*, 292.
- essay, the, as a literary form, 57-58, 129, 300.
- essays, directions for (*see* themes).
- etymology, suggestion of, 209.
- euphony, 222-223, 354.
- evidence, of cause, 79-82; circumstantial, 82-83, 287; analyzed, 95-98, 109-114, 280, 292; corroboration sought, 106, 280; testimony as to fact, 111-113, 280.
- example, as a means of exposition, 13, 38, 244.
- exclusion, logical, 101-102, 290-291.
- exordium, 116.
- expert testimony, 112.
- explanation and suggestion, 129, 131, 149 (*see* exposition); to be compressed in literary composition, 134, 140, 145, 149, 154-155, 160, 177, 180-181, 183.
- explicit reference, 9, 13, 16, 122.
- exposition, 37-59, 257-274 (for sub-headings *see* Contents).
- "expository plan," 55-56.
- expression, and repression, 187-188, 209-211 (*see* elegance); and idea, 205; daily themes an exercise in, 335.
- extensions, of the meaning of words, 195, 205.
- F
- Fable, Aristotle's distinction between complicated and simple, 162, 169, 304, 310.
- fact, and inference, 45, 109-114, 292; testimony as to, 111-113; and fiction, in narration, 142, 163-165, 303-304.
- fall, a stage of Greek tragedy, 152-153.
- fallacies, 96-100; *petitio principii*, 95; *non sequitur*, 96; *non causa pro causa*, 96; *post hoc*, 97; *ignoratio elenchi*, 99; *argumentum ad hominem*, 99, 290; *ad terrorem*, 99; of objections, 99.
- familiar words, for force, 213
- feeling, appeal to, 61-63, 124, 284-286; and reason, not appealed to separately, 63; in the peroration, 117, 124; a measure of literary composition, 129-130; suggested, not summarized, or explained, 130, 140, 160-162; dominance of a single, 133; description by the feelings of the describer, 185-188; suggested by diction, 209 (*see* force), 212-215; reserve in expression of, 188, 209, 215, 218-219 (*see* elegance); rhythm as the expression of, 224.
- FIELDING, *Tom Jones*, 141, 163, 305.
- figures, 189, 214-215, 353.
- FLETCHER, J. B., and CARPENTER, G. R., *Theme-Writing*, 274, 286, 303.
- for, and therefore, in argumentative plan, 74.
- force, 212-215; and correctness, 194, 197; emotional directness, 213; concrete and specific, 213-214; figure, 214-215; corrected by elegance, 215-221; violence, 215, 218-219.
- foreign words, 349.
- forensic oratory, 125-126.
- forms, of composition (*see* literary forms).
- formulation, and impression, 133.
- FREYTAG, GUSTAV, *Die Technik des Dramas*, 307-308.
- FROMENTIN, EUGÈNE, *Une Année dans le Sahel*, 300-301, 336, 350; *Un Été dans le Sahara*, 336-337.
- G
- GARDINER, J. H., *The Forms of Prose Literature*, 242, 274.
- general terms, lack suggestiveness, 213-214.

generalization, an object of exposition, 37, 43-45; in argument, 74-75, 78-81 (Mill's Canons), 82, 98; for science and for art, 179.
 generosity, a motive of romance, 167.
 genius, and technical skill, 139-140, 201, 350-352.
 GENUNG, JOHN F., *The Working Principles of Rhetoric*, 344.
 gesture, in narration and description, 130; to express character, 140, 143; to forward plot, 154.
 GIBBON, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, 35.
 GILLESPIE, ELIZABETH D., *A Book of Remembrance*, 321-322.
 GOLDSMITH, *The Vicar of Wakefield*, 130, 176.
 gradation, artistic coherence, 134, 304; consistency in development of character, 143-144.
 grasp, the mastery aimed at in logical composition, in exposition, 40; in argument, 70-71, 105, 115, 122, 124.
 grouping, a process of exposition, 38, 44; of argument, 114, 122.

H

HALE, E. E., JR., *A Constructive Rhetoric*, 351.
 hanging participle, 251.
 HARDY, THOMAS, *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*, 178.
 harmony, of scene and emotion, 186-188; of diction, 222-232, 354-362; the constant quality of good style, 222; the connotation of sound, 222; euphony, 222-223, 354; rhythm, 223-227, 354-357; alliteration, 228-232, 357-362.
 HART, A. B., *Revised Suggestions on the Study of the History and Government of the United States*, 267.
 HAZLITT, WILLIAM, *Originality (Criticisms of Art)*, 350; *The Prose Style of Poets*, 355-356.
 HEARN, LAFCADIO, *Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan*, 177-178.
 heightening, of diction, 188, 208, 213-215 (see style, concrete, figure).

HENRY, M. A., *Cours Pratique et Raisonné de Style et de Composition*, 237, 319-320.
 HILL, A. S., *Principles of Rhetoric*, 348-349.
 "historical method," in argument, 292.
 history, argument from (analogy), 84-85; allusions to, in description, 177.
 Holy Grail, a typical romance, 168.
 homeliness, of style, 197, 220, 349.
 HOMER, *Iliad*, 138; *Odyssey*, 165, 168.
 horror, best suggested indirectly, 186.
 House-that-Jack-built sentence, 24.
 HUGO, *Les Misérables*, 182.
 HUXLEY, T. H., *The Physical Basis of Life*, 102, 287.
 hypotaxis, 253 (see sentence emphasis).
 hypotheses, forming of, 82, 289.

I

Idiom, 197, 349.
ignoratio elenchi, 99.
 illusion, artistic (verisimilitude), 143, 154.
 illustration, in exposition, 13, 38, 244; in persuasion, 62.
 images, mental, the object of description, 171; and visual representation, 173-174; concrete and specific suggest, 213-214; figures specify, 214-215.
 imagination, a measure in literary composition, 129, 164; over-stimulated by a habit of figure, 215.
 imitation, study of style by, 187-188, 202, 205-206, 217, 351.
 incident, in narration (see plot, situation).
 indentation, to mark paragraphs, 11.
 induction, in exposition, 52; in argument, 78-83, 87-88, 286-287.
 inevitable, a characteristic of literary coherence, 133-134, 151.
 inferences, and facts, 45, 109-111, 113-114; refutation of (fallacies), 96-100.
 interest, keeping the, in a story, 151.
 interpretation, as giving artistic unity, 131-132, 163.
 interruption, of movement, to be avoided, 134-135, 145, 150-151, 153-162, 173, 180-182, 184.

introduction, in argument, 73-74, 115-116, 118, 279, 293.
 "inversion for adjustment," 22.
 issue, meeting the, in argument, 70, 72, 105-109, 115-116; determines a story, 141-142, 143, 148-149.
 iteration, in paragraph development, 13; in definition, 44; in persuasion, 121, 123-124, 298.

J

JAMES, HENRY, *The Lesson of the Master*, 157-160; *Brooksmith*, 190; *The Art of Fiction*, 310.
 JAMES, WILLIAM, *The Will to Believe*, 93.
 JANVIER, THOMAS, *Colour Studies*, 190.
 JOHNSON, CHARLES F., *Elements of Literary Criticism*, 301, 303, 307.
 JOHNSON, DR. SAMUEL, *A Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland*, 212; *Life of Addison*, 212; *Letter to the Earl of Chesterfield*, 220-221.
 joint methods of agreement and difference, Mill's Canon of, 79.

K

KEATS, *Ode on a Grecian Urn*, 256.
 KER, W. P., *Epic and Romance*, 303, 310.
 KILLICK, A. H., *The Student's Handbook Synoptical and Explanatory of Mr. J. S. Mill's System of Logic*, 78, 79, 281, 286, 290.
 kinds of composition, 1, 2, 129-130.
 KIPLING, RUDYARD, 007, 171; *Little Tobrah*, 306; *Without Benefit of Clergy*, 309; *Georgie Porgie*, 309; *Dinah Shadd*, 309; *On Greenhow Hill*, 309; *The City of Dreadful Night*, 336; *Thrown Away*, 344.

L

LA FARGE, JOHN, *An Artist's Letters from Japan*, 184; *Considerations on Painting*, 301, 336, 350; *Ruskin, Art and Truth*, 301.
 LANDOR, WALTER SAVAGE, *The Penitameron*, 178, 303, 361-362.

language, and the artist, 198, 202-203.
 LAROUSSE, P., *Grand Dictionnaire Universel*, 306.
 LEGOUVE, *L'Art de la Lecture*, 284.
 LEMAITRE, JULES, *Impressions de Théâtre*, 337; *Les Contemporains*, 353.
 length of sentences, 19-22.
 LESSING, *Laokoon*, 307, 336.
 letters, 137, 207, 304.
 LEWIS, E. H., *A First Book in Writing English*, 244, 247.
 limiting, the theme in exposition, 45, 46; the issue in argument, 104-109; the characters in narration, 141-142; the time and place in narration, 143, 146-147, 152.
 literal translation, 346.
 literary composition, distinguished from logical, 129.
 literary forms, of exposition, 57-59; of persuasion, 125-126; of narration, 162-170; of description, 173, 190.
 literary quality, 200 (*see style*).
 literature, and other arts, appeal to feeling in, 130; subject-matter in, 131, 175, 198, 199, 200; and science, 163-164; measured by style, 198-200.
 "live questions," not to be settled by demonstration, 87, 91.
 "local colour," characteristic detail, in description, 176, 177, 301, 337.
 logical exclusion, 101-102, 290-291.
 logical progress, in a sentence, 32, 33; in exposition, 52; in argument, 117, 122-123; distinguished from literary, 1, 129, 133-135.
 logical relevancy (unity) and literary, 131.
 logical subordination (*see emphasis*), and literary, 136.
 longer clause after the shorter, for cadence, 223.

M

MACAULAY, Francis Bacon, 34; *History of England*, 35; *Lord Mahon's War of the Succession in Spain*, 244-245, 256; *Machiavelli*, 245.
 MCMASTER, JOHN BACH, *History of the People of the United States*, 331.

- "magnetism," in speaking, 62.
 mannerism, used to express character, 140, 145; half-developed style, 207.
 MARSHALL, JOHN, CHIEF JUSTICE, *Gibbons vs. Ogden* (Selection IV), 71-73, 243, 244, 245, 250, 251, 255, 290, 293, 402, 437; *Cherokees vs. the State of Georgia*, 293.
 marvellous, the pleasure of romance in, 164, 166.
 mass (*see* emphasis, proportion).
 MATHER, COTTON, *Magnalia Christi Americana*, 324-331, 349.
 MATTHEWS, BRANDER, *Vignettes of Manhattan*, 190; *Speech-making*, 284; *The Short-Story*, 304, 306, 307, 310-311; *The Study of Fiction*, 310; *Parts of Speech*, 348-349.
 MAUPASSANT, GUY DE, *Pierre et Jean*, 310, 352; *Lettres de Flaubert à George Sand*, 354.
 measure, 223, 354-355 (*see* rhythm).
 mechanism, in literary composition, should be simple and invisible, 134, 148, 154, 180-184.
 memory, descriptive appeal to, 172.
 MEREDITH, GEORGE, *Diana of the Crossways*, 160-162; *Vittoria*, 163, 342-344; *The Ordeal of Richard Feverel*, 165, 344; *Lord Ormont and his Aminta*, 218-219.
 metaphor, 215.
 metonymy, 215.
 metre, out of place in prose, 224 (*see* rhythm).
 MEYNELL, ALICE, *Symmetry and Incident* (Selection II), 53-54, 55-56, 242, 246, 247, 250, 256, 349, 359, 372-383.
 MILL, JOHN STUART, *Logic*, 78-81, 87, 281, 286, 287, 289, 290, 292, 293.
 Mill's Canons of induction, 78-81.
 mode, of drama and of story, 131-133.
 modifiers, faulty placing, 27-28; put first in periodic sentence, 28.
 monotony, an affair of sentence-length, 22, 250; of measures, 223, 225, 354-356.
 MONTAGUE, EARL, *Defence of the Court of the Lord High Steward*, 98.
 mood, unity of, in artistic composition, 133, 146, 148, 155; expressed by the diction, 209 (*see* elegance).
 "Moral," of a story, 133, 149 (*see* climax, conclusion).
 MORE, SIR THOMAS, *Apology*, 357-358.
 movement, artistic coherence, 134-135; in narration, 149-162, 307-308; in story and in drama, 151-153; antecedent action should not delay, 154, 155-157; description should not delay, 160-162, 173; dialogue should forward, 157-160; in description, 180-182; in detail (*see* rhythm).
 music, and literature, appeal to feeling in, 130.
 mystery, the mood of romance, 166-167.
- ## N
- Narration, 138-170, 303-331 (*see* sub-headings in Contents).
 narrative poems, 153, 162.
 narrator, choice of a (for unity of plot), 147-148, 306.
 nationality in the conception of good style, 216.
 native words, for force, 213.
 nature, described through personal feeling, 186-188.
 NEWMAN, JOHN HENRY, CARDINAL, *Literature* (Selection III), 32, 35, 243, 246, 301, 350, 383-402; *A Grammar of Assent*, 81, 88, 93, 266, 280, 286, 289-290; *Poetry Considered with Reference to Aristotle's Poetics*, 350.
non causa pro causa, 96.
 non-restrictive clauses, 28.
non sequitur, 96.
 notes, taking, 44-50, 240; composing, 50-53, 240-241; analyzing, 53-56; palmed off for novels, 163-164.
 novel, defined, 162-163, 309-310; in its two moods, 138-139, 163, 310; epic, leading to realism, 138-139, 162-165; romance, 138-139, 165-169, 310.
 novelty, interest of, in literature, 176; in diction, 197, 204, 206.

O

- Objections, fallacy of, 99, 104, 120.
 obscurity, from surcharging, 203-204;
 from preciosity, 209-210.
 observation, for science and for art,
 179, 187.
 occasional speeches, 125.
 omission, in art, as the converse of
 selection, 131-132; as a means of
 conciseness, 134-135; as contribut-
 ing to movement, 134-135, 146-147,
 169-170, 180-182, 184; carried too
 far, 204.
 oratory, deliberative, forensic, occa-
 sional, 125 (*see* persuasion).
 order (*see* sequence, coherence).
organon, rhetoric as the, 273.
 originality, and eccentricity or novelty,
 202-204; in combinations of words,
 206-207, 350.
 ornament, extraneous, 231.

P

- Panegyric, 125.
 panoramas, in description, to be es-
 chewed, 180, 182, 342-344.
 parable, a method of literary interpre-
 tation, 130, 140, 166, 168.
 paragraph, defined, 10; subject stated,
 12, 243; short, incorporated or de-
 veloped, 11, 121, 124, 241; of transi-
 tion, example, illustration, 12; unity,
 tested by summary in a sentence,
 12; development, 13, 244-245; co-
 herence, 13-17; emphasis, 18, 21,
 246-247; in relation to the cohe-
 rence of the whole, 19, 246-247;
 number of sentences, 19-22; oral,
 121.
 parallel construction (*see* balance).
 parataxis, 253 (*see* coördination).
 particulars, demanding, in refutation,
 99-100, 120; analysis of evidence
 for, 111.
 PATER, W. H., *Imaginary Portraits*, 34;
 style, 200, 301, 351-352; *Marius the*
Epicurean, 209-210; *Greek Studies*,
 267, 348; *Miscellaneous Studies*, 336;
The Renaissance, 359-361.

- "pathetic fallacy," in description, 186-
 188, 209, 344.
 pause, in a sentence, throwing empha-
 sis on the preceding words, 34.
 PEACOCK, REGINALD, BISHOP, *The*
Repressor of Overmuch Blaming the
Clergy, 87.
 pedantry, false elegance, 202, 206, 210,
 211, 349.
 periodic sentence, 28-31, 254-255.
 permanence, a measure of classic style,
 216-217.
 peroration, 116-117, 124, 293.
 personality, as a means of persuasion,
 63; in selection, gives artistic unity,
 131, 163, 174-175; in expression,
 opportunity for, 137; personal feel-
 ing in description of nature, 186-
 188; in diction, is style, 198-207,
 230; and eccentricity or barbarism,
 202-204; and range of vocabulary,
 204-206; in combinations of words,
 206-207; daily themes cultivate ex-
 pression of, 332.
 persuasion, the proper field of rhetoric,
 1, 60, 283; energizes knowledge, 40,
 283; is personal, 60, 62, 63, 289; is
 the real object of conviction, 64;
 deals with enthymemes, not syllo-
 gisms, 78, 92, 94, 286, 289; *i.e.* with
 probabilities, 86-94; with certitudes,
 92, 94; of the pulpit, 93; exordium,
 116; peroration, 116-117, 293; liter-
 ary forms, 125; kinds, 125.
petitio principii, 95.
 PHILLIPS, STEPHEN, *Herod*, 301.
 phrase, borrowing, 45, 206 (*see* style);
 as a unit of rhythm, 223.
 phrase-hunting, 210, 220, 230-231.
 "picturesque" details, in description,
 178.
 PINCHOT, GIFFORD, *A Primer of For-*
estry, Part I (Selection I) (238, 246,
 247, 249, 250, 254, 255, 349), 363-
 372.
 place, of a story, limiting the, 146-147;
 unity of, 147.
 plan, by paragraphs, 53-54; "exposi-
 tory," 55-56; argumentative, 64-74,
 275-279; working plan, 49-50, 114-

115; for three speakers in debate, 117-120; in description, 182-342.
 plot, 145, 162, 304-318; unity, 145-148; emphasis, 148-149, 150; coherence, 149-162; mode of drama and mode of story, 151-153; predominance of interest in, makes romance, 163, 165, 303; marks off narration from description, 172-173.
 plots for stories, 318-331.
 POE, *The Fall of the House of Usher*, 133; *The Gold Bug*, 169; *Ligeia*, 169; *The Masque of the Red Death*, 306; *The Cask of Amontillado*, 306; *The Tell-Tale Heart*, 308-309; *The Philosophy of Composition*, 351.
 poems, narrative, 153, 162.
 poetry, the short-story approaches the artistic conciseness of, 169.
 point of view, in narration, of one main character, 141-142; in description, 175, 183.
post hoc, ergo propter hoc, 97, 290.
 preciosity, 209-210.
 precision, of diction, in argument, 95, 104-105; in literary composition, 205, 208, 351, 352.
 PRÉVOST, *Manon Lescaut*, 199.
 probability, degrees of, attainable in argument, 86-94.
 "progressive approach," a form of induction, 287.
 proof, tabulation of, 64-74; degree of, 86-94, 99, 107, 109; burden of, 100-101; preparation of, 104-114 (*see* argument, refutation).
 proportion, emphasis of space, 10, 18, 120-121.
 propositions, as a measure of progress, 1, 11, 129; as the subjects of short essays, 9; as the subjects of arguments, 65; statement of, for argument, 70, 104-105; as a measure of truth, 131.
 protagonist, in narration, 141-142.
 provincialism, in the conception of good style, 215-216.
 pulpit, as a place of persuasion, 61, 93, 125.
 purity, 196-198, 348-349.

Q

Question, putting, exposition, 46, 47.
 QUINTILIAN, *de Institutione Oratoria*, 241, 254, 255, 280, 284, 286-287, 289-291, 293, 349, 352-353.
 quotation and citation in exposition, 45.

R

Range, of suggestions in description, 174, 178; of vocabulary, 197, 204-206.
 reaction, variety to provide for, 136; of character on character, 141.
 READ, CARVETH, *Logic, Deductive and Inductive*, 80, 281, 286-290, 292-293.
 reading, for exposition, 46-50; for argument, 109-114; for style, 205-206.
 realism, as a mood of the novel, 163-165, 310.
 realization, of the image, for description, 175.
 realizing knowledge, the office of exposition, 40.
 recondite, style, 209-210.
 recurrences, of sound, 228-230, 358-362 (*see* rhythm, alliteration).
reductio ad absurdum, 103, 290.
 redundancy, 21, 247-249.
 reference, explicit, for connection, 9, 13, 16, 122; faulty, of pronouns, 27; books of, 47, 48.
 refutation, 94-104, 290; of premises, 94-96; of inferences: fallacies, 96-100, 290; burden of proof, 100-101, 290; methods, 101, 104, 290; rebuttal in debate, 117-120.
 relief, variety as a means of, 62, 124, 136.
 repetition, for explicit reference, 15, 250; and redundancy, 248-249.
 reports, as a form of exposition, 39, 40, 58.
 representation, and suggestion, 173-174, 357.
 research, for exposition, 46-50, 259-264, 267-271; for argument, 109-114.
 residues, Mill's Canon of, 80, 101.
 restrictive clauses, 28, 253-254.
 reverse, "dramatic," 152.

- review of a book, simple plan for, 239.
 revolutions, in plot, 162 (see "dramatic reverse").
 REYNOLDS, edition of *Stephen on Evidence*, 290, 292.
 rhetoric, defined, 1, 282; ancient, commensurate with persuasion, 2, 60; ancient, still valid in essentials, 60-61; manuals of, accused of laying too much stress on elegance, 211; and literature, study of, 274.
 "rhetorical" style, 232.
 rhythm, 223-227, 354-357.
 RINGWALT, R. C., *Modern American Oratory*, 281 (see Brookings).
 rise, the, a stage of a Greek tragedy, 152-153.
 ROBINSON, W. C., *Forensic Oratory*, 285-286, 289-291, 292-293.
 ROLAND, *The Song of*, 138.
 romance, 139, 163, 164, 169, 303, 310.
 rounding, a sentence, 223, 354-355 (see cadence, rhythm).
 rules, use of, in learning to write, 3.
 RUSKIN, JOHN, *The Stones of Venice*, 183, 359; *Modern Painters*, 186, 344.
- S
- ST. JOHN, JAMES, *Letters from France to a Gentleman in the South of Ireland*, 338-342.
 scene, of a story, limited, 146-147; unity of, 147; involved in the action, not explained, 154, 155, 157, 160-162; distinct enough for sympathetic realization, 176; described through personal feeling, 186-188.
 scenes, or situations, in narration, 149-150.
 scholarship, in diction, 197, 202-203, 204-206, 209-210.
 scientific interest, and literary interest, 163-164, 176.
 scientific, use of words, and literary, 198, 205, 208.
 SCOTT, F. N., *Paragraph Writing*, 243; *Composition Rhetoric*, 243 (with J. V. Denney); edition of *Spencer's Philosophy of Style*, 352.
 SCOTT, SIR WALTER, *Kenilworth*, 147, 309; *Ivanhoe*, 164, 342; *Guy Mannerling*, 166; *The Heart of Midlothian*, 305; *The Lady of the Lake*, 309.
 Selection, the method of art, 131-132, 300-301; in characterization, 140, 143; in plot, 146-147, 169; in description, 174-175; carried too far, 204; implies elegance of style, 208.
 senses, and intellect, appeal to, 130, 171-172.
 sentence, the subject of a short essay, 9; the subject of a paragraph, 11, 12; the smallest unity of composition, 193; unity, 23-25; coherence, 26-28; emphasis, 28-36; after a pause, 34; in relation to the coherence of the paragraph, 32, 36, 250-251; periodic, 28-31, 254-255; climax, 32, 33; balance, 34-36; measure, 223.
 sentences number of, i.e. long or short, 19-22, 247, 249 (see cadence, rhythm).
 sequence (see coherence, logical progress); of tenses, 252-253.
 setting (see description, narration).
 SHAKESPEARE, *Macbeth*, 130, 133, 152; *Hamlet*, 139; *King Lear*, 141, 185; *The Merchant of Venice*, 141, 145; *Twelfth Night*, 153.
 short-story, the, 144, 147, 150, 153, 169-170, 304, 310-311.
 SIDGWICK, ALFRED, *The Process of Argument*, 88, 286, 287, 289, 291-292.
 significance, the test of artistic relevance, 131, 133-134, 136, 140-141, 143, 146, 147, 150, 154, 165, 166; of incident, a mark of romance, 165-166.
 simile, 215.
 simplicity, of style, 205, 217, 220, 349, 362.
 simplification, of life, art is a, 131, 140, 143, 147, 152, 157, 169; of mechanism, 134, 147, 154, 180-182, 183, 338.
 sincerity, of style, 186-188, 230-232.
 situation, in narration, 143, 144, 148-150, 310.
 slang, 197, 218.
 smoothness, of movement, in detail, 21, 223; in general (see coherence, transitions).

- solution, in narration (*see* climax, conclusion).
- sound, suggestions of, a mainstay of description, 174, 190; connotations of, harmony by, 222; and sense, 222-223.
- speaking and writing, 60, 61.
- specific, force of the, 145, 182, 213-215, 344, 352-353.
- SPENCER, HERBERT, *Philosophy of Style*, 30, 255, 302, 352.
- statement, of the case (introduction) in argument, 115-116, 118; and suggestion, 129, 154, 155.
- STEEVENS, G. W., *With Kitchener to Khartum*, 182.
- STERNE, *The Sentimental Journey*, 133, 135, 172, 184, 199, 218.
- STEVENSON, ROBERT LOUIS, *Kidnapped*, 147; *David Balfour*, 147; *The Beach of Falesa*, 155-157; *A Gossip on Romance*, 165, 303, 310; *A Gossip on a Novel of Dumas's*, 310; *Travels with a Donkey in the Cévennes*, 171, 190, 338; *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*, 185; *A Humble Remonstrance*, 310; *Across the Plains*, 190; *The Wrecker*, 214; *Markheim*, 306; *Some Technical Elements of Style in Literature*, 228, 356-357; *The Sire de Malétroit's Door*, 304, 306; *Vailima Letters*, 307; *A College Magazine*, 351.
- stimuli, physical, used in narration and description to suggest thought and emotion, 160-162, 170, 179; to suggest mental images, 171-174.
- stories, plots for, 318-331.
- story, and drama, distinction of mode, 151-153, 307-308.
- strength, of style (*see* force).
- structure (*see* composition, forms).
- style, 198-232, 350-362 (*see* sub-headings in Contents).
- subject, of a paragraph, is a sentence, 11, 12; or matter, in literature and in the other arts, 131, 175, 198-199, 200; and style inseparable, 231.
- subordination (*see* emphasis).
- suggestion, the method of literary com-
position, 129, 133, 299, 300-301 (*see* concrete); and representation, 173-174, 180; range of, in description, 174, 178; of terror and horror, best indirect, 186; and denotation, in diction, 208, 213-214.
- summary, by paragraphs, 11, 53-54, 237-239; by "expository plan," 65-74; in conclusion of argument, 116; and suggestion, 130, 133, 149.
- surcharging, of words, leads to obscurity, 204; to fatigue, 215.
- surprise, in narration, 136, 151.
- suspense, in a paragraph, 17; in a sentence, 28-31; in persuasion, 123-124; in narration, 151, 307.
- SWINBURNE, *Atalanta in Calydon*, 199.
- syllogism, 77, 86, 96, 200.
- symbolism, 130, 140, 166, 168, 300.
- synonyms, 209.

T

- Tabulation, for exposition, 55-56; for argument, 64-74.
- taste, in diction, 197-198, 209, 219, 231 (*see* elegance).
- TAYLOR, JEREMY, BISHOP, *Holy Dying*, 214, 230.
- TENNYSON, ALFRED, *Mariana*, 344.
- terms, in argument, 95, 104-105; in narration and description, 145, 181, 188-190 (*see* abstract, concrete, and the whole of Part II).
- terror, best suggested indirectly, 133, 186.
- tertium quid*, 103.
- testimony, as to fact, 111-113, 292; expert, 112.
- THACKERAY, *Vanity Fair*, 139, 141, 150, 165; *Henry Esmond*, 148.
- theme, statement of, 10.
- themes, subjects and directions for, 235-239, 257-280, 299, 311-319, 332-336, 346-348.
- therefore* and *for* in argumentative plan, 74.
- thoughts, in story, expressed in the concrete, 160-162.
- time, limiting the, in narration, 143, 146-147; unity of, 147, 306, 308.

tone, unity of, 146, 148, 155.
 topics, insufficient to test the unity of a paragraph, 9.
 tragedy, Greek, parts of a, 152.
 transitions, in logical composition, 9, 12, 13-17, 22-23, 34, 36, 53, 118, 122-124; in literary composition, 134, 145, 153-162, 173, 180-182, 184.
 translation, of thought easy, of style almost impossible, 198; directions for, 346-348.
 trite, the, to be eschewed, 188, 206, 215, 349.
 truth, as an object of argument, 88-89, 92-93; to fact, in logical composition, 88, 92-93, 109-114; to personal conception, 131, 163-165, 187, 189, 300-301.
 U
 Underplot, 141.
 uniformity, of nature, a postulate of induction, 81; of usage, English temper against, 194-196.
 unities, the dramatic, 147, 169, 306.
 unity, logical, in general, 7; test of by summary in a sentence, 9; of a paragraph, 12; of a sentence, 23-25, 30, 253; regulated by the conclusion, 10, 52; artistic, in general, 130-133, 299; of conception, selection, or interpretation, 131-132, 163-164; of impression, 133, 146, 230; in narration, of character, 141-142; of plot, 145-148, 304-307; in the short-story, 169; in description, 174-175.
 unperiodic sentence, 31-33.
 usage, 193-198, 202-204, 208, 348-349.
 use, good (*see* usage).

V

Variations, concomitant, Mill's Canon of, 80.
 variety, in sentence length, 22, 144, 259; as a means of reclaiming attention, 62, 124; in general, as a means of emphasis, 136; in dialogue, 144-145; in measure, 223, 225-227, 354-358; as a mark distinguishing epic from drama, 302.
 verbs, in description, should bear their share, 145, 181, 183, 344.
 verisimilitude, 143, 147, 154, 300-301.
 VIRGIL, *Aeneid*, 168, 178.
 vivacity, or vividness, of style (*see* force).
 vocabulary, range of, 197, 204-206, 350-351; as the register of experience, 205.
 vulgarity, of style, 197, 206-208, 211.

W

WENDELL, BARRETT, *English Composition*, 246, 352.
 WHATELY, *Rhetoric*, 287.
 WILDE, OSCAR, *A Ballad of Reading Gaol*, 351-352.
 witnesses, comparative credibility of, 111-113.
 "word-painting," expresses a confusion of ideas, 173-174.
 words (*see* usage, style); sense of, 202, 205; coining of, 203.
 working, plan, 49-50, 114-115.
 WRIGHT, T. H., *Review of Spencer's Philosophy of Style*, 352.



